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Introduction
Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann
The rise of National Socialism in Germany and the resulting Holocaust
has proven to be one of the most engaging subjects of historical reßection. For the most part, scholars have focused on the more traditional
questions of Hitler, political culture, the place of ideology and antiSemitism, the strategy of dominating Europe, the Nazi movement, or
the functioning of the regime itself, especially its bureaucratic mechanisms. In more recent years, scholars in both Europe and the United
States have focused on Nazism's attitudes toward women and gender
and argued that they were second only to racism in structuring the new
German society and defining its enemies. These are of course important issues that require attention in order to explain the rise of German
fascism and its genocidal project. However, they will at best render
only partial explanations and possibly even distorted ones because they
lack, we think, an adequate appreciation of the structural-that is,
economic, dass, and power-dimensions that largely led to' the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the successful rise to power of the
Naziparty. lt is this area and approach that we are highlighting in this
volume. Rather than presenting the Weimar Republic as a failed democracy, ßawed in both its political culture and its democratic institutional tradition, and undermined by an economic collapse, the
emphasis here will be on seeing it as a developed capitalist society with
distinct structural deficiencies and contradictions that weakened it
from the outset.
There is, of course, a relatively small but important and growing
11
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number of scholars who are working in Marxist and/or other structural
traditions in both Europe and North America in an effort to better
understand the rise of German fascism, and we collected and introduced a number of their works in our 1983 volume Towards the
Holocaust: The Social and Economic C ollapse of the Weimar Republic.
Several of the principal contributors to that volume, such as Dietmar
Petzina, John Nagle, Reinhard Kühnl, Ulrike Hoerster-Phillips, and
Richard Geary, described "a republic fatally ßawed at the outset by a
failure to effect structural changes which would have secured a democratic order-{)f a republic that consequently was undermined because
the bourgeois elements which should have defended it would not do
so, and the working-class and minority group elements which tried to
defend it, could not do so. " 1
Previously and since the argument has been advanced by David
Abraham's important book, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic:
Political Economy and Crisis, which maintained that important segments of the economic and political elites of the Weimar period, in
their search to overcome their own structural and economic and political problems, passed political and economic power to individuals who
eventually helped doom the Weimar Republic by transferring power to
the Nazis. 2 When it was first published, this book occasioned great
controversy concerning both its thesis and its methodological scholarship. Abraham has admitted that in places the first edition contained
errors in footnoting, translating, and paraphrasing. While he has apologized for these, and has corrected them in the second edition, he has
also resolutely denied the accusations of fraud and fabrication.
The charges against Abraham, however, far transcend the alleged
carelessness of an individual. Certainly the allegations and controversy,
amounting virtually to a witch hunt, indicate that the very interpretation and approach utilized by Abraham touched some raw nerves
among historians. Without engaging in the minutiae of the controversy,
we think that its intensity and excess were motivated at least in part by
an attempt on the part of some scholars who have a stake in a different
picture of the German elite's relationship with the Nazis, to discredit a
historical approach that had the temerity to suggest that there might be
close structural links between German industrialists and Junkers and
the rise of fascism. With the question of these links made even more
urgent by recent signs of historical and political amnesia in Western
Europe, it is an opportune moment to introduce additional material,
interpretations, and authors that contribute to the further development
of Marxist and other structural perspectives, and thus to the debate.
Authors such as Kurt Gossweiler and Reinhard Kühnl, who either
enrich or relativize the Abraham thesis, have not previously appeared
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in English (with the exception of Kühnl's essay in our 1983 volume),
although their research and writing have been significant in Germany
for many years.
Tue apparent amnesia about fascism and World War II in Europe has
taken various forms, including the resurgency of right-wing apologists
for Nazism; a passion for Hitler memorabilia, including the forged
diaries purchased by Stern magazine; public apathy concerning unpunished war criminals; the controversial invitation by West German
Chancellor Helmuth Kohl to President Ronald Reagan to visit the
German military cemetery at Bitburg; the election of Kurt Waldheim
as president of Austria and his subsequent audience with the pope; and
perhaps most disturbingly, the tendency on the part of established and
recognized scholars to write about the period in ways that would have
been politically and morally unacceptable even several years ago.
In Germany today the actual scandal lies in playing down the Nazi
period rather than in its outright denial. Some, like Joachim Fest,
Hitler biographer, have attempted to incorporate Nazism into a universal notion of "totalitarianism." This is one side of a growing historical
relativism that has been described as "helpless antifascism"-helpless
because of its mental inertia and appeal to a passive morality that is
grounded in neither fact nor morality.
Other scholars, such as Ernst Nolte and Andreas Hillgruber, have
attempted to contextualize the Nazi Holocaust by arguing that Hitler
had reason to fear the Jews (Nolte), or that German atrocities must be
seen in the light of previous Soviet atrocities and political developments at that time (Hillgruber). 3 This revisionist tendency is part of a
larger political and historiographical agenda that has as its basis the
temptation "to forget," that seeks a unifying myth that might restore to
Germans a measure of pride in their past and a sense of resoluteness
against their "real" enemies, the Soviets. This reconstruction of the
historical past cannot be fashioned without considerable sleight of
hand. This volume is intended to expose the "magic" of some historical
practitioners and offer a scholarly corrective.
Articles in the present volume accordingly fall into three categories:
those that offer new insights into and/or empirical analyses of the dass
alliances that supported fascism; those that reexamine the ability of
existing opposition forces to resist its rise ; and those that look at current
revisionist tendencies and the conditions that have fostered them.
Part 1 presents the contributions to the nature of the dominant
alliance, set in the context of the national and world political economy.
lt is well known that in terms of industrial production Germany had a
relatively "late" start compared with other industrializing countries.
However, by 1914 industrial production had grown so rapidly as to
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place Germany among the very top in terms of its share in the total
world industrial output. Other countries appear to have made the
transition from a preindustrial to an industrial mode of production over
a longer period of time, thus producing, so it could be concluded, less
of a structural strain. Germany's rapid transition implies that despite its
industrial might remnants of the preindustrial society lingered on, well
into the twentieth century. lt might also be argued that these remnants
were stronger, able to exert significantly greater political power, than in
countries where a longer period of time had essentially reduced feudal
powers (such as the church and the aristocracy) to a "negligible quantity" by the time of the Nazi movement and its subsequent rule.
Observations of this kind have raised the question as to whether
German fascism should be viewed as the outcome of irreconcilable
structural conßicts resulting from a distinct pattern of industrial development, an independent force that was able to inßuence the course
of capitalist development, or a syncretic combination of the two.
Both Geoff Eley and Derek Linton speak to this question and
evaluate the merits of reasoning from which it springs. Kurt Gossweiler
addresses the same problem, if only indirectly, when he suggests that
Weimar democracy might have been saved through a broadly based
coalition and an economic policy designed to weaken the Junkers'
economic and political position through land reform.
All capitalist societies that thoroughly asserted themselves over
feudal powers, however, subjected populations to incessant change,
although of unequal magnitude or inten:sity. A number of prominent
social scientists have suggested that it was the "middle class" particularly-threatened by processes of modernization or change and
crises in capitalist production-that supported and thus was "responsible" for the Nazi rise to power. Eley rejects this view, suggesting
instead that Nazism be seen as a larger movement responding to the
society-wide insecurity produced by the speed and magnitude at which
capitalist production had taken hold, uprooting millions and tearing
apart the traditional social fabric of entire nations.
A phenomenon such as German fascism-not having been observed
earlier-clearly is symbolic of a "new era," one most strikingly characterized by monopoly capitalism and imperialism. lt is reasonable to
ask, therefore, whether these developments, relatively recent in the
history of world capitalism, had anything to do with the rise of German
fascism. Further, is fascism to be observed in any nation that has
reached the state of monopoly capital and imperialism, or does it rise
only in specifio-emergent capitalist-conditions? The "Bonapartist"
perspective on fascism, examined by Linton, sheds a good deal of light
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on this question, as does the more recent work of Nicos Poulantzas,
evaluated by Jane Caplan.
One aspect of Poulantzas' work on fascism was to examine economic
and political dimensions of the societies in which it arose. Both
Gossweiler and David Abraham attempt to determine the degree to
which German fascism can be linked to specific economic interests and
elites and the extent to which it emerged from political processes
outside the realm of production. We have induded a revised version of
previously published work by Abraham because it represents a cohesive and powerful presentation of his very suggestive and important
structural analysis of the rise of German fascism within a model of dass
differentiation.
Nazi rule was also initiated and made possible by the existing
elites-economic, political, and military-as Gossweiler points out.
He argues that those who were "victorious" in bringing about Nazi rule
could have preserved the Weimar republic but chose not to because
they were unwilling to accept the anticipated lower long-run rate of
capital accumulation. Instead, important segments of these elites empowered a "new" political elite to manage the affairs of government by
dictatorship.
Gossweiler's daim raises an interesting question: What is the process
by which "new" elites, based in emergent political movements, are
able to gain legitimacy with existing elites? How can "old" elites,
particularly the capitalist ruling dass, gain suffi.cient confidence in an
emerging elite, not of its mold, to allow it to dictate its affairs in the
realm of politics? John Nagle and Brian Peterson investigate these
questions in Germany, showing how the National Socialists chose
distinct tactics to make themselves acceptable to established elites and
to generally legitimize itself with its voters-Nagle examining aggregate national politics, Peterson looking at regional elites and their
relationship to the NSDAP. Together their work presents the often
contradictory diversity of the Nazi movement and policy as well as the
conßicts among existing elites.
In Part II a number of authors explore the specific weaknesses and
divisions in the ideology and tactics of those who tried to oppose the
fascists. Gunter Remmling analyzes the role of the German Communist party and the "legal" destruction of the left and the labor movement; Kurt Pätzold examines the function of Nazi terror and
demagoguery in pacifying the opposition; and Ben Fowkes looks at the
divisions within the Social Democratic party and the consequences for
the ability to resist. Fowkes argues that the failure of a broad left
coalition to curb the economic and political power of the Junkers was
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due in part to the fact that the left could not agree on such an aggressive
stance. The major strategy of the noncommunist left, particularly the
Social Democratic party, was to defend the existing democracy, not to
further the material interests of the workers to challenge directly the
power of the economic elites.
Articles in Part III take up the issue of historiography, in an effort to
explain the movement away from an antifascist front to a posture that is
increasingly apologetic of German fascism, its war and genocide. Looking at Dachau, the town with the first concentration camp built by the
Nazi dictatorship, Tony Barta demonstrates how and by whom the
antifascist front was defeated within months after the German capitulation and over the course of the American occupation. Addressing the
same process from a national perspective, Reinhard Kühnl follows
these patterns into the 1980s. He demonstrates the various ways in
which the German right, having transferred power to the Nazis, has
been engaged in relativizing, downplaying, and excusing the fascist
dictatorship ever since the war. Academics have played no small part in
this endeavor, too often accepting the political right's cold war ideology
and its insistence that German fascism be viewed outside of social
structure and its economic, dass, and power relationships.
In 1959 Theodor W. Adorno warned that "we'll have come to terms
with the past only when the causes that have led to it will be abolished. " 4 Individual and national identity should not be awakened at the
cost of repressed truths and false historical legitimations. Today the real
<langer seems to us to be not the few neo-Nazi organizations and active
fascists, but the readiness to minimize the crimes of the past, to
relativize and universalize them, or, as in the case of some historians, to
try to put things "into perspective" by equating Nazi crimes with those
committed by other nations, by suggesting dubious parallels, and by
denying the singularity of what happened. lt is our hope that the essays
in this volume will help to illuminate the shadows of the past so that
they will not again fall upon the future.

Notes
1. Michael Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann, Towards the Holocaust: The Social and

Economic Collapse of the Weimar Republic (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983),
p. 15.
2. David Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political Economy and Crisis
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981; 2nd. ed„ New York: Holmes & Meier,
1985).
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3. "Historikerstreit": Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der
nationasozialislischen Judenvernichtung (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1987).
4. Theodor W. Adorno, "What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?" in
Geoffrey Hartman, ed., Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 129.

Part I
Reclaiming the Past:
History and Theory

State and Classes in Weimar Gennany
David Abraham
Some forty years ago, Franz Neumann, though writing at a time hardly
conducive to a generous reading of the political possiblities of the late
Weimar Republic, observed that there had been several political alternatives to fascism, not just a socialist alternative. M uch of the debate
that has sought either to indict or exonerate capitalism (or capitalists)
has taken the collapse of the bourgeois republic rather too much for
granted. Similarly, the study of the political development and social
origins of modern state forms has allowed the importance (and horror)
of fascism as a "final outcome" to do considerable injury to the actual
political possibilities of Weimar Germany. Finally, although recent
discussion of organized capitalism and corporatism has cast valuable
light on economic transformations during a period that included the
Weimar era, the polyvalence of the political is frequently shortchanged.1
In the following 1 will examine the different ways in which the social
dominance of the various fractions of the capitalist elite might have
been expressed politically within the political framework of the Weimar
Republic: how the dominant fractions could have organized their own
interests, incorporated or repressed the interests of at least some of the
subordinate classes, and achieved some balance of those interests as a
neutral, national interest. The inability of the dominant classes to
organize their own interests posed a crucial stumbling block to winning
mass support, while the limited mass support available became an
intolerable burden on the accumulation process. As a result, stability
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was tenuous and expensive. Since the resulting breakdown was a state
crisis, we begin with an examination of the relationship of the state to
the economy and society.

State and Economy
Tue functions of the state vary from society to society, but every
state, except one on the brink of collapse, performs one function above
all others-and in a sense comprehending all others: it underwrites and
maintains the principal social and economic relationships of its society.
In a capitalist and industrial society such as Weimar Germany, the state
provides cohesion for economic, political, and cultural processes and
relations. Yet capitalism's economic relations are relatively independent
of its political ones. Production in capitalism, in comparison to feudalism, for example, does not rely on political mechanisms to be set in
motion. Thus, political relations can develop separately from economic
relations, and the state in capitalist society may be relatively autonomous. 2 In the parliamentary democratic state, formally equal competition increases this autonomy. Within limits determined by the specific
status or conjunctures of the economic, ideological, and political
realms, state policy output is a product of recognized, rule-bound,
institutionalized bargaining where the outcome in any given case cannot be determined beforehand. 3 But at a minimum, the state in a
capitalist society must guarantee that capitalist production can take
place and that the social relations of that production are reproduced.
Tue state is the regulating mechansim for the equilibrium of the
entire society. Ultimately, it is through the agency of the state that the
dominant social dasses are organized, that is, elevated from the level of
their selfish, individual interests to that of their collective, dass interest. Alone, the private and competitive nature of the appropriation of
surplus would tend to foster systemic disunity among capitalists. Similarly, it is through the state that the dominated social dasses are
disorganized, that is, kept from the level of their dass interests and
kept at the level of their interests as individuals, citizens, and members
of the nation. 4 Tue Marxist expectation that the (increasingly) social
nature of production in industrial capitalism would by itself engender
working-dass unity has not, on the whole, proven correct. To organize
the interests of the capitalist dass and its allies successfully and to turn
these into "national interests," the state must stand at a distance from
individual capitalists; it must not allow itself to become the creature of
specific capitalist dass members or interests. 5 Tue crisis of the last
years of the Weimar Republic stemmed in large part from the inability
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of the state to organize the interests of the members of the ruling bloc
in an autonomous fashion. The republic was unable to safeguard existing social relations not because of any revolutionary threat but rather
because of the conßicts and contradictions within the bloc of dominant
classes together with the expensive welfarist policies of the preceding
years.
lt can be argued that since the "Keynesian Revolution" the separation between state and economy has collapsed: civil society and state
are joined. The state both reßects and acts upon prevailing social and
economic relations. The government bureaucracy is responsible for the
planning, direction, and control of economic undertakings whose costs
and technological needs are too much even for large monopolies. The
security of private property, of economic growth, and of crisis-free
economic performance now require constant intervention by the state,
an approach followed almost as closely by conservative governments as
by social democratic ones. 6
Although this interdependence was not yet fully the situation in
Weimar Germany, there were substantial elements of such a development and demands for it. 7 The role of the Prussian-German state in
nineteenth-century German industrialization, unprecedented at the
time, provided the groundwork for later forms of organized intervention. 8 To the extent that there were government attempts to intervene
in and alleviate the economic crisis after 1928, and to the extent that
such interventions were expected by the great majority of the population, the economic crisis exacerbated the political crisis. There was
increased conßict in the political realm precisely at those points when
the state was called on to do more in the economic realm. Heinrich
Brüning, with his limited, largely negative intervention, had trouble
maintaining-and Franz von Papen and General Kurt von Schleicher,
with their more active intervention, had trouble establishing-political
legitimacy through mass loyalty partly because their economic interventions were unsuccessful. 9 The failures of their policies were not
primarily due to any inherent lack of wisdom in the content of the
policies. Indeed, some of the von Papen and Schleicher policies were
quite promising and were adopted a short time later by the Nazi
government. The conßicts of needs, interests, and ideologies within
the bloc of ruling classes were largely responsible for the ineffectiveness of government policy, and it was only once these were resolved
that a coherent state policy was possible. So long as the ruling bloc
itself lacked clear and organizing leadership its members could not rise
above the level of sauve qui peut.
That Germany was furthest down the road of organized capitalism
did not alter the need for leadership within the social and economic
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elite. Tue development of the first constitutive elements of this system
only increased the saliency of state-economy interaction. H. J. Puhle
enumerates those elements, which developed even before World War 1:
the increased taxing prerogatives of the state, the growth of public works
and services and insurance, the bureaucratization and organizational
tendencies of large industry, especially the new strategic growth industries (electro-technical, chemical, motor and engineering) and the workers' movement . . . further that of political and public-oriented pressure
groups which contributed decisively to changing the relationship between government, parliament and public, thereby lastingly altering both
political landscape and style and binding the sectors of the private economy together with each other and with the agents of the state through
their intervention in elections, in the press, in parliament and its committees and through the activities of their representatives in regional government and professional organizations.10

An indicator of the advanced role of the state is the percentage of the
gross national product (GNP) devoted to public, state expenditures.
Thus, in the United States the figures for 1900 and 1929 were 4 percent
and 10 percent respectively; in Germany they were already 16 percent
and 30.6 percent. But the increased interpenetration of state and
economy did not "free" state activity from nonpolitical constraints, and
it did not relieve the dominant social classes of the need to accomplish
an internal ordering crowned by a hegemonic fraction. Tue patriarchal
social commitment of the German bureaucracy augmented the state's
autonomy but did not determine the nature and outcome of political
practices and the form of society. Germany would be home to organized precapitalism, organized capitalism, and organized socialism.
Care must be taken to avoid reifying the concepts of autonomy and
mass loyalty. While there were moments in late Weimar Germany
when the state seemed to be functioning as the instrument of capital as
a whole, or even of just one sector of it, there were other times when
the state seemed "merely" to be sanctioning and protecting the rules
and social relationships of the capitalist order. In these latter instances
the state was probably functioning more independently. Yet it is exceedingly difficult to delineate the social mechanisms that account for
one type of functioning or another. Tue number of contacts between
industrial leaders and members of the government or the bureaucracy,
for example, did not (and generally do not) vary a great deal. Linkages
were both constant and institutionalized; there is no evidence of the
state's "holding the riße butt over the heads" of the Weimar capitalist
dass. Describing this autonomy as "relative" is, therefore, not enough.
We shall have to analyze very carefully the individual policy formulations, outputs, and outcomes in order to relate the concept of autonomy to the conßicts within the ruling bloc. Similarly with the concept
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of mass loyalty: equal votes need not be of equal significance. Tue
percentage of the German electorate that voted for the Nazi party in
the autumn of 1932 (33 percent) was not substantially greater than that
which voted SPD in 1928 (30 percent), but, these were different voters,
and a qualitatively different mass loyalty emerged to replace the rather
tenuous loyalty enjoyed by the republic.
Tue autonomy of the state is conditioned by the ways in which the
economic realm is dependent on state activity. Broadly conceived we
can locate five areas of such state activity. (1) Tue state guarantees the
organizational and legal principles of the capitalist system (e. g., the
inviolableness of contracts and freedom of labor). 11 (2) lt establishes
and constructs some of the material preconditions for production that
are for the benefit of all economic actors but beyond the reach of any
one of them (e. g. , infrastructure and other external economies such as
railroads and canals). Although this is an old area of activity, the
increased dependence of industrial production on technological advance has enlarged the scope of these activities and further "socialized"
the costs of production. 12 (3) The state occasionally and regularly
participates and intervenes in the course of economic activity and
growth, to secure growth and avoid and remedy crises (e.g., government contracts-especially military, fiscal, and monetary policies-and
tariffs). Growing concentration and inflexibility (cartels, monopolies)
render commodity production and exchange increasingly incapable of
regulating themselves. (4) Tue state regulates conflicts between capital
and labor so as to avoid constant social crises (mediation and even
compulsory arbitration have been accepted by capital). Generally capital shares an interest in keeping these conflicts within limits so as to
facilitate the final area of state activity. (5) Tue state maintains the
legitimacy of, and mass loyalty to, the social system as a whole (e.g.,
distributive and social welfare measures, foreign successes).
Whereas activity in the first two areas is undertaken with the full
cooperation of representatives of capital, activity in the last three areas
is undertaken against the will of some, perhaps even a majority, of the
representatives of capital. Tue state's successful execution of these
activities brings to it increased legitimacy. Legitimation is, therefore,
both an activity of the state and an outcome of its activities. Tue growth
of the role of the state is part of a three-stage historical development:
organization of the market to relieve the pressure of competition faced
by individual capitalists (monopolies, self-financing); the institutionalization of technological progress to relieve the threat of crises
faced by the economy as a whole (research and development, investment outlets); and state regulation of the entire system to relieve the
pressure of social, political, and economic tensions. 13
What the state needs in order to execute these activities limits the
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possible range of its action and policy outputs. The state needs financial
resources, a capacity for technological rationality, an already existing
legitimacy or mass loyalty, and the loyalty of the owners of the means of
production. The Weimar Republic after 1929 was progressively deprived of these, and its ability to act diminished commensurately. The
loyalty of capital was essential for a number of reasons. As Müller,
Brüning, von Papen, and Schleicher all discovered, the state can only
make offers or set limits in a process in which the owners of the means
of production dispose of them as they see fit. Too much state pressure
can precipitate investment and employers' strikes, a loss of cooperation, or a "crisis of confidence," thereby exacerbating the crisis instead
of mitigating it. In order to be able to stabilize the economy the state
needs mass support, which is forthcoming only when demonstrable
economic successes are at hand; to obtain these, cooperation with the
private sector is essential. The owners of the means of production
abandoned the Weimar Republic in its attempts to achieve mass support in part because of the constraints placed upon it by the results of a
parliamentary democracy where all citizens were entitled to press
equal claims. The capacity for technological rationality, which the state
also requires, is limited by the fact that the private sector is frequently
the source of economic data and other information. 14 The financial
needs of the state are met primarily through tax revenue. Although the
state may set tax rates that attempt to reßect the interests of all of
society, receipts from business remain particularly vulnerable; the
growth of the economy as a whole presents itself as the only way out. 15
Political and economic developments may dictate an increased and
ongoing state role in the economy. The state may undertake economic
planning so as to maintain, implement, replace, or compensate for
particular economic processes. Curiously, however, the more the state
needs to intervene in the economy, the more dependent it becomes on
the owners of the means of production. This is true regardless of
whether the need for intervention is episodic or organic; the need may
even be purely a function of developments within the economy. Thus,
with the onset of the depression the Weimar state became increasingly
dependent on die Wirtschaft. The ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie and its logic of accumulation limits the range of possible state
policies by successfully characterizing some of them as "utopian. " 16
The growing expectation of improvements in the standard of living also
renders the state more dependent on the dominant economic powers.
This is ironic since it is generally social-democratic parties and governments that encourage such expectation. 17 Once such expectations are
rooted they are nearly impossible to reverse democratically, and their
costs invariably seem to grow, during both normal and crisis periods.
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Clearly such was the case in Weimar Germany. From Müller on, the
state was cast in the role and burdened with the responsibility of
economic coordination; it could not possibly succeed since economic
decisions remained the private prerogatives of the industrialists and
their leaders. lt was in this context that the results of the predepression
conßicts and decisions over the distribution of state revenue came to
threaten the very ability to produce and accumulate surplus. Despite
the institution of consumption and other regressive taxes, it was impossible to pass increased state costs completely on to wage earners and
other taxpayers. So long as revenue sources remained domestic, the
areas of state activity came into conßict with each other and further
weakened the state. Tue functions of facilitating private accumulation
and guaranteeing mass legitimacy could not be reconciled. 18
This outline of state/economy relations under conditions of capitalist
crisis merits elaboration. In a series of essays and lectures, 19 Knut
Borchardt has offered an analysis of the specific structure and core
problems of the Weimar political economy very much like that presented here and throughout my own work. In an important sense this is
highly ironic, for although Professor Borchardt is generally understood
as making a conservative argument, few scholars have made the central
point as clearly as he has: in capitalist democracies capital rules, and it
is its logic that enjoys hegemony. 20
At the core of the "Borchardt thesis" lies the argument that political
alternatives after 1930 were heavily constrained by economic necessity:
in particular, Chancellor Brüning could do little to save the Weimar
system because orgainzed labor's wage and social policy victories had
paralyzed German capitalism. A strong labor movement extracted
wage increases in excess of productivity growth, thereby squeezing
profits, discouraging investment, and antagonizing capital. Tue entrepreneurial dass could then only welcome the growth of a reserve army
of the unemployed in order to weaken the bargaining position of labor
and strengthen its own. To argue this is to say, in effect, that the
vehement objections ofWeimar capitalists to high and "political'' wages
were rationally founded, whatever the ideological functions of such
objections. Weimar, in other words, suffered from an economic crisis
that was, in good measure, a profit crisis engendered by a militant
reformist labor movement. This circumstance left republican and socialist politicians with little room for maneuver, facilitated the growth of
right radicalism, and eventually encouraged the migration of parts of
business into the right-radical camp. For Borchardt, as for the analysis
here, the system suffered from a structural problem that went well
beyond the pressure of reparations and high interest rates.
Borchardt portrays the Weimar economy as nonfunctional and un-
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tenable ("nicht funktionsfähige") and existing within a barely functional and tenable political system. 1 believe one can accept his
judgment without inferring "anti-labor" conclusions. Borchardt finds a
net social product per capita during Weimar that lay well below the
long-term trend line (the 1913 level was not reattained until 1928); real
net investment per capita (despite the wave of "industrial rationalization") about 12 percent less than in the immediate prewar years;
personal consumption levels 16 percent higher and public expenditures 34 percent higher in 1928 than in 1913; and an unprecedentedly
high share of national income (nearly 67 percent) going to wages. He
links low investment levels to high levels of public borrowing and
spending, disproportionately costly wages to a successful wages policy
by labor and the state, and slowness in productivity growth to these
and other factors. Due to the political strength of labor, high unemployment did not succeed in adjusting wages downward in time, and
the rate of exploitation remained inadequate. The "relative powers of
the combatants" Marx referred to in Capital seemed to weigh in favor of
labor.
In other words, the Social Democratic party (SPD) and trade unions
succeeded at much of what they had promised to do. Once they
experienced defeat and abandoned efforts at revolutionary transformation after 1918-19, the SPD and the German Trade Union Federation
(ADGB) militantly and successfully pursued redistributional struggles.
These were often facilitated and even encouraged by political and legal
mechanisms, such as binding compulsory arbitration by the state, as
well as by elections. By the time of the SPD's successful 1928 election
campaign, socialist theorists and representatives of capital alike had
come to believe that the weekly wage was a political wage, dependent
on the political representation of labor. Incremental social and wage
gains lay at the center of labor's strategy-and capital's fears. Indeed,
successful social democratic reformism appeared as more of a threat
than communist agitation. As we shall see, wage and social-welfare
policy became the sina qua non of left politics in Weimar. Indeed, to
labor's ultimate grief, they were the litmus test applied to all governments-before and after 1932. Labor's approach worked for a while,
but once it began to fail, there was no Spielraum and no simple escape
route: the piper had to be paid. Domestic-oriented and heavy industries, partially on account of their greater labor-intensity and tighter
markets, were the first to call the question and demand an end to the
Weimar system. With little change in labor's posture, and with worsening world trade protectionism, the export and dynamic industries lost
their relative preeminence within German capital and moved closer to
the position of their more nationalist and conservative colleagues.
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Social democratic scholars in particular respond with great unease to
arguments affirming the reality of the "profit squeeze." They fear
blaming (productive) labor, fear suggesting a shortage of investments
and profits rather than of demand and jobs. 21 Actually, the thesis of
labor-induced profit squeezes is not the intellectual property solely of
conservatives and neoliberals or the policy property of business. Historically, there has been a left/right conßuence on this question. 22
Analyses that stress the profit squeeze have understandably generated
a great deal of discomfort among those German scholars who see such
arguments as blaming labor for the severity of the depression, the
collapse of Weimar, and worse. 23 From the perspective of the present,
they seem also to justify the contemporary abuse of labor by Christian
Democratic, Thatcherite, and Reagan-Republican governments while
suggesting the sterility of any collective or demand-centered recovery
strategy. Today, as in Weimar, the question can be asked: Are there not
enough jobs for people or not enough profits for investment? And
though investment there must be--capital strike and ßight notwithstanding-can one assume that private capitalists do it better than
socially-oriented public organs? Posed this way, Borchardt's argument
appears to be intrinsically anti-labor, redolent of the desire of Weimar
capitalists to take advantage of the economic crisis to weaken labor and
its organizations and to undermine democracy.
Social-democratic power does not alter the core of capitalism. As we
shall see, the Weimar labor movement's search for economic rationality, social justice, and political participation was inevitably and
decisively constrained by the privileged status systematically accorded
the logic of accumulation. lt seems that the best that can be accomplished is the worst that can be done: paralyzing capitalism without
being able to transform it. 24 Tue Weimar SPD and ADGB were highly
effective but also terribly vulnerable. Having mistakenly assumed that
democracy would overcome capitalism within the new system of capitalist democracy, they were at a complete loss to deal with the system
in distress. Having persuaded most of their members that success was
to be measured almost uniquely by wage and social welfare gains, the
SPD and ADGB had virtually no idea what to do once capitalism
ceased producing surplus they could skim. Rather than inferring from
profit-squeeze analyses only the possibility of a "right turn" or retreat
by labor, is it possible to posit the possibility of a turn away from
economism and a politically-oriented turn to the left to escape the
crisis? At least one of Borchardt's critics, Holtfrerich, citing arguments
of the sort made here, has cautiously suggested something of this sort
by stressing the availability, feasibility, and desirability of job-creation
and pump-priming programs. 25
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Yet to stress the availability, feasibility, and desirability of job creation and other antideßationary measures is not enough to solve the
riddle of state-economy relations in the Weimar capitalist democracy.
There was no economic way because there was neither political will nor
an alternative political economy. Chancellor Brüning, in his efforts to
balance and further various capitalist interests while also retaining the
tacit support of labor, could not abandon the imperative of accumulation. At least not unless he, as political entrepreneur, was forced to do
so. For that to have happened would have required one of two inducements: either the pressure of a broader worker-salaried employeepopular constituency such as came into being in the 1960s but which
was impossible in Weimar, or a rapprochement between the Socialist
and Communist movements. Yet socialist complicity in and commitment to the system seems to have been too great to permit any undoing
of the fatal decisions of 1918-19 that split the labor movement. And if,
somehow, the SPD and German Communist party (KPD) had been
able to join forces, the evidence suggests that the leftward pressure
thereby exerted would have been directed to toppling Brüning. With
that, political warfare would have replaced economic constraints. 26

State and Society
The crisis of the Weimar state was not a social crisis of the sort
anticipated by many communists: a "maturation" of dass antagonisms
that coincided with the "catastrophic development" of the capitalist
economy. 27 The depression was indeed a catastrophe, and dass antagonisms of all sorts were rife, but the impetus for the state crisis came
from the determination of capitalist groups to make hay while the
douds shone. This, in turn, brought about the political crisis that led to
the abandonment of and opposition to parliamentary government.
Both capital and labor, but especially the former, now oriented their
struggles toward a transformation of the internal organization of the
state; their dass struggle became political for the first time in a decade.
The availability of a new mass base was then secured and a new form of
government encouraged. The divergent interests of the various capitalist groups were organzied anew, and the new form of government
could function as the new guarantor of cohesion for unchanged social
relations. What were the bases of these various capitalist groups; how,
and under whose leadership, were they formed into the "historical bloc
of ruling classes"?
lt is an axiom of Marxist analysis that the manner in which surplus
value is extracted from the direct producer determines the social
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relations involved in production and ultimately the relationship of the
rulers and the ruled. 28 Those involved in production are the carriers of
the social relations engendered by the given mode of production. The
capitalist mode of production allows for the separation of economic,
political, and ideological relations because surplus is extracted solely
within the economic realm, virtually unassisted by political or ideological mechanisms. In capitalism these carriers of social relations become
dasses through their activity-through their practice in the political
realm. 29 An objective relationship to the means of production, being a
carrier of certain social relations, is an insufficient base for a dass in
capitalism. 30 As indicated earlier, the state, when functioning coherently, helps organize the owners of the means of production into a
dass; this same function is performed for wage labor by political
parties. 31 Unless so organized, wage laborers will appear in this dominant political sphere simply as individuals, as citizens seeking to
achieve their selfish interests. Conversely, those in dominant dasses
will appear as spokespersons for the interests of the nation as a whole,
and the actualization of their needs through the state will generally be
consented to and accepted as legitimate. 32 This is one meaning of the
term hegemony. Thus, to overstate the case somewhat, social relations
become historical activity in their political embodiments. 33
No society, induding Weimar Germany, is characterized by just one
mode of production with its attendant social relations. Although industrial capitalism was by far the dominant mode of production in Weimar
Germany, other modes also existed: the family peasant, small commodity, and even feudal modes coexisted with industrial capitalism.
The economic, political, and ideological practices of all these partially
amalgamated "subsocieties" constituted the German social formation.
A half century earlier Marx had remarked on the incompleteness of
capitalist development in Germany. Even in the Weimar period it
remained true that Germany suffered "not only from the development
of capitalist production, but also from its incompleteness. Alongside of
modern evils, a whole series of inherited evils oppress us, arising from
the survival of antiquated modes of production .... We suffer not only
from the living, but from the dead. "34 These "dead" were to play a
crucial role in the resolution of conßicts within the historical bloc of
ruling dasses.

The ruling bloc
The East Elbian Junkers continued to occupy vital positions in the
military, civil service, and judiciary and remained an important force
within the ruling bloc. Although total agricultural production contrib-
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uted under 15 percent to the GNP, and the agricultural portion of the
population had slipped to 25 percent by 1925, the agricultural elite
continued to enjoy vastly disproportionate inßuence. Up to 1918 industrial development, despite its rapidity, had taken place within a semifeudal context, and the Junkers preserved a political and ideological
supremacy greater than that of any other landed group in industrial
Europe. 35 They continued as a dass in charge of the state and as a
ruling dass. Gramsci characterizes them as
the traditional intellectuals of the German industrialists who retained
special privileges and a strong consciousness of being an independent
social group, based on the fact that they held considerable economic
power over agriculture .... Tue Junkers resemble a priestly-military
caste, with a virtual monopoly of directive-organisational functions in
political society, but possessing at the same time an economic base of its
own and so not exclusively dependent on the liberality of the dominant
economic group.... the Junkers constituted the officer dass of a large
standing army, which gave them solid organizational cadres favouring the
preservation of an esprit de corps and of their political monopoly. 36

In the Weimar period their political monopoly was broken, and they
did become increasingly dependent on the liberality of the hegemonic
industrial group, but per se the dominant economic group, the bourgeoisie, had never directly ruled in Germany. The earlier political and
cultural monopoly of the nobility impeded the development of an
extensive and independent bourgeois political personnel. 37 This lacuna
had much to do with the continued parliamentary crises and the
fragmentation of the liberal parties; in turn, the Catholic Zentrum and
the SPD were aided in their prewar growth precisely by this fragmentation. 38 Bourgeois fragmentation continued throughout the Weimar
period. The Gustav Stresemann cirde constituted perhaps the only
successful, representatively bourgeois political group of the entire
era. 39 The bulk of industrialists greeted his death with a sigh of relief,
anxious as most were to disavow him. Representatives of the agricultural elite, however, despite their even greater dissatisfaction with
government policies, continued to fill posts and participate in the state
apparatus at all levels down to the very end of the republic and beyond.
Although it had partially merged into the bourgeoisie, the agricultural
elite continued to constitute an autonomous dass or fraction within the
ruling bloc dominated by industry.
Viewed strictly in terms of their percentage contribution to the GNP
or portion of the population, representatives of the agricultural sector
ought to have been little more than junior allies or supporters of a
ruling bloc. However, even after World War I the agricultural elite of
estate owners continued to occupy vital positions in both political and
civil society; all reaches of the military and civil service, for example,
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continued to bear their mark. An additional factor was at least equally
important in preserving the status of the rural elite as members of the
ruling bloc: the composition of the agricultural and industrial sectors
was not symmetrical; the relationship of the peasant majority to the
large landowners was very different from that of the worker majority
toward the factory owners. Even when organized, peasants, unlike
unionized workers, did not generally adopt an adversary posture toward their putative betters. Peasants simply did not hate the big estate
owners the way workers hated the Herren of industry. The resolution of
the economic and political conflicts between grain-growing estate
owners and the body of dairy- and livestock-producing peasants enabled Landwirtschaft to appear as a solid front and buttressed the
position of the agricultural elite both vis-a-vis industry and in society
generally. In the final two years of the Republic, this solid front began
to dissolve; many non-Catholic peasants voted for the Nazis, yet even
this did not signify abandonment of the agricultural elite's core interests. Toward the end of the Republic, an attempt to reconcile estateowner and peasant interests through the "Green Front" occurred, with
demands crystallizing around autarky. Not only socialists but also important industrial and commercial groups tried unsuccessfully to exploit rural cleavages and break this agricultural front, which even in the
1920s operated to retard capitalist development.
The dominant element within the unity of dominant classes, what we
can call the hegemonic dass or fraction, did not remain the same
throughout the Weimar years. Rather, largely cartelized and domesticoriented heavy industry vied for hegemony with generally less cartelized dynamic and export industry. These two fractions of industrial
capital entertained similar but far from identical interests. Their relations to their commercial, financial, and agricultural partners also
varied, and rivalries between and among these fractions were always
present.
Thanks to the cheap debt-retirement, bankruptcies, and lowered
real wages resulting from the inßation and Ruhr occupation, most of
German industry was able, with the assistance of American capital, to
rebuild, modernize, and expand capacity quickly after 1923. An already cartelized industrial sector became even further dominated by
grand monopolies and cartels. Both the labor unions and the workers'
parties were demoralized by a series of defeats between 1919 and 1923,
and the election results of 1924 embodied the new "economy-friendly"
state of affairs. What various branches of German industry chose to do,
or could do, with their plants was conditioned by a number of factors.
Conflicts arose out of the divergent production desiderata, trade, and
political needs of the various branches of German industry.
The first central cleavage during these years was between domestic-
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and export-market-oriented industry. The domestic-market-oriented
branch consisted mainly of heavy industry, led by iron, steel, and
mining interests, especially those of the Ruhr. (Except for brief interludes such as the British coal strike of 1926, Germany's basic heavy
industries were not exporters.)
After 1925 and certainly by 1927 heavy industry was burdened with
substantial overcapacity, and it suffered from unsatisfactory shares in
various international cartels (such as the International Raw Steel Community). In the prewar period income from German ferrous metals
production was one quarter of the world total; by early 1929 it was
down to one eighth. Only an expanded domestic market could absorb
this sector's production at high prices. Almost all production and
ownership units here were large and cartelized, and the burden of
wages constituted a much greater share of total costs. Tue growing and
prosperous export industries, by contrast, accepted high protective
tariffs for domestic primary industry, so long as they received refunds
from the primary producers equal to the difference between world and
domestic prices for those quantities subsequently exported. Heavy
industry was thus more hostile toward the gains of the organized
working dass in the realm of wages, hours, social-welfare legislation,
and labor relations. Of all industries, mining had the highest percentage of total costs devoted to labor and social insurance. Despite increased production, its 1927 profit rate was only 4 percent; the ironproducing industry's an even lower 2.8 percent.
The other fraction of industry. was export industry: the dynamic,
technologically more advanced, and prosperous sector of industry. lt
was led by the machine, electric, and chemical industries but included
a broad range of producers (including, somewhat anomalously, textiles)
as well as commercial interests. Profit rates in this sector were sometimes more than triple those in heavy industry. In contrast to overcapacity in heavy industry, the net value of industrial exports nearly
doubled between 1925 and 1929. By the latter date, nearly 35 percent
of industrial production was for export. This dynamic fraction was
behind the most-favored-nation trade treaties negotiated with a host of
countries after 1925, and it supported Stresemann's foreign policy of
international reintegration enthusiastically. Its primary markets lay in
the developed countries of the west and north. Wage labor constituted
a smaller share of total costs in these industries (lowest of all in
chemicals) while contributing more of what the industrialists themselves called "added value." These industries were more prepared to
work together with organized labor while regularly opposing the demands of organized agriculture.
By contrast, the internal-market strategy and greater opposition to
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the organized working dass by heavy industry helped this fraction
forge and maintain links to the agricultural sector and the policies it
proposed. Lowering production costs was a central refrain for them
both, as were protection of the borderlands and revision of Versailles.
Relations between the representatives of industry and agriculture
did not follow any smooth pattern during the Weimar years, however.
Although the industrial elite was in a position to set both the tone and
the agenda for capitalists during the entire period, its willingness to
make sacrifices on behalf of its rural partner varied. Viewed from the
perspective of general economic policy, agriculture was increasingly
shortchanged between 1924 and 1929. The year 1925 marked the
beginning of a trend characterized by trade treaties unfavorable to
agriculture, growing agricultural imports, disadvantaged access to capital, widening price scissors, and then, by 1928, the onset of the
agricultural depression. Since the home market for heavy industry
enjoyed only a brief spurt, agriculture was' left, until the end of the
stabilization, as the only serious proponent of a semiautarkic "domestic-market" strategy. With the growing struggle over "costs of production" inside the last bourgeios/working-class coalition government
(1928-30). However, relations between agrarian and industrial leaders
improved. As was the case before World War 1, organizations representing heavy industry moved toward the policies advocated by agriculture, while more dynamic and successful export industry groups
called on agriculture to make itself more efficient, cut costs, and help
itself. (Even socialists were no more critical of German agriculture and
its elite than were the spokesmen for these dynamic industries.) If we
use inßuence within the all-encompassing League of German Industry
(RDI) as an indicator, we can conclude that heavy domestic industry
was ascendant over other industries until 1925 and again after 1930.
Patterns of trade and social legislation recommended by industry as a
whole and the policies of the state bureaucracy reßected this predominance (although severe conflicts persisted throughout the Weimar
years).
Other cleavages involved capital composition and ideology, factors
that also contributed to divergent attitudes toward labor and toward
agriculture. Within the League of German Industry (RDI), power was
wrested after 1930 by the heavy-industry conservatives from the dynamic-export liberals who had held it since about 1925. The processing
and smaller finishing industries then buckled under the menacing of
heavy industry's vertical cartels and a political campaign against the
system of export rebates. Beginning in the late 1920s, mining and steel
organizations threatened to withdraw from the RDI and from other
organs whose policies they deemed insufficiently conservative or
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overly attentive to export and parliamentary constraints. Industrial
circles began to plan a trade strategy that abandoned the pacific market
of northern and western Europe and overseas in favor of the "imperial"
market of eastern and southern Europe. The relatively virgin markets
of the East were presented simultaneously as an inducement to export
circles and as a threat to agriculture to encourage their lining up
behind heavy industry. The prospects of renewed profitability were
thus ultimately tied to a changed social and political system at home
and an imperial policy in central Europe presented as autarky.
Each hegemonic fraction attempted to make its own economic interests into political interests and to represent the common interests of
the classes and fractions in the bloc. 40 In the Weimar context, each was
charged with the primary responsibility for "getting us off the current
socialist road and enabling industry to speak in the name of the
economy and the nation, not just capitalism. " 41 Taken as a whole,
however, these classes were the power bloc in Weimar Germany.

The Mittelstand and the peasantry
Allied to the power bloc politically, albeit not wholeheartedly, and
opposed to it economically, was the Mittelstand. 42 Composed of shopkeepers and commodity producers on one hand and salaried employees on the other, each constitutiµg just under 20 percent of the
population, the alliance proved frustrating for the Mittelstand. While
the salaried employees found themselves profiting economically from a
massive bourgeois-social-democratic collaboration (1924-29) in the
realm of employee rights and Sozialpolitik, they found the value of
their political patronage declining and withdrew their support from the
bourgeois parties when the bourgeois parties hardened their positions
on Sozialpolitik .43 At the same time, their self-consciously separate
status prevented them from moving left.
The shopkeepers and commodity producers defected even earlier.
Not only did they suffer more from the inßation, but the costs of the
bourgeois collaboration with social democracy were not offset by any
redeeming benefits. Initially, they had nowhere else to go, but once
the movement to the Nazi party began, it became a stampede. 45
Losers in the inßation and unable to penetrate the system of industrylabor collaboration, the Mittelstand could be mobilized politically
against it.
Further support for the ruling bloc was provided by the bulk of the
peasantry. Unlike the "allies," these "supporters" of the ruling bloc
obtained little in exchange for their support. Certain half-truths propogated by ruling-bloc-ideology shored up this support: an identity of
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interests shared by all agriculturalists, big and small alike, and a fear of
antiproperty, urban reds. Although peasant support was retained
within the range of older bourgeois parties until 1930, it too seemed to
disappear overnight (among Protestants at any rate) as soon as an
uncompromising advocate presented itself. Once the republic appeared to announce itself to the peasantry only with the tax collector,
the peasantry announced itself to the republic with the "Emperor. " 46
C lass and C oalition Politics
There are two ways of looking at coalition politics, both actual and
potential, in the Weimar period. The first is in terms of the social
dasses or forces represented by various political parties; the second is
in terms of the political parties and electoral coalitions themselves. Let
us examine first the actual and potential dass blocs and then the
electoral results. Several blocs or coalitions of dasses were formed (or
were possible) during the Weimar years. These blocs were unstable
and shifting. In addition, at different moments, different fractions of a
bloc were in a position toset the tone and agenda for a bloc as a whole.
Economic and political bonds brought and kept bloc partners together:
economic and political conßicts kept various bloc possibilities from
forming and tore others asunder.
In conceptualizing coalitions or blocs we are faced with a dual task:
on the one hand, analysis of dass blocs as formed from "the bottom up"
and involving group intentions, dass situations, tensions, and consciousness at the base; on the other hand, analysis of more tangible
power blocs as formed from "the top down" and consisting of organized
political activity and interventions, of parties, alliances, policy formation, leadership organizations, and so on. lt is primarily in terms of the
latter that the coherence and strength of blocs can be evaluated.
During the Weimar Republic certain policy issues, decisions, and
nondecisions were particularly critical and, as analysis below will demonstrate, blocs formed and dissolved around issues of social policy
(Sozialpolitik), trade policy (Handelspolitik), reparations and foreign
policy (Reparationspolitik broadly conceived), distribution of the national wealth (and burden), democratization (in both the public and
private spheres), and the balance between private accumulation and
social legitimation. Thus, government coalitions, cooperation and conflict among corporate interest organizations and unions, patterns of
social, trade, and fiscal legislation, the policies of state bureaucracies,
the public agenda as enunciated by various ideological apparatuses,
and the articulation of the tasks at hand by the spokespeople for dasses,
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unions, and parties all help provide the basis for a partially inductive
determination of the dass coalitions constituting a bloc.
Schematically, for Weimar Germany we can map several blocs composed of rural and urban, dominant and dominated dasses. Through
these power blocs, the economic sphere, where individuals appear as
the carriers of determinate social relations, shaped the political sphere,
in which members of all dasses appear as equal citizens with equal
daims. lt was largely through state activity that intrabloc conßicts were
mediated and the interests of a bloc as a whole pursued. Although
some of the respective blocs here are labeled with dates, these dates
only indicate the ascendance, sometimes tacit or de facto, of one or
another coalition, not necessarily a formalized shift. The formal goal of
the bourgeoisie remained united bourgeois rule, and the form of state
might depend on what type of mass base was available for that rule.
In Tables 1-5, we posit five such dass blocs. In each schema the
hegemonic dass or fraction, that is the dominant element within the
unity of dasses, is represented in capital letters, and ties represented
by solid lines are stronger than those represented by dashed lines.
In the bloc formation shown in Table 1, the estate owners and heavy
industry together were hegemonic. Their relationship was mediated on
the terrain of the state. Export industry, consisting of the more dynamic, new processing industries, was also part of the bloc; it was
linked directly to heavy industry. Family peasants too were part of the
bloc, although they profited less from their membership. They were
linked to the estate owners. Finally, the petty bourgeoisie was an ally of
this bloc, profiting as it did from the bloc's social protectionism and
antisocialism. Other groups must be considered as having been in
opposition.
In the bloc formation shown in Table 2, heavy incl ustry was
Table 1
"Sammlung" Bloc: Pre-1914 Bourgeois Bloc:
The "Historical Ruling Bloc"
estate owners

heavy industry

family peasants

export industry

rural labor

l

.ettybo.r.eoisie
salaried employees

proletariat

State and Classes

39

Table 2
Antisocialist Right Bourgeois Bloc: 1922-24:
Rolling Back the Revolution
estate owners
family peasants
rural labor

heavy industry

[~e~!fi0~~tEtJ

petty bourgeoisie
salaried employees
proletariat

hegemonic. Export industry was allied to heavy industry in this bloc as
well, but it demurred from some of the bloc's economic policies. Again,
family peasants were linked via the estate owners. The petty bourgeoisie was lost to the bloc because of the effects of inflation, and other
groups were in opposition. This bloc made use of inflation, French
occupation of the Ruhr, and aborted communist uprisings to revoke the
eight-hour day, lower real wages, and wipe out its debt. By 1924,
however, currency stabilization, the massive influx of American capital,
and the lifting of trade restrictions led to a realignment.
In the bloc formation shown in Table 3, export industry was
hegemonic. Linked to it in the bloc were the organized proletariat
(including rural labor) and salaried employees. An expansive economy
and liberal social legislation permitted interclass cooperation. Heavy
industry, although still within the bloc, had much in the realm of social
and economic policy over which to be dissatisfied. Estate owners and
family peasants were distinct losers in this arrangement. Tue petty
bourgeoisie became increasingly homeless, as was demonstrated by its
accelerating desertion of the primary bourgeois parties. Bloc 3 demonstrated that it was possible for a fraction of the dominant classes to
abandon other fractions to a significant extent in favor of a more
thoroughgoing collaboration with the organized working class. 47
Aware of the high costs of the class compromise coalition, prominent
figures in export industry and some progressives in heavy industry
attempted to forma bloc enjoying mass support but not dependent on
the organized working class. Had they succeeded, the bloc would have
looked like that shown in Table 4. This bloc formation would have
removed the "pernicious" influence of both the "feudal" estate owners
and socialist working class. lt failed to emerge because the liberal
industrialists could not split the peasants from the estate owners and
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Table 3
Class Compromise Bloc, 1925-30:
Republican Stability with Democratic Potential
estate owners

r-------------,
heavy industry
J
------

family peasants

export industry

rural labor

petty bourgeoisie
salaried employees
proletariat

overestimated the republican potential of the petty bourgeoisie. Tue
progressive aspects of the bloc would have linked salaried employees to
export industry while the conservative ones would have linked the
petty bourgeoisie to heavy industry. 48
With the end of cooperation with the working class, the failure to
build a liberal bourgeois bloc, and the loss of peasant support, the
dominant classes by 1932 found themselves in the position of the bloc
shown in Table 5. This short-lived bloc formation was like the "Sammlung" bloc except for the important fact that it lacked any base of
mass support. After over a decade of republican government it was
impossible to stabilize a government that enjoyed no mass support.
Further, the agricultural elite was far more dependent on heavy industry that it had been in the prewar bloc.
Tables 6 and 7 introduce the political parties, electoral results, and
party coalitions of the Weimar period. Very schematically, we can say
that the parties drew their primary electoral support from the following
Table 4
Liberal Bourgeois Bloc (never formed):
The Goal of Liberal Politicians
estate owners

heavy industry

family peasants

export industry

rural labor

[g~g1~~~g~~~~:r-+-1

[~~~12~d_:_~~l~~e~_:}-J
proletariat
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Table 5
Baseless Bloc, 1932: Fascist Potential
estate owners

heavy industry

family peasan ts

export industry

rural labor

petty bourgeoisie
salaried employees
proletariat

groups: the German Communist party (KPD) from the working dass,
and the unemployed; the Social Democratic party (SPD) from the
working dass, urban and rural, and to some extent the middle dass;
the German Democratic party (DDP) from liberal industry, urban
commercial groups, intellectuals, and initially family peasants; the
Catholic Center party (Zentrum) from Catholics of all dasses, especially workers and peasants; the German People's party (DVP) from
urban middle dass, "white-collar" groups, mainline industry, and upper bourgeoisie; Economic Party of the Middle Class
(Wirtschaftspartei from urban petty bourgeois; the Christian National
Peasants and Rural People's party (CNBLP), as its name implies; the
German National People's party (DNVP) from various urban middle
dasses, military and rural elites, and Protestant peasants; the National
Socialist German Workers party (NSDAP) from urban and rural Mittelstand, especially Protestant, some from all other groups. The key
electoral contribution of the NSDAP consisted of uniting on the basis of
an authoritarian populism the various Mittelstand groups (petty bourgeois, peasant, rentier, white collar) who were or had become homeless in the course of economic and political changes and whose
economic existence provided no basis for unity.
A note on the Mittelstand and the rapid demise of the DDP: this was
the party founded by the most republican industrialists and staffed by
liberal intellectuals. Its early electoral strength indicated not so much a
left-liberal impulse on the part of its Mittelstand voters as the assumption that the only way to moderate the socialists would be through
friendly opposition. In other words, they thought the socialists would
be stronger than they actually were. Once the SPD proved irresolute,
offensive opposition was the order of the day. By 1924 many of the 1919
DDP (and 1920 DVP) voters voted DNVP. Not at home there either,
many voted Wirtschaftspartei in 1928. This was a vote simultaneously
against the working dass and against big business. On the Zentrum:
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the Catholic party was very flexible, partially because of its mixed yet
guaranteed constituency. After moving leftward during the war it
moved rightward after 1923. From 1918 to 1923 it was allied with the
SPD, from 1924 to 1931 with the middle bourgeois parties; by late
1932 it was prepared to forma government with the Nazis alone.
Tue dotted lines in Table 6 indicate the division of the party arena
into left, center, and right-according to the policy behavior of the
parties, not necessarily according to the intentions of their electoral
supporters. Tue weakness/disappearance of the center is, of course, the
dassic story of Weimar Germany. Tue second dassic story is the
inability of the left to unite. Consequently, the third dassic story is
about the instability of cabinets and coalitions. Table 7 examines the
vote totals of the three fields and of coalitions other than those actually
formed.
Socialist-bourgeois collaboration under socialist leadership was rendered impossible once the Zentrum backed away and moved to the
right. Socialist-bourgeois collaboration under bourgeois leadership was
rendered impossible by the shrinkage of the DDP and DVP and by the
latter's move to the right. Before 1924 and the defeat of the working
dass, the DVP was not prepared tobe part of a "republican bourgeois"
arrangement; after 1924 this was the weakest alignment. "Right bourgeois" coalitions were the goal of organized capitalist interests, but the
fractiousness of the splinter parties and of the DNVP left them frustrated. Electorally, the most viable possibility remained socialist-bourgeois collaboration under bourgeois leadership; politically the SPD
remained willing, but once the economic crisis set in, as it did after
1929, the economic costs it exacted proved intolerable. After 1930 no
parliamentary government was possible that exduded both the SPD
and the NSDAP. Ultimately, both the SPD and the parliamentary
government itself were rejected.
Tue political interests of dasses are generally represented through
parties, and it is through the practice of the parties that struggles
among the dasses may take place. lt was characteristic of the last years
of the Weimar state that, except for the working dass, dasses became
detached from their parties, which ceased to be viewed as effective
representations of dass interests. This break in the link between representatives and represented weakened parliament after 1930 and presaged the movement toward what could be called parliamentary idiocy.
Concomitant with this was the relative increase in the power of the
military, the bureaucracy, and private-interest groups. 49 This shift did
not occur entirely against the will of the dominant dasses, nor did it
indicate a diminution of their power. German industry had, after all,
been socially dominant for decades without much of a direct presence

Table 6
Percentage of the Vote Obtained by the Parties and Coalitions Formed

1919b
1920
1924 (1)
1924 (2)
1928
1930
1932 (1)
1932 (2)
1933

KPD
(USPD)
7.7
20.0
13.3
9.2
10.7
13.1
14.3
17.0
12.2

SPD
37.8

21. 7c

20.4
26.0

29.8

24.6e

21.6
20.3
18.4

8.3

Z (+BVP)
20.0
18.0

DVP
4.4

6.3

~~:~

~:~
.l~'

DDP
18.6
5.8

~:~
1.1
.9
.8

~i:~

15.7

.. ···is:i··.··
14.0

14.0

1.1
2.0
1.0

Bourgeois
splinter
partiesa
1.6
3.1

..

~·~

7.3 ....
13.8

3.0
3.5
1.5

DNVP
10.3
14.9

rn.~
. : """2{[:~
14.3
7.1
6.0
8.5
7.9

Not
Voting
17.3
21.6
6.6
23.7
3.0
22.3
2.6
25.5
18.3
18.6
37.l
16.5
33.0
20.0
44.2 12.l
NSDAP

Sources: Bernhard Vogel et al., Wahlen in Deutschland (Berlin, New York, 1971), pp. 296, 297; Heinrich Striefler, Deutsche Wahlen in Bilder und
Zahlen (Dusseldorf, 1946), pp. 67, 68; Max Schwarz, MdR (Hanover, 1965), pp. 822, 823; S. M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday
Anchor, 1960), pp. 131-51.
Note: Abbreviations from left to right: KPD= German Communist party; USPD =Independent Social Democratic party (with KPD in 1920);
SPD= Social Democratic party of Germany; DDP = German Democratic party; Z = Catholic Center party (Zentrum); BVP = Bavarian affiliate of Z;
DVP = German People's party; DNVP= German National People's party; NSDAP =National Socialist German Workers party. Cabinet composition
did not mirror electoral results directly; frequently there were dabinets of "personalities," for example in 1922-24 and 1930--32. Altogether there were
twenty-two governments. 'The Z was nearly always the fulcrum; after 1924 its right wing tended to dominate. From 1923 to 1930 the DVP enjoyed
disproportionate inßuence. Prosperity and Stresemann's program for reintegrating Germany internationally were essentially responsible for bringing
the DVP into the ranks of the "middle parties"; this lasted only as long as they did.
aWirtschafts Partei, Christian National Peasants, and Rural People's party (CNBLP), Volkskonservativen, and regional splinter parties.
bThe government of revolutionary delegates, declared in November 1918, consisted of 3 SPD and 3 USPD members.
cThe initial position of the SPD yielded to cabinets strongly inßuenced by DVP.
d DNVP was sometimes in but mostly out of the government.
e SPD was not in government, but the government depended on SPD toleration.

Table 7
Vote Totals of Camps and Potential Coalitions
Left
1919
1920
1924
1924
1928
1930
1932
1932

(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)

45.5
41.7
33.7
35.2
40.7
37.7
35.9
37.3

Center__
38.6
26.3
22.5
41.0
28.8
18.5
16.8

Right
16.3
32.0
43.4
23.4
29.9
43.8
47.2

SOCIALISTa
bourgeois

Socialisth
BOURGEOIS

Republicanc
bourgeois

76.4
48.0
42.9
49.8
50.0
43.l
38.4
36.3

80.8
62.0
52.1
59.7
58.6
47.7
39.5
38.3

43.0
40.3
31.7+
33.7+
28.8+
23.l+
20.9
21.5

Right d
bourgeois

Actuale
coalition

16.3
32.0
36.8
37.6
35.9
25.5
10.l
14.0

76.4
48/40.3
55.5
41.0
58.6
36.9
41.5

Sources: Vogel et al. , Wahlen in Deutschland, p. 296, 297; Strießer, Deutsche Wahlen in Bilder und Zahlen , pp. 67, 68; Schwarz, MdR, pp. 822,
823; Lipset, Political Man , pp. 131-51; cf. K. D . Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik (Stuttgart, 1955), p. 645. On the parties generally:
Sigmund Neumann, Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik (Stuttgart, 1965); Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik (Bonn, 1965); E. Matthias
and R. Morsey, Das Ende der Parteien, 1933 (Dusseldorf, 1960) pp. 743-94.
aSPD+DDP+Z
b SPD+DDP+Z+ DVP
cDDP+Z+DVP
dDVP through DNVP
e SeeTable 6
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on the political scene or direct management of the state apparatus. 50
Tue Weimar Constitution had attempted to establish parliamentary
government as the locus for resolution of social and interest-group
conßicts, but so limited and democratic a system would have left too
much to be decided by vote counting. The constitution postulated a
kind of super pluralism with equilibrium produced by the continuous
collision of conßicting interests, almost all of which would have their
inputs. 51
Additionally, the bourgeois parties from the DDP through the
DNVP were singularly incapable of unifying the interests of the dominant classes. Prominent industrialists constantly bemoaned the fragmentation (Zersplitterung) and internal conßicts that rendered the
bourgeois parties incapable of merging or acting together to dominate
the political scene. 52 Of course they were unwilling, once the depression began, to make the kinds of concessions that had enabled
Stresemann to act as if such a dominance had been established. Tue
industrialists themselves, however, provided a recalcitrant base for any
unified party formation. They rejected political modification of private
interests and were "incapable of accepting co-responsibility .... for
national-political tasks"; they demonstrated irresponsibility and were
"incapable ofbuilding mass support and providing moral leadership."53
Back in 1923 industrialists had demonstrated this same selfishness
during the Ruhr occupation and inßation. Their selfishness blocked the
"national effort" even when the government was headed by a bourgeois-conservative shipping magnate, Cuno. They had favored militant
national resistance only to discipline organized labor and then colluded
with the French to ameliorate their economic situation. 54
Tue contradictory relations among the fractions of the bourgeoisie
disabled its own political parties and augmented both the role of the
state as the cohesive factor for the bloc of dominant classes and the
bourgeoisie's Bonapartist tendencies. Conflicts over political leadership within the industrial bourgeoisie worsened with the start of the
agricultural depression in 1928 and became even more acute with the
onset of the industrial depression. These conßicts seemed to immobilize not only the parties but also the state itself; state intervention
appeared to be--and was-riddled with contradictions.
N evertheless, as far as the dominant classes were concerned, the
state played the role of political organizer of the power bloc. Poulantzas
asserts, a bit too glibly, that "the state plays this role because the
political parties of the bourgeois fractions are unable to play an autonomous organizational role. [Tue state's role] emerges as the factor of
political unity of the power bloc under the protection of the hegemonic
fraction and as organizer of the latter's interests. "55 As the bourgeois
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parties declined they took on the role of transmission belts, virtually
carrying messages from private interest and pressure groups to the
state. In turn, the state moved from a parliamentary to a ministerial to a
presidential form, each stage being marked by a narrowing of those
circles to which the state was responsive. (In 1930 parliament disposed
of ninety-eight laws while five were enacted by emergency decree. By
1932, five were enacted by parliament and sixty-six by decree.) The
weakening of the bourgeois parties further exposed their essentially
class character. Capitalist groups became increasingly concerned with
what James O'Connor calls "the private appropriation of state power for
particularistic ends. "56 Instead of being populated by citizens, the
parties became transparent class representatives. Only the Catholic
Zentrum and later the Nazis escaped this fate. The consequence of this
demystification was further loss of support, especially from the Mittelstand. Ultimately, however, the Weimar state was unable, in any of its
forms, to resolve the contradictions within the bloc of dominant
classes. Before it could do so, the victories won by the working class
had to be reversed, and the struggle for hegemony within the dominant bloc had tobe resolved-both, of course, "in the interests of the
nation."

Weimar Stability: Labor-Capital Cooperation
No parliamentary-democratic state system can maintain itself without a mass base. Between 1924 and 1930 the German working class,
organized primarily in the SPD, provided a substantial part of this
base. The divisions and conßicts within and among the non-workingclass strata were such that governing without working-class participation would have been undesirable even had it been possible. Having
accepted the rules of the republican game, it was impossible to deny
the strength of the working-class party, which shared adherence to
those rules. Indeed, the working class's commitment to those rules was
greater than that of any other class. lt was after 1923, however, that the
policy indeterminacy built into those rules became acceptable to the
dominant classes. The defeat of the revolutionary working-class impulse had been completed by 1923: local communist uprisings had
been suppressed; previous concessions in the realm of wages and hours
had been reversed in the context of the Ruhr occupation; the inßation
facilitated liquidation of industrial debts; the SPD had rid itself of most
of its revolutionaries; völkisch radicalism had subsided; radical tax laws
were being rewritten, and their author, Matthias Erzberger, had been
killed. After 1924, a steady ßow of foreign capital facilitated business
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and industrial expansion. 57 The necessity of governing with labor was
recognized by leading industrialists as early as 1924, although initially
they meant the Catholic workers organized in the Zentrum. By 1926, a
leading industrialist, Paul Silverberg, could tell the annual convention
of the League of German Industry (RDI) that government without
organized labor (i.e., the SPD) was undesirable, even impossible. In a
development that furthered this reorientation, Stresemann had been
victorious in 1924 over the rightist, pro-DNVP wing of the DVP. 58
Some steel magnates and other dissidents migrated to the DNVP,
while Stresemann found a new source of support in the white-collar
employee wing of the party. 59 Stresemann argued that further counterrevolution would strengthen rather than weaken the left and would
drive the Catholic Zentrum back in a social-populist direction.
Industrialists and workers each found the other necessary for social
stability; their cooperation was mediated, albeit asymmetrically, by the
state. 60 Some elements of the dominant bloc objected from the outset,
but their opposition was stilled both by apparent economic prosperity
and the political stability engendered by cooperation. Some elements
of the working class also objected, but even the bulk of the KPD
recognized that a period of capitalist stabilization had begun after the
thorough defeats of October 1923 and German acceptance of the
Dawes Plan in April 1924. 61 Charles Maier employs the somewhat
anodyne concept of "corporatist equilibrium" to describe the post-1924
stability. Such a description, however, fails to appreciate the role of the
state and its apparatus in organizing the dominant classes. Maier
writes:
What permitted stability after 1924 was a shift in the focal point of
decision making. Fragmented parliamentary majorities yielded to ministerial bureaucracies . . . where interest-group representatives could more
easily work out social burdens and rewards. This displacement permitted
a new compromise: a corporatist equilibrium in which private interests
assumed the tasks that parliamentary coalitions found difficult. 62

As a statement about the consequences of the fragmentation of the
bourgeois parties this is correct, although there was nothing new in the
German bourgeoisie's reliance on the state organs. As a statement
about some kind of neutral or corporate state and a social equilibrium,
it is false. There is nothing neutral or classless about organized capitalism.
Although the economic recovery and prosperity of the years 1924-29
were both borrowed and uneven, they were experienced as a real
turnaround, despite consistently high unemployment. There were
good reasons for this optimistic view. In 1923 German industrial pro-
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duction represented 8 percent of world production compared with a
prewar share of 16 percent; the volume of industrial production in 1923
was only 55 percent of the 1913 figure. In addition, Germany had lost
75 percent of its iron ore sources, 31 percent of its blast furnaces, and
23 percent of its other iron and steel facilities in the peace settlement.
Yet by 1927 Germany had attained its prewar volume of industrial
production; an increase of 3. 5 percent in the following year made
Germany the world's number-two industrial power. 63 In addition, new
investment, rationalization, and concentration enabled German industry to attain a level of productivity formerly unique to the United
States. 64 Industrial interests could afford to govern with the working
masses and to accede to some of their demands. Between 1925 and
1930 export industry engaged in this kind of Giolittian arrangement in
the name of "quality production and expanded trade and consumption. "65 Heavy industry too went along with this, or, more accurately,
most ofheavy industry went along at best half-heartedly. For organized
agriculture, dependent on tariff protection, such an arrangement was
intolerable. lt had never really recovered and was almost immediately
the victim of a price-scissors trend. The agricultural sector became
compressed both as consumer and as producer. Production in 1929, for
example, was only 74 percent of the 1913 level, and the agricultural,
industrial, and total price indices were skewed accordingly (see
Table 8).
For the mass of industrial workers and their political (SPD) and
economic (ADGB) organs cooperation offered the possibility of both
success and stability. In the course of World War 1 the unions had
passed from toleration to recognition, and from 1918 to 1924 unions
and entrepreneurs had worked together with partially shared and
partially divergent goals in the central joint working groups (Zentrale
Arbeitsgemeinschaften). Once the revolutionary impulse had beendefeated, capital and labor formalized their relations through laws and
private agreements. A step-by-step system was devised consisting of
collective bargaining, mediation, and compulsory arbitration, which
institutionalized a certain amount of economic dass conßict while
simultaneously softening dass conßict in general. 66 The unions themselves came to perceive strikes as a means of last resort to be used only
when other means failed to yield a compromise. Only secure unions
could indulge themselves in such a routinized policy perspective, one
based on three important assumptions: first, that the unions did indeed
enjoy full recognition by the state, the industrialists, and the public as a
whole,; second, that through their assumption of "national" tasks and
responsibilities the unions had earned an unassailable, quasi-official or
public status; and third, that as institutions they were strong enough to

Table 8
Price Indices 1924-33

(1913= 100)

1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933

Agricultural
prices

Industrial
prices

Cast of
raw
materials

128
132
132
138
132
126
107
89
77

137
157
150
148
159
157
154
142
ll8
lll

136
133
130
132
134
132
120
108
88
88

84

Cast of
living

131
142
142
148
152
154
148
136
121
ll8

Nominal
wages

Real
hourly
wage
rates

Real
weekly
wage
earnings

91
123
128
145
164
169
155
137
ll3
ll5

100
105
ll0
ll7
123
126
127
122
121

84

70
87
90

97
108
ll0
105
100
94
98

Level of
industrial
production

77
92
87
ll0
ll3
ll4
99

82

66

74

Source: Gerhard Bry, Wages in Germany, 1871-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 461-67; Deutsches Zentral Archiv, Potsdam
(DZA), Büro des Reichspäsidenten/Landwirtschaftsfragen, 332/104; Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutschen Reich, 1926--33, passim.
Note: Hourly wages tended tobe the form of payment for industrial workers, weekly earnings for white collar employees. A reduced work week is
also indicated.
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weather even severe economic changes. 67 The extent to which such a
policy perspective was durable rather than tenuous was a political
question; the answer would depend not primarily on industrial or
economic dass relations but rather on political dass relations as evidenced in the parties and in the state. After 1924 the position of the
SPD and the working dass as underpinnings of the Weimar state
appeared to be permanent. Even bourgeois parliamentary governments, such as those that governed from 1924 to 1928, had to respect
and make significant concessions to the working dass.
An expansive economy, international reconciliation, sweeping social
legislation (typified by the unemployment insurance law of 1927 and
the acceptance of binding, compulsory arbitration of labor disputes
through the Labor Ministry), and vastly increased state welfare expenditures were all part of this collaboration. In a sense, industrialist
August Weber was correct when he told fellow members of the RDI
that the "whole so-called revolution has become a pure wage movement." Labor abandoned its political struggle while, within limits, its
economic struggle was incorporated. 68
The promises of the Weimar Constitution appeared to be bearing
fruit: not only were the unions accorded the right to organize (Koalitionsfreiheit), but the results of collective bargaining were recognized
as well. The state was dedared committed to Sozialpolitik, and according to artide 165, capital and labor were to enjoy parity in the determination of economic policy. Despite the obvious and severe setbacks
organized labor suffered in the four years following promulgation of the
constitution, the ADGB and SPD alike based their efforts on what it,
and the democratic republic it signaled, offered. For Rudolf Hilferding,
this was the form of state in which the dass opposition of workers could
be carried furthest without systematic violence; for Hugo Sinzheimer,
the privileged position of the unions provided a favorable basis for the
further development of society, nation, and state; while for Ernst
Fraenkel, the collective rights of labor represented the positive link
between the working dass and the Republic.
This sense of parity, of labor's co-responsibility for the social, economic, and political common good (Gemeinwohl), came to be conceptualized as "pluralist democracy," according to which the
democratization of the state could be followed by a democratization of
the economy. Thus, it was in 1928, at the height of Weimar's stability,
during the period of cooperation between organized labor and the
dynamic-export fraction of industry, that the ADGB put forward its
program for Wirtschaftsdemokratie, for democratizing the economy.
Whether such a program was feasible within a capitalist democracy or
would have taken Germany "beyond" capitalism is moot. The advent of
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economic adversity, a shift in the balance of power within industry, and
the beginning of a general capitalist offensive together led not only to
the abandonment of any hopes for economic democracy, but also to
immobility within both the SPD and ADGB and, ultimately, impotence and despair.
Bourgeois-working-class collaboration during the period of recovery
stabilized the dominance of the former by at once rewarding and
depoliticizing the latter. Playing by the rules of the game tended to
make the SPD a normal, interest-aggregating Volkspartei: Sigmund
Neumann has suggested that up to 1930, 25 percent of SPD members
and 40 percent of SPD voters were other than working class. 69 Strikes
were invariably about wages and other distribution questions; gone
were vague political demands and political strikes. Although they
retained a more violent tenor and archaic vocabulary, communist-led
actions in this period were not much different. 70 The SPD was simply
more forthright in representing, together with the unions, the day-today interests of the working class in a capitalist society. Thus, the major
electoral victory of 1928 was in no way interpreted as a mandate for
systemic change. Neither was the repression rather than cooptation of
rowdy KPD May Day demonstrations; the SPD would not mobilize
forces for change. Finally, in the same line were the toleration of
Brüning's nonparliamentary semidictatorship, the support of the reactionary, senile Hindenburg against Hitler for the presidency in 1932,
the holding back of the socialist Reichsbanner militia, and the politics
of the "lesser evil" right up to the final weeks of the Republic.
The bourgeois classes and their political representatives were not
unaware of the costs of this collaboration. In a routine and sometimes
successful manner, they opposed the "limitless spending" and "stultification of initiative" that were at the heart of SPD programs. What
they could not foresee in general was the exact limit of the economy's
ability to absorb popular programs. Hence their own credibility was
damaged, and much of their opposition appeared sporadic and unprincipled, selfish rather than for the national good. Various conflicts over
trade and tariff policy, for example, seemed to underline this selfishness while simultaneously demonstrating how split the dominant
classes really were. Important sectors of the Mittelstand came to see
themselves as victims of this selfish, weak-kneed policy, and the ranks
of the allies and supporters of Germany's social elites were weakened
accordingly. The DDP and DVP paid a price in lost support before
industry itself concluded that it could no longer afford collaboration.
The major bourgeois electoral victory of 1924 had created the conditions for a popular class state, that is, a state populated by classes rather
than equal citizen-atoms, but nevertheless a state where a bourgeois
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government seemed to be acting in the interests of all citizens and the
nation. Sacrifices of various kinds were demanded of all classes for the
good of the nation. The cooperation of the bourgeois classes and their
various interest groups, however, remained tenuous at best. The interests of the dominant classes were not unified, and the links between
representatives and represented remained weak. Although the balance
within the bourgeois parties (DDP, DVP, DNVP) shifted to the right,
as did the politics of the Catholic Zentrum, they all remained vulnerable to fissures and splits. Despite the absence of the SPD from the
government between 1924 and 1928, the internal coherence of the
bourgeois parties was not substantially augmented. Thus, the Zentrum
was unable to win the support of its Bavarian sister party for the
Zentrum's own conservative presidential candidate, Marx, against the
northern Protestant Hindenburg in 1925. 71 The DDP's ranks continued to shrink even during the period of stability. Stresemann was
constantly under fire from those within the DVP who perceived too
many of their individual interests being sacrificed. The DNVP was torn
between "abstentionist-rejectionist" and compromise-oriented alternatives as well as between rural and industrial demands. Despite its
second-place finish in the 1924 elections, the DNVP participated in the
bourgeois government only on two occasions between 1924 and 1928. 72
Indicative of the bourgeoisie's inability to raise itself from the level of
economic-corporate interests to the level of political interests was the
continuing growth, even before the depression, of splinter parties,
most of which claimed only to represent specific economic groups. 73
The major bourgeois parties never really succeeded in reconciling the
various interests of those who comprised their bases. Consequently,
the parliamentary and party format for bourgeois-working-class collaboration remained inadequate while it simultaneously aggravated existing cleavages within the bourgeois parties. This was neither the first
nor the last occasion when bourgeois political stability was dependent
on SPD and union support. The latter, in turn, was conditioned primarily by the bourgeoisie's ability to pay the bill.

The state bureaucracy
The state bureaucracy supplemented parliament and the parties as
an arena of dass collaboration. Many working-class economic victories,
both nationally and in Prussia, were achieved through the agency of the
Labor Ministry. Headed most frequently by members of the labor wing
of the Zentrum, this ministry tilted toward labor in arbitrating work
and contract disputes. Once the depression began it came under
constant attack from bourgeois forces. The Labor Ministry was also one
of the main sources, along with local government, of the costly social
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welfare and insurance programs (Sozialpolitik), which assumed tremendous symbolic as well as economic importance. 74 Tue Economics
Ministry served an analogous function in promoting the interests of the
industrial dasses. lt reflected the splits in the industrial camp, however, especially that between export-oriented, small and new industries and domestic-oriented heavy industry. 75 Major industries and
cartels supplied the ministry's leadership and staff, much of which
moved back and forth between the ministry and the League of German
Industry (RDI). 76 A similar situation existed in the Finance Ministry,
although there more democratic commercial and banking interests
dominated. 77
In their capacity as ministerial bureaucrats and politicians, these
individuals often adopted a certain far-sightedness and autonomy their
friends and colleagues back in the interest-group organizations failed to
appreciate. Their dass origins did not entirely guide their policy formulation. 78 Tue aristocratic and petty-bourgeois members of the bureaucracy did not behave differently because of their different origins.
lt is in this sense, too, that the Junkers had functioned as the intellectuals for the dominant industrialists. 79 Tue relative autonomy enjoyed
by the bureaucracy existed as a function of its role within the state.
Ostensibly, the bureaucracy represented the needs of the entire nation
in a neutral fashion. However, conflicts within the bureaucracy reflected arrangements and conflicts among the dominant dass fractions
and between them and the working dass on the political scene as a
whole. Tue less obvious the dominance of any particular capitalist
fraction, the greater the impact of the bureaucracy and of the executive.
Tue political disorganization of the dominant dasses, even during
the years of stabilization, rendered the bureaucracy a stronger force in
mediating interdass conflicts. Beyond this, Weimar coalition (SPD,
DDP, and Zentrum) and socialist governments (as in Prussia) added
republican personnel to all the previously antirepublican organs of
state and civil society: schools, police, chambers of commerce, judiciary, church. 80 They did not, however, restructure these organs; nor, in
the absence of real state power, could they have been expected to do
so. Since the working dass's political practice did not aim at taking state
power, the structures of the capitalist state remained intact, despite the
conflicts over leadership within the dominant dasses. 81

Crisis and the End of Stability
Tue bourgeois governments of 1924-28, under several DVP and
Catholic chancellors, were able to compromise and maneuver as much
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as they did ·only at the expense of the parties that constituted the
various coalitions. 82 Cabinets and bureaucracies worked out a host of
compromises, but party life showed signs ofbecoming moribund as the
transmission of interest-group pressures became an increasingly central activity. 83 Already, formal and real power began to issue from
different sources. Collaboration did not create consensus, and the
centrality of the middle parties masked the dedine and splitting of
their constituencies. The political crisis became increasingly acute
after 1928, before the economic crisis had really set in. No member or
fraction of the dominant bloc was capable of imposing its direction on
the other members of the bloc, either through parliament or other
organs of the state. The minimal ideological unity Stresemann was able
to impose dissolved even before his death in October 1929.
The bloc, in brief, could not surmount its own internal contradictions. 84 The political and economic interests of both industry and
agriculture were fragmented along several axes, and despite a plethora
of organizations and pressure groups, no voice was accepted as guiding.
Whereas before 19'28 state trade and social and foreign policies had
demonstrated considerable inconsistency and instability, after 1928
incapacitation became more frequent. As the political crisis deepened
and the locus of decision-making narrowed from parliament to cabinet
to presidential cirdes, the expression of dominant bloc interests actually became more fragmented. Despite the government's increased
emergency powers, it was faced with increased bourgeois disunity.
The SPD electoral victory of 1928 and the Young Plan for reparations
revisions set off the brewing political crisis. Fascism reappeared as a
mass party and as a possible political alternative through which the
interests of the dominant bloc might be represented less directly but
more effectively than they had been. The internal political crisis of the
dominant bloc and its dass offensive were intertwined. In some respects the situation after 1928 was like that of 1923 when the conservative shipping magnate, Cuno, had been chancellor: a fragmented
bourgeoisie concerned solely with its particularistic interests prevented the state from formulating a national policy while simultaneously undertaking an offensive against the working dass. The SPD
was hardly prepared for such a turn of events: the 1.2-million plus
increase in votes it received in 1928 over 1924 was not a reward for
steadfast opposition to capitalism and bourgeois rule, for such opposition had not been its policy. 85 Despite an initially very strong position
in the cabinet and parliament in 1928, the SPD program consisted only
of the same elements as before: defense of the daily interests of the
organized working dass within the capitalist system and continuation of
Stresemann's foreign policy. The SPD was, therefore, inadequately
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prepared for the massive lockouts undertaken by employers in Ruhr
heavy industry in the fall of 1928. The substantial electoral losses
suffered by the bourgeois parties accrued primarily to the benefit of
other splinter, rightist, and particularist parties. With prosperity
largely mortgaged to American capital through the agency of German
finance and industry, the prospects of an SPD government mediating
the conßicting needs of the dominant bloc were slim. 86
The political crisis was fueled by the onset of a fiscal crisis following
the collapse of the New York stock market and the subsequent
shrinkage of loans. The fiscal crisis served as a pretext for the ouster of
Rudolf Hilferding as finance minister and his replacement by the DVP
and 1. G. Farben representative, Paul Moldenhauer. Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht, representing another, still more anti-SPD faction of the dominant bloc, had undermined Hilferding's attempt to
restructure government finances in a manner commensurate with the
new situation but not entirely at the expense of the working dass.
Beginning in 1929 unemployment began to rise quickly, and it was over
this issue that the Grand Coalition (bloc 3) stretching from the SPD to
the DVP collapsed.
With almost 3 million unemployed by March 1930, the DVP refused
to agree to an increase in employers' contributions to the unemployment insurance fund, and the coalition collapsed. 87 lt was indicative of
the SPD's identification with the existing system that it was in no
position to ask the working dass to accept this setback in the name of a
larger struggle. Just prior to his death the previous October,
Stresemann had barely convinced his DVP delegation to accept a
similar compromise on unemployment benefits and taxation. In the
face of substantial opposition to the Young Plan, Stresemann had
managed to coerce minimal dominant bloc unity in its favor. 88 With his
death, anti-social-collaborationist forces were no longer to be restrained, and the conflicts within the dominant bloc could no longer be
held in check.
Industrialists had all along complained of high "political wage rates,"
but with the onset of the depression the costs of maintaining mass
legitimacy through the working dass became "excessive." Under the
pressure of the heavy-industry fraction, the RDI at its 1929 meetings
issued a blistering attack on the policies of the labor-export coalition.
Entitled "Recovery or Collapse," it became industry's manifesto for
rolling back the gains of organized labor, those obtained both in the
workplace and in parliament. Beyond that, however, this and other
similar initiatives were part of a campaign by heavy industry (supported
by organized agriculture) to remove the dynamic-export fraction from
its hegemonic position. These initiatives gained momentum-due both
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to political developments and to the decline of international tradeand, at the 1931 RDI convention, spokespeople for the dynamic fraction were either ousted from their leadership positions or eased into
retirement.
Tue economic crisis-first in agriculture, then in domestic, and
finally in export industry-together with the state's fiscal crisis rendered the costs of social collaboration, reparations fulfillment, and a
trade policy based on these two intolerable for the dominant classes.
Tue contradiction betwe.en the necessary costs of collaboration and the
imperatives of capital accumulation and reproduction could no longer
be accepted by a fragmented dominant bloc. Key sectors of capital,
including mining, iron and steel, and the whole of agriculture, were in
the midst of profitability crises even before the full brunt of the
international depression was felt. Partially opposed to these sectors,
however, was a prosperous export sector consisting mainly of new
industries-ones that had a greater interest in the fulfillment of reparations and a lesser interest in the repression of labor. Some of these
industries even subscribed to trade union ideas about the need for
increased mass consumption (Kaufkraft). Heavy industry and agriculture were not altogether in agreement either. Whereas industry
preferred low food costs and high industrial prices, agriculture preferred just the reverse. Whereas both industrial sectors were operating
well below capacity and looked favorably on foreign expansion, pacific
or otherwise, agriculture was overproducing and tended toward various
autarkic formulas. Once the economic crisis began, it became even
more difficult to subsume the diverse economic-corporative interests of
the various fractions of the bloc into one political interest. Tue frequency with which representatives of these fractions found it necessary
to remind each other of their common opposition to the organized
working dass bears witness not only to the depth ofhostility toward the
SPD and KPD but also to the increased salience and depth of conßicts
within the bloc.
Between mid-1930 and the end of 1932 three successive semi- and
nonparliamentary governments failed to unify, transcend, or subsume
the interests of the dominant fractions while securing for themselves a
mass base. Was there no bourgeois political force to organize the
political unity of the dominant economic fractions out of the diversity of
their economic interests? Was no political unity possible and no mass
political support available within the Republic--despite the singlemindedness of elite anti-socialism? Were the maintenance of capitalist
economic relations and political democracy so antithetical in this conjuncture that undermining of the Republic was a self-evident necessity
for the dominant classes?
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Heinrich Brüning, a leader of the Catholic Zentrum party, became
chancellor following the collapse of the Grand Coalition in March 1930.
He ruled without a parliamentary majority through the semiconstitutional mechanism of presidential decree. The Brüning regime functioned as a surrogate for the bourgeois parties, which had, by this time,
lost nearly their entire electoral backing. They had become simple
transmission belts for economic interests; under pressure from their
industrial backers they had become creatures of "industrial egotism
lacking any social concern. " 89 A fully inverse relationship had developed between industry's direct inßuence in a party and that party's
electoral viability: the bourgeois parties were now capital's own, and
they proved useless. The first year of Brüning's regime was, nevertheless, tolerated by the SPD, which could have toppled him. He attempted to implement a program bridging the differences among the
three dominant fractions, and his economic policies were characterized
by brutal deßationary budget-balancing and belt-tightening. Brüning's
modest efforts to force the estate owners to modernize, give up their
huge subventions, or face massive peasant resettlement (land reform)
led them to conspire with President Hindenburg's camarilla, and Brüning was abandoned. In fact, however, the heavy-industry fraction had
already turned against him because he had not cut himself off entirely
from the pressure of organized labor, Catholic and socialist. The dynamic-export fraction of industry, on the other hand, was prepared to
continue supporting him, but it was no longer setting the tone or
agenda for the dominant classes as a whole. 90
Brüning was succeeded in May 1932 by a cabinet of barons headed
by Franz von Papen. Papen's government was heralded as being fully
authoritarian and national, but throughout its six-month tenure it
lacked any base of mass support and failed to unify the interests of the
dominant fractions. lt catered almost exclusively to the protectionist
and autarkic strivings of the rural elite and heavy industry while failing
to integrate the Nazi party as a junior member of the government.
Papen was even less able than Brüning to harmonize the interests of
the three dominant fractions, although he was certainly more energetic
and effective in his repression of the SPD and unions. Because he
incurred the wrath of the dynamic-export fraction and failed to split and
enlist part of the Nazi party, Papen was replaced in early December
1932 by General von Schleicher.
Schleicher's failings were a mirror image of his predecessor's: if
Papen erred on the side of estate owners, deßation, domestic-oriented
heavy industry, autarky, and failure to seek a mass base, then
Schleicher and his left-Keynesian minister for "Work Creation" erred
grievously on the side of opposition to the rural elite, inßation, the
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export industries, and too much dickering with the Nazi "left" and the
unions. His public-works program was not unlike that proposed by
some union spokespeople. Although both fractions of industry were
opposed to an inßation, the prospects of a policy shift in favor of the
dynamic-export industries came as a rude shock to those in heavy
industry and agriculture who had previously brought about a shift in
their own favor. Conßicts rather than joint interest had come to the fore
among the dominant fractions. Finally, Schleicher's efforts raised the
spectre of state socialism and a possible reparliamentarization of political life, even in military dress. The prospect of a dirigist social dictatorship supported by Nazi and union anticapitalist masses was too
much to bear: the reentry of the unions into the corridors of power
threatened what had been the primary political accomplishment of the
previous year and a half, namely, their exclusion.
After the failures of the previous two years it was the political fear
inspired by Schleicher's program that was central and that led finally to
the appointment of Hitler on January 30, 1933. Papen's program, this
time with a mass base and a more imperialist tone, appeared to be the
least common denominator for the three dominant fractions. Tue question remaining was how to reconcile the interests of an autarkic rural
elite with the interests of the export-oriented dynamic industries. A
program for forming cartels in agricultural production and for guaranteeing prices without altering property relations would satisfy the
demands of the estate owners. A program of holding down the costs of
production while increasing public spending, especially on armaments, would go some way toward satisfying heavy industry. A vigorous
program of trade expansion, especially in middle and southeastern
Europe-imperialism-could open avenues for export industry without setting it against either the rural elite or heavy industry. Residual
notions oflaissez-faire entrepreneurship would have to give way to state
guidance; ideological homage to the Mittelstand would be honored,
after some early confusion, mostly in the breach; and a republic that
could only infrequently muster a majority in its favor, but that was
nevertheless divisive and costly, would have to be abandoned. lnitially,
given an improvement in the international economic situation, "only"
the peasantry, the working class, and Germany's neighbors would have
to pay.
After 1929 Germany witnessed a continuous narrowing of the locus
of decision-making and decision-makers. First parliament ceased to
participate in making crucial decisions; then the parties themselves
became nearly irrelevant, and finally even the cabinet ministers were
shut out. Within the corporate-interest organizations such as the RDI,
the general-membership assemblies yielded decision-making power to
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their presidia and then to a few executive leaders. By the end of 1932,
crucial decisions were being made by a handful of men in leadership
cirdes, and one can indeed speak of diques. Although elections occurred with increasing frequency after 1930, their primary effect was to
destabilize the situation further. They served also to indicate that a new
Mittelstand mass had been aggregated, more on the basis of ideological
and political unity than economic. Since 1924, most industrialists and
most bourgeois politicians had remained somewhat aloof from völkisch
(populist radicalism) and had come to look upon it with disdain. After
1930, however, this new popular mass and the Nazi party it supported
became objects of their intense interest. Once they established that
both the party and its mass were (or could become) supporters of social
order, various governmental possibilities involving the Nazis became
feasible. In the eyes of those professional politicians and economic
leaders for whom the NSDAP was an exogenous force and its supporters potential revolutionaries, the preferred strategy was to split the
party and enlist its masses. lt was only reluctantly that the leading
industrial cirdes became receptive to the idea that the entire NSDAP
had to be called upon to take charge of the state and provide that
popular base that had been lacking since 1930.
But what was the NSDAP to be called on to do? To assume state
power, to be the dass in charge of the state for the maintenance of the
economic and political order? Would the Nazis constitute a dass, or
would they merely act as an agent for the capitalist dass or for some
capitalists? Or were the Nazis simply the only acceptable common
denominator for stabilizing the political system and guaranteeing the
social system? The leading representatives of the dominant dasses
thought the Nazis manageable, despite their demands for total power.
Industrialists and agrarians do not seem to have feared that, like the
mid-nineteenth-century bourgeoisie described by Marx, they were
about to "give up the right to rule for the right to make money." As
guarantors of capitalism, as proponents of a strong, imperialist Germany, the Nazis appeared tobe the best available possibility.
The manner in which dasses had been organized and inserted into
the political struggle up to 1930 led first to success in isolating the
economic struggles of the dominated dasses from their political struggle and then to the defeat of both facets. But the political unity of the
dominant dasses was not successfully molded out of the diversity and
isolation of their economic struggles. 91 Further, the political support
previously tendered by the Mittelstand in exchange for nonsocialist
stability evaporated. By 1930 virtually all sections of the dominant bloc
agreed that postcrisis Germany must be spared the costliness and
unreliability of an ineffective, democratic political structure and a
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profit-devouring social welfare system. Beyond that, however, there
was little clarity: a presidential dictatorship, a military dictatorship, a
restructured but suffrage-based republic with vague corporatist overtones, a government with or without a mass base-all were conceivable
though each would necessitate a different base of legitimacy and a
different internal arrangement of the dominant bloc. 92
Thus the rollback of working-class gains, a solution to the fractional
struggles inside the dominant bloc, and some settlement with the
supporting classes outside the center of the capitalist mode of production (peasants, petty bourgeoisie) were all on the agenda. 93 No one of
these tasks required a fascist or imperialist solution; perhaps even all
three in their ensemble did not. But the concrete conjuncture and
manner in which these tasks appeared heightened such a possibility. As
we have seen, the dominant bloc eventually "decided" for fascism,
although there may have been other ways out of the economic, political, and social crisis that too would not have violated the fundamental
interests of its members. 94
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What Produces Fascism:
Preindustrial Traditions or a Crisis
of the Capitalist State?
GeoffEley
I
The aim of this essay is to explore some of the emerging emphases
in current discussions of fascism. In some ways that discussion
has entered the doldrums. There was a certain high point in the
late 1960s, when the subject was first properly opened up, and
when the generalizing ambitions of social scientists and historians
brießy converged. Ernst Nolte's Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche,
translated with exceptional speed as Three Faces of Fascism: Action
Francaise, Italian Fascism, National Socialism; general surveys by
Eugen Weber, Francis L. Carsten, and John Weiss; an anthology on
the European right edited by Eugen Weber and Hans Rogger; the
thematic first issue of a new periodical, the Journal of C ontemporary
History; Barrington Moore, Jr. 's vastly inßuential Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy (1966); the Das Argument discussions of
the German new left; and three international conferences in Seattle
(1966), Reading, England (1967), and Prague (1969)-all these imparted an excitement and vitality to work on the subject. 1 In retrospect
there is an air of innocence to this activity, and its intense preoccupation with comparison, generalization, and theory has tended not to
survive the subsequent growth of empirical research. These days
people are far more cautious, because the accumulated weight of
historical scholarship has seemed to compromise the explanatory
potential of the old theorizations.
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So what is left, once certain old certainties (like totalitarianism or the
orthodox Marxist approaches) have been abandoned? The answer, if we
consult the most recent publications, is not very much. We know far
better which theories do not work (totalitarianism, the 1935 Dimitrov
formula, the authoritarian personality, the mass-society thesis, monopoly-group theory, and so on) than those that do. 2 There have been
certain major interventions-the work of Nicos Poulantzas and the
controversy surrounding Renzo De Felice are two that come to mindbut on the whole they have not sparked much widespread debate. 3
Most writers have tended to settle for a typological approach to the
definition of fascism, by using certain essentially descriptive criteria
(ideological ones have tended to be the most common) as a practical
means of identifying which movements are "fascist" and which are not.
Yet this begs the more difficult conceptual issues and leaves the
stronger aspects of definition (such as the dynamics of fascism's emergence, and its relation to dass, economics, and political development)
to the concrete analysis of particular societies. 4
Understandably, this is an outcome with which historians can live. In
fact, the enormous proliferation of empirical work over the past ten to
fifteen years has concentrated overwhelmingly on more immediate
problematics, normally with a national-historical definition (for example, of N azism or Italian fascism rather than fascism in general). We
"know" far more than ever before, but this remains the knowledge of
highly particularized investigations. Not surprisingly, a common response has been the philistine cry of despair (or perhaps of triumph):
"reality" is simply too "complex." Radical nominalism easily follows,
and there is precious little agreement as to whether fascism even exists
as a general phenomenon. 5
At the same time, there is now a large body of excellent work that
lends itself to theoretical appropriation. Some of this is on the less
significant fascisms of the north and west of the European continent or
on the larger but ambiguous "native fascisms" of the East, and facilitates a stronger comparative dimension to the discussion. Other contributions are on specific aspects of German and Italian history, including
the structure of interest representation, the sociology of the Nazi
movement and the nature of the Nazi electorate in Germany, or the
precise dynamics of the post-World War 1 crisis in ltaly. In the langer
term this intensive reworking of the empirical circumstances of the
fascist victories, on the basis of exceptionally elaborate primary research, often sophisticated methodologies, and "middle-level generalizations," promises to reconstruct our theoretical understanding of
fascism. My own object is more modest. lt is clear that the coherence of
current research relies on a number of organizing perspectives that
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derive from the older theoretical literature. These run through the
analytical structures of particular works with varying degrees of explicitness and self-conscious utilization. The aim of this essay is to
identify some of the perspectives, to explore their strengths and weaknesses, and by drawing on the more recent theoretical discussions,
perhaps to suggest where future interest might fruitfully be directed. 6
II

One of the commonest emphases in the literature is a kind of deep
historical perspective, which proceeds from the idea of German, and to
a lesser extent Italian, peculiarity when compared with the "West." In
this case the possibility of fascism is linked to specific structures of
political backwardness. These are themselves identified with a distinctive version of the developmental process, and are thought to be
powerful impediments to a society's ultimate "modernization."
This "backwardness syndrome" is defined within a global conceptual
framework of the most general societal comparison. lt stresses
"lateness" of industrialization and national unification and their complex interaction, predisposing toward both a particular kind of economic structure and a far more interventionist state. The divergence
from Western political development is usually expressed in terms of the
absence of a successful "bourgeois revolution" on the assumed AngloFrench model, an absence that facilitates the dominance after national
unification of an agrarian-industrial political bloc with strong authoritarian and antidemocratic traditions. The failure to uproot such
preindustrial traditions is thought to have obstructed the formation of a
liberal-democratic polity, and in general this is taken to explain the
frailty of the national liberal traditions, and their inability to withstand
the strains of a serious crisis. In recent social science this perspective
stems from (among others) Barrington Moore, Alexander
Gerschenkron, and the discussions sponsored by the Social Science
Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics. In contemporary Marxism it has drawn new impetus from discussion of the ideas of
Antonio Gramsci. In both cases the analysis may be traced back to the
end of the last century. 7 lt exercises a profound inßuence on how most
historians tend to see the problem of fascism, though frequently at a
distance, structuring the argument's underlying assumptions rather
than being itself an object of discussion.
The argument was put in an extreme, discursive form by Ralf
Dahrendorf in Society and Democracy in Germany, which deeply
inßuenced a generation of English-speaking students of German his-
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tory. lt has also functioned strategically in a large body of work dealing
with the imperial period of German history (1871-1918), whose authors
write very much with 1933 in mind. One of the latter, Jürgen Kocka,
has recently reaffirmed Dahrendorf's argument in a particularly explicit way, which highlights the specific backwardness of German political culture. Thus in Kocka's view "German society was never truly a
bourgeois society," because the "bourgeois virtues like individual responsibility, risk-taking, the rational settlement of differences, tolerance, and the pursuit of individual and collective freedoms" were much
"less developed than in Western Europe and the USA." Indeed, the
chances of a "liberal-democratic constitutional development" were
blocked by a series of authoritarian obstacles. Kocka lists
the great power of the Junkers in industrial Germany and the feudalizing
tendencies in the big bourgeoisie; the extraordinary power of the bureaucracy and the army in a state that had never experienced a successful
bourgeois revolution and which was unified from above; the social and
political alliance of the rising bourgeoisie and the ever-resilient agrarian
nobility against the sharply demarcated proletariat; the closely related
anti-parliamentarian, anti-democratic, and anti-liberal alignment of large
parts of the German ruling strata. B

In fact, the "powerful persistence of pre-industrial, pre-capitalist traditions" preempted the legitimacy of the Weimar Republic and favored
the rise of right-wing extremism.
These arguments, which are conveniently summarized in Kocka's
essay, are representative of the generation of German historians who
entered intellectual maturity during the 1960s, in a fertile and (for the
time) liberating intellectual encounter with the liberal social and political science then in its N orth American heyday. This is particularly true
of those historians who have explicitly addressed the question of
N azism's longer-term origins, for whom such figures as Karl Dietrich
Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, Ernst Fraenkel, Martin Broszat, M. Rainer
Lepsius, and Dahrendorf provided early intellectual examples. 9 Here,
for instance, is Hans-Jürgen Puhle summarizing the argument in terms
that correspond precisely to the ones used by Kocka. Fascism is to be
explained by the specific characteristics of a society "in which the
consequences of delayed state-formation and delayed industrialization
combined closely together with the effects of the absence of bourgeois
revolution and the absence of parliamentarization to form the decisive
brakes on political democratization and social emancipation. " 10
lt should be noted that this approach to the analysis of fascism is
advanced as an explicit alternative to Marxist approaches, which for
this purpose are reduced by these authors polemically and rather
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simplistically to a set of orthodox variations on themes bequeathed by
the Comintern, in a way that ignores the contributions of (among
others) Poulantzas, the Gramsci reception, and Tim Mason. 11 Thus in a
labored polemic against the German new left Heinrich August Winkler
gives primary place in his own explanation of Nazism to preindustrial
survivals, which in other (healthier) societies had been swept away.
This was the factor that explained "why certain capitalist societies
became fascist and others not. " 12 Or, as Kocka puts it, adapting Max
Horkheimer's famous saying: "Whoever does not want to talk about
pre-industrial, pre-capitalist and pre-bourgeois traditions should keep
quiet about fascism. "13
Kocka specifies this argument in a detailed study of American whitecollar workers between 1890 and 1940, which is motivated by an
explicit comparison with Germany. 14 He begins with a well-known
feature of Nazism, namely, its disproportionate success among the
lower middle dass or petty bourgeoisie, and among white-collar workers in particular. He then abstracts a "general social-historical hypothesis" from this-namely, that the lower middle classes develop a
"potential susceptibility to right-wing radicalization as a consequence
of transformation processes which typically appear at advanced stages
of capitalist industrialization"-and proceeds to test it against the experience of American employees in retailing and industry between the
end of the nineteenth century and World War II. 15 After careful
discussions of social origin, educational background, income differentials, organizational experience, and status consciousness, he condudes
that American white-collar workers showed a much lower propensity to
see themselves as a distinct dass or status group superior and hostile to
the working dass. This "blurring of the collar line" helps explain the
absence of "class-specific" political tendencies comparable to those of
German employees, because while the latter turned to the Nazis in
large numbers, their American counterparts joined with manual workers in support of the New Deal. Thus the comparable socioeconomic
situations of white-collar workers in the two countries failed to produce
identical ideological or political orientations. If this is so, Kocka argues,
perhaps the general hypothesis, which seeks to explain the rise of
fascism by the "changes, tensions, and contradictions inherent in advanced capitalist societies," needs to be qualified. 16
Kocka considers a number of explanations for the divergence, juxtaposing German and American particularities in each case. Thus the
socialist consciousness and greater independence of the German labor
movement, which led to its deliberate isolation in the political system,
was not replicated in the United States and American white-collar
workers had far less reason to construct ideological defenses against the
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left. Second, ethnicity fragmented the potential unity of both workers
and petty bourgeoisie in the United States far more than religious or
ethnic differences did in Germany. Third, the swifter emergence of the
interventionist state in Germany tended to emphasize the importance
of the collar line and legally cemented the lines of differentiation (for
example, through the separate insurance legislation for white-collar
employees), while, fourth, the existence of "a stratified educational
system" tended to strengthen the barriers between occupations by
lowering the mobility between manual and nonmanual jobs. Each of
these points is well taken, though the enormous expansion of tertiary
employment in Germany after the turn of the century (and hence the
broadly based recruitment of the white-collar labor force), is probably
understated, as are the conceptual difficulties in mobility studies,
which Kocka takes rather uncritically on board. 17
Kocka reserves his major explanation for a fifth factor, namely, "the
continuing presence or absence of pre-industrial corporatist/ bureaucratic traditions at advanced stages of industrialization. " 18 In the
United States the absence of feudal traditions has long been seen as a
crucial determinant of the country's political culture, permitting the
hegemony of democratic citizenship ideals and the containment of dass
animosity. 19 In Germany, by contrast, the political culture suggests a
"deficit in some essential ingredients of a modern bourgeois or civil
society that was closely but inversely related to the strength of Germany's pre-industrial, pre-capitalist, and pre-bourgeois traditions." In
the case of white-collar workers this created much ready support for
the fascists. 20
There is much to agree with in Kocka's account, which is exactly the
kind of controlled comparison the field so badly needs. By taking the
idea of preindustrial continuities and arguing it through in a very
specific context he enables us to see more clearly its attractions and
disadvantages. The very concreteness of the analysis allows the case for
the German Sonderweg-for German exceptionalism-to be made
more convincingly probably than ever before. At a general level his
conclusions seem unimpeachable. This applies most certainly to his
stress on "the relative autonomy of social-structural and socio-cultural
developments" within the larger process of capitalist industrialization.
As the American material shows, there is nothing in the logic of the
latter per se to send industrial workers automatically to the left and
nonmanual ones automatically to the right of the political spectrum (or,
one might add, to associate specific ideologies or political attitudes
necessarily with any particular social group).
At the same general level, it is hard to quarre! with Kocka's formulation of the pre-industrial argument:
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The uneasy coexistence of social structures that originated in different
eras, the tense overlayering of industrial capitalist social conßicts with
pre-industrial, pre-capitalist social constellations-the "contemporaneity
of the uncontemporary"-defined Germany's path to an industrial society,
but not America's.21

His practical elaboration of this point, however, is not wholly convincing. To single out the primacy of preindustrial traditions from the
larger explanatory repertoire seems arbitrary, not least because some of
the major German particularities in Kocka's list-for example, the rise
of the Social Democratic party (SPD), or the constitution of Angestellten (employees in the private sector and low-status public employees) as a separate social category by the interventionist state-are
formed during industrialization rather than before it. 22 Moreover,
though Kocka seeks to establish German peculiarity compared with the
"West", what he actually shows with most of his argument is American
peculiarity with Europe, certainly with the European continent andin
many ways with Britain too.
Ultimately Kocka's view of fascism is confusing. On the one hand, he
upholds the relationship between capitalism and fascism ("the susceptibility of the new middle dass to right-wing extremism ... would not
have existed without the changes, tensions, and crises that accompanied the creation of an industrial capitalist society"), pointing only to
its interaction with older preindustrial traditions in a complex causal
dialectic ("the tension and crises inherent in industrial capitalist systems on one side, and the repercussions of the collision of older
traditions with industrialization and modernization, on the other"). 23
On the other hand, the main logic of his argument definitely gives
analytical priority to the preindustrial part of the equation, making it
the real difference between Germany (which went fascist) and other
countries (which did not). 24 However, all capitalist societies are forged
from precapitalist materials, and this is as true of the United States
(with its nonfeudal configuration of property-owning white democracy)
as it is of Germany (with, if we follow Kocka for the sake of argument,
its feudal legacy of military and bureaucratic traditions) and elsewhere.
In the period of industrialization itself the implied ideal of a "pure"
capitalism without precapitalist admixtures (the "modern bourgeois or
civil society" that Germany is supposed not to have been and against
which German history is measured) never existed. That being the case
the crucial problem becomes that of establishing how certain "traditions" became selected for survival rather than others-how certain
beliefs and practices came to reproduce themselves under radically
changed circumstances, and how they became subtly transformed in
the very process of renewal. Preindustrial values had to be rearticu-
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lated in the new conditions of an industrial-capitalist economy. lt is this
process of active reproduction through a succession of new conjunctures between the 1870s and 1930s, surely, that has first claim on
our attention.
In other words, Kocka's argument can be tested only on the terrain
he deliberately abandons, namely the immediate context of the Weimar Republic. lt is here that white-collar attitudes acquired their
specific content and political effectiveness, in the vicissitudes of the
capitalist economy and the permanent political uncertainty after 1918,
for to ensure their disproportionate right-wing orientation (and eventually to harness a fascist potential) required a positive ideological
labor, on the part of employers, the state, and the right-wing parties.
One of the least satisfactory aspects of the preindustrial argument is a
kind of inevitabilism-a long-range sociocultural determinism of preindustrial traditions-that implies that German white-collar allegiances
were just never available for left-wing politics until after 1945. This is
partly belied by the manifest dividedness of white-collar allegiances
until the late 1920s, and once we concede the existence of significant
exceptions, as in any historical argument indeed we must (for example,
why did the causal chain of preindustrial status mentalities and rightwing proclivities work for some white-collar groups at different times
but not for others?), the preindustrial argument looks far less compelling. In fact, there is much evidence that in the earlier circumstances of
the German Revolution many white-collar workers moved significantly
to the reformist left. That the left-wing parties (especially the SPD)
failed to respond creatively to these possibilities was less the result of
German white-collar workers' ineluctable conservatism (bequeathed
by the absence of bourgeois revolution, and so on), than of specific
political processes and their outcomes, which were themselves naturally subject to the disposing and constraining inßuence of social and
economic determinations.
Similarly, we can scarcely understand the nature of the collar line
unless we also examine the technical division oflabor, the social context
of the workplace, and the position of white-collar workers in the labor
process-all of which were experiencing some basic changes in the
early twentieth century, in Germany no less than in the United States,
but which are strangely absent from Kocka's final account. In the end
the invocation of preindustrial ideological continuities confuses these
issues, though the argument is handled more constructively in Jürgen
Kocka's text than in most others.
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III
One point emerges dearly enough from Kocka's account, and that is
the limited explanatory potential of a sociological approach to fascism.
This should not be misunderstood: I am not voicing hostility to sociology per se, either to the use of different kinds of social theory or to
the adoption of social-scientific methodology, quantitative or otherwise. Nor am I suggesting that sociological approaches to fascism in
particular are completely lacking in value. Quite the contrary, in fact.
Tue careful dissection of the fascist movement's social composition
through analysis of the leadership, activists, and ordinary membership,
and through a long tradition of sophisticated electoral analysis, has
been an essential feature of recent research. lt has generated an
enormous amount of information and many new questions, providing
the indispensable foundation for any intelligent reßection. 25
Tue problems arise with the larger condusions. Writers move too
easily from an empirical sociology of the fascist movement and its
electorate to a general thesis concerning its origins and conditions of
success, which is usually linked to conceptions of modernization, social
change, and the impact of economic crisis. Such conceptions combine
with the deep historical perspective identified above to suggest that
fascism is structurally determined by a particular developmental experience. This is powerfully represented, for instance, in Barrington
Moore's celebrated arguments about the relationship of different developmental trajectories ("dictatorship" and "democracy") to the societal dominance of different types of modernizing coalitions (based on
specific configurations of land-owning and urban-bourgeois elements
and their links to popular forces). In German historiography especially,
it is strongly implied that fascism follows logically from patterns of
partial or uneven modernization, which throw unreformed political
institutions and "traditional" social structures into contradiction with
the "modern" economy. In some versions this effectively redefines
fascism as a more general problem of political backwardness.
In this sort of thinking the notion of traditional strata, which are
unable to adjust to modernization for a mixture of material and psychological reasons, has tended to play a key part. Since the 1920s, for
instance, there has been general agreement that fascism originates
socially in the grievances of the petty bourgeoisie or lower middle
dass. In the words of Luigi Salvatorelli in 1923, fascism "represents the
dass struggle of the petty bourgeoisie, squeezed between capitalism
and the proletariat, as the third party between the two conßicting
sides. " 26 This was the commonest contemporary judgment and has
been pursued repeatedly by both historians and sociologists, Marxist
and non-Marxist alike. Most of the accumulated evidence (and a moun-
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tain of continuing research) is assembled in an enormous collection of
essays recently edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan
Petter Myklebust, Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European
Fascism (1980), and while the aggregate effect of around 800 pages is
hard to assess, it seems to confirm the received assumptions. There
have been attempts to suggest that other social groups were ultimately
more important in the fascists' makeup, or that class was less important
than "generational revolt. " 27 On the evidence of Who Were the Fascists, however, the fascist movement's social composition seems to have
been disproportionately weighted toward the petty bourgeoisie (that is,
small-scale owners and producers, together with the new strata of
salaried employees, including lower grade civil servants, junior managerial and technical personnel, teachers, clerical workers, and parts of
the professions ). 28
At the same time, to call fascism ßatly a protest movement of the
petty bourgeoisie is clearly an oversimplification. As David Roberts
observes in an excellent discussion of petty bourgeois fascism in Italy,
the tendency is to "assume that if we can find social categories enabling
us to distinguish fascists from non-fascists, we have the key to explaining the phenomenon," with consequences that are potentially extremely reductionist. 29 As Roberts continues, historians of Italian
fascism habitually analyze it "in terms of socio-economic crisis and the
traumas and frustrations which industrial modernization causes the
lower middle class," and the same is equally true of writers on
Nazism. 30 As suggested above, this argument conjoins with another
popular thesis concerning the relationship of fascism to modernization,
where the movement's specificity derives from "its appeal to certain
kinds of people who see themselves as losers in modern technological
civilization," who rejected "the modern industrial world" and took
refuge in an ideology of "utopian anti-modernism. " 31 The problem
here is that the correlations between fascist ideology, the support of the
petty bourgeoisie, and general economic trends are drawn in a way that
is too general and mechanical. Though the casualties of capitalist
industrialization were certainly prominent among the radical right's
supporters, this was by no means the whole story.
As David Roberts reminds us, the deficiencies in this standard view
"stem not from the insistence on the petty bourgeois role in fascism,
but from the inferences about motiviation that are made from this fact
of social composition. " 32 Summarizing his own argument in The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism he highlights a quite different
ideological tendency in the petty bourgeoisie: so far from "trying to
preserve traditional values and repudiate the modern industrial
world," its exponents were firmly committed to a heavily productivist
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vision of industrial progress, and harboured few "backward-looking"
anxieties about the modern world in the way normally attributed. In
fact, they were preoccupied less with the socioeconomic problems of
declining preindustrial strata than with the long-term political questions of Italy's national integration and cultural self-confidence. Their
resentments were aimed less at the bearers of capitalist industrialization than at the representatives of a narrowly based parliamentary
liberalism (not forgetting, of course, the socialist left, whose growth the
latter seemed irresponsibly to permit). In Roberts' view, petty-bourgeois fascism emerged as a critique of "Italy's restrictive transformist
political system" under the radicalizing circumstances of World War I.
As "political outsiders," its spokespersons presented themselves as a
new populist "vanguard" capable of providing the ideological leadership effectively abdicated (as they saw it) by the old Giolittian establishment. Moreover, their urgency stemmed not just from the
shattering experience of the war, but from the ensuing crisis of the
biennio rosso, with its alarming evidence of Socialist electoral gains,
working-class insurgency, and ambiguous Popolare radicalism. 33
Under these circumstances radical nationalism was an intelligible response to the social dynamics of national disintegration. Affirming the
virtues of industrial power, productivism, and dass collaboration, its
architects offered a program of national syndicalism, which "could
mobilize and politicize the masses more effectively and thereby create
a more legitimate and popular state. " 34
In other words, it is worth considering the possibility that fascism
was linked as much to the "rising" as to the "declining" petty bourgeoisie. Now, on past experience (the celebrated "gentry controversy"
in Tudor-Stuart historiography is a good example), this kind of terminology may create more trouble than it is worth, 35 so let me explain
carefully what I mean. Both Germany and Italy were societies experiencing accelerated capitalist tranformation, through which entire regions were being visibly converted from predominantly rural into
predominantly urban-industrial environments. In both cases the process was extremely uneven (in vital ways functionally so), with equally
large regions trapped into social and economic backwardness (the
south in Italy, or the East Elbian parts of Prussia and the Catholic
periphery of the south, south-west, and extreme west of Germany). In
Italy the process was the more concentrated and dramatic, producing
interesting similarities with Tsarist Russia: for example, the massive
spurt of growth from the 1890s to World War I; the very high levels of
geographical, structural, and physical concentration of industry, which
brought masses of workers together in a small number of centers and
created new conurbations with politically volatile populations; the in-
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terventionist role of the state, linked to a powerful complex of railway,
heavy-industrial, shipbuilding, engineering, and hydro-electrical interests, the selective involvement of foreign capital, and a well-knit
oligopoly of government, industry, and banks; an exclusivist and
oligarchic political system; and a dramatic discrepancy between north
and south, between a dynamic industrial sector that in all respects was
highly advanced and an agricultural one that was equally and terribly
backward.
This situation produced complex political effects. Simplifying wildly,
we might say that the pace of social change outstripped the adaptive
capabilities of the existing political institutions, particularly when the
latter were called on to be responsible to new social forces-agricultural populations concerned .for their future in an economy increasingly structured by industrial priorities, urban populations
demanding a more rational ordering of their hastily improvised city
environment, a potential chaos of private economic interests, the mass
organizations of the industrial working dass , and the more diffuse
aspirations of the new professional, administrative, and managerial
strata of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. lt is the last of these
groups that interests me here.
For in a situation of widespread political uncertainty-in both Germany and Italy (and, we might add, Austria, Hungary, and Spain) an
existing political bloc of industrial, agrarian, and military-bureaucratic
interests entered a protracted period of instability and incipient dissolution in the 1890s from which it never really recovered-large
numbers of the educated citizenry experienced a radical skepticism in
the appropriateness of the existing political forms, which were largely
liberal and parliamentary in type. Acutely conscious of the sociocultural fissures in their newly unified nations, such people took
rccourse to a new kind of radicial nationalism , which stressed the
primacy of national allegiances and priorities (normally with a heavily
imperialist or social-imperialist inßexion) over everything else. Under
circumstances of unprecedented popular mobilization, in which socialists and other "antinational" elements achieved an increasingly
commanding position for themselves, this lack of confidence in the
unifying imagination of the liberal and conservative political establishment acquired an extra political edge. From the turn of the century
radical-nationalist voices called for a new drive for national unity, at first
as a kind of dissenting patriotic intelligentsia, but more and more from
an independent political base, with its own organized expressions and
wider social resonance.
In my own work on Germany 1 have tried to characterize this
dissenting radical-nationalist politics as a new kind of right-wing popu-
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lism. 36 lt was to be found above all in the ideology and mass agitational
practice of the nationalist pressure groups, for whom the Pan-German
League may be considered a vanguard, but which included the N avy
League, the Defence League, the anti-Polish movement, and a variety
of other organizations. Originating in the regional and local dissolution
of the old Bismarckian power bloc (essentially an industrial-agrarian
coalition, hegemonically ordered by a right-wing liberal politics), it
created a new space for disinterested patriotic activism. Though aimed
at the directly "unpatriotic" activities of the socialists, ultramontanes,
and national minorities (especially the Poles), this was also motivated
by a growing anger at the alleged faintheartedness of the constitutional
government, the old-style conservatives, and above all the liberal
parties from whom many of the radical-nationalist activists came by
personal background, family, or general milieu.
In other words, radical-nationalists raised a radical right-wing challenge, at first obliquely and then openly, to the established political
practices of the dominant classes. If Germany was to enter into its
imperialist heritage, they argued, if patriotic unity was ever to be
achieved and domestic squabbling overcome, if the work of national
unification was to be completed and the nation's internal divisions
healed, above all if the challenge of the left was to be met, then a new
political offensive to regain the confidence of the people was required.
This demand-for a radical propagandist effort to win the right to speak
for the "people in general"-I have called "populist. " 37 At its height
this radical-nationalist agitation produced a generalized crisis of confidence in the existing political system, which undermined the latter's
hegemonic capability-the ability, that is, to organize a sufficient basis
of unity among the subordinate classes to permit stable government to
continue. In Germany this point was reached around 1908-09, and
arguably opened the way for a far-reaching reconstitution of the partypolitical right over the next decade. In ltaly the process was more
strung out, extending from the intellectual nationalist ferment of the
early 1900s to the interventionist drive of 1914-15. Arguably a similar
process was unleashed by Spanish Regenerationism after the SpanishAmerican War. 38
My suggestion is that we can explain the attractions of radical nationalism (and by extension those of fascism without recourse to the
cultural and economic "despair" of threatened "traditional" strata, to
concepts of "anti-modernism," or to the persistence of Kocka's "preindustrial traditions." Those attractions may be grasped partly from the
ideology itself, which was self-confident, optimistic, and affirming. lt
contained an aggressive belief in the authenticity of a German/ltalian
national mission, in the unifying potential of the nationalist panacea,
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and in the popular resonance of the national idea for the struggle
against the left. Radical nationalism was a vision of the future, not of the
past. In this sense it harnessed the cultural aspirations of many who
were comfortably placed in the emerging bourgeois society, the successful beneficiaries of the new urban-industrial civilization, whose
political sensibilities were offended by the seeming incapacitation of
the establishment before the left-wing challenge. While 1 would concur with Roberts that this outlook possessed a definite appeal to a
certain type of patriotic intellectual or activist, it is also likely that in
times of relative social and political stability the ideology in itself could
achieve only a limited popular appeal. But in times of crisis, which
brought the domestic unity, foreign mission, and territorial integrity of
the nation all into question, this might easily change. The dramatic
conjuncture of war and revolution between 1914 and 1923 produced a
crisis of exaGtly this kind.
Given the operation of certain recognized social determinations (like
the status distinctions between white-collar and manual work, or the
deliberate fostering of white-collar consciousness by employers and the
state), we should concede a certain effectivity to this specifically political factor when trying to explain the radical right-wing preferences of
large sections of the new petty bourgeoisie. There is no space to
develop this argument more fully here, and in some ways the knowledge to do so is not yet assembled, given the general paucity of
research in the area. Though we are well equipped with data concerning the voting patterns in Weimar elections, for instance, or the
relative prominence of different occupations among the Nazi party
members, we are still very ignorant about the social histories of the
particular professions and categories of white-collar employment. What
we do know certainly suggests that the avenue of inquiry is worth
pursuing. The presence of professionals, managers, and administrators
among Nazi activists is now well attested, and the Nazi state provided
plenty of scope for the technocratic imagination-in industrial organization, public works, social administration, and the bureaucracy of
terror. 39 This sort of evidence moves securely with the direction of the
above remarks. At the very least the grievances of the "traditional"
petty bourgeoisie coexisted in the fascist movements with other aspirations of a more "forward-looking" and "modernist" kind.

IV
This critique of the "petty-bourgeois thesis" can be further developed. Despite the overrepresentation of the petty bourgeoisie, fas-
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eist parties were always more eclectic in their social recruitment than
much of the literature might lead us to suppose. Two observations in
particular might be made. On the one hand, peasants proved especially
important to a fascist party's ultimate prospects, because the transition
from ideological sect to mass movement was achieved as much in the
countryside as the towns. This was true of both ltaly (1920--21) and
Germany (1928-32). Conversely, some of the smaller fascist movements owed their weakness to the country population's relative immunity to their appeals. This applied to both Norway and Sweden, where
farmers kept to the established framework of agrarian-labor cooperation, and to Finland, where neither the Lapua movement (1929-32)
nor its successor, the Patriotic National Movement (Isänmaallinen Kansanliike-lKL; 1932-44), could break the hold of the Agrarian Union
and Coalition Party on the smaller farmers. 40
On the other hand, it is also clear that many fascist parties acquired
significant working-class support. The best example is the Nazi party
itself, with its 26.3 percent workers in 1930 and 32.5 percent in 1933.
But though higher than the working-class membership of the ltalian
Fascist party (15.4 percent in 1921), this was by no means exceptional.
Both Mikl6s Lack6 and György Ranki show that the Hungarian Arrow
Cross won much support from workers, in both the more proletarian
districts of Budapest and the industrial areas of N6grad, Veszprem, and
Komarom-Esztergom. 41
There is a tendency in the literature to play down the importance of
this working-class support in the interests of the petty-bourgeois thesis, especially in the German case, where the research is extensive.
Certainly, we can admit that the Nazis made most progress among
specific types of workers. Tim Mason lists "the volatile youthful proletariat" in the big cities, who went straight from school to the dole,
who lacked the socializing education of a trade-union membership, and
who provided much of the Sturmabteilung (SA) rank-and-file support;
the "uniformed working class" in public employment, especially in the
railways, post office, and city services; and those in the small-business
sector of provincial Germany, "where the working-class movement had
not been able to establish a stable and continuing presence. " 42 lt
seems clear that the Nazis failed to breach the historic strongholds of
the labor movement-the urban industrial settings that contained the 8
million or so wage earners who voted habitually for the SPD and the
German Communist party (KPD)-and had to be content with those
categories of workers the left had failed (or neglected) to organize.
Yet this was surely significant enough. Though not a sufficient basis
for contesting the left's core support, it deprived the latter of a necessary larger constituency. As Mason points out, between 1928 and July
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1932 the combined popular vote of the SPD and KPD fell from 40.4
percent to 35. 9 percent, and it was progressively unclear how they
were to break through the "sociological, ideological, religious and, not
least sex barriers" that defined the "historic" working class in Germany.
Mason suggests, in fact, that under the conditions of economic crisis
after 1929 these barriers were virtually impassable. By eliminating the
chances for either reformist legislation or effective trade-union economism, the depression "robbed the working-class movement of its anticipatory, future-directed role for the working class in general," and "to
the degree that industry and trade shrank, the potential constituency of
the workers' parties stagnated." The effect, Mason concludes, was a
disastrous "narrowing of the political arena of the working class movement."43
This brings us to an interesting problem. In effect, the SPD and
KPD were facing under particularly extreme, urgent, and dramatic
circumstances the classic dilemma of the European left in the general
period after the stabilization of 1923-24: how to win popular support
for socialism by electoral means, at a time (contrary to earlier predictions) when the industrial proletariat in the classical sense had little
chance of becoming a numerical majority of the voting population, and
when a reformist practice had ceased to show tangible returns. In the
crisis of Weimar, moreover, the cause of socialism had become inextricably linked to the defense of democratic gains. lt became imperative for the left to break out of the class-political ghetto for which its
entire previous history had prepared it, by building broader political
alliances and appealing not only to workers, but to white-collar employees, small owners, pensioners, professional people, students, and
so on. Most of all, it was vital to conceive of other than class collectivities, by rallying the people as consumers, as women, as taxpayers,
as citizens, and even as Germans-not as some opportunist and eclectic pluralism of discrete campaigns, but as the coherent basis for the
broadest possible democratic unity. Yet it was in this democratic project
that the politics of the left proved most lamentably deficient, at least
until after 1935, when the Popular Front revealed a new strategic
perspective. lt was less the left's inability to carry the working class
itself (though, as Mason points out, in 1930-32 about half the wagedependent population voted for other parties) than its abdication from
this wider popular democratic mobilization that proved most fatal to
the Republic's survival. 44
Arguably, it was precisely here that fascism showed its superiority. In
the end, the most striking thing about the National Socialist German
Workers party (NSDAP), for instance, was not its disproportionate
dependence on a particular social group (the petty bourgeoisie), but its
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ability (by contrast with the two working-class parties) to broaden its
social base in several different directions. The promiscuous adaptability
of Nazipropaganda has often been noted, and it was certainly adept at
tapping manifold popular resentments, promising all and nothing in
the same breath. This remarkable diversity of social appeal can, however, easily mislead. Though both cynical and opportunist, Nazi eclecticism was also a major constructive achievement. The Nazis rallied a
disparate assortment of social and political elements that lacked strong
traditions of cooperation or effective solidarity in the political sphere,
and often surveyed long histories of hostility and mutual suspicion.
From September 1930 to January 1933 the NSDAP was a popular
political formation without precedent in the German political system.
lt not only subsumed the organizational fragmentation of the right. lt
also united a broadly based coalition of the subordinate classes, centered on the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie but stretching deep into
the wage-earning population.
lt did so on the terrain of ideology, by unifying an otherwise disjointed ensemble of discontents within a totalizing populist framework-namely, the radicalized ideological community of the German
people-race. The resulting combination was extraordinarily potentactivist, communitarian, antiplutocratic, and popular, but at the same
time virulently antisocialist, anti-Semitic, intolerant of diversity, and
aggressively nationalist. In Germany this right-wing Jacobinism was all
the more complex for the absence of a strong existing tradition of
popular radical nationalism, though as I have tried to argue above, one
had begun to take shape since the start of the century. In ltaly, for
example, as David Roberts argues, the fascists had access to the suppressed Mazzinian tradition of unfulfilled radical-nationalist expectations, which they could then recover and transform. In Germany, in
the absence of something similar, the recourse to new synthetic solutions (anti-Semitism, the race-mission in the East, "national socialism")
was correspondingly all the more important. There was perhaps something of the same contrast in the difference, say, between the authoritarianism of a Pilsudski in Poland, which could conjure memories
of national democracy for its present purposes, and the more radical
innovations of the Arrow Cross and Iron Guard in Hungary and Romania. This goes some way to explaining the greater radicalism of Nazi
racialism and the apparent irrationalism of the program's implementation during World War II.
This line of argument reinstates the importance of ideology for our
understanding of fascism. In particular, it directs us to the contested
terrain of popular-democratic aspirations, where the socialist left
proved most deficient, the fascist right most telling in their mode of
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political intervention. Where the left, in both ltaly and Germany, kept
aggressively to a class-corporate practice of proletarian independence,
the fascists erupted into the arena and appropriated the larger popular
potential. 45 Of course, putting it like this presupposes an expanded
definition of ideology, where it means something more than what
happens inside a few literati's heads and is then committed to paper
and published for wider consumption. In other words, 1 mean something more than the well-tried intellectual history so popular with
many Germanists during the 1950s and 1960s-that is, not just ideas
and attitudes, but also types of behavior, institutions, and social relations, so that ideology becomes materially embodied as well as just
thought about (for example, not only the fascist movement's formal
aims, but its style of activism, modes of organization, and forms of
public display). On this basis fascism becomes primarily a specific type
of politics, involving radical authoritarianism, militarized activism, and
the drive for a centralist repressive state, with a radical-nationalist,
communalist, and frequently racialist creed, and a violent antipathy for
both liberal democracy and socialism. Providing these elements are
treated not as some revealed unity, but as a set of potentials whose
concrete substance may be unevenly and partially realized in "real"
(particular, historical) fascisms, a definition of this kind could be quite
serviceable.

V
lt is time to draw some of these threads together. My comments have
clearly been concerned mainly with the strong German and ltalian
cases, with occasional reference to fascist movements elsewhere. 1 have
also (mindful of the typology referred to in note 4) confined myself to a
particular aspect of the overall problem, namely the "coming to power"
of indigenously generated fascist movements, rather than the less
compelling examples of the smaller imitative or dient movements, or
the dynamics of established fascist regimes. In so doing 1 suggested
that the specificity of the fascist movements resided in a particular
capacity for broadly based popular mobilization-a distinctive ideology
or style of politics, as the preceding paragraph puts it. Fascism is more
extreme in every way. lt registered a qualitative departure from previous conservative practice, substituting corporatist notions of social
place for older hierarchical ones, and ideas of race community for those
of clerical aristocratic and bureaucratic authority. These and other
aspects of fascist ideology are intimately linked to its broadly based
popular appeal. Fascism is an aggressively plebeian movement, espousing a crude and violent egalitarianism. Above all, fascism stands
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for activism and popular mobilization, embracing everything from
paramilitary display, street fighting, and straightforward terror to more
conventional forms of political activity, new propagandist forms, and a
general invasion of the cultural sphere. lt is negatively defined against
liberalism, social democracy, and communism, or any creed that seems
to elevate difference, division, and conßict over the essential unity of
the race-people as the organizing principle of political life.
At the same time, fascism was not a universal phenomenon, and
appeared in strength only in a specific range of societies. In explaining
this variation there are two main emphases. One is the deep historical
perspective discussed in relation to Jürgen Kocka. At some level of
explanation the structural factors stressed by the latter are clearly
important and might be summarized as follows: (1) accelerated capitalist transformation, in a dual context of simultaneous national state
formation and heightened competition in the imperialist world economy; (2) the coexistence in a highly advanced capitalist economy of
large 'traditional' sectors, including a small-holding peasantry and an
industrial-trading petty bourgeoisie, "deeply marked by the contradictions of capitalist development" ;46 and (3) the emergence of a precocious socialist movement publicly committed to a revolutionary
program. This complex overdetermination (the "contemporaneity of
the uncontemporary," or "uneven and combined development")
characterized both German and ltalian history before World War 1,
articulated through the interpenetration of national and social problems. Most of the primary analytical traditions share some version of
this framework (for example, the political science literature an state
formation and the related theories of developmental crises, the particular works of Gershenkron and Barrington Moore, and most of the
analogous literature within Marxism).
However, German historians have given this structural argument an
additional formulation, which is far more problematic. Evaluating German development (or "misdevelopment," as they call it) by an external
and linear model of "modernization," which postulates an ultimate
complementarity between economic growth and political democratization (which in Germany, for peculiar reasons, was obstructed), such
historians stress the dominance in German public life of preindustrial
ideological traditions. The absence of a liberal political culture is
thought to have permitted the survival of traditional authoritarian
mentalities that enjoyed strong institutional power bases, and could
then be radicalized under the future circumstances of an economic or
political crisis. Thus a "reactionary protest potential" is created. 47
Fascism draws its support either directly from traditional social strata,
or from newer strata (such as white-collar employees) supposedly be-

88

Radical Perspectives

holden to traditional ideals. This essentially is Jürgen Kocka's argument.
Though not incompatible with a modified version of the above, the
second approach stresses the immediate circumstances under which
the fascists came to power. Here it is necessary to mention the impact
of World War I, the nature of the postwar crisis in the European
revolutionary conjuncture of 1917-23, the unprecedented gains of the
left (both reformist and revolutionary), and the collapse of parliamentary institutions. Together these brought a fundamental crisis in the
unity and popular credibility of the dominant classes, which opened
the space for radical speculations. Here again, although one was the
major defeated party and the other a nominal victor in World War I,
the German and Italian experiences were remarkably similar in these
respects. In both cases the radical right defined itself against the
double experience of thwarted imperialist ambitions and domestic
political retreat, each feeding the other. In both cases the postwar
situation was dominated by the public accommodation of labor, whose
political and trade-union aspirations appeared to be in the ascendant:
trade unions acquired a new corporative legitimacy; socialists attained a
commanding presence in large areas of local government; the national
leaderships of the SPD and Italian Socialist party (PSI) occupied the
center of the political stage; and substantial movements to their left
(first syndicalist and then commuriist) added an element of popular
insurgency. In both cases, too, liberal or parliamentary methods of
political containment were shown to have exhausted their potential,
guaranteeing neither the political representation of the dominant
classes nor the mobilization of popular consent. In such circumstances
fascism successfully presented itself as a radical populist solution.
In dther words, fascism prospered under conditions of general political crisis, in societies that were already dynamically capitalist (or at
least possessed a dynamic capitalist sector), but where the state proved
incapable of dispatching its organizing functions for the maintenance of
social cohesion. The political unity of the dominant classes and their
major economic fractions could no longer be organized successfully
within the existing forms of parliamentary representation and party
government. Simultaneously the popular legitimacy of the same institutional framework also went into crisis. This way of formulating the
problem-as the intersection of twin crises, a crisis of representation
and a crisis ofhegemony or popular consent--derives from the work of
Nicos Poulantzas and its subsequent reworking through the extensive
and continuing reception of Antonio Gramsci's ideas into the English
language. lt has been formulated with exemplary clarity for the case of
Nazism by David Abraham:

What Produces Fascism

89

Could no bourgeois political force organize the political unity of the
dominant economic fractions out of the diversity and factiousness of their
economic interests? Was no political unity possible and no mass political
support available within the Republic, despite the singlemindedness of
the dominant classes' anti-socialism? Were the maintenance of capitalist
economic relations and political democracy so antithetical in this conjuncture that abandonment and undermining of the Republic were selfevident necessities for the dominant classes?48

In the context of the Weimar crisis, adjustments within the existing
institutional arrangements looked increasingly untenable, and more
radical solutions beyond the boundaries of the existing political system
consequently became more attractive.
The problem of defining fascism is therefore not exhausted by describing its ideology, even in the expanded sense of the latter intimated
above. Fascism was not just a particular style of politics, it was also
inscribed in a specific combination of political conditions (themselves
the structured, mediate effect of complex socioeconomic determinations), namely the kind of dual crisis of the state just referred to. Now,
that kind of crisis is normally associated with the Great Depression
after 1929, but the postwar crisis of political order between 1917 and
1923 was equally important. The global ideological context of the
Bolshevik Revolution and its international political legacy gave enormous impetus to the radicalization of the right, and the more vigorous
fascist movements generally arose in societies that experienced serious
left-wing insurgencies after 1917-18. As well as Italy and Germany,
Hungary, Austria, Finland, and Spain are all .good examples. Although
the recent tendency has been to accept that "Francoism was never
really fascism but rather some variant of limited, semi-pluralist authoritarianism," for instance, Paul Preston has argued convincingly that
it was (at least between the mid-1930s and mid-1950s), and does so
partly on the basis of "the Spanish crisis of 1917-23," which was
"analogous to the Italian crisis of 1917-22. " 49 Moreover, this approach
supplies criteria for assessing the seriousness of other crises elsewhere.
Thus the formation and ßeeting victory of the Popular Front in 1934-37
threatened to create a comparable situation in France, until the
breakup of the left government dissipated the gathering concentration
of radical right-wing forces.
The operative circumstances were ones that made it possible for the
dominant classes to take extreme or exceptional solutions seriously,
though never without well-founded hesitation. One such circumstance
was obviously the very emergence of the fascists as a credible mass
movement, for without the popular materials an "extra-systemic solution" (in Abraham's phrase) was clearly a nonstarter. 50 But, as a gener-
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alization, recourse to the fascist option was politically most likely where
the left had achieved significant inroads into the administration of state
power and the limitation of private capitalist prerogative, or where
combinations of entrenched left-reformism and concurrent revolutionary activity seemed to obstruct the resolution of economic crisis and
the restoration of order. For example, the most persuasive reading of
the crisis of Weimar stresses the importance of a kind of social-democratic corporatism (embodied in trade-union legislation, a ministry of
labor, compulsory arbitration procedures, unemployment insurance,
other welfare legislation, and so on), whose defensive strengths could
not be dismantled within the existing constitutional framework of parliamentary decision-making. The structural necessity of fascist remedies (given certain inflexible commitments and requirements among
the most powerful fractions of the dominant classes) can then be
located in the labor movement's ability to defend the institutional
advances of the 1918 revolution (or more accurately, of the political
settlement of 1918-23). 51 When we add the SPD's strong position in
provincial and local government, the impressive militancy of the
Reichsbanner militia, and the continued vitality of a strategic Marxistreformist vision among the party intelligentsia, the appeal of a radical
authoritarian solution becomes all the more intelligible. 52
This idea of a defensive social-democratic corporatism, which within
the limits of this essay has to remain theoretically underdeveloped,
may well be a fruitful one for the discussion of fascism. lt lends a formal
unity to the political crisis of Weimar, between the foundering of the
Grand Coalition in March 1930 on the issue of insurance legislation,
and the precipitation of the von Papen-Hitler maneuver in December
1932-January 1933 by General Kurt von Schleicher's renewed corporatist exploration. Mutatis mutandis, the argument also works for the
Italian situation in 1918-22, where the presence of a mass socialist
party publicly committed to a revolutionary program (however rhetorically) had effectively thrown the state into paralysis. Here the growing
popular strength of the left, its aggressive use of the workers' councils
in Milan and Turin, its commanding position in northern local government, and its massive concentrations of regional support provoked a
massive counterrevolutionary backlash, organized through M ussolini's
fascists. In both Germany (1918-33), and Italy (1918-22), and for that
matter in Spain (1931-36), we are dealing in effect with limited socialist
enclaves (some of them physical, some institutional, some merely
attitudinal or ideological) within the existing state, which constituted
intolerable obstructions to the kind of stabilization a powerful coalition
within the dominant classes was increasingly pursuing. Arguably a
comparable situation threatened to arise in the wake of the Popular
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Front in France (1934-37), and if the Labour Government had chosen
to conduct a stubborn resistance to the demands for conservative
stabilization in 1931 instead of capitulating, similar circumstances
might have materialized in Britain as well. As Joseph Baglieri says of
Italian fascism:
The movement's functional role against the socialists and the Popolari
attracted the sympathies and support of all those interests which felt
threatened by the post-war mobilization of the lower classes, the incipient
process of economic and political democratization, and the breakdown of
traditional authority. In the process of crushing the left, the fascists
succeeded in offering these interests an alternative sovereignty which
successfully stood in for the crumbling Liberal state.53

Fascism may bebest understood, therefore, as primarily a counterrevolutionary ideological project, constituting a new kind of popular
coalition, in the specific circumstances of an interwar crisis. As such it
provided the motivational impetus for specific categories of radicalized
political actors in the immediate aftermath of World War 1, embittered
by national humiliation, enraged by the advance of the left. As working-class insurgency defied the capacities of the existing liberal politics
to achieve the necessary stabilization, this radical-nationalist cadre
became an important pole of attraction for larger circles of the dominant classes and others who felt threatened by the reigning social
turbulence. In Italy, where the socialist movement was generally further to the left than in Germany, and where no equivalent of the SPD
functioned as a vital factor of order, this process of right-wing concentration around the redemptive potential of a radical-nationalist antisocialist terror was far more advanced. But later, in the renewed but
differently structured crisis of 1929-34, a recognizable pattern recurred. Elsewhere a similar scenario was scripted, but indifferently
played out. Spain and possibly Austria were the closest examples of a
similarly enacted fascist solution. Other countries certainly generated
their own fascist cadres-in some cases very large (France, Finland,
Hungary, Romania), in some quite small (Britain, Scandinavia). The
severity of the political crisis, and the resilience of established political
forms, determined the broader attractions of the fascist ideology.
In the end both perspectives are necessary-the deep historical or
long-term structural one and the stress on the immediate crisis, but we
have to be clear about what exactly each may reasonably explain. In
particular, the causal primacy of "preindustrial traditions" threatens to
become both teleological and heavily determinist, locating the origins
of fascism somewhere in the middle third of the nineteenth century,
when Germany (and Italy) failed to take the "long hard road to modernity," in Dahrendorf's phrase.
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M uch of this would be perfectly acceptable and in the most rounded
of analyses, should be complementary to the other type of approach
rather than antithetical. Yet in the works of Jürgen Kocka and other
German historians the explanatory claims are far more aggressive than
this. Tue "preindustrial traditions" are given a privileged place in the
causal repertoire in a way that specifically displaces certain other
approaches-those beginning with the interior dynamics of the immediate fascism-producing crisis. What is seen to be the driving contradiction of the latter-the antidemocratic mentalities that left various
social groups so receptive to the fascist appeal-is displaced from its
own contemporary context onto a much deeper argument about the
course of German history and its singularity. This is accompanied by a
clearly stated polemical purpose: fascism is to be explained not by its
capitalist present, but by the baleful inßuence of the feudal past.
Winkler is quite explicit on this score. Tue antidemocratic outcome to
the world economic crisis in Germany, as opposed to "the other developed industrial societies," had "less to do with the course of the
crisis itself than with the different pre-industrial histories of these
countries. Tue conditions for the rise of fascism have at least as much to
do with feudalism and absolutism as with capitalism. "54
This is unnecessarily restrictive. Older attempts to take the relationship between fascism and capitalism as the primary causal nexus
were indeed inadequate, but that is no excuse for evading the challenge of more recent discussions of fascism or more general theories of
the state, forms of domination, and so on. Historical discussions of the
relationship between capitalism and fascism are actually proceeding
with an unprecedented intensity, as the most cursory glance at current
research on the Weimar Republic or the final years of liberal Italy will
quickly reveal. But they are doing so in an almost wholly "empirical" or
"practical" way, without any guiding reference to the larger theoretical
issues discussed in this essay. If we are truly to understand the problem, I would argue, it is here, by theorizing fascism in terms of the
crisis that produced it-that we shall have to begin.

Notes
This essay originally appeared in Politics and Society 12, no. 1 (1983): 53--82, and
subsequently as a chapter in From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German
Past, by Geoff Eley, published by George Allen & Unwin in 1986. lt is reprinted with
permission from George Allen & Unwin .
Whatever coherence and value the text may possess owes a great deal to the thoughts
and writings of those who have labored longer and more directly on the subject of fascism
than I have myself. My main intellectual debts should be clear from the notes but my
thinking has been shaped over a period of time by the work of three friends and
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colleagues in particular, who may not always recognize their own ideas after 1 have
finished with them, but who deserve to be handsomely thanked: Jane Caplan, Michael
Geyer, and Tim Mason.
1. See Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965);
Eugen Weber, Varieties of Fascism (New York: Krieger, 1964); Francis L. Carsten,
The Rise of Fascism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); John Weiss, The Fascist
Tradition (New York: Harper & Row, 1967); Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds.,
The European Right (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965);Journal ofContemporary History 1 (January 1966), special" issue entitled "International Fascism, 192045." The Journal of Contemporary History published a second special issue ten
years later called "Theories of Fascism" 11 (October 1976). Selections from both
issues have been published as G. L. Mosse, ed., International Fascism: New
Thoughts and New Approaches (London: Sage Publications , 1979); Barrington
Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1966).

The three international conferences produced the following volumes of proceedings:
P. F. Sugar, ed., Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918-1945 (Santa Barbara:
University of California Press, 1971); S. J. Woolf, ed., European Fascism and The
Nature of Fascism (New York: Random House, 1968); Institute of History, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, ed., Fascism and Europe (Prague, 1970), 2 vols. The
first of the two Woolf volumes was recently reissued in a slightly revised form as
Fascism in Europe (London: Methuen, 1981).
2. By now there are many critiques of these older approaches. Among the best are B.
Hagtvet, "The Theory of Mass Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic: A
Re-examination, " in S. U. Larsen, B. Hagtvet and J. P. Myklebust, eds ., Who Were
the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen: Universitetsfarlaget, 1980),
pp. 66--117; and M. Clemenz, Gesellschaftliche Ursprünge des Faschismus (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972), pp. 26--57, 96--126, 235-49. In some ways totalitarianism
theory in particular has fallen more to the relentless accumulation of monographic
research than to frontal critique. For an introduction to that scholarship see Jane
Caplan, "Bureaucracy, Politics and the National Socialist State, " in P. Stachura, ed.,
The Shaping of the Nazi State (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 234--56; and H .
Mommsen, "National Socialism-Continuity and Change," in W. Laqueur, ed. ,
Fascism: A Readers Guide (London: Wildwood House, 1976), pp. 179-210.
3 . Nicos Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship (London: NLB, 1974); R. De Felice,
Fascism: An Informal Introduction to lts Theory and Practice (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1976). Poulantzas' book on fascism has excited little formal
discussion by comparison with his other writings, with the major exceptions of an
excellent short essay by Jane Caplan appearing in this volume, and a more abstract
piece by Ernesto Ladau. Likewise, De Felice's work has not had a great deal of
impact outside the specifically Italian discussion. See E. Ladau, "Fascism and
Ideology, " in Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: NLB, 1977), pp. 81142; and M. Ledeen, "Renzo De Felice and the Controversy over Italian Fascism, "
Journal of Contemporary History 11 (October 1976): 269-82.
4. For example, see S. Payne's useful general text, Fascism: Comparison and Definition
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), pp. 195ff. , 6ff., where he proposes a
"descriptive typology" based on "(a) the fascist negations, (b) common points of
ideology and goals, and (c) special common features of style and organization." The
negations involve antiliberalism, anticommunism and qualified anticonservatism.
The common goals indude a new kind of "national authoritarian state," a "new kind
of regulated, multi-dass, integrated national-economic structure," a radical foreign
policy, and "an idealist, voluntarist creed." The stylistic and organizational features
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are "an aesthetic structure of meetings, symbols and political choreography"; militarized forms of mass mobilization; a stress on violence, masculinity, and youth; and
a "tendency towards an authoritarian, charismatic, personal style of command."
This is very similar to the approach of Juan Linz, who has published a number of
widely cited and inßuential essays proposing "a multi-dimensional typological definition" of fascism . (see his "Some Notes toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in
Sociological Historical Perspective," in Laqueur, ed., Fascism, pp. 3-121). Personally, though there are many valuable insights to be culled discretely from his work, I
find Linz's general argument obscure, inconclusive, and confusing in the density of
its cultivated empirical complexity. Moreover, the typology described above needs
to be extended by a further set of distinctions between the different kinds of fascist
movements. One possibility would be the following: (1) indigenously generated
movements that successfully came to power (Italian Fascism, Nazism, Francoism) ;
(2) small imitative movements that achieved no particular popularity in their home
societies (e.g., the British Union of Fascists, or the various Scandinavian Nazi
groups); (3) !arger indigenous movements with strong similarities of ideology, sociology, and style, but that originated independently of Italian or German sponsorship in a different configuration of social forces, and never took power under
peacetime conditions (e.g., Arrow Cross in Hungary, or Iron Guard in Romania); (4)
finally, the so-called Quisling regimes installed by the Germans during the war.
5. Fora particularly pointless such discussion, see G. Allardyce, "What Fascism Is Not:
Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept," American Historical Review 84 (April
1979): 367-88.
6. A familiar but nonetheless important disclaimer should be entered here: by making
certain criticisms of existing works, I am not trying to discount their value or consign
them to the scrap-heap. The point is to open up discussion, nothing more. In certain
ways this essay connects with a !arger intellectual project, concerned with redrawing
the agenda of German historical discussion for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See D . Blackbourn and G. Eley, Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung: Die gescheiterte bürgerliche Revolution von 1848 (Frankfurt :
Ullstein, 1980), and the controversy it has aroused. This book has now appeared in
an expanded and revised English edition as The Peculiarities of German History:
Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984). This essay originated in a review essay for another journal,
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helped formulate the judgments on which the following exposition rests . They
include: Laqueur, ed., Fascism; Mosse, ed., International Fascism; Payne, Fascism;
Larsen, Hagtvet, and Mylkebust, eds, Who Were the Fascists; H. A. Winkler,
Revolution, Staat, Faschismus: Zur Revision des Historichen Materialismus (Gottingen, 1978); and J. Kocka, White Collar Workers in America 1890-1940: A SocialPolitical History in International Perspective (London, 1980).
7. For discussions of these analytical traditions, see Blackbourn and Eley, Mythen
deutscher Geschichtsschreibung, and J. A. Davis, ed., Gramsci and ltaly's Passive
Revolution (London: Croom Helm, 1979). For valuable examples see A.
Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1966); Charles Tilly, ed. , The Formation of National
States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); R. Crew,
ed., Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States (Princeton :
Princeton University Press, 1978); and B. Hagtvet and S. Rokkan, "The Conditions
ofFascist Victory," in Larsen, Hagtvet, and Myklebust, eds., Who Were the Fascists ,
pp. 131-52, which links the "violent breakdown of competitive mass politics" to a
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June 21, 1980, pp. 9-13, reaffirmed Dahrendorf's argument.
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Stürmer, ed., Das kaiserliche Deutschland: Politik und Gesellschaft 1870--1918
(Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1970).
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Antonio Gramsci: Towards an Intellectual Biography (London: Merlin Press, 1977),
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1980), pp. 295-324; P. Spriano, Antonio Gramsci and the Party: The Prison Years
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Fascism, pp. 165-95; Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag,
1977); "Zur Entstehung des Gesetzes zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit vom 20.
January 1934: Ein Versuch über das Verhältnis 'archäischer' und 'moderner' Momente in der neuesten deutschen Geschichte," in H. Mommsen, D. Petzina, and B.
Weisbrod, eds., Industrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer
Republik (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1974), pp. 322-51; "Intention and Expianation: A
Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism," in G.
Hirschfeld and L. Kettenacker, eds., Der "Führerstaat": Mythos und Realität (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 21-42; "Open Questions on Nazism," in R. Samuel, ed., People's
History and Socialist Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 20510.
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12. H. A. Winkler, "Die 'neue Linke' und der Faschismus: Zur Kritik neomarxistischer
Theorien über den Nationalsozialismus," in Revolution, Staat, Faschismus, p. 116,
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21. Ibid., pp. 28lf. Tue phrase "contemporaneity of the uncontemporary" originates
with Ernst Bloch. In some ways it corresponds to Trotsky's "uneven and combined
development" and the Althusserian "overdetermination."
22. In other ways the argument seems strained. Thus the suggestion that "corporatist
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Bonapartism, Fascism, and the Collapse
of the Weimar Republic
Derek S. Linton
In a survey of theories of fascism, the historian Martin Kitchen divided
them into three types: "heteronomic," "autonomic," and "syncretic."
Included in the first type were those theories "which assert that
fascism is determined and produced by capitalism (or to use the
somewhat euphemistic terms, 'industrial society', 'modern society',
'the age of the masses' or 'modernisation') ... whereas those in the
second hold that fascism was an independent force which was able to
determine the course of capitalist development. " 1 Syncretic theories
combine aspects of the first two. Although these distinctions have
seldom been absolute, they do indicate general tendencies found in
the literature on fascism, whether Marxist or non-Marxist. This essay
will explore one set of basically syncretic theories within the Marxist
tradition, the set of analyses of National Socialism that derived from
Marx's and Engels' accounts of Bonapartism in nineteenth-century
France. 2
Tue exploration will proceed in three parts. First, I will outline the conditions of emergence of the Bonapartist perspective on
fascism from the debates within the Communist International during
the 1920s. Second, I will examine some of the elements of Marx's and
Engels, concept of Bonapartism that proved especially stimulating and
fruitful in framing a Marxist explanation of National Socialism. Finally,
I will exposit, compare, and contrast the leading Bonapartist perspectives of the 1930s, those of August Thalheim er, Leon Trotsky, and Otto
Bauer. Throughout, 1 will be largely, although not exclusively, con100
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cerned with the explanatory framework of the theories rather than their
political functions or strategic implications.

The Bonapartist Perspective on Fascism
The triumph of M ussolini's Fascist movement in Italy in 1922 and the
stunning defeat and brutal suppression of ltaly's militant and powerful
labor movement were experienced by European Marxists as cataclysmic shocks. 3 These serious reversals as well as the unexpected
strength of counterrevolutionary movements in postwar central Europe
shattered apocalyptic hopes among members of the Comintern for
rapid proletarian victories modeled on the Bolshevik example and
prodded some thoughtful social democrats to reconsider their strategies for a purely peaceful parliamentary road to socialism. These
shock experiences also sparked considerable debate and theoretical
controversy about fascism and counterrevolution within the European
left, which established the parameters for subsequent Marxist interpretations of German National Socialism.
Already in the mid-1920s, the complex of problems and questions
arose that would be central to Marxist theorizing on what constituted
fascism. First, in what temporal trajectory of capitalist development
should the fascist phenomenon be placed? Was it the product of the
epoch of imperialism and capitalist decay, an aberration of belated and
incomplete capitalist development, the offspring of postwar social displacement, disorientation, and economic crisis, or a complex hybrid of
these possibilities? Second, what accounted for the political geography
of fascism? Why had it taken root in Italy rather than elsewhere? Was
fascism merely a local phenomenon, the outcome of a specific configuration of dass forces and political crisis confined to Italy? Or was
fascism likely to spring up in other countries with relatively weak
industrial development and large transitional dasses (landowners,
peasants, artisans, small shopkeepers)? Could it even be a general form
of counterrevolutionary movement common in varying degrees to all
capitalist nations? Third, what constellation of dass forces made fascism
possible? What was the relation of the fascist movement to the largescale capitalists, the landowners, the old and new lower middle dass,
the peasantry and labor? How was it related to the postwar labor
offensive and the capitalist counterattack? Was it essentially the counterrevolutionary instrument of big capital and the agrarians or was it a
semi-autonomous movement of the petty bourgeoisie and declasse
elements? Finally, what was the political nature of fascism? What was
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its relation to the preexisting political system, the parties, and the
state? Once in power, was the fascist state a new form of class rule, the
direct instrument of monopoly capital, or was it analogous to the
Bonapartist regime described by Marx? Divergent answers to these
questions generally implied alternative strategies for combating fascism
as well.
Although the Fifth Congress of the Communist International in 1924
attempted to settle these issues by resolving that "fascism is the instrument of the big bourgeoisie for fighting the proletariat, when the legal
means available to the state have proved insufficient to subdue them," 4
even within European Communist parties answers to these questions
continued to be quite diverse and leading Communists openly dissented from this resolution. Thus, for example, as late as 1928 the
Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti considered fascism a largely
Italian phenomenon and warned against diluting the concept by applying it to all forms of reaction. 5 In Italy the intermediate and transitional
classes had been especially strong and the specific constellation of class
relations was unlikely to occur elsewhere. Moreover, fascism was originally to some degree autonomous from capitalist interests. According
to Togliatti, while the attacks of fascist gangs on the organizations of
workers and peasants
worked naturally to the advantage of industrial and financial capital ...
fascism was not simply capitalist reaction. lt embraced many other elements at the same time. lt comprised a movement of the rural petty
bourgeois masses; it was also a political struggle waged by certain representatives of the small and middle bourgeoisie against a section of the
traditional ruling dass, . . . finally it was a military organization which
claimed the ability to take on the regular armed forces of the state with
some probability of success. 6

Once in power, claimed Togliatti, fascism became "a center of political
unity for the dominant classes but only after a far-reaching transformation in its structure and social compositions." Fascism also differed
from other forms of reaction in its savage suppression of democratic
rights and its thoroughgoing extirpation of all autonomous mass organizations including those of the Socialists, which the Comintern resolution had maligned as instruments of capitalist dictatorship and twins of
fascism.
After 1928, however, such relatively sophisticated and complex
analyses became anathema within the Comintern. As the Soviet leadership under Stalin became increasingly preoccupied with the domestic tasks of "building socialism in one country," it stringently
disciplined and purged foreign Communist parties in order to compel
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them to conform to the shifting policies of the Communist party of the
Soviet Union. 7 Henceforth, virtually unquestioning orthodoxy was
enforced within the Comin.tern.
In the case of the Comintern analysis of fascism, orthodoxy meant
that the dubious propositions already advanced in the 1924 resolution
now congealed into frozen verities. First, fascism was held to be a
product of monopoly capitalism in the epoch of decay. "lt is based on
the concentration and centralization of capital and the associated development of trusts and cartels, and leads to the massive centralization
of the whole apparatus of mass oppression-including the political
parties, the Social Democratic apparatus, the reformist trade unions,
the cooperatives, etc. "8 Second, fascism was declared a general phenomenon common to all capitalist nations: "The totality of modern
capitalist states constitutes a varied amalgam of fascist countries (Italy,
Poland) and bourgeois democracies containing fascist elements and
standing at different stages of the fascisation process." Third, the social
base of fascist movements was said tobe "the petty bourgeois masses,
and the corresponding strata of white collar workers and officials,"
largely manipulated and deployed by the high bourgeoisie for counterrevolutionary goals. 9 Finally, the Soviet Comintern delegate Dmitril
Manuilski avowed,
Political reaction as a form of government has advanced continuously with
the development of imperialism in all capitalist states and has become the
counterpart to imperialist aggression. The fascist regime is not just any
new type of state; it is one of the forms of bourgeois dictatorship characteristic of the imperialist epoch. Fascism grows organically out of bourgeois democracy. The process whereby bourgeois dictatorship switches to
an open form of suppression of the workers thus represents the essence of
the fascisation process.10

This Comintern version of fascism was, as Kitchen remarks, "the
extreme form of the heteronomic theory. " 11
Two further elements of this orthodoxy, which reigned in the Comintern and German Communist party (KPD) from 1928 to 1935 and
which contributed indirectly but substantially to Hitler's victory, deserve emphasis. 12 First, any repressive and antilabor regime was labeled "fascist." Hence, the conservative and authoritarian
governments of Chancellors Henrich Brüning, Franz von Papen, and
General Kurt von Schleicher in Germany between 1930 and 1932 were
described as already fascist, thus trivializing the <langer of Hitler's
accession to power. Second, the Social Democrats were branded a twin
of the moderate wing of fascism. Indeed, since Socialists, unlike the
Nazis, supposedly successfully deceived the workers, they were desig-
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nated the primary enemies of the Communists. Such a position obviously precluded any common action with organized socialists against
the Nazis. Thus in February 1932, less than a year before the Nazi
seizure of power, Ernst Thälmann, the leader of the German Communist party, could still stamp the national Brüning government and the
Social Democratic-dominated government of Otto Braun in Prussia
fascist for such antilabor measures as cutting welfare payments and
curbing strikes. 13 He could complacently denounce what he called the
"opportunistic overestimation of Hitler fascism" and blithely assert that
Social Democracy was the most active element in the fascisation of
Germany and hence the KPD's most dangerous enemy.
Consequently, during the period of the rise of Hitler, Marxist analyses treating the Nazi movement as anything other than the pliable and
bribed instrument of German big business and the Junkers were
formulated outside of and in opposition to the official Comintern position, as were antifascist strategies based on a united front of the
German Social Democratic party (SPD), Communists, and trade
unions. The three key figures who posed comprehensive alternative
analyses and strategies were the German right communist August
Thalheimer, the expelled Soviet left-oppositionist Leon Trotsky, and
Otto Bauer, the foremost theoretician of the Socialist party of Austria.
Despite quite significant differences in their theories of fascism, all
three, for reasons to be explored, took Marx's and Engels' writings on
nineteenth-century Bonapartism as their point of departure. By employing the concept of Bonapartism, all three developed extensive
interpretations of the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the Nazi
seizure of power that compared favorably both in subtlety and political
acumen with the emde instrumentalism of the Comintern.

Bonapartism in Marx and Engels
The French historian Pierre Aycoberry, in his historiographical study
The Nazi Question, praises August Thalheimer for brilliantly framing
the question "concerning the relative autonomy of the state vis avis the
dominant economic class. 14 He concludes, however, by contending
that "at bottom, he did not contribute much more than a return to
Marx, the return to origins, a standard tactic of reformers and heretics.
But he was to have many descendants in this regard: the application of
the notion of Bonapartism to German history and the debate on the
reciprocal relations of the Nazi state and the great monopolies originated with him." Such an assessment begs more questions than it
answers. Leaving aside that Thalheimer concentrated on the conditions
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leading to the Nazi seizure of power rather than on the Nazi state, it
fails to answer the question of "which Marx" Thalheimer and the other
Bonapartist theorists returned to.
Thalheimer, Trotsky, and Bauer were all well aware that the instrumentalist conception of the state and politics favored by the Comintern
could muster strong textual support, such as the famous passage in the
Communist Manifesto where Marx wrote, "The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the
whole bourgeoisie. " 15 Although Marx's writings on Bonapartism and
the Commune were certainly his most sustained political writings, the
decision to privilege these texts over others suggests that Thalheimer,
and to a lesser degree Bauer and Trotsky, found either Marx's mode of
analysis, the structural characteristics of the events he analyzed, or
both, especially germane for understanding National Socialism. Second, neither Thalheimer nor any of the others simply appropriated and
applied Marx's model of Bonapartism. Not surprisingly, given Marxist
historicism, all of them used it as a starting point but also recognized
and emphasized negative analogies between Bonapartism and fascism
that depended on the intervening development of capitalism since the
mid-nineteenth century. Tue question to be asked then is: What aspects of Marx's and Engels' accounts of Bonapartism did they find
useful? While the answers would be somewhat different for
Thalheimer, Trotsky, and Bauer, some elements were shared among the
three.
In many respects the historical situation in which Marx originally
grappled with the regime of Louis Napoleon presented obvious parallels with the triumph of fascism in Italy or the rise of Hitler, parallels
that few well-versed Marxists could overlook. Despite the defiantly
optimistic peroration with its ringing prophecy of the downfall of Louis
Napoleon's regime, Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire portrays a tragedy of
working-class defeat, followed by the attrition of a parliamentary republic, culminating in the seizure of power by an unscrupulous and
shadowy political adventurer aided by a secret society and backed by
the bayonets of the army. Tue events that brought Louis Napoleon to
power were as much a shock to Marx after the heady optimism of the
1848 revolutions as the triumph of fascism was to Marxists in the 1920s.
Marx explained these events by closely examining both the cohesion
and the fragmentation of the French bourgeoisie. 16
According to Marx, the dictatorship of Louis Napoleon was in no
respect a direct response to a working-class offensive. Indeed, after the
crushing defeat of June 1848, when Parisian workers had revolted in an
attempt to retain the right of the unemployed to guaranteed jobs in the
national workshops, "the proletariat passes into the background of the
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revolutionary stage," although the June Days would haunt "the subsequent acts of the drama like a ghost. " 27 Tue J une Days not only
catalyzed cohesion in an otherwise fragmented bourgeoisie, which
rallied around the slogans "property, family, religion, order," but also
traumatized property holders giving rise to a deep-rooted fear of disorder or any sign of reawakening dass conßict. This fear, periodically
revived by peasant and labor unrest or petty-bourgeois discontent,
would condition the willingness of the bourgeois parliamentary bloc to
lean on the executive and the army and to undermine and eliminate
democratic rights, including universal manhood suffrage. "lt understood that all the so-called bourgeois liberties and organs of progress
attacked and menaced its class rule at its social foundation and political
summit simultaneously, and had therefore become 'socialistic .' "18 Unable to represent the majority of the nation, the bourgeois parliamentarians would attempt to stiße the political expression of the majority.
Not only were the bourgeois parliamentarians unable to represent
the vast majority of the nation, but riven by irreconcilable internal
antagonisms, they were unable even to represent the bourgeoisie.
Much of The Eighteenth Brumaire is taken up with the parliamentary
intrigues and machinations of the various factions of the bourgeois
parties, the internal disintegration of the party of Order and the
consequent crisis of representation. From the outset, the party of
Order was, according to Marx, split into two great rival factions,
Orleanists and Bourbons, each backing a rival royal house. 19 As is usual
with Marx, he treats these factions not merely as political divisions but
rather as expressions of social interests, capital and landed property
respectively, reinforced by cultural distinctions. The continual squabbles within the party of Order over constitutional issues and the
conßicts of this party with the president, Louis Napoleon, who constantly attempted to enlarge his sphere of authority, soon alienated
those whom it purported to represent.
The parliamentary party was not only dissolved into its two great factions,
each of these factions was not only split up within itself but the party of
Order in parliament had fallen out with the party of Order outside
parliament. The spokesmen and scribes of the bourgeoisie, its platform
and its press, in short, the ideologists of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie itself, the representatives and the represented, faced one another
in estrangement and no longer understood one another. 20

This estrangement increasingly led to a rejection of parliamentary
government by the extraparliamentary bourgeoisie and to its support
for an authoritative executive in the person of the president, Louis
Napoleon. The aristocracy of finance, its business tied up with public
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credit, "condemned the parliamentary struggle of the party of Order as
a disturbance of order." 21 The commercial bourgeoisie soon followed
suit. In short, the parliamentary party of Order failed to aggregate the
heterogenous interests of the bourgeoisie or create the conditions of
order and stability that were regarded as necessary for the pursuit of
private business affairs.
This crisis of representation and the longing for stability, order, and
economic security meant that the bourgeoisie was willing to countenance Louis Napoleon's coup d' etat in December 1851. In so doing
the bourgeoisie confesses that its own interests dictate that it should be
delivered from the danger of its own rule; that in order to restore
tranquility in the country, the bourgeois parliament must first of all be
given its quietus; that in order to preserve its social power intact, its
political power must be broken: that the individual bourgeois can continue to exploit the other classes and to enjoy undisturbed property,
family, religion and order only on condition that their dass is condemned
along with the other classes to like political nullity.22

If the fragmentation of bourgeois interests and the generalized crisis
of representation eroded the parliamentary republic and thus made
Napoleon's coup possible, there remained the question ofhow and with
what bases of support the adventurer Louis Napoleon was able to seize
and retain power. Marx's account of the sources of support for Louis
Bonaparte and the social interests that his regime served is extremely
complex. 23 According to Marx, the mass base of Louis Napoleon's
presidency and coup d' etat had been the conservative peasantry,
which, inspired by the Napoleonic legend, had elected Bonaparte to
the presidency in December 1848. Louis Napoleon's major organizational base of support, however, was the Society of December lOth, a
secret society gathered from the declasse ßotsam of all social classes,
which functioned both as an approving claque simulating public enthusiasm and as a terrorist gang intimidiating political opponents. The
second organizational source of support was the army recruited from
the peasantry. From 1848 Louis gradually brought the army under his
control, replacing parliamentary generals, wining and dining the officer corps, promising future glory.
Marx also detailed the political means employed by Louis Napoleon
to strengthen the executive power against the parliament after his
election to the presidency in December 1848. 24 Part ofhis success was
attributable to the deficiencies of the Constitution of 1848, which made
the president the only official elected directly by the entire nation and
invested him with quasi-royal powers. Louis Napoleon's adroit use of
these prerogatives combined with the factional disarray of the National
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Assembly resulted in a steady increase in the autonomy of executive
authority. By the time the parliamentarians decided to oppose his
designs for an unconstitutional second presidential term, his tight grip
on the levers of power, the army and the bureaucracy, enabled him to
carry out a successful coup.
Under Louis Napoleon, the executive power with its army and vast
body of officials appeared to have acquired complete autonomy vis-a-vis
civil society. 25 Marx considered the appearance of complete autonomy
illusory claiming instead that the executive rested on the passive base
of the masses of small isolated peasant proprietors. This vast dictatorial
power seems to have served no well-defined class interests or indeed
any interests apart from those of Louis Napoleon and his immediate
entourage. Louis Napoleon pursued contradictory policies and attempted to play off all classes against one another, to conjure and steal
"the whole of France in order to make a present of her to France. "26
However, while breaking the political power of the bourgeoisie, "by
protecting its material power, he generates its political power anew."
This seems, however, to be an inescapable consequence of maintaining
bourgeois property relations rather than the willed or forseeable result
of conscious policy.
The other locus classicus for Bonapartist analyses of fascism was
Engels' attempt in the Origin of the Family, State and Private Property
to generalize the phenomenon of Bonapartism by classifying it as an
exceptional form of state in conditions of class balance. According to
Engels,
By way of exception, however, periods occur in which the warring classes
balance each other so nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator,
acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of independence ofboth. Such
was the absolute monarchy of the seventeenth and eighteenth century,
which held the balance between the nobility and the dass of burghers;
such was the Bonapartism of the First and still more the Second French
Empire, which played off the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the
bourgeoisie against the proletariat. The latest performance of this kind in
which ruler and ruled appear equally ridiculous, is the new German
Empire of the Bismarck nation; here capitalists and workers are balanced
against each other and equally cheated for the benefit of the impoverished
cabbage junkers.27

While this rather elliptical historical formula sacrificed any sense of the
complex internal fragmentation of classes, the importance of transitional classes, or a crisis of representation for the triumph of Bonapartism nonetheless both Otto Bauer and Trotsky would make use of the
notion of "class balance."
Thus in summary, the Bonapartist theorists of the 1920s and 1930s
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could in varying degree draw on some elements of Marx's dissection of
Bonapartism: the depiction of Bonapartism as in part a response to
working-class defeat accompanied by bourgeois fear and fragmentation;
the account of the corresponding crisis of representation, attrition of
parliamentary rule, split between public power and private social
interest, and autonomization of the executive as the bourgeoisie recognized that its political power was incompatible with preserving social
dominance; the portrayal of the opportunities this provided for a declasse adventurer and his followers to seize power. lt should be noted,
however, that Marx's analysis could be more readily made to yield
answers to questions about the social character of fascism and its
relation to the political system than about its relation to the historical
development of capitalism or fascism's political geography.

Bonapartist Perspectives of the 1930s
The analysis of the attrition of Weimar democracy and the rise of
Hitler based most closely on Marx's Bonapartist model was undertaken
by August Thalheimer and other contributors to Gegen den Strom
(Against the Current), the journal of the German Communist partyOpposition (KPD[O]) between 1930 and 1933. 28 Thalheimer, who had
been a key theoretician of the German Communist party until his
expulsion for outspoken opposition to the Comintern resolution of
1928, warned with prophetic lucidity against the tendency on the part
ofboth Communists and Social Democrats to underestimate the fascist
danger. Given the organizational weakness of the KPD(O), however, his
clearsighted warnings during the early 1930s would remain Cassandralike. Although his articles were discovered by the German new left in
the 1960s, recent Marxist critics have faulted him for ostensibly failing
to relate the orientations and attitudes of classes in Germany to the
economic conjunctures of the 1930s and the categories of political
economy. 29 This criticism is only partially justified, since it tends to
focus myopically on his best-known article, "Uber den Faschismus"
(On Fascism), rather than his writings on the political situation in
Germany.
lt was in "Uber den Faschismus," written in 1928 and published in
1930, that Thalheimer depended most heavily on The Eighteenth Brumaire, which he quoted extensively. Nonetheless, he did not equate
Bonapartism and fascism, stating instead that "they are related phenomena with common as well as divergent characteristics both of which
have to be worked out. "30 Indeed, he proceeded analogically, establishing a series of correspondences and contrasts between these two
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forms of rule. Among the features they shared, he numbered the
autonomy of executive power, "the political subordination of all masses,
induding the bourgeoisie itself, under the fascist state power but with
the social dominance of the large bourgeoisie and large landowners,"
and the attempt to appear as the benefactor of all dasses. 31 Even the
dynamics of dass struggle that brought both regimes to power were
similar, a defeat of a working-dass offensive and the exhaustion of the
bourgeoisie, which searched for a savior to preserve its social power.
The nationalism and imperialist aspirations of both regimes as well as
their internal contradictions propelled both to war.
However, a number of features distinguished the two regimes as
well. 32 Some of these stemmed from the different national histories of
France and Italy, as for example Louis Napoleon's use of the Napoleonic legend as opposed to M ussolini's more artificial attempt to recall
the glory of ancient Rome. "More important, however, are the distinctions which stem from changes in the general character of capitalism."
Louis Napoleon belonged to the age of competitive capitalism and
could sometimes advance national liberation, for instance in his aid to
Italian independence, whereas M ussolini's foreign policy bore the
marks of modern imperialism and was reactionary from the outset.
Moreover, the organizational bases of the two regimes diverged in
certain respects. Whereas the Society of December 10th was the
counterpart of the secret societies of the early French labor movement,
the fascist party was the counterrevolutionary counterpart of the Bolsheviks. The mass character of the fascist party "makes it in certain
respects stronger, but also increases its internal contradictions, the
contradiction between the social interests of these masses and the
interests of the dominant dass which it serves. " 33
Although Thalheimer did not explicitly emphasize his differences
from the Comintern position in this artide, they were nonetheless
pronounced. While he too related the triumph of fascism to the era of
imperialism and monopoly capitalism, albeit somewhat perfunctorily,
he pointed out that the nations where fascism had come to poweramong which he counted Italy, Poland, and Bulgaria-were not exactly
major capitalist societies. 34 While the attempt to dismantle the parliamentary system and create "stronger political guarantees for bourgeois
domination" was evident in "such highly developed capitalist lands as
England, Germany and France which were more or less socially and
economically shaken by the results of the war, that points in the
direction of fascism, it can lead to forms of open dictatorship of capital
in certain critical situations. But these will not necessarily be identical
with fascism. "35
Thus while there was a general tendency toward the dedine of
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parliamentary regimes, the subsequent forms of rule were contingent.
One explanation for this was that although the bourgeoisie played a
central role in the demise of parliament, preparing the conditions for
its own political dispossession, it was relatively passive in the actual
coups that brought dictatorships to power. Nor could fascism be regarded as the final form of capitalist rule, a position common in the
Comintern, with its obvious corollary that after fascism the working
dass would triumph. Thalheimer reminded his readers that despite
Marx's characterization of the Second Empire as the last and rottenest
form of state power, it had been followed by a stable parliamentary
democracy. 36
Thalheimer sometimes sounded like an instrumentalist, claiming
that fascism was an open dictatorship of capital, but this could presumably be reconciled with his account of political expropriation since the
social power of the bourgeoisie not only remained intact but was
enhanced by the destruction of all working-class and mass organizations. 37 Thus his account of the social characteristics and political
nature of fascism paralleled Marx's account in The Eighteenth Brumaire
and was considerably more nuanced than the instrumentalist position
adopted by the Comintern in 1928. Moreover, in contrast to the
dogmatism of the Comintern, Thalheimer left his analysis open-ended
by calling for further investigation of the forms of capitalist dictatorship
and questioning the possibility of reducing different national experiences and class configurations to a schematic theoretical formula.
Although "Uber den Faschismus" largely discussed Italian fascism,
by the time it was published Thalheimer had already written about the
crisis of German parliamentary democracy in the spring of 1929 in an
article entitled "Die Krise des Parlamentarismus-das Vorspiel zur
Krise der bürgerlichen Herrschaft" (The Crisis of Parliamentarianism-a Prelude to the Crisis of Bourgeois Domination). 38 In this
article Thalheimer cited numerous attacks by leading journalists and
politicians including Chancellor Gustav Stresemann against the dependence of the government on parliamentary parties. Most of these
speeches and articles advocated strengthening executive authority and
ending "partyism," which pandered to special interests. Thalheimer
compared this opposition on the part of the bourgeois spokespersons to
their own parties and representatives and the appeal for a more autonomous executive to the preparatory period that had led to Bonapartism
in France in the early 1850s or to fascism in Italy in the early 1920s. At
the root of the crisis of parliament he detected an offensive on the part
of the German trusts, which, faced with worsening international competitiveness, could no longer tolerate the costly and uncontrollable
outcomes of the parliamentary process:
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The pressure of the trust capital on the masses of people in Germany
grows visibly. The "industrial middle class" is ground down, monopoly
capital has already created higher profit rates for itself, at the same time
putting pressure on wages and social costs. The consequence, a slow but
steadily growing counter pressure from under, radicalization of the petty
bourgeois and the working dass. 39

This radicalization was already apparent during the elections in May
1928 when both far left and right had gained at the expense of the
centrist parties. The bourgeois parties by attacking parliamentarianism
were ideologically preparing their own demise. "The social dominance
of the bourgeoisie has fallen into contradiction with its political rule. lt
prepares its own political resignation in order to preserve and fortify its
dass dominance. " 40 Thus by selectively deploying elements of Marx's
Bonapartism model, Thalheimer described a gathering crisis of parliamentary democracy and bourgeois hegemony well before the onset of
the Great Depression and Hitler's electoral breakthrough. Because of
the international situation of German capital, large industry was no
longer willing to maintain the costly series of political and social
compromises such as high welfare payments that had stabilized Germany since 1924. 41 lt should be noted, however, that until 1932
Thalheimer, in contrast to Marx in The Eighteenth Brumaire, tended to
depict capital as a unified political agent arrayed behind the leadership
of the major trusts. Moreover, he was vague on the way the needs of
German trusts translated into demands by leading politicians for a
stronger executive.
Thalheimer's understanding of the crisis of representation enabled
him to see through the pseudo-parliamentary trappings of the presidential government Thalheimer regarded as a prelude to fascist dictatorship. Already in spring 1930, Thalheimer affirmed that although
Brüning could rely on a majority in parliament he could not rely on a
parliamentary majority-since his majority included the Nationalists,
who took their lead from the president. 42 In addition, neither the
composition nor the policies of the government were controlled by the
Reichstag. President Hindenburg had determined the composition of
the Brüning government, had mandated agricultural tariffs and the
program of aid to the Junkers, and could prorogue parliament at any
time using the emergency powers granted in Article 48 of the Constitution. Moreover, the mass of the bourgeoisie had turned increasingly
antiparliamentary.
Thalheimer strongly believed that the objective preconditions for a
fascist dictatorship were already present in Germany. 43 While the
elimination of concessions to labor made during the postwar labor
offensive of 1918-20 had in the past been possible under parliamentary
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democracy, now the broad and systematic attack on German labor, the
attack on wages and welfare, was becoming so intense as tobe incompatible with the maintenance of democratic rights, especially the right
of organization and the right to strike. Second, he argued that while the
agency costs of the state might well be higher under a fascist dictatorship, these costs would be more than offset by cuts in social
expenditure. Third, he contended that it was not a question of the
bourgeoisie voluntarily handing over power to the fascists but rather
the unavoidable logic of its position. In Italy the bourgeoisie had only
wanted to intimidate labor, to eliminate its organizations, "not the rule
of fascism. But to break the organization oflabor by systematic terror, it
had to accept in the bargain the building, arming, military training of
fascist organizations and the tolerance and support for their actions by
civil and military authorities." While a sector of the bourgeoisie already
openly backed fascism, another sector continued to oppose it, but
"against their will they play into the hands of the fascists. " 44 Even the
Democrats and more liberal members of the Peoples' party were
clamoring for a stronger executive authority, while the agrarian wings
of the Nationalists, Popular Conservatives, and Center vociferously
supported a dictatorship by President Hindenburg. 45
Again before the Nazi electoral breakthrough, Thalheim er perceived
the impending <langer. Tue National Socialists were the most active
wing in this weakening of parliamentary rule, cooperating with but
simultaneously distancing themselves from the conservative grouping
around Hindenburg. 46 Above all, they were using the situation advantageously to build up their party organization in the workplace and
governmental apparatus. They were both participating in parliamentary institutions to destroy them and at the same time increasing their
extraparliamentary terror against labor. Recognizing that fascism, like
Bonapartism, was in part a consequence not of the strength of labor but
rather its weakness, internal division, and exhaustion, Thalheimer
cautioned against an abstentionist or passive policy on the part oflabor,
although given the policies of the Communists and Socialists, he
appears to have doubted the likelihood of energetic or concerted
action. 47 Tue form of bourgeois rule was not a mere juridical question
but one of the balance of dass power. Parliamentary democracy was
worth defending against fascism, he avowed, but it could be defended
only by extraparliamentary means.
While these early articles by Thalheimer stressed the incompatibility of continued parliamentary government and democracy with
the onslaught against labor orchestrated by German trusts, during the
chancellorships of von Papen and General Schleicher, the final act of
the Weimar Republic, Thalheimer and other contributors to Gegen den
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Strom emphasized the failure of the presidential dictatorship to overcome the economic crisis of capitalism, stabilize the political situation,
attract a mass base, or aggregate the interests of the various fractions of
the high bourgeoisie. In his analysis of the November 1932 elections,
Thalheimer made clear that the authoritarian von Papen-Schleicher
government rested on no base of support either within or outside of
parliament. If it tried to demonstrate that the new Reichstag was
incapable of functioning nothing was gained.
Capital expects the dictatorial government to create "order." This government, however, is parliamentary scandals, new elections or actions of the
sort of July 20th or September 12. A dictatorial govenment that is even
more insecure and weaker than a parliamentary one, which has to stage a
coup de main every few weeks, is not what the grande bourgeoisie
expects from a reactionary dictatorship. 48

While the Nazis had suffered their first major defeat in this election, a
loss of some 2 million votes, Thalheimer attributed this loss to purely
temporary factors. 49 These factors included hopes reposited by the
large and petty bourgeoisie in von Papen's program for economic
revival, the pressure of large landowners in favor of von Papen, the
disappointment of many Nazi followers with the lack of immediate
success by the party, and the extraparliamentary activity of labor. Von
Papen's economic program was failing since he was "paralyzed by his
incapacity to bridge the divisions between industrial and agrarian
capital in the interest of capital as a whole. " Moreover, government
instability created an unfavorable business climate. Even the Junkers
whom von Papen favored were increasingly falling away from the
government because of his incapacity to meet their maximum demands. As the von Papen government failed, Nazi voters who were
disappointed by the lack of success in taking power in August would
stream back.
This mode of analysis was continued in December 1932 in the
anonymous article "Von Brüning bis Schleicher" (From Brüning to
Schleicher), which declared that von Papen had brought on the instability by his plans for revising the Constitution and by incurring the
opposition of industrial and commercial capital to the costs of his
agrarian program. 50 While von Papen's downfall once again opened the
prospect for Nazi participation in the government, those at the pinnacle of the state apparatus, especially the generals, were still not prepared to subordinate themselves to the fascists. If anything, despite
initial appearances, General Schleicher's government was even weaker
than his predecessor's. He retreated from von Papen's plans to alter the
Constitution and his program for creating employment and stimulating
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the economy was failing even more rapidly than von Papen's.
Schleicher tried to play the benefactor of all classes, eliminating the
import quotas that damaged industrial interests, promising the agrarians a mandatory mixture of butter and margarine, ending von Papen's
wage controls, and promising no further lowering of living standards to
labor. His social rhetoric was beginning to be perceived by the bourgeoisie, however, as a disturbing sign of weakness vis-a-vis labor. Nor
was Schleicher in a position "to force the various fractions of the
bourgeoisie to reduce their particular interests to a common denominator. " 51
Tue meetings between Hitler and von Papen could be seen as
threats to replace Schleicher in the unified interests of large capital.
This judgment was reiterated and elaborated in the issue of Gegen den
Strom that appeared a few days after the formation of the Hitler-von
Papen government, a government it described as Nazi-dominated despite the presence of the conservative Nationalist coalition partners.
"Von Papen and Schleicher fell because of the antagonisms within the
camp of the bourgeoisie . . . because those strata of the bourgeoisie
which felt disadvantaged by their policies could play the fascist party
off against them. Today, however, the bourgeoisie has handed over
power to the fascists and resigned in their favor." Tue consequence of
this would be the complete elimination of the rights of laborers and an
unrestrained attack by capital. While the Nazis could not resolve the
international capitalist crisis, they could "reduce the living standard of
labor to a level of unimaginable misery" while providing subventions to
industry and the Junkers. 52 Tue industrialists had abandoned political
power but their control over the workplace would be even more
stringent.
There were certainly numerous deficiencies in the analysis of
Thalheimer and the KPD(O). The relation between cohesion and fragmentation, particular and common interests within the bourgeoisie,
was never clearly spelled out. Sometimes the bourgeoisie appeared as
a unified agent subordinate to the interests of the trusts, at other times
as a more heterogenous social group, antagonistic to labor and sharing a
common interest in order, but otherwise unable to coordinate its
manifold economic and political interests. Although there were indications in several articles that the Nazi party garnered cross-class support, there was little concrete investigation of its composition. Tue
strength and lasting contribution of Thalheimer's analysis, however, lay
in bis often penetrating treatment of the political process and social
implications of the steady erosion of parliamentary democracy and the
establishment of presidential dictatorship, a treatment derived from
the leading motif of The Eighteenth Brumaire and rooted in an exam-
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ination of the ways in which a defense of social and economic interests
of the German bourgeoisie had become structurally incompatible with
the preservation of democratic rights and norms.
The second major Marxist figure of the 1930s who analyzed the
phase of presidential dictatorship in Germany from 1930-33 in terms of
Bonapartism was Leon Trotsky. Like Thalheimer and in opposition to
the German Communist party (KPD), Trotsky sharply distinguished
between the period of presidential dictatorship and fascism and
pressed for a united front of labor organizations to halt the Nazis.
Trotsky's use of the Bonapartism concept, however, contrasted markedly with that of Thalheimer in several respects. Whereas for
Thalheimer fascism was the modern analog of Bonapartism-Bonapartism in the era of mass politics and monopoly capitalism-Trotsky
viewed Bonapartism as either a preparatory phase for fascist dictatorship ("preventive Bonapartism") or a degenerate form of fascist
rule ("Bonapartism of fascist origin"). 53 While Bonapartism could assume many forms depending on concrete historical conditions, the
essence of Bonapartism for Trotsky consisted of being a dictatorship
resting on the military, police, and bureaucracy:
a government of the saber as judge arbiter of the nation-that's just what
Bonaparlism is. The saber by itselfhas no independent program. lt is the
instrument of "order." lt is summoned to safeguard what exists. Raising
itself politically above all classes, Bonapartism ... represents in the
social sense, always andin all epochs the government of the strongest and
firmest part of the exploiters; consequently, present day Bonapartism can
be nothing else than the government of finance capital which directs,
inspires, and corrupts the summits of the bureaucracy, the police, the
officers' caste and the press. "54

Thus for Trotsky, Bonapartism lacked mass support or indeed any
firm support outside the state apparatus. A Bonapartist dictatorship
was preventive when civil war was threatened, when the working dass
and fascists were balanced but an open confrontation had not occurred.
''As soon as the struggle of two social strata, the haves and have nots, the
exploiters and exploited-reaches its highest tension, the conditions
are established for the domination of bureaucracy, police, soldiery. The
government becomes 'independent' of society. "55 This would be a
short-lived and highly unstable form of government. More stable was
"Bonapartism of fascist origin," which arose when after seizing power, a
fascist party gradually lost its petty-bourgeois mass base as some of its
followers were absorbed into the state apparatus and others were
disillusioned by the regime's inability to fulfill its social promises. At
that point, "fascism is regenerated into Bonapartism. "56 Hence Trotsky
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placed Bonapartism and fascism in a temporal trajectory of "preventive
Bonapartism"-fascist dictatorship-"Bonapartism of fascist origin," all
of which socially served finance capital but rested on different social
bases and had different relations to the petty bourgeoisie and labor.
This notion of Bonapartism as a short-lived phase of dass equilibrium
prior to civil war emerged in Trotsky's characterization of the Brüning
chancellorship in early 1932.
Tue Brüning regime is the regime of bureaucratic dictatorship or, more
definitely, the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie enforced by means of the
army and police. Tue fascist petty bourgeoisie and the proletarian organizations seem to counterbalance one another . . . Brüning's dictatorship is
a caricature of Bonapartism. His dictatorship is unstable, unreliable,
shortlived. Supported directly only by a small minority of Democrats
against the will of the workers, threatened by fascism. . . . Tue dictatorship of bureaucratic impotence fills the lull before the battle, before
the forces are openly matched. 57

If the Brüning government was a caricature of Bonapartism, the governments of von Papen and General Schleicher in late 1932 were the
real thing, specifically German forms of Bonapartism. Hindenburg's
reelection to the presidency in spring 1932 with the support of the
Socialists and Catholic Centrists had the character of a plebiscite
against civil war. "But precisely this is the most important function of
Bonapartism: raising itself above the two struggling camps in order to
preserve property and order. lt suppresses civil war, or precedes it or
does not allow it to rekindle. "58 Hindenburg permitted the government to appear to have mass support, although Hindenburg himself
had broken with the democratic parties and openly served the landowners, industrialists and bankers, while the upper levels of the propertied dass were Papen's only base of support. Hence, despite such
apparent successes as the coup against the Socialist government in
Prussia in July, von Papen's grip on power was precarious. Behind
Hindenburg and von Papen stood the state apparatus, the strongest
sector of which was the army, embodied by General Schleicher, whom
Trotsky viewed as the "core of the Bonapartist combination. "59 While
Trotsky regarded the von Papen-Schleicher governments as highly
unstable, he expected finance capital to opt for an open fascist dictatorship only if the dass struggle intensified. 60
This proved to be false but was noted by Trotsky without theoretical
reevaluation after the Nazi seizure of power. In his own account of the
coming to power of the Hitler-Hugenburg government, it was not
intensified struggle by the revolutionary working dass but rather the
fragmentation of the possessing dasses that issued in the handing over
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of power to the Nazis. General Schleicher, in whom Bonapartism
assumed its purest form, fell because the passivity of the proletariat
"weakened the hoop of fear that binds together the possessing classes,
bringing into the open the antagonisms that tear them apart. "61 The
economic base for Bismarck's coalition of iron and rye, of heavy industry and large-scale agriculture, no longer existed. Because of its narrow
social base, the industrial bourgeoisie needed Junkers and rich farmers, but economically the preservation of agriculture had become a
millstone. When Schleicher deserted the agrarians, they engineered
his downfall and replaced him with Alfred Hugenburg, who was the
embodiment of the Junkers and landed property. Hitler had been
added to "decorate the camarilla of property owners with the leaders of
a 'national movement,' and secondly, to place the fighting forces of
fascism at the direct disposal of the proprietors." Trotsky considered
this operation highly risky for the propertied clique around Hugenburg, which he believed held the real posts of power "while the
plebians are assigned the decorative or secondary posts." The government was a brittle, contradictory, and internally divided amalgam of
representatives of agriculture, industry, and the reactionary petty bourgeoisie. Although Trotsky did not rule out that the clique of property
holders would eliminate the Nazis and a return to a Bonapartist regime, he thought more likely a situation of semi-civil war that would
make the Nazis indispensable and in which they would displace their
"much too corpulent mentors," expropriating them politically. 62
Although occasionally rising to the rhetorical power of Marx in The
Eighteenth Brumaire, especially in "What Is National Socialism?" of
June 1933, in which he discussed the symbolic manipulation by the
Nazi regime, Trotsky was clearly less indebted to Marx's concept of
Bonapartism and more dependent on Engels' various formulations for
his analysis of fascism than was Thalheimer. 63 Were their differences
ultimately more than terminological? Did they have any consequences
apart from the fact Trotsky labeled Schleicher a Bonapartist, while
Thalheimer regarded the period of presidential dictatorship as a prelude to fascism, the modern variant of Bonapartism? In fact, the
terminological differences were closely tied to substantive differences.
Thalheimer's account of the increasing autonomy of the executive was
much more processual; autonomization was a dynamic response to both
a crisis of representation within the bourgeoisie and the incompatability of the maintenance of parliamentary system with the industrialists' offensive, an offensive that reflected both the international
position of German capital and the relative weakness of German labor.
As a result he paid much more attention to the specific policies of both
the bourgeois parties and government and recognized that the steady
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movement toward fascism was accompanied by a corresponding erosion
of labor's power in the face of the capitalist offensive. By contrast,
Trotsky's more mechanistic account treated the early 1930s as a period
of labor offensive, albeit one thwarted by labor's misleaders and the
unstable equilibrium between labor and fascism approaching civil war,
a perspective on the nature of the period not far removed from the
Comintern's. Nonetheless, both Trotsky and Thalheimer stood far from
the Comintern in their recognition that the presidential dictatorship
between 1930 and January 1933 was not fascist and that all available
means for united labor action had to be utilized to prevent the Nazis
from seizing power.
The third major Marxist figure who adopted a Bonapartist perspective was Otto Bauer, the leading theoretician of the Austrian Socialist
party. 64 While both Trotsky and Thalheim er treated Bonapartism and
fascism as related phenomena, they asserted that key differences depended on contrasts between the phase of competitive capitalism in
which Louis Napoleon had operated and monopoly capitalism, but
both left the precise nature of this dependence unspecified. In contrast, Bauer attempted to link his Bonapartist analysis of fascism with a
closer examination of the structural transformation of the interwar
economy, a linkage often obscured by excerpting his chapter on fascism
from Zwischen zwei Weltkriegen? (Between Two World Wars ?) of
1936. 65 Moreover, he strove to place fascism within the framework of a
generalized European economic, political, and cultural crisis of the
postwar era, a crisis of capitalist civilization, and in doing so developed
a far more comprehensive syncretic theory of fascism than did the other
two.
Bauer took World War 1 as the starting point of the crisis of capitalist
civilization. The war had disrupted the delicate balance of the international economy, which was never restored in the postwar world. M uch
of Zwischen zwei Weltkriegen? consists of a detailed analysis of the
world economy in the 1920s, of international credit and currency
problems, the expansion of agricultural output and changes in industrial production processes such as the rationalization movement in
Germany. 66 As a consequence of the enormous expansion of production
brought on by industrial rationalization coupled with a lagging masspurchasing power that put downward pressures on prices and profits
even during the prosperous late 1920s, the economic crisis of the 1930s
was quantitatively more severe than earlier ones. The inability of the
leading capitalist powers to reestablish stability in the postwar world, a
failure associated with reparations and international credit, also meant
that the depression of the 1930s was qualitatively different from earlier
cyclical downturns. In the face of falling prices, agriculture and indus-
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try had demanded strong measures to protect the domestic market and
substantial export premiums. 67 Central banks had adopted monetary
regulation to stave off the collapse of their currencies. Everywhere
open competition and free trade had been replaced by bureaucratically
administered economies that began by regulating currency and foreign
trade but soon extended their controls to agricultural production,
wages, the labor market, and consumption, ushering in a new neomercantilist phase of capitalism, of which fascist Germany was the most
extreme variant.
Fascism too, according to Bauer, was very much a product of closely
interconnected social processs caused by the disruptions of the war
68 Both Italian
years and the economic crisis of the postwar
fascism and German National Socialism had recruited their initial
followers from among declasse veterans who knew no other existence
than war. The ideology and organizational forms of fascist movements
were above all military. The war and the postwar economic crisis had
also impoverished and embittered many small farmers and petty bourgeois, who then rejected democracy and the middle-class parties they
had previously supported and turned instead to fascism. Moreover, the
capitalist dass had seen its profit rates fall in the postwar crises, and it
therefore desired to break the resistance of labor, a desire probably
irreconcilable with the continuance of democracy. Fascist movements
had been especially strong in Italy and Germany, both of which had
weak and belated traditions of parliamentary democracy, had been
shaken by their war experiences (domestic opposition to entering the
war in Italy, the unexpected military defeat in Germany), and suffered
severe economic dislocation in the immediate postwar period.
Although capitalists had not originally encouraged the formation of
fascist movements, they quickly discovered that these movements were
useful for intimidating labor and driving it on the defensive. 69 In
Germany, however, after 1923, when the Ruhr had reverted to national
control and the currency and economic recovery had been underwritten by foreign loans, German capital stopped its funding of the paramilitary right and instead bankrolled the bourgeois parties. Even the
monarchist Nationalists gradually accepted democratic rules. Only
with the onset of the depression in 1929 had German heavy industry
and the Junkers rediscovered the usefulness of a fascist movement.
"The bourgeois fractions which supported Brüning used the anxiety of
the Social Democracy and trade unions at the prospect of a fascist
dictatorship in order to extract from them toleration for Brüning's
capitalist dictatorship, which with the deßationary policy of its emergency decrees rapidly lowered the living standard of the popular
masses. " 70 The fact that the Nazis attacked such labor defense organi-
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zations as the Reichsbanner and Rotfront ensured favorable handling
by the state authorities.
This did not mean, however, that the industrialists or Junkers had
become fascists. Indeed, they were largely contemptuous of the plebians who composed the fascist movement.
But as in Italy the moment came in which the capitalists and Junkers had
only the choice of suppressing the fascists, and with that instantly changing the balance of forces in favor of labor, or handing over state power to
the fascists. In this situation Hindenburg's Junker cronies decided on the
transfer of state power to Hitler. As in Italy representatives of the historic
bourgeois parties entered the first fascist govemment believing that they
could subordinate and assimilate the fascists . But more rapidly than in
Italy, German fascism used this conquered state power to throw the
bourgeois parties out of the govemment, to dissolve the parties and
organizations of the bourgeoisie and to establish its totalitarian dictatorship. Here too the dass struggle seemed to end when the fascist
storm troops set up their domination over all classes. 71

Although the fascists justified themselves to the bourgeoisie on the
grounds of having saved it from Bolshevism, the proletariat had long
been on the defensive. The capitalist dass and large landowners transfered power not because of a threatened proletarian revolution but
rather "to destroy the achievements of reformist socialism. " 72 (This
emphasis on social-democratic achievements was not surprisingly far
more pronounced in Bauer's work than in Trotsky's and Thalheimer's.)
The fascist dictatorship was the outcome of a peculiar balance of dass
forces that, using Engels, Bauer compared to the balance between the
nobility and bourgeoisie that had sustained absolutism or the balance
between the bourgeoisie and labor that had resulted in Bonapartism.
The capitalists had been too weak to carry through their deßationary
and antilabor policies by ideological or legal means, but "strong
enough to pay, arm and unleash on the proletariat a lawless, anti-legal
private army. " 73 Labor, led by the reformist socialists and trade unions,
had been strong enough to hinder the deßationary policy but not
strong enough to defend itself against force. Since the socialists had
supported the democratic republic, peasants, petty bourgeois, and
many workers viewed them as an integral part and beneficiary of the
hated system that failed to protect these strata from impoverishment
during the economic crisis. Therefore these strata ßocked to the fascists. "The result of this balance of forces or much more the weakness of
both dasses is the victory of fascism. " 74 Thus while Bauer, like Trotsky,
made use of the balance-of-dasses notion from Engels, the accounts of
the players and relative weights in that balance were quite different.
While the bourgeoisie had been politically dispossessed, its organi-
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zations, press, and traditions destroyed, the leading sector of the
bourgeoisie rapidly found that the new system of domination would
serve its own interests. 75 The fascist dictatorship smashed the unions
and other mass organizations that previously inhibited capitalist dominance and by eliminating all democratic rights silenced any possible
opposition. lt retained a capitalist economy and therefore had to be
solicitous about the profitability of industry. Being dependent on the
banks and credit system for government financing, the dictatorship had
to represent the interests of high finance as congruent with national
interest. Moreover, in power the fascist parties suppressed the radical
anticapitalist tendencies in their own ranks, Hitler's murder of Sturmabteilung (SA) leaders in June 1934 being a prime example, thus
removing the last impediment to bourgeois social dominance .
However, while Bauer, in contrast to Thalheimer and Trotsky, did not
ascribe any importance to divisions within the capitalist class for the
victory of fascism, once fascism was in power he thought that the
development of the administered economy was likely to injure the
interests of particular fractions of capital and thereby heighten intracapitalist tensions. 76 Fascist totalitarianism ran counter to the traditions and ideology of many strata of the bourgeoisie. Autarky and
preparation for war hurt the export-oriented finished goods industry.
Rentiers feared a devaluation of their financial instruments in the event
of war. lncreasingly the armaments industry and large landowners who
were closely related to the officer corps obtained the upper hand. Thus
in the final analysis, the fascist dictatorship rested on and served only
one fraction of the bourgeoisie, the war-oriented sector. This position
approached the definition of fascism announced a year earlier at the
Seventh Comintern Congress, where as part of the shift to a strategy of
forming Popular Fronts with socialists and liberal parties, the official
spokesman Georgi Dmitrov had proclaimed that fascism was "the open
terroristic dictatorship of the most reactionary, chauvinist, most imperialist elements of finance capital. " 77
However, in it comprehensiveness, empirical weight, and subtle
analysis of the relation between the ruling caste and dominant class
under fascism, Bauer's fascism theory was distant from that of the
Comintern. Rather than being satisfied with generalities about monopoly capitalism, Bauer undertook a concrete analysis of the strains of the
postwar economy. While he believed that there were strong tendencies
in all modern capitalist economies toward a bureaucratically administered economic system, these tendencies emerged fully only where
fascism was victorious, as in Italy and Germany. To explain why fascism
had come to power in these nations, Bauer provided a multicausal
interpretation that connected the weakness of parliamentary democratic traditions, the effects of the war, and the specific character of the
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postwar economic cns1s in both countries. Bauer's account of the
preconditions, social composition, and appeal of the fascist movements
was considerably more intricate than either the position of the Comintern or those of Thalheimer and Trotsky. In accordance wtih earlier
Italian analyses like Togliatti's, he acknowledged the relative autonomy
of the fascist movement. However, despite his use of a Bonapartist
model, Bauer's analysis of the political crisis and presidential dictatorship in Germany was far sketchier than Thalheimer's or Trotsky's
and bourgeois fragmentation played no role whatsoever in his chronicle
of the triumph of fascism. Nonetheless, Bauer's combined analysis of
developmental tendencies in the postwar economy and the internal
conditions in Italy and Germany that created a favorable climate for the
victory of fascism permitted him to confront the Comintern theory of
1928 on its own terrain and offer a comprehensive alternative to this
heteronomic model.
Despite the significant contributions of Thalheimer, Trotsky, and
Bauer to a Marxist theory of fascism, in the postwar world, the
Bonapartist alternative was largely relegated to oblivion as the historiography of Nazism fell victim to the cold war. Across the military and
political barriers of divided Europe, a theory of totalitarianism that
equated Nazism and Communism on the basis of purely formal similarities faced an unrevised and mirror-image communist theory that
equated fascism with monopoly capitalism in the era of imperialism. 78
Only with the growth of the new left in the 1960s would these Bonapartist analyses be disinterred, reprinted, reexamined, and eventually
further elaborated and modified. 79 The appropriation of the Bonapartist theories of the 1930s enabled adherents of the new left to establish
contact with a critical Marxist tradition while avoiding the staggering
simplifications of the instrumentalist intepretation with its lack of complex mediations between social classes, economics, and political representation still dominant in the East bloc. Presently the impetus for
reexamining seems exhausted, but over a fifteen-year period beginning
in the mid-1960s historians and political scientists associated with the
new left produced a substantial body of work on National Socialism
deriving either directly or indirectly from some variant of the Bonapartist perspective. Although much of this work transcended some of the
manifest weaknesses of the literature of the 1930s, for example, the
relative inattention to Nazi ideology, the thinness of empirical evidence
for the divisions between fractions of capital, nonetheless this recent
literature testifies to the vitality and rich legacy of this alternative
tradition.
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Theories ofFascism:
Nicos Poulantzas As Historian
Jane Caplan
scientists, Nicos
tical scient
two political
Within a year of each other, in
Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband, published deeply contrasting studies
of the state under capitalism, 1 and thereby embarked on a project of
mutual criticism that has had a wide airing among Marxists. 2 This
interest was hardly surprising. For one thing, the coincidence of the
books' publication broke a relative silence on the theory of the state in
Marxism, and a debate of some kind was long overdue. Secondly, the
debate they provoked went straight to the heart of an already familiar
conßict of political cultures, as a resume will show.
Poulantzas and Miliband started from theoretical positions that could
hardly be more dissimilar, and they became progressively more critical
of each other. Miliband's The State in Capitalist Society is a work of
dissenting radicalism, forceful, incisive, and politically uncompromising. Yet, as a detailed exposure of the composition, mechanics, and
style of Western political systems, it stands firmly within the empirical
tradition exemplified by the political sociologist to whom it is dedicated, C. Wright Mills. In this sense, its structure, if not its political
judgment, conforms to a version of orthodox political theory rooted in
Western bourgeois thought. Poulantzas' Political Power and Social
Classes, on the other hand, is the heir, through critical modification, of
the newer and rather less accessible methodological school associated
with the name of Louis Althusser. Its entire problematic and vocabulary were far less familiar when it was first published, and correspond
to a theoretical rigor quite absent from Miliband's work. Tue establish128
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ment of a strict Marxist theoretical framework was an integral part of
Poulantzas' project, and was pursued by him with a special regard for
conceptual precision and subtle differentiations.
Tue two authors themselves were a good deal less dispassionate than
this in describing one another's method. In Miliband's eyes, Poulantzas
suffered from "an exaggerated fear of empiricist contamination," and
was guilty of a "structuralist abstractionism" so abstruse that "it cuts
him off from any possibility of achieving what he describes as 'the
political analysis of a concrete conjuncture.' "3 Conversely, Poulantzas
accused his critic of capitulating to "the illusions of the evident," and of
a neopositivist empiricism that (returning Miliband's own charge of
"super-determinism") led to the establishment of "immutable dogmas." In addition, some of Miliband's criticisms struck him as so
"utterly absurd" that he dedined to respond. 4 lt is hardly surprising,
then, to find that the two writers have been characterized as working
within utterly different systems ofknowledge. 5
I have started my assessment of Poulantzas' work by posing the
substance of his argument with Miliband not because I wish to take
sides in it, but because I find myself awkwardly poised between the
two protagonists-a position of epistemological impurity that would, I
fear, commend my remarks to neither. My interest in Poulantzas arises,
in fact, precisely from this midway position. In a subsequent defense of
his work against Miliband's charge of crippling abstractionism, Poulantzas referred explicitly to his second book, Fascism and Dictatorship,
which, he daimed, far from eschewing contamination by facts, constituted "a detailed historical analysis of German and ltalian fascism. "6
lt is this book, and the author's daim, that I want to discuss here; and
the major issue is not the absence of "facts," but their very concrete
and provocative presence.
My reactions on reading Fascism and Dictatorship were mixed. On
the one hand, its basic problematic was immediately absorbing: it
offered an analysis of fascism set strictly within the terms of the dass
struggle, but which insisted on the specificity of the political domain,
and correspondingly rejected a crudely economistic correlation of dass
and state. On the other hand, I was surprised, given the ostensible
rigor of this methodology, by the carelessness with which Poulantzas
treats historical data, and by the extent to which subsequent empirical
research has tended to weaken the general analysis of fascism that he
proposed. I have since been told that it was naive of me to suppose that
a political theorist would have much sensitivity to "real" history; but
this dismissal of a genuine problem-the correlation of theory and
concrete analysis-hardly seems adequate. Rather, it seems important
to explore the paradox that, in Poulantzas, extreme theoretical preci-
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sion is combined with crude empirical inaccuracy. Without such an
attempt, the book might as well be ignored; but with it, there is at least
a chance of illuminating the problem.
1 will therefore consider Fascism and Dictatorship from the standpoint of a historian whose field is the structure of the National Socialist
regime in Germany, but not in the guise of the outraged specialist
rescuing "history" as such from the crude embrace of the political
theorist. Thus, although my argument will not primarily be concerned
with problems of epistemology, it is bound to bear strongly on them. In
this sense, an examination-however preliminary and partial-of some
of the historical limitations and errors of Poulantzas' study will, 1 hope,
help to expand the discussion of method among historians, and assist
the further articulation of Marxist political history.
My starting point is Poulantzas' own statement of his intentions and
method in the lntroduction to Fascism and Dictatorship. The correct
method for analyzing fascism as a political phenomenon, he observes,
is "to concentrate on a thorough investigation of where fascism took
root, and to analyse concrete situations. " 7 He then points out that his
book
is not a historiographical study of German and Italian fascism, but a study
in political theory-which of course cannot be carried out without thorough historical research. But the treatment of the material, and in particular the order of exposition, are bound tobe different in each case. This
study concentrates on elucidating the essential features of fascism as a
specific political phenomenon. Historical "events" and concrete details
are used here only to the extent that they are relevant illustrations of the
subject under discussion [i.e., the essential features of fascism]. 8

As a description of a conventional line of demarcatiorr between
history and political theory, this is perfectly clear and unexceptionable
(indeed, the traditional invocation of history as the provider of events
for pictorial purposes is perhaps somewhat surprising to find in this
context, suggesting as it does a discrete object ofknowledge defined by
chronology). At any rate, although Poulantzas has elsewhere argued
that concrete facts "can only be rigorously-that is, demonstrablycomprehended if they are explicitly analysed with the aid of a theoretical apparatus constantly employed through the length of the text,"
the previous quotation shows his clear acknowledgment that the need
for theory does not in itself cancel out the need for soundly derived
historical detail. 9 In other words, Poulantzas' discourse explicitly combines the theoretical and the empirical in an alliance in which the
former takes primacy. 10
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Tue order of exposition in Fascism and Dictatorship reßects the
terms of this alliance. In a series of chapters that analyze in turn the
relationship of fascism with each of the dasses and condude with a
general treatment of the fascist state, Poulantzas first states his theoretical propositions, and then illustrates them by reference to the
Italian and German cases. However, it is not easy to do justice in a
short summary to the various themes he develops in this way. His
method leads to careful conceptual differentiation, and his propositions
are generally stated with powerful darity; but their exposition is
characterized by subtle and exhaustive argumentation that does not
lend itself readily to precis. 1 shall therefore offer only a highly compressed resume of the main features of Poulantzas' theory of fascism,
with a view to making my particular criticisms intelligible. 11
Tue central theme of Poulantzas' study is the specificity of fascism as
one form of "exceptional capitalist state," namely, of the regimes corresponding to various types or articulations of political crisis under
capitalism; other examples would be military dictatorship and Bonapartism. 12 Tue framework in which its specificity can be established
consists, according to him, of (1) the changes in the relations of production, and (2) the developments in the dass struggle and their relation to
the political crisis. Both these questions are subjected to concentrated
theoretical and empirical examination. Only by this means, Poulantzas
argues, can the essential elements of fascism be identified and distinguished from its secondary, contingent features, and a rigorous
specification of the fascist state be accomplished. Thus Poulantzas
begins by arguing that fascism cannot be dissociated from the imperialist stage of capitalism; more specifically, the period that saw its first
rise was one of transition, in imperialist countries, toward the dominance of monopoly capital. This point alone, however, cannot explain
the emergence of fascism, nor finally define its uniqueness in contrast
to other types of exceptional state. These matters can only be elucidated by also examining the particular conjuncture of the dass struggle, that is, the specific sets of relations of dass forces at the given time.
Thus an analysis of the dass struggle will expose the crisis of the
political representation of monopoly capital, and its possible resolution;
it will also make the crucial distinction (for working-dass strategy)
between a political crisis of this kind and a true revolutionary situation.
Poulantzas is particularly concerned to refute a number of contemporary interpretations of fascism adopted on the left: fascism as the
direct agent of monopoly capital (the economist line of the Third
International); fascism as a system of dass equilibrium (a theory elaborated principally by the German right communist August Thalheimer
and echoed by many Marxists in one form or another); and fascism as
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the dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie (described by Poulantzas as a
social democratic interpretation). These three rejected theories are not
arbitrarily introduced by Poulantzas, for they correspond to crucial
elements in fascism, torn out of context: the role of monopoly capital,
the extreme degree of autonomy of the state, and the ties between the
fascist party and the petty bourgeoisie. Each of these important facets
of the problem of fascism is vulnerable to misconception, especially in
the sense that each may be mistaken for the whole, although they are
all in fact only parts. Poulantzas' ambition is to correct the errors of
emphasis and to reconstruct a relationship between these parts. He
theorizes fascism as follows:
Throughout the rise of fascism and after the conquest of power, fascism
(the fascist party and the fascist State) characteristically has a relative
autonomy from both the power bloc [i.e., the politically dominant classes
and/or dass fractions, conceived of as an unstable alliance-J.C.] and the
fraction of big monopoly capital, whose hegemony [i. e., relative dominance within the alliance] it has established. This relative autonomy
stems from two sets of factors:
(a) from the internal contradictions among the classes in the power
alliance, i.e. from its internal political crisis: the relative autonomy necessary to reorganize this bloc and establish within it the hegemony of the
fraction of big monopoly capital;
(b) from the contradictions between the dominant classes and fractions
and the dominated classes, i.e. from the political crisis of the ensemble of
the social formation, and from the complex relation between fascism and
the dominated classes. This relation is precisely what makes fascism
indispensable to mediate a re-establishment of political domination and
hegemony.13

"Relative autonomy" is a key concept here. For Poulantzas, the
political-state power-is always relatively autonomous from capital
itself; in fascism, this autonomy exists in an extreme or an exceptional
degree. Thus his formulation avoids both a simplistic association of
fascism with a single dass, and also the rather more subtle but still
inappropriate proposition of dass equilibrium. The concept of
"hegemony" adds extra definition to his picture of the political: by
emphasizing that the power bloc consists of more than one dass or dass
fraction, related in an often problematic and contradictory alliance,
Poulantzas disposes of the simplistic notion that capital is an indivisible
entity and that "the ruling class" exists as the coherent agent of this
entity. Thus, if I may insert the determinant emphases into Poulantzas'
own words, the historic achievement of fascism is "to mediate a reestablishment of political domination and hegemony." In essence,
fascism acts as the instrument for the resolution of both of the political
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crises identified in the whole quotation. lt is specified by the identification of those characteristics that fit it for this task.
This preliminary theoretical statement by Poulantzas is typical of the
qualities of precision and darity that make a decisive contribution to
the book's value as a whole. Poulantzas' careful distinctions are extremely useful for analyzing the political character of a phenomenon as
complex and as misunderstood as fascism, for they break up this
congealed notion into conceptually functional pieces. But the füll
character of such a set of propositions lies, as it were, in their historical
intersections. lt is precisely the analysis of a concrete historical conjuncture that authorizes its appropriation to theory, for otherwise the
theory remains locked within its own potential, its explanatory power
unused.
lt is in the analysis of the concrete historical conjuncture that Poulantzas' book reveals its weaknesses, however. In other words, the
"thorough historical research" deemed an indispensable part of the
project turns out in the end to be seriously inadequate: partly in the
sense that it is carelessly clone, and partly in the sense that it has since
proved to be so easily contradicted. To illustrate this, 1 propose to
examine three related aspects of the evidence tendered by Poulantzas
in illustration of his theory of fascism, taken from the German case. The
area of possible choice for such a critique is wide, for almost no part of
Poulantzas' empirical material is free from suspicion. 1 have therefore
made my selection with a view to attempting a progressive critique of
some central elements of his theory as it relates to the structure of the
fascist state. These are:
1. His periodization and characterization of the relations between
the Naziparty and the state.
2. His handling of the term petty bourgeois in connection with the
personnel of the state apparatus.
3. His ascription to the Nazi regime of a unity of structure and
motivation.

Poulantzas' periodization of party-state relations after 1933 suffers
from the general incapacity of his theory to accommodate the actual
course of events. There are also numerous inaccuracies, which, though
often minor in themselves, cumulatively weaken his analysis.
In general terms, Poulantzas' object is to explain the process by
which German fascism after 1933 became the means by which big
capital established its hegemony within the power bloc and achieved
the status of "ruling class" (the dass whose political representatives
occupy the dominant place on the political scene), while at the same
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time locating and explaining the relative autonomy of the Nazi state. To
do this, he postulates a particular relationship between party and state
as well as a particular metamorphosis of the dass relations of the party.
Poulantzas divides the period of Nazi rule after 1933 into two episodes, an initial and a stabilized stage. He argues that in the first stage
the petty bourgeoisie was established as the ruling dass, in that the
Nazi party was acting as the effective representative of the petty
bourgeoisie on the political scene. The political representatives of the
(politically incapacitated) fractions of capital were evicted from the
political scene: the bourgeois parties were abolished, and their politicians were expelled from power. At the same time, the upper ranks of
the state apparatus were, he says, "massively filled" with petty-bourgeois members of the National Socialist German Workers Party
(NSDAP). 14 In this sense, the petty bourgeoisie was also established as
the "class in charge of the state"--the dass from which the personnel of
the state is recruited and which subordinates the state apparatus to its
own characteristic dass ideology. l5
At a later date, so Poulantzas argues, the first of these two forms of
domination by the petty bourgeoisie was dissolved: it ceased tobe the
"ruling class." In other words, the Nazi party and state leaderships
ceased to function as the political representatives of the petty bourgeoisie; what Poulantzas calls "the representational tie" was broken.
However, the petty bourgeoisie still continued to act as the dass in
charge of the state, in the sense that it still provided the personnel for
the state apparatus. Concomitantly, the NSDAP itself was reduced to a
diversionary or integrationist vehide for the petty bourgeoisie, and was
politically subordinated to the state. Together, these changes in the
relationship between party and state, and in the dass relations of the
party, marked the reestablishment of the dominant roles of big capital.
Thus Nazism and monopoly capital had grown doser, but the relationship of the party with the petty bourgeoisie continued to ensure
the relative autonomy of the state from big capital. This, then, was the
so-called stabilized stage of fascism. 16
If the summary 1 have attempted of Poulantzas' analysis appears
confusing, this is only partly due to the tendency of any process of
compression to produce this effect. In some measure, that is to say, the
confusion is inherent in the incorrectness of the analysis. Thus, for
example, there is no exploration of the alleged rupture of the representational tie between party/state leaderships and the petty bourgeoisie
as a dass. Tue rupture is postulated as an unsubstantiated fact, even
though the cause and consequence of this rupture-the reestablishment of the domination of big capital-is one of the crucial elements in
Poulantzas' general theory and thus demands explanation. Equally, his
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account of the transition and difference between the initial and stabilized stages is almost impossible to follow in detail, owing to his
failure to explain what he means by the terms "party" and "state," and
to define their relationship with "fascism" as he uses this term.
lt is not surprising, then, that the evidence offered in illustration of
this highly demanding and to some extent misleading analysis is inadequate to represent it.
To start with, the postulation of a two-stage periodization of fascism
in power is clearly crucial to Poulantzas' analysis, because it defines
fascism's mediating role, and locates its relative autonomy. Yet his
account contains elementary errors of dating that are bound to call his
whole treatment into question. He writes that in 1933-34 "the last of
the bourgeois politicians (von Papen, Hugenberg, von Neurath) were
expelled from the government," his way of presenting an important
illustration of the initial stage of fascism in power, namely, the political
eviction of the bourgeoisie. But the fact is that one of this trio, Konstantin von Neurath (foreign minister), did not leave his ministry until
1938. Moreover, a significant group of other unmistakably bourgeois
politicians survived up to this date, and even beyond it: Lutz Schwerin
von Krosigk, Franz Gürtner, Paul von Eltz-Rübenach, Werner von
Blomberg, and Hjalmar Schacht, who held, respectively, the ministries
of finance, justice, transportation, armed forces, and economics/
Reichsbank presidency-hardly a negligible list of political offices. lt is
as if Poulantzas defined his bourgeois politicians solely by reference to
their party membership, and then assumed that they ceased to be
bourgeois politicians after 1934 because their parties had by then been
abolished. This is an evident absurdity, yet it is the only way to make
logical sense of his argument, unless (as is more probably the case) he
was simply ignorant of the survival of a significant bourgeois element in
the Nazi regime until the year 1938.
This initial error, though it might appear trivial, has far-reaching
consequences. Not only does it obviously subvert the particular
periodization proposed, but it also threatens part of the general interpretation advanced by Poulantzas. For this reason, the issue is more
than just a pedantic quibble about dates. In the first place, Poulantzas'
supposition that 1934 marks the date of the defeat of the bourgeois
power bloc hides from him the actual significance of one of the crucial
political events of that year-the purge of the Nazi party's mass base,
the Sturmabteilung (SA), which had been intensifying its clamor for a
second, populist revolution. The liquidation at Hitler's orders of the SA
leadership (by the Schutzstaffel, or SS, with army connivance), and the
elimination of the SA as an effective political force, must be seen
primarily as a consequence of Hitler's early weakness vis-a-vis the old
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bourgeois power bloc (especially the army). Tue purge of the SA
represented the terms of this initial compromise into which Hitler was
forced, though the relationship was , to be sure, a complex one: a coup
by Hitler against the fascist movement as such, in order to forestall a
possible conservative-military coup against the new regime. In other
words, Hitler was obliged initially to move his regime not against but
toward the old power bloc, establishing an uneasy tactical compromise
from which he did not fully emancipate the regime until 1938. Although Poulantzas evidently understood the populist character of the
SA, he mistook the full context of the 1934 purge: the result is a tangle
in which 1934 is postulated as the date of defeat both of the radical
petty bourgeoisie (the SA purge) and of the old bourgeois bloc (the
alleged expulsion of bourgeois politicians).
If, however, we grasp the true significance of the SA purge, and also
correct Poulantzas' dating errors, then we can appreciate an important
fact that remained hidden from him: the considerable continuity of
bourgeois representation on the political scene, throughout almost the
whole decade of the 1930s. By missing this, Poulantzas reduces to
invisibility a political tendency in the regime that ran to some extent
counter to fascism, in that it maintained (if indirectly) a certain link
with pre-1933 attempts to resolve the crisis without recourse to fascism. This bourgeois-conservative tendency progressively lost ground
as the regime developed, through an extremely diffuse and undirected
process of political subversion, its full "fascist" character: extreme
political autonomy. In 1938 this process culminated in a visible change
in the status of the bourgeois-conservative politicians in the regime.
Either they were ousted from ministerial power or, if they remained (as
did ministers Krosigk and Gürtner, for instance), they were driven
unmistakably onto the defensive in government and administration,
forfeiting political initiative and clout. A more far-reaching example of
this same process was Hitler's purge of the military leadership early in
1938, and his assumption of direct personal command of the armed
forces: here was the decisive break with the old-guard generals, leading
ultimately to a war conceived and conducted in unprecedented defiance of conventional military strategy. Thus all the evidence points to
the period around 1938 as a major watershed in the political constitution of the Nazi regime-though not the last one, as what follows will
suggest.
Poulantzas' proposition that the stabilized stage of fascism was
marked by "the subordination of the NSDAP to the Nazi state apparatus in the strict sense of the term" (i. e., to the state bureaucracy) is also
open to serious challenge. 17 Tue main objection to this formulation is
that it rests on a highly dubious characterization of the Third Reich as
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"a monocratic administrative state." Poulantzas quotes this phrase from
Karl Dietrich Bracher, who has carried out pioneering research into
the Nazi regime, but this judgment is not one of his more successful
achievements. 18 Subsequent research into the workings of Nazi government strongly suggests that it was characterized by an extreme
diffusion and dislocation of authority, and a highly disordered proliferation of agencies and hierarchies. In this context, it becomes extremely
difficult to speak with any confidence of "the subordination of the party
to the state," for such a description must rely on a secure definition of
its two terms that is not empirically available. A concrete example will
suggest the nature of the problem.
According to Poulantzas, "the party's general secretary, Rudolf Hess,
was allowed into the government for purely decorative purposes," all
important political decisions being actually taken by the state apparatus. This misses an important point. lt is true that Hess himself was not
personally an outstandingly effective political figure. The office he
headed as Führer's deputy and minister without portfolio (not "general
secretary") had powers, however, which it did use, to vet all government enactments in draft, to propose legislation itself, and also to vet
senior civil service appointments. After his ßight to England in May
1941, Hess was replaced by his erstwhile deputy Martin Bormann, a
far more determined figure who worked (with some success) to concentrate greater political authority in his hands, and who based this
evolving system of power on what could be seen, for the first time, as a
genuinely organized party structure. To describe Hess as "decorative,"
and to leave out subsequent developments entirely, is therefore misleading-the analysis is broken off at an arbitrarily defined terminal
point. Moreover, the structure and personnel of the Hess/Bormann
office itself reßected the complex and shifting structural relationships
and identity of the regime. lt was in his capacity as minister without
portfolio that Hess built up his office, though it was called the Staff of
the Führer's Deputy. After Bormann took over in 1941, it was renamed
the Party Chancellery, and in 1943 Bormann acquired the title of
secretary of the Führer-a sequence of names that demands to be
pondered. Moreover, the staffing of the office was far from simple:
finance seems to have come from unidentified NSDAP sources, while
almost all the officials were trained civil servants as well as NSDAP
stalwarts.
This dense web of connections represents only a partial reconstitution of a single aspect of the regime's political structure, yet it already
suggests that Poulantzas' static analysis of this structure is suspect. He
cannot, of course, be held responsible for those deficiencies of his
approach that have been brought to light by later research; and indeed
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the main historical monographs supporting the alternative characterization of the regime 1 have proposed were not published when
Poulantzas was writing Fascism and Dictatorship. 19 lt is, nevertheless,
striking that a central part of his analysis should so completely fail a
later empirical test. Information of the kind needed to back a general
analysis is, of course, assembled piecemeal, and its implications can be
recovered only with some difficulty-a condition of historical research
that Poulantzas, to his own cost, ignores.
Tue role of the petty bourgeoisie in the fascist regime is a crucial one
in Poulantzas' scheme, as is evident from the brief summary above. The
petty bourgeoisie is, in a sense, the condition of mediation for fascism
and big capital; it is also explicitly the condition of the fascist state's
relative autonomy from big capital. At the same time, it is dearly the
most difficult dass to analyze and to place in a historical conjuncture,
owing to its ambiguous position in the capitalist mode of production.
Poulantzas insists that, in Marxist theory, economic relations alone are
inadequate for a definition of the petty bourgeoisie, and that ideological and political relations are indispensable in arriving at a definition. 20
Inescapable though this fact may be, it is also bound to be the source of
much debate, since it so enlarges the scope for investigative interpretation. In particular, it must raise the question of the relationship between the theoretical and the empirical, for an understanding of the
nature and status of the petty bourgeoisie is likely to depend on a set of
conceptual distinctions that will have tobe carefully recombined in any
concrete analysis.
In the present case, the issue is the relationship between a number
of concepts elaborated by Poulantzas and their status with regard to
empirical detail. First, Poulantzas makes the distinction, mentioned
already, between the ruling dass and the dass in charge of the statethat is, between (1) the dass whose representatives occupy the dominant place on the political scene, and (2) the dass that provides the
personnel of the state apparatus. Second, Poulantzas operates with a
distinction between a dass and a social category. Class is defined
primarily (though not exdusively) by reference to position in the mode
of production. A social category, on the other hand, is a group defined
primarily by politics and ideology. The components of a social category
do not, of course, escape dass status, but they are corporately recognizable as a particular group in the sense that they possess a degree of
internal unity and autonomy and express this to visible social or political effect. 21
These two sets of definitions come into combination when the relationship of the petty bourgeoisie and the state is under discussion.
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Poulantzas defines the petty bourgeoisie as a class composed of two
groups: (1) the traditional petty bourgeoisie of small-scale producers
and owners, not exploiting wage labor, and (2) the
petty bourgeoisie of nonproductive salaried employees. This definition is familiar,
and in general useful. Within group (2), as Poulantzas points out, are
numbered the personnel of the state, or civil servants; these are "nonproductive employees whose function is to ensure, through the role of
the State, the reproduction of the conditions of production of surplus
value. " 22 At the same time, however, the civil service also stands as a
classic example of the social category (a fact Poulantzas adduces as the
source of the misconception that proposes the civil service itself as a
"new class"). In concrete terms, the common ideology of the civil
service as a social category will include a degree of "statolatry" (idolization of the state), and more specifically a tendency to see the state as
the necessarily powerful, but still neutral, executant of "the common
good." Civil servants may also appear (to themselves and to others) as a
group uniquely poised "above" confücts of class or interest, and they
may weil be amenable to political invocations of this virtuous role.
Beyond this, they may also see themselves as constituting a pseudoclass, possessing a distinct set of corporate interests.
The civil service is also subject to a third definitional system, in
addition to its status within the petty bourgeoisie and its homogeneity
as a social category. Poulantzas, following Marx, agrees that a civil
service can also be viewed in terms of the class origin of its members. 23
Thus Marx offered the example of a civil service whose upper ranks are
recruited from the landed nobility and the bourgeoisie, with the middle and lower ranks petty bourgeois in origin.
How do these concepts, separately defined, operate together in
practice to illuminate the relationship between the petty bourgeoisie
and the personnel of the state? In the course of his discourse on the
theory of state power in Political Power and Social Classes, Poulantzas
used them effectively to invalidate any theory seeking to locate a
source of power in the civil service itself. Yet the sensitivity he showed
when handling this initial case is not, unfortunately, reproduced in the
historical passages of Fascism and Dictatorship. Here, where discussion ought to rest on a careful specification of the terminology in use
and the concepts to which it refers, Poulantzas actually shifts his
discourse through all four modes. In other words, there is no clarification of the actual relationships or overlaps on the civil service field
between the concepts of (1) class in charge of the state, (2) petty
bourgeoisie as class, (3) civil service as social category, and (4) class
origins of civil servants.
For example, the actual significance of the petty bourgeoisie's al-
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leged invasion of the "upper ranks" of the German state apparatus after
1933 cannot be assessed without a prior knowledge of the class origin of
those evicted. 24 Tue practical relationship between class status and
class origins must also be established for this purpose, as also the actual
context in which the inherently subjective concept of the "social category" is operative-and all this through rigorous reference to the
concrete conjuncture under scrutiny. Yet Poulantzas, far from acknowledging the specificity of each of his concepts, tends to employ them as
if they are interchangeable. Thus the initial acquisition of ruling-class
status by the petty bourgeoisie, and its subsequent demotion to acting
as the class in charge of the state, are voided of meaning if the state
personnel is, in another definitional system, regarded as part of the
petty bourgeoisie in any case. 25 Furthermore, the persistence within
the state apparatus of what Poulantzas describes as "contradictions of
the 'corporative' type, between social categories" becomes inexplicable. 26 lt is assigned, without discussion, to the level of a secondary
and nondetermining feature of the fascist regime. Thus the discourse
threatens to remain a competition of categories, whose contradictions
in historical combination are not forced into yielding up their political
significance.
Here is a case where empirical research (however prosaic) is indispensable in order to anchor the discussion. When Poulantzas speaks of
a "massive" filling of the "top ranks" of the state apparatus by pettybourgeois members of the NSDAP, we need to know what "massive"
connotes, what the "top ranks" are, and whether the class origin of the
party members is fully established. Of course, if Poulantzas were
relying on a widely known corpus of firm evidence, these matters
would be less important. In fact, however, his assertions are highly
controversial: they are not supported by evidence, and to the best of
my knowledge would be hard to prove in any case. Tue necessary
recovery of appropriate information on the class origin, party affiliation,
and administrative rank of public service recruits as a whole from 1933
has not yet been carried out, not least owing to the difficulty of access
to the relevant documentation. In the meantime, it seems to be the
case that the "top ranks" of the civil service (i.e., Regierungsrat upward) were in general relatively successful in resisting the alleged
invasion of the petty bourgeoisie-but at a fatal price of being progressively outßanked, as an external redisposition of political forces
took place in the kaleidoscopic shifting of institutional structures and
relationships.
1 do not mean here to deny the force of Poulantzas' statement that
"institutions do not determine social antagonisms: it is the class struggle which governs the modifications in the State apparatuses. "27 Tue
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primacy thus established is correct and important. My point is that
Poulantzas' specific understanding of the dass struggle is, in this context, incorrect, as adequate research might have demonstrated. In
general terms, the dass struggle in the Nazi state revealed itself in the
relations within and between state institutions in the plural, as well as
in a state system conceived of as a whole. Thus, for example, a sector of
the bourgeoisie (that which had traditionally provided personnel for
the upper civil service) continued in certain institutions to "function as
a social force" in the sense suggested by Poulantzas; 28 his exdusive
consignment of the state apparatus to the petty bourgeoisie in its
various manifestations is too crude.
As a final point, there is in any case an unexamined tension in
Poulantzas' general presentation of the petty bourgeoisie, namely, his
failure to consider the contradictory tendencies in petty-bourgeois
ideology toward both statolatry and violent individualism. This is important in the context of the civil service, for these tendencies find one
of their most characteristic expressions in the tortured mental postures
of petty state officials-the ideological tension between the service
they offer and the status they daim.
Generally, then, Poulantzas' attempt to construct the role of the
petty bourgeoisie in the Nazi state is broadly unsuccessful and suggests
an oversimplification of political and ideological categories. This is
largely due to the absence of an empirical location for his typology-a
location that would extract and expose the actual contradictions in this
dass's situation, rather than those visited on it in the name of method.
My final criticism is that Poulantzas treats the Naziregime implicitly
as a unity, with its own firm line of determinate policy. In other words,
he appears to endow the regime with an unquestioned capacity for
intention and execution. 1 use the words "appears to" deliberately, for 1
think that his treatment follows logically from a methodological position, and is not a condusion he draws from a process of research. 1 will
return to this problem below, but first 1 want to present a preliminary
case against what is, in effect, Poulantzas' central thesis: that fascism's
historic function is the performance of a service of mediation to monopoly capital, which it achieves partly by means of preserving its relative
autonomy from capital. Manifestly, this endows fascism with an objective role in the resolution of the dual political crisis of the dominant
dass, a crisis whose initial establishment by Poulantzas is one of the
most successful achievements of the book. However, it also appears
that his version of the resolution of the crisis is at least partly based on
an assumption about the Nazi regime's integrity that cannot be proven
historically.
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Tue substance of my doubts about the correctness of Poulantzas'
interpretation is this: the degree of political dislocation in the structure
of the state after 1933 was such that, if it did not amount to a "primacy
of politics," it at least constituted an extension of political autonomy to a
degree that calls into question the alleged historic service of fascism to
capital. 29 In other words, the political developments after 1933
strongly suggest that the fascist period in Germany was a part rather
than a resolution of the political crisis of representation of the early
1930s. lt is Poulantzas, postulation of a successful mediation by fascism
that, in this sense, lies at the root of the distortions, contradictions, and
confusions of his study.
In fact, the correct conclusion seems at times to be forcing its way
into Poulantzas' discussion-hence, for instance, his unexplored and
unexplained treatment of the fascist party and fascist state in Germany
as, variously, correlates, synonyms, and opposites. 30 Take also his pair
of propositions that (1) "big capital used the fascist party, the fascist
State and fascist ideology to impose a general policy which unified the
power bloc," and (2) "the continuous contradictions between big capital and the Nazi party-state [were] part of the 'game' which national
socialism was playing, juggling big capital with the other classes and
fractions of the power bloc, and the power bloc with the masses. "31
These two propositions contain a clear contradiction, which can hardly
be disguised by describing National Socialist policy as a "game." Contradictions of this kind cannot be denied, and it is quite correct that
they should make their existence felt in such passages. However, the
only way they can be "made sense of" is by acknowledging that the
political tensions that Poulantzas continuously judges as "secondary"
after 1933 were, in fact, of primary and fundamental significance for
assessing the nature of the fascist regime in Germany.
lt seems in any case that any examination of exceptional states must
always bear in mind the possibility that it is dealing with a stage of crisis
in conjunctural terms, and not an end to it. This possibility is surely
inherent in the concept of the exceptional state as such. An adequate
examination of the "concrete facts" of the fascist period in Germany
would suggest the aptness of this conclusion in this case, but Poulantzas is not concerned to examine the full career of fascism in either
Germany or ltaly. In the German case, his research and exposition
cease, broadly speaking, at the mid-1930s, because he is interested
only in establishing fascism up to its so-called stabilized stage, that is,
up to about 1934 in Germany. Stabilization is thus enthroned as a
historical and analytic end-point beyond which nothing more need be
said about the phenomenon of fascism. True, he occasionally lifts a
corner of the veil that shrouds the later 1930s and the war years, with,

Theories of Fascism

143

for example, an observation on the displacement of the dass struggle,
or on the nature of the contradictions found in the Nazi state. 32 But
these hints are never followed up. Instead, their significance remains a
shadow, and we are left with a stronger memory of much blander
assertions, such as that "the characteristic features of[petty-bourgeois]
ideology correspond completely to the interests of big capital. "33
Clearly, one objection to such a half-finished exposition of fascism is
that it rules out any explanation of its collapse, and is therefore inadequate. This objection cannot be dismissed as stemming from teleology:
it is not a bid to read the outcome back into the origin, and compress
these as stages in a single process. Rather, the objection is founded on
the more secure procedure of deriving fascism's collapse from fascism's
contradictions, and not the contradictions from the collapse. This theoretical approach suggests that one must grasp fascism in its process as
well as its structure, and thus examine its füll trajectory. In historical
terms, the fascist regime must be independently specified, and not
simply allowed to follow from an analysis-however acute--of fascism
before it comes into political power. Though Poulantzas is partly aware
of the significance of the transition, his basically structural approach
prevents him from subjecting fascism-in-power to the same detailed
examination he makes of fascism before it constitutes its regime. Consequently, his characterization of fascism is incomplete. In addition, it
would be enormously difficult to derive from his analysis an explanation
of the collapse of fascism that did not contradict his account at crucial
moments. On the contrary, an entirely new system of explanation
would have tobe developed from scratch.
An interpretation of fascism developed from this method would, 1
think, run along the following lines. The starting point could be Poulantzas' acute diagnosis of the crisis of representation of the power bloc,
but fascism, as 1 have indicated, would have to be seen as a further
stage in this crisis, not its resolution. Fascism is the most extreme form
yet observed of the exceptional capitalist state, and the essential contradiction of exceptional states is that they represent a type of coercive
structure in which the control of the extraction of surplus value is
displaced from the labor process to the political process, in a vast
enhancement of the state's role. The fascist regime is the extreme form
of the autonomization of politics under capitalism. lt is the product of
an immense dislocation of the capitalist mode of production, and
although it may appear to the economically and politically distressed
power bloc as the only short-term solution, this fascist resolution is
unlikely to persist in the long term, for it manifestly bristles with
contradictions. As a system, it cannot be other than permanently
fraught with its own downfall, for politically it has forfeited (by exceed-
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ing) the state's brief under capitalism: to act as the guarantor of the
conditions for the reproduction of the conditions of production of
surplus value-the rest being up to capital.
This delicately distanced relationship of the political and the economic is explosively compressed under fascism, and the political is
enthroned in a threatening autonomy. (The only rational version of such
an autonomy in the capitalist stage of production is, of course, the
deliberate political subversion of capitalism-revolution.) This is not to
deny, however, that there will be steps in the fascist process that will be
beneficial to capital, but these will measure only a temporary masking
of the fundamental contradiction, and not (as in a model of "normal''
capitalism) a strategic adaptation to the contradictions of the mode of
production. The self-destruction of fascism is therefore inherent in its
political status, and to the extent that it embodies the purely political,
so it will bring down the social formation with it.
This interpretation follows logically from an understanding of the
significance of the labor process under capitalism, as the characteristic
locus of capital's domination over labor. lt underlines the need to
concentrate more research specifically in this area, and to take this
premise generally as an appropriate explanatory starting point for the
political history of capitalism. In the case of fascism, the characterization 1 have outlined in these terms could be followed through historically in a number of ways, of which only a few can be suggested here.
Under National Socialism, for example, one term of the fundamental
contradiction in the role of the state is expressed in the tendency
toward the ultimate autonomization of the political police, with its
disruptive implications for the process of production. Of course, we can
also locate in National Socialism the alternative tendency toward disciplining the labor force through the labor process too, visible for example in the compulsory membership of workers in the Labor Front, the
various forms of corporative organization, the much-publicized attention to working conditions, and so on. These tendencies are often seen
as the "rational" or "modern" side of fascist regimes, whereas in fact
they are developmental tendencies of capitalism at a certain stage of
the dass struggle. Their appearance is thus not generic to fascism,
though under fascism they take a particular form (e. g., corporate rather
than independent labor unions). This so-called rational aspect of fascism must be compared with similar developments in other capitalist
countries, and when this is done, the preponderance in fascist states of
the machinery of political control will emerge as the determining
characteristic, and the pace at which this machinery operates will be
seen to accelerate as the contradictions established in fascism become
more acute. lt is for this reason that the executions mount, the con-
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centration camps fill, the police system takes off into total independence, and, at the most extreme and comprehensive level, war engulfs
society, as the Nazi regime "matures" into the füll expression of its
con tradictions.
Other historical moments through which the characteristic political
nature of fascism might be investigated and specified include, for
example, in the German case the successive and fumbling attempts by
capital to avoid recourse to the political after 1930 (the administrative
autocracy of the Brüning and Papen governments); the actual process
by which the NSDAP established itself as a political alternative; the
enthronement of ideology after 1933; and, connected with this, the
"archaisms" of Nazism, such as its invocations of feudal and even
Germanic-tribal community models (tendencies often dismissed as
simply absurd, but that might perhaps be logically related to the
genuinely anachronistic political status claimed by a fascist regime in
capitalism). The complicated and ambiguous subformations of the system need rigorous identification, as, for example, the role of the SS in
the system of production. The "post-history" of fascism is another
indispensable field of study: for example, the connection between the
developments of the Nazi era and the extraordinary degree to which
dass struggle in West German capitalism since the later 1940s has been
de-politicized. The Italian case could also be studied in similar detail,
as an apparently "weaker" instance of the model 1 have outlined.
Finally, the value of such studies ought not be vitiated by failing to
specify fascism in comparison with developments in those capitalist
societies that have not undergone a fascist period, or have experienced
exceptional regimes of a nonfascist type.
The above forms an incomplete and partly speculative list of points
thrown up by what 1 believe to be a fruitful approach to the analysis of
fascism: both the list and my general propositions would have to be
refined and modified by reference to the concrete. Only in this way,
however, can we arrive at a genuine distinction between the essential
and the secondary elements of fascism, and thus-which is the purpose
of the enterprise-develop a strategic political grasp of the phenomenon.
The common denominator of these three historical criticisms of
Poulantzas' study is, therefore, that by failing to delve sufficiently
deeply into his historical material, Poulantzas missed successive instances of contradiction; and cumulatively these omissions led to a
major misunderstanding of fascism. Poulantzas failed, in effect, to act
out his own stated commitment to concrete research.
1 have not, however, wanted to launch an attack on Poulantzas' work
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as such-as if, by bagging each school of theorists as it appeared, one
could aim at exterminating the breed and making the world safe for
history. On the contrary, it is precisely because of the constitutive
relation between history and theory that I hope this essay will be read
as a critique and not as an attack. In subjecting one of Poulantzas'
ostensibly most historical texts to a deliberately historical critique, I
hope to have indicated some of the problems of constructing an adequately based theorization, without implying that the purpose as a
whole is worthless.
The generic historical weakness of Fascism and Dictatorship derives
from a pervasive deficiency of method. There is an assumption, nowhere queried in the book, that at any given moment all the empirical
knowledge required for the füll expression of a theorized problem does,
in fact, exist. But the only sense in which this can be true is a
tautologous one, and this does not appear tobe the position adopted by
Poulantzas. Yet that his writing implies a total confidence in facts as
they stand is a failing of some importance: it is not just a question of a
superficial arrogance of style, but suggests a failure to grasp the writing
of history as a refraction of current and past practice, a practice by
which we in the present constitute the objects of our enquiry in the
past.
On the simplest level, Poulantzas' theoretical constructions frequently make substantial promises that are then thrown away by a
careless use of historical data. Moreover, if, as this critique has suggested, some significant information is likely to be unknown at any
given time of writing, then what we write ought to respond to this
absence-not in any sentimental sense of humility before history, but
for the ordinary and concrete reasons that we are always engaged in a
progressive articulation of knowledge.
A more serious objection to Fascism and Dictatorship, as both an
interpretation of a phenomenon and an example of method, is that it
seems able to offer only an analysis of a problem that is specifically
given, that is, established by a cursorily defined prior situation, and
emptied of its relation to later conjunctures. The isolation of a concrete
moment from the succession of moments in which it is buried is, of
course, a constant methodological problem for historians, and Poulantzas is far from being the only writer to fail to meet this challenge.
Yet an effective awareness of this problem and its implications seems to
be absent from his work: hence his rather uncritical treatment of the
pre-history of the era he disctisses, and the virtual impossibility, as we
have seen, of deducing the next steps from his study. For historical
enquiry this form of quarantine is the reverse of healthy, for, in this
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case, it bars Poulantzas from establishing the relationship between
contradiction and collapse.
N evertheless, though Poulantzas' study of fascism ultimately reveals
a combination of historical and methodological weakness, it is still a
work of great richness and value, as 1 hope 1 have made clear. A work of
this provocative power and subtlety deserves a critique that tries to
take the argument forward, rather than throwing it back; anything less
would be a disservice to Poulantzas' project-a political project that
Marxists cannot ignore or brush aside. Not to take Poulantzas' history
seriously would also merely confirm the bankruptcy of the historical
profession; too many of us are still bound to a level of sophistication
little more demanding than that represented by the supposed distinction between facts and theories. If we must learn to elaborate a problematic that will not turn history into a prolonged tautology, we must
also realize that history conceived unproblematically is reduced to the
category of the factitious. Though the later fate is often unthinkingly
embraced by historians, no Marxist should be satisfied tobe numbered
in their company.
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Economy and Politics in the Destruction
of the Weimar Republic
Kurt Gossweiler
The Marxist view regarding the relationship of economy and politics
has often been presented in a distorted manner in Western publications. This is presumably due to either ignorance or bias, even though
the basic writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin are extremely precise in
this respect.
One of the latest examples of such distortion can be found in
Henry A. Turner's extensive work, German Big Business and the Rise
of Hitler. 1
Turner's comments regarding the "primacy of economy" or the "primacy of politics" reproduce the misleading usage of these terms within
the framework of a controversy featured in the 1960s in the West Berlin
journal Das Argument. The English historian Tim Mason there maintained that within the context of the entire history of bourgeois society
the domestic and foreign policy of the Nazi state from 1936 onward was
no longer determined by the primacy of economy but by the primacy
of politics. 2 Thereby Mason wanted to uphold the viewpoint that
during the fascist dictatorship it was not the economic power-wielders,
as is generally understood, who determined politics but the Nazi
politicians who allowed themselves to be guided by ideological conceptions and prejudices instead of by economic interests.
Translated by Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann
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Tue use of the pair of there "economy" and "politics" therefore had
nothing in common with the relationship usually brought forward in
this connection by Marxists. Opposing Mason, Eberhard Czichon
advocated the thesis of the "primacy of industry with the cartel of
National-Socialist power" in a bid to defend an assumed Marxist position. 3 Tue facts he introduced to counter Mason were by and large
excellently suited to contradict Mason's assertion that it was very
difficult to prove even an indirect involvement of the economic leaders
in state-political opinion-molding during the Third Reich. However,
his usage of the term "primacy of industry" only served to complicate
the terminological confusion because, first, he seemed to corroborate
those who, like Mason, held and still hold the view that Marxism is
characterized by its postulation of the primacy of economy and, second, because Czichon restricts the sphere of inßuence of the decisive
economic circle to industry.
Tue main reason for the terminological confusion stems from the fact
that within the scope of this controversy two different, albeit closely
linked, questions have not been clearly differentiated: namely, the
question pertaining to the foundation, that is to say, the basis of society,
that sphere of the social organism which provides keynote stimuli for
the sustained further development of society and, second, the consideration of which factors-economic or political-have priority in deciding practical politics.
A reply to the first question was strikingly given by Karl Marx in the
famous sentences of his "Preface to a Critic of Political Economy":
In the social production of their existence men inevitably enter in definite
relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material
forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which
arises a legal and political super-structure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. Tue mode of production of material
life, conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life.
lt is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but
their social existence that determines their consciousness. 4

Friedrich Engels in his late letters gave a number of additions and
explanations concerning these fundamental stipulations in regard to
the basis and superstructure of human society, directed against a
simplified, undialectical interpretation. In his letter ofJuly 14, 1893, to
Franz Mehring, Engels explains why such additions became necessary:
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That is to say we all laid, and were bound to lay, the main emphasis, in the
first place, on the derivation of political, juridical and other ideological
notions, and of actions arising through the medium of these notions, from
basic economic facts. But in so doing we neglected the formal side-the
ways and means by which these notions, etc., come about-for the sake of
the content. This has given our adversaries a welcome opportunity for
misunderstanding and distortions. 5

The briefest summary of Engels' expositions is found in a letter sent
to W. Borgius on January 25, 1894: Noting that "economic conditions
[are those] which ultimately condition historical development," Engels
states:
political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development is based on economic development. But all these react upon
one another and also upon the economic basis. lt is not that economic
situation is the cause, solely active, while everything else is only passive
effect. There is, rather, interaction on the basis of economic necessity,
which ultimately always asserts itself. 6

In 1920, the third year of young Soviet power, V. 1. Lenin was
confronted with the need to reply in a fundamental manner to the
second question, namely, the primacy of economy or politics in solving
burning practical political issues. In the context of an inner-party
dispute regarding the role and tasks of the trade unions, Trotsky and
others criticized Lenin for seeking to solve this question politically,
maintaining the correct approach was an economic one. 7 They thus also
advocated the primacy of economy.
Lenin, in rejecting such a viewpoint, responded with an extensive
reply that might, at first glance, appear contradictory.
1 said again in my speech, that politics is a concentrated expression of
economics, because 1 had earlier heard my "political" approach rebuked
in a manner which is inconsistent and inadmissable for a Marxist. Politics
must take precedence over economics. To argue otherwise is to forget the
ABC of Marxism .... Without a correct political approach to the matter
the given dass will be unable to stay on top, and consequently, will be
incapable of solving its production problem either. B

The apparent inconsistency of this assertion, when considered carefully in detail, turns out to be a precise description of a dialectical
relationship. Classes with counteracting economic and political interests emerge from an economic basis characterized by the private
ownership of the means of production. In a narrow sense economic
interests relate to the distribution of the national product, in a wider
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sense to the constellation of conditions of ownership of the means of
production. Political interests are geared to attaining and holding such
a share of political power for the fullest possible implementation of
one's economic interests. This interrelationship is expressed in Lenin's
formula: politics are concentrated economics.
Tue respectively ruling economic class requires political power in
order to defend, to consolidate, and to extend its economic supremacy
as on the other hand the nonpossessing, exploited class will have the
means of freeing itself forever from its economic exploiters only by
seizing political power and ensuring its consolidation. In the final
analysis, for both classes political power and political struggle are the
decisive means of implementing and ensuring their economic interests. This objectively given interrelationship was postulated by Lenin
in his thesis on the primacy of politics. Indeed, from a Marxist-Leninist
viewpoint, contrasting the economic with the political approach as
completely counterposed, as clone by Lenin's opponents, is impermissible because politics are the concentrated expression of the economy. However, by necessity, politics possesses primacy vis-a-vis the
economy because all decisions, even those relating to "purely economic" questions, must be taken from a political standpoint, from the
standpoint of attaining and legitimately preserving political power.
Thus, the facts hitherto presented clearly make plain that the struggle waged by Turner and others against an alleged Marxist thesis of
primacy of economy is nothing other than a quixotic battle. (In order to
rule out false interpretations, 1 should like to expressly indicate that
this naturally does not signify that all political struggle pursued only
economic goals. Needless to say, the political struggle comprehends
the implementation of interests in respect to all other spheres of life.)

Economy and Politics in the Creation of the Weimar Republic
Following World War 1, the economic situation facing German imperialism was catastrophic. Striking features included an economy
dismembered and whittled down through the war costs. In addition,
there were the inestimable costs stemming from the defeat, which in
turn required a raising of the accumulation rate to a hitherto unknown
level as a precondition for the economic survival of German capitalism,
to a level leaving no freedom of movement whatsoever for social concessions to the wage earners.
Nonetheless, as the Weimar Republic dawned, an Arbeitgemeinschaft agreement was signed by Hugo Stinnes and Carl Legien,
representing powerful capital interests, and the trade unions. Within
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this framework the employers made concessions to the workers that,
even during the economic boom years before the war, they had
rigorously rejected as unacceptable and ruinous. However, now not
only were the economic bases for perpetuating the capitalist mode of
production endangered, but political power as a whole, the very continued existence of capitalism in Germany, was at stake.
The imperative of the primacy of politics was implemented because,
otherwise, survival would not have been possible. In order to retain
political power and thereby the preconditions for subsequently restoring the supremacy vis-a-vis the contracting party, the German big
bourgeoisie found itself compelled to accede to economic concessions
that wholly contradicted the prerequisites for reestablishing a properly
functioning capitalist reproduction process under the given economic
conditions.
The German upper bourgeoisie (Grossbourgeoisie), who, as Lenin
wrote, had "learned from the Russian example," implemented "an
excellent strategy" as their power was being most seriously threatened. 9 Abraham Frowein, a presidium member of the League of
German Industry (RDI) strikingly characterized this approach when,
reviewing the past, he declared on June 12, 1919: "Gentlemen, in
Russia events took the wrong turn and, right from the start, industry
found itself rejecting the revolution. If we-and this would have been
feasible-had taken up a stance of non-cooperation, then 1 am sure that
by today we would have the same conditions as prevail in Russia. " 10
However, such a strategy was assured success only because the
German "economic leaders" found partners in the form of trade union
and Social Democratic party (SPD) leaders who were willing to guarantee the survival of capitalism in Germany in return for making economic, social, and political concessions that, in 1913, were seen as
sensational, whereas in November 1918 they could be likened to a
reward for having renounced the programmatic goals of Social Democracy for a bowl of soup. Moreover, these leaders , when confronting the
German upper bourgeoisie and the former Kaiser's generals, behaved
in the same manner as the liberal bourgeoisie had responded in 1848-49 when faced with the Prussian monarchy, and in the wake of
Bismarck's successful blood-and-iron politics. They established an alliance with the representatives of old power to combat the forces of
revolution. This behavior, which in Germany's past had brought about a
complete counterrevolution for each semi-completed revolution , permitted the hitherto existing basis of German society to remain in
almost unchanged form also during the Weimar Republic.
Indeed, not only were the most outspoken enemies of the German
working-class movement, the coal and steel barons of the Ruhr, able to
steer their empires undeterred by the turbulence of revolution, but
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also the most anachronistic element of this modern industrial country,
the powerful Junker landowners, remained unchallenged because of
the alliance between the social-democratic leaders and the generals,
who primarily came from Junkerdom.
Thus, from the outset the Weimar Republic was affiicted by a most
striking contradiction-the anomaly of an economic structure that was
only insignificantly modified in comparison to the Empire and that was
characterized above all by its continuity and similarity to it as well as a
state domination apparatus that remained virtually untouched except
for the very top levels. On the other hand, there was a bourgeoisparliamentary state form that, due to pressure from the revolutionary
masses, was able to leave far behind the rights and the Constitution
inherited from Bismarck.
This contradiction was so acute that merely sticking to it unchangeably was bound to give rise to constant, severe conßicts as neither of
the two poles in society was prepared to accept limitations imposed by
the other. Tue conditions for the realization of capital necessitated a
political order in postwar Germany permitting a still greater exploitation of labor power than had been the case in the Empire. However,
ensuring and realizing the democratic rights for the popular masses, as
embodied in the Constitution, required, as a minimum, the elimination of the economic and political positions of power of the most
entrenched enemies of parliamentary democracy, namely, the Junkerdom and the mighty Ruhr industrialists, as well as the nationalization of
the big banks.
This fundamental contradiction explains the great number of dass
dashes between 1919 and 1923, with the short-lived rightist conspiracy
in Berlin known as the Kapp putsch as the most prominent. A further
result and at the same time also a significant piece of evidence of this
contradiction was the Stinnes Plan of Autumn 1923, a plan for subjugating the German workers to a dictatorship motivated by the needs of
capital realization. 11 lt was drawn up by the same man who, four years
earlier, had signed the agreement establishing the Arbeitsgemeinschaft.
Due to the unfavorable dass-power relationship for the employers,
between 1919 and 1923 high finance was not in a position to establish a
political order in line with the realization needs of capital. Consequently, these needs had to be met in a different manner, namely, in a
way that appeared to be independent of political conditions and not
influenced by political bodies. Inflation provedjust as brutal a means of
fostering the exploitation of the wage recipients as would have been the
case with an extensive increase of the work day-and that is precisely
what happened. 12
Tue short phase of "normal" development between 1924 and 1929 is
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no argument against the assertion regarding the absence of a foundation for a stable development of the Weimar Republic. For, whereas
Social Democratic party and trade-union leaders hurriedly considered
this phase a new beginning for a crisis-free economy that would subsequently grow into socialism along peaceful lines via "organized capitalism," in reality, as far as the big-capital opponents of the Weimar
democracy were concerned, this period merely represented an armistice phase. Moreover, this phase had been accepted only after the
SPD and the trade unions had actually renounced the eight-hour day,
one of the principle revolutionary gains of the period, and only after the
French waiver in respect to the priority rating of German reparation
payments led to a situation in which other liabilities of American
finance capital displayed an ostensible inclination to bolster up the
capital-formation process in Germany by providing loans. The contradictions between capital and labor was therefore, during the normality
phase, minutely less pronounced because of the partial abandonment
of the revolutionary gains and particularly because of the external
temporary capital inflow. That is why the stabilization of capitalism in
Germany could be only very relative and had to be more fragile than
was the case in the other developed capitalist industrial countries.

The Establishment of the Fascist Dictatorship: Economic
Compulsion or the Implementation of Political Will?
The outbreak of the world economic crisis, coupled with its unexpected duration and severity and occurring at a time when many
German economic leaders did not expect it, necessarily brought forth
again the temporarily submerged contradiction. Big capital's need for
an authoritarian (that is, a dictatorial) state and the need on the part of a
broad section of the population, particularly organized labor, for expanded and secure democratic rights and social advances became again
fully pronounced, although they had never totally disappeared.
One might conclude that the world economic crisis had been the
development that triggered off the ever more resolute struggle of
broader sections of the ruling dass against the Weimar Republic.
Attentive observers, however, have been quick to note a keynote
feature, namely that the offensive against the Weimar Republic began
toward the end of 1927 and early 1928, that is to say, the temporary
armistice initiated by capital came to an end considerably before the
outbreak of the world economic crisis. 13 Singularly significant evidence
in this context was the forming early in 1928 of the Association for the
Renewal of the Reich, which, in rejecting the Weimar Republic,

Economy and Politics

157

echoed the clarion call for establishing a Third Reich. 14 Further symptoms along similar lines were the right-wing seizure ofleadership posts
both in the German National People's party (DNVP) and the Center
party, namely, Alfred Hugenberg and the Prelate Kaas; the lockout of
some 250,000 metalworkers by the Ruhr trusts in November 1928, and
the memorandum of the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie entitled 'Äscent or Demise" in December 1929. 15
All these facts run counter to the viewpoint that the outbreak of the
world economic crisis sparked the employers' onslaught against the
Weimar Republic. No doubt the said crisis clearly had a strengthening
but by no means a causal effect. The real reasons lie deeper. In
essence, they reside in a closely intermeshed combination of economic, domestic, and foreign policy forces. Moreover, it is by no means
accidental that the end of the "armistice" coincides with the point at
which Germany again regained its number-one position as an imperial
power in Europe and number two in the capitalist world at large.
Indeed, by 1927-28 the first stage was reached-namely, the restoration of prior economic power. Once this had been achieved, sights were
set on further objectives. These included the liquidation of the political
consequences of the defeat and the revolution, that is to say, the
brushing aside of the Treaty ofVersailles and parliamentary democracy,
the "multiparty state" (Parteienstaat). 16
Coupled with the regained economic power there developed an avid
interest in a "fair" participation in the appropriation of the world's
resources-in the urge to carve up the world once again in favor of
German imperialism. As in 1914, German imperialism, feeling "left
out in the cold," again demanded a "place in the sun," or-coining the
rightist phraseology during the Weimar Republic--the "people without space" demanded "Lebensraum." If one is anxious to peddle
"power politics" abroad then-according to Wilhelm Groener-it is
essential to remain "firm and unrelenting" at home. An orientation to
external expansion requires an orientation toward repression at
home. 17
Tue fate of the Weimar Republic was, however, by no means exclusively in the hands of hostile big-business interests. Tue counterforce was to be seen in the successful extension and defense of
democracy, provided it took up a resolute and united stance in pursuit
of these goals. This possibility had been demonstrated by the campaign
for the expropriation of the princes waged in 1926, as well as by the
Reichstag elections in spring 1928. Jointly the workers' parties along
with the left-bourgeois German Democratic party gained a total of 13. 9
million votes while the rightist bloc ranging from the National Socialist
German Workers party (NSDAP) to the German People's party (DVP)
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garnered just over 10.2 million votes. Between these two blocs was the
Center and the Bavarian People's party, which together drew 5. 2
million votes. Of these, a considerable number, namely the Catholic
workers, should in fact be included in the left-wing potential. 18
The dreadfully fateful contradiction between the social structure of
the Weimar Republic, with its semi-feudal residues, and the bourgeoisdemocratic state form needed tobe overcome. Moreover, in order to
beat back the offensive of high finance and the Junker enemies of the
Weimar Republic, it was necessary to mobilize and bring fully into play
this powerful left-potential for attainable goals.
As the expropriation campaign of the princes had shown, the first
and the most politically urgent and popular agenda should have been
the destruction of the East Elbe landed aristocracy in favor of a land
reform that partitioned the Junker land among the land-impoverished
peasants and agricultural workers. Naturally it was not sufficient to
raise the issue in petitions brought to parliament; what was needed
above all was backing by extraparliamentary forces, especially through
trade-union actions, thereby spearheading mass pressure to the fullest
possible extent. Indeed, such actions could safely have counted on
sympathy and even support among elements of the powerful big bourgeoisie.19
Thus a program aimed at dividing up the Junker landed estates could
have been a point of departure for creating a powerful, campaigning
democratic front alongside it, thereby seriously weakening the most
reactionary wing or the ruling elite.
The principal force of such a front could only be the working-class
movement. A commensurate initiative along these lines would have
had the chance to bring about a decisive shift in the balance of power in
favor of bolstering up and consolidating the democratic content of the
Weimar Republic. If the SPD and the allied Free Trade Unions had
taken such an initiative following the overwhelming social-democratic
electoral success in May 1928, this would most probably have resulted
in a series of positive effects.
The first and most important commensurate outcome would have
been the prevention of the disastrous further division of the workingclass movement. The unity of action so aptly displayed during the
expropriation campaign of the princes would have been given new
impetus in the struggle for agrarian reform. As long as the Weimar
Republic existed, even though its formation did not completely reßect
the overall demands of the German Communist party (KPD), the party
had backed every real move in defense of democracy notwithstanding
the fact that the Communist party never once relinquished its goal,
namely the aim of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg to establish a
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socialist German republic. Moreover, the Communist party would
never have hesitated to back to the hilt any initiative for the elimination
of the hotbed of reaction, namely the East Elbe J unkerdom as, indeed,
such action would have been fully consistent with the agrarian program
of the KPD. 20
Second, a united campaign of struggle of the two workers' parties for
such a popular goal would, undoubtedly, have drawn broad sections of
the democratically minded bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie into the
orbit of the overall working-class movement.
Third, by engaging in this struggle, the working-class movement
would have proved itself the most resolute advocate of peasant interests
and, thereby, real possibilities would have emerged for dismembering
the grip of the most reactionary forces on the land.
Fourth, if such policies had been pursued, severe restrictions and
obstacles would have been imposed, in particular, on the possibility of
fascism's developing into a mass movement. Fascism would have been
denied one of its main arguments (namely, that Marxism in the guise of
the SPD ruined the middle classes and the peasantry) and, moreover,
would have faced a united working-class movement. As a result, fascism
would not have found itself in a position of merely having to combat a
powerless, divided working-class movement, engaged in constant bickering.
Fifth, such an attack on the Junkers would have brought out the
differences within the big bourgeoisie and weakened-for both political and economic reasons-that element within the heavy-industry
faction which tended to form coalitions with the Junkers and was the
major enemy of the Weimar Republic. The political reasons include the
still widespread and deeply entrenched "Kapp putsch trauma," that is,
the fear of provoking the regeneration of a united defense by the
working dass (as in 1920 against the Kapp putsch) which would have to
be challenged and opposed by die-hard policies. Economically, large
parts of the industrial and banking sections were interested in eliminating the Junkerdom and replacing it with a healthy peasant agriculture
that would expand the domestic market, particularly for agricultural
machinery and fertilizers. Thereby, subsidies to the parasitical, crisisridden, and semi-feudal Junker agriculture could have been avoided.
However, such considerations should not be taken to characterize
the agrarian reform as the key issue for the survival of the Weimar
Republic but are intended merely to rebuff the widespread concept
that the Weimar Republic never had the slightest chance of escaping its
subsequent fate. On the contrary, one should emphatically underline
the following: a policy would have been possible that decidedly aimed
at healing the recognized structural defects of German society. Fur-
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thermore, a policy for fostering the union of the left forces would have
made it possible for them not only to ward off the rightist onslaughts on
the Weimar Republic but to extend democratic rights in both the state
and the economy at large. The chances that such a policy could have
succeeded were still considerable in 1928 and had not completely
disappeared even as late as 1932.
However, as is known after its electoral gains and victory, German
social democracy took no initiative whatsoever in implementing a
program to promote and consolidate democracy. Moreover, the SPD
did not even revert to its own agrarian program, the draft of which,
adopted on January 12, 1927, proclaims that for reasons ofboth production and population politics the SPD advocates a fundamental change
in basic property ownership conditions and, therefore, a "planned land
reform." According to this program, in the eastern part of the country,
agrarian units were not to exceed 750 hectares, with additional areas
being returned to the Reich without compensation. 21
In reality, SPD policies were not geared to changes and reforms but
solely to retaining what had been achieved through the alliance with
that wing of the big bourgeoisie which had displayed a willingness to
enter into an alliance with social democracy on conditions decreed by
the big bourgeoisie. This had been succinctly expounded by Paul
Silverberg, who, on September 4, 1926, when addressing the members' meeting of the RDI, declared that social democracy should "return to reality" and should "renounce radical doctrinarism along with
the ever destructive never constructive policy of the streets and force"
and cooperate in a responsible manner "with the employers and under
their direction ."22
In practice this meant that the Hermann Müller government, in
defiance of the SPD's electoral promises, had to follow (and indeed
followed) the basic policies of the preceding bourgeois bloc parties, that
is, to step up the struggle against the Communist party and to continue
the armaments program of German imperialism. This led to the Bloody
May of 1929 with the subsequent banning of the Red Front Union
(while the fascist SA and SS terror groupings could legally continue to
exist!) and to the decision to build the armored cruiser, a project that
was clearly rejected prior to the elections. Basically, this was a suicidal
policy. lt even more profoundly widened the divisions within the
working-class movement, weakened the reputation and standing of
social democracy with large segments of the population, undermined
the confidence SPD members had in their own party, and thereby
decidedly weakened the entire left. The counterforces on the right,
however, in particular the Nazi fascists, gained ground as a direct
consequence. Adhering to a policy that renounced positive political
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change was bound to pave the way for successive decline: from a policy
that defended the status quo to a policy that tolerated the "lesser evil"
to the final capitulation to the greatest evil without even a semblance of
a fight. Weimar democracy could have been salvaged only by taking the
initiative and inßicting ever new setbacks against its enemies, thereby
deepening and consolidating it in every possible manner. Since the
SPD as the left party with the greatest mass inßuence renounced such
a policy, the shameful capitulation of the Prussian Braun-Severing
government-facing the coup d' etat initiated by Chancellor von Papen
on July 20, 1932-was the unavoidable consequence.
The division of the left forces, coupled with the role of the socialdemocratic Hermann Müller government as executive organ in implementing a national policy dominated by big capital and hostile to the
middle dass, and an identical role of the Braun-Severing government
in Prussia, created favorable preconditions for the successful development of a rightist offensive, although the electoral result of 1928 and
the subsequent formation of the Grand Coalition compelled these
forces to alter both tactics and timing.
The tactical goal, especially of Hugenberg's DNVP, was now to
discredit the SPD in the eyes of the electorate by holding the party
responsible for as many unpopular measures as possible. Even the
signing of the Young Plan, which determined and regulated the size
and mode of payment of reparations and which directly served the
interests of German finance capital, was seized on by the German
nationalists, along with the Nazis, to unleash an unrestrained hate
campaign and to accuse the SPD of high treason.
The basic strategy for the attack on the Weimar Republic, as thought
up inter alia by the Union for the Renewal of the Reich, sought the
transformation of the Weimar Republic from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential dictatorship. Furthermore, this was to be undertaken in a legal manner by means of an extensive interpretation of all
relevantly suitable articles of the Weimar Constitution. 23
However, this approach alone could not ensure a lasting solution and
a final break with the Constitution. For this to occur, an enabling act
was required, for which, however, a two-thirds majority was necessary.
This gave the illusion that the throttling of the Weimar Republic,
outwardly at least, was to proceed nicely along constitutional lines.
The transformation of the Weimar Republic into a presidential dictatorship proved possible with relatively little friction not the least
because of the social-democratic leadership's policy of tolerance toward
the Brüning government, formed in the spring of 1930 following the
dismantling of the Hermann Müller cabinet. 24
The greatest difficulties arose in the attempt to obtain a parliamen-
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tary two-thirds majority for abolishing the Weimar Constitution, that
is, through the Enabling Act. Over a long period, bourgeois party
politicians and their allies in industry sought to set up a single, large
bourgeois coalition or even party as a counterweight to social democracy. Backed by a sizable bourgeois parliamentary majority, they thus
hoped to govern without and against the SPD and to implement the
desired constitutional changes. However, all these efforts were unsuccessful, indeed were destined to remain so. First, there was considerable rivalry and jealousy-motivated bickering among party politicians.
Second, the opposing interests of the diverse factions of the dominant
class backing the different bourgeois parties were too great to overcome. Finally, because all these parties, with the exception of the
Center party, had been deserted by a majority of their voters on
account of their support for the emergency decrees, they gradually
wasted away. In this manner, they lost ever more significance with
regard to the aspired parliamentary majority necessary for a "legal"
transition to the desired dictatorship.
Hugenberg's DNVP had been particularly outspoken against a fusion
with the other bourgeois parties. The reasons for this stance were the
substantial differences of interests that existed between decisive circles
of heavy industry, especially in the Ruhr mining area, and the East
Elbe landed aristocracy, represented by Hugenberg and his party on
the one hand, and the export industry, certain sections of banking
capital, and the wholesale sector (which partly backed the German
People's party [DVP], the Center party, and the German Democratic
party [DDP]), on the other.
Instead of cooperating with the bourgeois middle-of-the-road parties, Hugenberg opted for an alliance with the NSDAP. Although it was
still (in 1928) rather unimportant, the NSDAP was in Hugenberg's
sense at least radically antidemocratic. In this arrangement, analogous
to the relationship between the Center party and the SPD, he hoped
to gain an alliance partner that would provide the DNVP with the
necessary mass basis for the unchallenged leadership of the bourgeois
camp. For this reason he generously placed his extensive propaganda
apparatus at the disposal of the NSDAP along with financial means
from the heavy-industry-backed electoral fund he administered. This
sponsorship of the NSDAP proved exceptionally fortunate for Hitler
but not for Hugenberg. In September 1930, the NSDAP achieved a
sensational electoral victory. Instead of weakening the workers' parties
by attracting its electors, as H ugenberg had hoped, this victory came
almost exclusively at the expense of the bourgeois parties, above all
Hugenberg's own party. lts loss to the NSDAP amounted to 2 million
voters. 25
Tue September 1930 electoral result immediately created a hitherto
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unprecedented situation. Both the leaders of the bourgeois parties and
important "captains of the economy" were suddenly confronted with a
party that had mushroomed from an 800, 000 voter organization to a 6
million one, thus turning the NSDAP into a powerful political force
and the second most powerful party. The NSDAP had thus become a
force that could no longer be overlooked, but equally as important, a
power that opened up quite new, surprising, and welcome possibilities
for overcoming the parliamentary obstacles for the "legal" transition to
a dictatorial form of domination.
All bourgeois parties, along with other groups and factions of the
ruling dass, quickly realized that the NSDAP would have tobe directly
involved in government. 26 However, its possible role and the leadership under which this was to happen became a matter of contention,
resurrecting old rivalries and competitive bickering. Hereby, as time
passed and situations changed ever more, new considerations and
combinations were brought into play. To simplify matters the following
four major groups and strategies can be observed:
1. Alfred Hugenberg and his party, as well as the circles from heavy
industry and the landed aristocracy behind this party, relying on Reich
President Paul von Hindenberg, resolutely pressed for an alliance with
the NSDAP, with the NSDAP in the role of junior partner, attracting
the masses-in other words, an alliance that would assure the Hugenberg party of supremacy in the bourgeois camp and leadership in the
desired "National Dictatorship," the culmination of which should in
due course be the restoration of the monarchy.
2. The Center party (Brüning) and those circles in heavy industry,
chemicals, the electrical industry, the export sector, and the bankers
behind it, wanted to win over the NSDAP for a government alliance.
With the assistance of the NSDAP it thereby hoped to move from the
Weimar democracy to an authoritarian regime that in the long run
would similarly culminate in the restoration of the monarchy. 27
3. In contrast to these strategies, Hjalmar Schacht and Fritz
Thyssen-both principal spokesmen of a group of industrialists and
bankers particularly strongly linked to U. S. finance capital-were not
anxious to subordinate the Hitler party to one of the old bourgeois
parties. Instead, using Hermann Göring, whom they backed very
generously as their go-between to the NSDAP, they pressed Adolf
Hitler to stake a claim to the chancellorship as a precondition for the
NSDAP's joining the government. Moreover, they advised Hitler to
make his bid with utmost persistence and without the slightest concessions. Thereby they hoped that a Hitler government would allow
them to triumph over all contenders and to pursue a foreign policy
bent on expansion solely in the East in alliance with the West.
4. General Kurt von Schleicher cooperated with NSDAP organiza-
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tion head Gregor Strasser, the second most powerful NSDAP figure
after Hitler, until his demise early in December 1932, in attempting to
set up a military dictatorship. He sought to anchor this in the working
class by means of his "trade union axis" project ranging from the Free
Trade Unions (Theodor Leipart) to the Christian trade unions to the
NSDAP. 28
Schleicher tried to implement his project under the Papen government, but Chancellor Franz von Papen swung toward the Hugenberg
line and tried to "soften Hitler" and to cause him to relent by dissolving
the Reichstag during a period of deep crisis in the NSDAP. He thereby
compelled the Naziparty to enter a further costly electoral campaign.
This maneuver proved to be a serious mistake, ending in von Papen's
forced resignation.
By means of his September emergency decrees, von Papen brought
about savage wage cuts and simultaneously put the tariff system out of
order. Through this approach he gained for himself the enthusiastic
support of large segments of the entrepreneurial community. 29 However this enthusiasm soon waned as he proved incapable of handling
the unexpected resistance by the working people, which was highlighted by the Berlin transport workers strike in early November 1932.
Moreover, as von Papen had anticipated, Hitler's popularity fell sharply
in the elections, with the NSDAP losing some 2 million voters. The
Nazis did not become more submissive as a consequence, and so he
found himself being increasingly pressured by the industrial forces
behind him, above all the leading figures of the "Langnamverein," Paul
Reusch and Fritz Springorum, who urged him ever more vehemently
now to establish the new, strong state by changing the Constitution,
thereby making short play of all resistance. In the face of this pressure,
plans were concocted in the von Papen cabinet to attain a change in the
Constitution by means of a coup d' etat, namely, by imposing a new
constitution making the parliament powerless. However, these plans
quickly provoked alarm among virtually all bourgeois party leaders as
well as the majority of "economic leaders" and, above all, the Reichswehr leadership. They all agreed that the legal path should not be
shelved, so as not to provoke unforeseeable reactions by the working
people. 30
Under these circumstances, the Hugenberg-von Papen variant,
which got its strongest support from Reich President Hindenburg, had
to be given up together with von Papen's chancellorship, and negotiations about the NSDAP participation in government had tobe taken up
again. The necessary breathing space and the domestic appeasement
was achieved by bequeathing to General Schleicher the chancellorship
and by revoking the most provocative stipulations of the emergency
decrees enacted by von Papen in September.
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Thus, one of two remaining possibilities for attaining the dictatorship
had to be chosen: either the risky coup d' etat backed solely by the
army or the legal formation of a government for establishing a national
dictatorship on the conditions demanded by the Nazi party, namely,
Hitler's chancellorship. In this situation the key ruling-dass cirdes
opted for the path of (at least) formal legality, thereby revealing that
Schacht and Thyssen were indeed the better strategists. They had
foreseen that, provided Hitler remained steadfast and did not lose his
nerve, all other variants would surely fail. For sound reasons, a coup
d' etat bid had to be avoided, yet the legal path was feasible only with
the cooperation of the NSDAP, which now had more leverage and,
being the most powerful government party, was in a position to insist
on its daim to head the government. Both Schacht and Thyssen still
feared that Hitler, given the signs of dedine in his party, might be
inßuenceable and agree to the compromise solutions as suggested, for
example, by Schleicher and Strasser. Therefore, during these very
weeks Schacht wrote several rallying letters to Hitler and in collusion
with Hermann Göring, Schacht and Thyssen did everything possible to
periodically prop up Hitler's confidence in the final, successful outcome. 31 Ironically, it was von Papen's mediation that set into motion
these complicated and intrigue-ridden negotiations held during the
weeks of December and January and that brought forth on January 30,
1933, that very government which was destined to plunge Germany
and the world at large into the worst catastrophe ever recorded.
However, the ruling dass was not only confronted with having to
select between two paths to a dictatorship. lt also had the opportunity
to choose between destroying the Weimar Republic and reverting to a
properly functioning parliamentary system. Commensurate possibilities existed, for as prominent economists and politicians correctly
pointed out in the autumn of 1932, the most profound depths of the
crisis had been overcome. Tue November elections had demonstrated
that the antiparliamentary NSDAP showed strong signs of dedine,
characteristics that were bound to manifest themselves still more
sharply and rapidly the longer the NSDAP was kept out of the government. Tue elections had also revealed that sizable chunks of the Nazi
voters had reverted to their old parties, the DNVP and the DVP, a
process that certainly would have continued. Probably quite a sizable
number of disillusioned proletarian Nazi electors would have found
their way to the extreme left, the KPD, and the SPD would also have
gained from an NSDAP collapse. lt should be noted that the Communist party did not pose a danger to the bourgeois order. Tue party was
still, as always, advocating the establishment of socialism in Germany
but was not planning a putsch; indeed, the party hoped to win over the
majority of the working dass through the ripening of a revolutionary
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situation in the Future. The ruling class, as weil as the KPD leadership,
realized that the KDP--with the bulk of its supporters out of workwas not even in a position to spark a general strike without the SPD
and the trade unions. Tue ruling circles were also convinced that the
leading echelons of both the SPD and the trade unions would do
everything in their power to avoid a general strike.
In a nutshell, if the ruling circles had renounced the establishment
of the dictatorship, this would by no stretch of the imagination have
denoted the demise of the bourgeois order in Germany but rather the
possibility of a return to parliamentary democracy, albeit under conditions of a weakened right wing due to the collapse of the NSDAP and
due to the larger KDP that would have spearheaded a struggle-imbued
left. Tue rejuvenated left would have been in a position, given the next
economic upsurge, to attain through sustained struggle far greater
concessions than had been possible between 1924 and 1929-possibly
even greater than those obtained in the Arbeitsgemeinschaft agreement. Moreover, under such conditions, an armaments and expansionist drive would never have become possible in the foreign policy
arena.
This was exactly what the ruling circles feared most of all. A renunciation of the dictatorship would have denoted the loss to capital of all
those valuable gains that resulted from the crisis, namely, the sacrifice
of the low-wage policy so important for world market competition, the
forfeiture of the benefits attained through the destruction of the tariff
contract system, and the radical cutbacks exacted on social services.
German big capital was not willing to accept such losses. 32 Consequently it opted for Hitler and persistently pressed for the initiation of
the next stage in the restoration of the old power structure and German
predominance in Europe. To this end it needed the fascist dictatorship.
Therefore, the worst nightmare that could have happened as far as
German monopoly capital was concerned was the collapse of the Nazi
party and a return to parliamentary conditions. Indeed, this apprehension accelerated the delegation of power to the Nazi party. 33
What does all this mean with respect to the relationship between
economics and politics in the destruction of the Weimar Republic?
1. There was no economic compulsion for establishing a fascist
dictatorship in Germany. A renunciation of the dictatorship would by
no means have denoted the ultimate economic "death" of German
capitalism, as Alfred Sohn-Rethel had purported. 34 Opting for the
dictatorship constituted a political decision that had also been economically motivated-it promised far higher profits than a return to parliamentarism.
2. This decision was taken above all by the top levels of the most
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important German companies, the leaders of the landed aristocracy,
and the Reichswehr generals. They were joined by most of the big
bourgeoisie politicians-except where the latter had already been commensurately active-as evidenced by their approval of the Enabling
Act.
3. Attempts by certain historians, above all Henry A. Turner, to
absolve economic leaders from responsibility for this decision are in
sharp contradiction to historical truth and have nothing whatsoever to
do with scholarship. 35
4. The reason the Hitler variant succeeded in the face of other
dictatorship possibilities lay in the commitment of the elites to
rigorously retain the legislative course for fear that the "illegality from
above" would give an inestimable impetus to "illegality from below. " 36
The reason was not primarily, as David Abraham argued, that "German capitalism could not surmount its own internal contradictions" and
that fascism thereby came to power as "the outcome of the inability of
fragmented dominant groups to organize and unify their interests. " 37 lt
was rather the inverse: the Hitler solution was accepted by most
important representatives of the ruling dass because they agreed,
despite their internal conßicts, not to allow a return to the parliamentary system, and because they also agreed that transition to the dictatorial regime was to proceed "constitutionally."
In sum, the motives of the ruling dass for the destruction of the
Weimar Republic and the establishment of the fascist dictatorship
were, in the final analysis, economically substantiated but by no means
economically determined. The decision to exdude the subjugated
dasses from a share in state power and concentrate this very state
power in the hands of the executive, in effect handing over power to the
fascists, was a political decision-indeed, an expression of the primacy
of politics.
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For füll details consult Axel Schildt, Militärdiktatur mit Massenbasis: Die
Querfrontkonzeption der Reichswehrführung um General von Schleicher am Ende
der Weimarer Republic (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1981).
See Reinhard Neebe, Großindustrie, Staat und NSDAP 1930-1933 (Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1981), pp. 127-30.
Resistance to relinquishing the "constitutional path" also became very evident
during the sixtieth members' meeting of the so-called Langnamverein, the association for the preservation of common economic interests in the Rhineland and
Westphalia, in remarks made by Carl Schmitt, the crown lawyer of German big
business and leading constitutional expert who opposed demands by Fritz Springorum "to move from the stage of advance notifications and preliminaries" and to
implement the necessary, basic reforms "without consideration," whereby Spring-
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orum perceived as particularly urgent changing the electoral law and introducing a
second chamber. See Mitteilungen des Vereins zur Wahrung der gemeinsamen
wirtschaftlichen Interessen im Rheinland und Westfalen, 1932 annual, no. 1, vol. 21.
See Kurt Gossweiler, Die Röhrn-Affaire: Hintergründe-Zusammenhänge-Auswirkungen (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1983), pp. 285-89, 561-62.
The Deutsche Führerbriefe inßuenced above all by the industrial magnate Paul
Silverberg in November 1932 carried an article in two parts headed "Jena or Sedan?"
which expressed the fear that the "state wages system-after the ebbing of the crisis
waters-will again operate with a plus omen" adding "as in May of the system
period." The journal continues: "Sedan or Jena? .. . Utilizing to the full the crisis
for cleansing and reorientating or muddling along from one day to the next quite
certain that the same trouble will, after a langer period, crop up all over again. This
is the epochal question facing the economy." See also Gossweiler, Aufsätze, pp. 140-41.
Kurt von Schröder, co-owner of the Cologne bank J. H. Stein and a close, inßuential
friend of Himmler, declared during the Nürnberg Tribunal proceedings against IGFarben in 1947: ''After the NSDAP had incurred its first rebuff on November 6,
1932, and thereby surpassed its pinnacle of success, backing by the German economy became particularly urgent" (taken from Gossweiler, Aufsätze, p. 559).
See Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Ökonomie und Klassenstruktur des deutschen Faschismus:
Aufzeichnungen und Analysen; published and introduced by Johannes Agnoli,
Berhnard Blanke, and Niels Kadritzke (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973), pp. 126,
188. See also criticism of Sohn-Rethel in Gossweiler, Aufsätze, pp. 636-43. The
objection against Sohn-Rethel is also valid against Knut Borchardt's thesis that the
Great Depression (and thus the collapse of the Weimar Republic) was due to the
unbearably (for capital) high wages (see Knut Borchardt, Wachstum, Krisen , Handlungsspielräume der Wirtschaftspolitik. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1982). Among others, the economic development of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) does not substantiate this view. For the past forty years, the wage level
in the FRG has (in real terms) far exceeded that of the Weimar Republic without any
threat to the bourgeois parliamentary system. Rather, as a comparison between the
Weimar Republic and the FRG shows, monopoly capital in the FRG is no langer
politically compelled to maintain a parasitic social segment like the Junkers . The
FRG has been free of this financial burden, which so heavily bore on the entire
Weimar society. This difference surely contributed significantly to the FRG's steep
economic upswing and to the much larger political stability vis-a-vis the Weimar
Republic.
H . A. Turner, Jr. maintained that the above-cited work by D. Abraham possessed no
proper scholarly relevance because of errors in the footnotes and sources of reference. Although it is of course appropriate to criticize such negligence, it is not
appropriate to elevate such errors as the sole criterion of a sound scholarly approach.
A scholarly treatment of a topic can be discerned first and foremost by examining
whether the historical process had been examined in line with its true motivating
forces or merely exploited for the sake of its examples in point-whether historical
research hinges on a scientific conception (method) or solely on pure empiricism. A
comparison along such lines between the works of Abraham and Turner would
decisively favor the former. Abraham's work can be justifiably regarded as a serious
analysis of German society and the driving forces of its economic and political
development during the years of the Weimar Republic. Moreover, Abraham uses
sound methodological and theoretical techniques. Indeed, even if one cannot agree
with his findings, the nature of his analyses must cause all impartial readers to treat
them with commensurate respect. The thick volume by Turner, conversely, recalls to
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mind-just like the earlier, smaller collection entitled Faschismus und Kapitalismus
in Deutschland-the work of an attorney who delves into history for but one reason,
namely to find exonerating arguments for his dient. In Turner's case the dient is
German big business. All facts considered suitable are unbelievably exaggerated;
conversely, everything countering the dient's interests is either completely concealed or, at best, depicted by means of an intensely extreme presentation, as wholly
insignificant or invalid in the final analysis.
36. Thus the substantiation of the Center leader Kaas in a letter to Schleicher, January
26, 1933. See also Gossweiler, Aufsätze, p. 59.
37. Abraham, The Collapse, pp. 35 and 316.

Regional Elites and the Rise of National
Socialism, 1920-33
Brian Peterson
In the past decade, historians have actively debated the social composition of the Nazi party's membership and electorate during the Weimar
years. Most now generally agree that the social dass most indined to
join and vote for the National Socialists was the petty bourgeoisie,
induding artisans, shopkeepers, and peasants. 1 Substantial support,
however, has been shown to have come from higher social strata.
Recent studies have demonstrated that residents of affiuent neighborhoods, vacationers, cruise ship passengers, civil servants, and
rentiers-all arguably elite-supported the National Socialist German
Workers party (NSDAP). 2 On the other hand, big business and
Junkers-the core groups of the ruling dass in Weimar Germanywere generally disindined to join or vote for the Nazis, although some
of them gave various other kinds of direct and indirect support. 3
The present study is primarily interested in elite support manifested
by membership in and voting for the Naziparty. The thesis here is that
"peripheral elites'', that is, provincial aristocratic and bourgeois elements that lacked control of the central machinery of the government
and economy, were the main upper-dass groups giving active support
to Nazism. Nazism represented to these peripheral elites an aspiration
to remove control over the machinery of the national government from
the hands of the large corporations and the Junker dass, as well as to
free the government from inßuence by the organized working dass.
They desired government policies more favorable for small-to-mediumsize industrial firms, banks, and commercial enterprises.
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Table 1
Shifts from Election to Election in Correlations
Between Percentage of Domestic Servants and Percentage Nazi Vote
Region
Urban
Rural
Protestant
Catholic
Northeast
Silesia
Northwest
Central
Rhineland
Southwest
Bavaria

Urban
Rural
Protestant
Catholic
Northeast
Silesia
Northwest
Central
Rhineland
Southwest
Bavaria

1924A*

1924B

-.08x
.04x
.09
.24
.16x
-.07x
.15x
.22
.22
.62
.22

.06x
.12
-.08
.02x
-.09x
.24
.0lx
-.14x
.0lx
-.07x
.02x

1928
-.12x
- .24
-.09
.03x
.20
.17x
-.13x
.19
.03x
- .69
.02x

1932A

1932B

1933

.OOx
-.13
-.30
-.19
-.17
- .2lx
- .15x
-.15x
-.27
-.17
-.31

-.08x
-.05x
-.03x
-.08x
-.06x
.02x
.06x
-.09x
.OOx
-.llx
-.02x

.16
-.06x
.OOx
-.18
-.02x
-.06x
-.04x
-.17
- .23
-.07x
-.09x

1930
.13x
.27
.16
.08x
-.30
-.19x
-.05x
.22
-.04x
.37
.04x
Number of
Localities
187
968
631
393
150
78
179
169
194
169
211

Underlining: Significant, positive initial correlation or significant shift in direction of
overall party vote shift.
Initial correlation, not shift.
x: Not significant at .05 level.

These peripheral elites never became the central decision-making
group within the Nazi party, apart played by "military-political-intellectuals" of a statist and totalitarian orientation. The peripheral elites,
however, played a very important role as a bridge between the party's
ideologues and the petty-bourgeois masses. As seen in Table 1, peripheral elites contributed to the voting surges of the NSDAP in May
1924 and again in 1930. This elite support represented an assurance to
the core elites that Nazism was not truly a socialist movement and thus
served to ease Hitler's accession to power in 1933.
In distinguishing peripheral elites from core elites, geography and
dass position were closely related, for all regions were not equal. Core
regions obviously included the great metropolises, especially Berlin,
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Hamburg, and Düsseldorf, the home cities of many top industrial
corporations, banks, and commercial enterprises, as well as government centers. Also induded would be the heavy-industry centers of
the Ruhr and Upper Silesia, home to some of the wealthiest people in
Germany and headquarters to the great iron, steel, and coal companies. Likewise, Protestant Prussia, the region around which Germany was unified and the home of the Junkers, the aristocratic landowners of East Elbia, must be considered a core region, in spite of its
predominantly agricultural composition. The rural elite of Protestant
Prussia was accustomed down to the revolution in 1918 to exercising
disproportionate inßuence over the political and economic life of Germany as a whole. This power continued to a lesser degree in the
Weimar period through Junker inßuence in the military and civil
service and through Junker control over the dominant national farm
organization-the National Rural League (Reichslandbund-RLB).
The political party of the Junkers in the Weimar period was the
German National People's party-DNVP.
Peripheral regions, Catholic and/or non-Prussian, induding Bavaria,
Rhineland-Westphalia outside the Ruhr, and southwest and central
Germany, lacked the political power of Protestant Prussia and were
generally areas of peasant, rather than estate, agriculture and small to
medium-sized industrial firms. Elites in these areas were less wealthy
than the core elite and also lacked a tradition of service to the national
state.
The consciousness of elites in core and periphery was historical as
well as economic. Politics in Germany in the 1920s still reßected
displacement of peripheral elites in the unification process of the
1860s, and old resentments lingered. Below the surface of the large
national parties that appeared dominant in 1919, many regional and
sectoral parties were waiting to break out and did so in 1920--28.
Within this constellation of dass forces, the Junkers were in many
respects the most volatile. Until 1918 Junkers obviously were an important component of the ruling dass because of their dose association
with the Hohenzollern state machine. After 1918 their position became
less dominant. The Kaiser had always seen himself as the natural leader
of the Junkers, but Friedrich Ebert, the Social Democratic president of
Germany from 1918 to 1925, in spite of his role in creating the Free
Corps (right-wing paramilitary organizations, many of whose members
later became Nazis), was despised by the estate owners. The election as
president of Germany in 1925 of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg
partially remedied this problem for the Junkers, and Hindenburg
would play a vital role both in providing special government assistance
for East Elbian agriculture and in brokering the deal between the
Nazisand the DNVP that brought Hitler to power.
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Tue revolution of 1918 cost the Junkers the dominance in Prussia
given them by the three-class suffrage system, where the bottom 80
percent of the taxpayers could vote for only one-third of the state
parliament seats. With their loss of control over Prussia, Junkers lost
their leveraged position of dominance over the German federation. The
ultimate indignity of the revolution for the Junkers was witnessing the
support their agricultural workers gave to radical proposals such as
dividing up the estates. With the support of the Social Democratic
government, the Junkers smashed the revolutionary movement in both
urban and rural areas, using army and the Free Corps. Finally, after a
viable independent labor movement in rural East Elbia had been
destroyed, the Junkers set about convincing peasants and agricultural
workers to favor the DNVP and RLB, by involving them in cooperatives for credit, marketing, and purchases, protecting the workers
from inßation through in-kind wages, and fighting for higher agricultural prices and an end to government restrictions on farming. 4 Tue
success of the estate owners in winning special protection for the
purported agricultural interests of all sections of the East Elbian population brought many in the lower classes to respect Junker hegemony
during the early 1920s.
In the period from 1919 to 1923, an important group of Junkers
aligned themselves with Erich Ludendorff, the quartermaster general
of the German army in World War I and the effective dictator of
Germany from 1916 to 1918, who set up a movement to overturn the
Weimar state, rule by military dictatorship, and resume the war. 5
Hitler and the early Nazis were allied with the Ludendorff Circle in a
subordinate capacity. The Junkers saw Hitler as a "drummer" with the
task of stirring up the Bavarian masses on behalf of a nationalist counterrevolution. Tue failure of this plot in Berlin in the autumn of 1923
did not prevent the outbreak of the Beerhall Putsch in Munich, but the
Reichswehr (German army), which had been arming, equipping, training, and providing officers for the Sturmabteilung (SA-the paramilitary wing of the Nazi party, which was actually more important and
powerful than the party itself during this early period) now pulled
away. There was a breach between the traditional Junker conservatives
in the DNVP and the Ludendorff-Hitler movement, and the Junkers
brießy moved toward cooperation with the Weimar regime.
From 1926 on, however, the Junkers entered a profound economic
crisis that eventually cost them their leadership over the peasants and
agricultural workers of East Elbia and Germany generally. As their
estates became less and less profitable due to falling agricultural prices
and rising industrial prices, they were under pressure to increase the
exploitation of their workers. 6 In the agricultural crisis of the 1870s
autonomous peasant cooperatives developed in western and southern
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Germany because noble landlords were unable to provide traditional
types of individual assistance to nearby peasants, but in the late 1920s
many Junker-dominated agricultural cooperatives in northeastern Germany collapsed, damaging the ability of the Junkers to tie the peasants
to themselves through co-op loans, marketing, and other assistance. 7
Junkers demanded special government assistance for themselves
through the Osthilfe (Eastern Aid) program, and this angered many
west and south German peasants who felt that they also deserved aid. 8
The result was that peasant support for the DNVP greatly diminished in 1928, particularly in western, southern, and central Germany,
where peasants switched to the Country People's party (Landvolkpartei) based on anti-Junker elements within the RLB. After 1928
the Nazis were able to recruit many Landvolk voters. Nazimeetings in
East Elbia were filled with workers, small peasants, and agricultural
workers, with high school students, teachers, or ministers usually the
only representatives of the local elite present. 9 Junkers seldom attended. Nazism spread in the Northeast as an anti-Junker, as well as
anti-urban-worker and anti-Jewish, movement.
The alliance between Hitler and the Junkers was renewed, however,
in the joint DNVP-NSDAP referenda against the Young Plan-an
arrangement for reparations payments on loans to Germany-in 1929
and against the Social Democratic-dominated Prussian government in
1931. Many areas of complete agreement between the Nazis and
Junkers did, of course, exist. Both supported militarism and expansion
in the East and opposed the workers' movement. Reports of Junker
agricultural congresses from the early 1920s reveal a surprisingly crude
anti-Semitism. 10 Junkers supported many aspects of the Nazi economic
program: autarky through high tariff barriers for agricultural products;
German self-sufficiency in grain; and compulsory mixing of alcohol
made from distilled fermented potatoes with gasoline to keep up farm
prices and make Germany more self-reliant in energy resources. 11
Nazisand Junkers differed sharply on the questions both of settling
peasants and agricultural workers on bankrupt estates and the use of
imported Polish agricultural labor. 12 Speaking at a Silesian Nazi party
school, von Reibnitz asserted, "In the German East there is not the
correct, healthy mixture of small and large farms." He wished to
restrict large estates to only 7 to 10 percent of the agricultural land in
East Elbia, comparable to the percentage in Württemberg. 13 Harwig
von Rheden-Rheden, writing in the agricultural supplement of the
Nazi daily, called it "shameful" that foreign migratory workers were
brought in for the sugar beet harvest. 14
In any case, Junkers were not willing to concede a leadership role to
Hitler. A Nazi estimate in January 1933 was that only one Junker in ten
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supported the Nazis in the Frankfurt/Oder electoral district, with the
remaining nine supporting the DNVP. 15 Junkers always saw themselves as the natural rulers of Germany and regarded the Hohenzollern
kaiser as the crowned symbol ofJunker supremacy. They saw Nazis as
plebeian, South German, and, perhaps worst of all, Catholic. Wilhelm
Henning, the chairman of the Association of Nationalistic Soldiers,
stated: "Our preference for the Hohenzollerns will not allow us to aid
in the establishment of a one-sided party domination which at least in
its practical consequences might aid Roman strivings to replace this
party dictatorship through an empire of a South German Catholic
prince." 16 Junkers could not rid themselves of nineteenth-century
categories in evaluating the Nazis. For them, Nazis were always agents
of rival monarchs in Bavaria and Austria.
Junkers saw the Nazi party as inclined toward socialism and aiming
to tear down traditional leadership strata. This critique certainly
seemed to have considerble local justification with reference to East
Elbian Nazis, although their leftism was the consequence of the antiNazi stance of the Junkers. Northeast German Nazis were radical by
default, since the local upper classes could not be recruited to the Nazi
movement in large numbers. With an almost exclusively plebeian base,
Nazis in Protestant Prussia adopted a "socialist" line. 17 The radical SA
was larger in proportion to total Naziparty membership in the Northeast than elsewhere in Germany, while the more elite Schutzstaffel (SS)
organization was delayed in establishing itself in East Elbia. 18
North German "radicals" and South German "conservatives" within
the NSDAP had in common an anti-Junker stance. Both opposed
"Kaiser fetishists": "the men of the eternal yesterday, the stubborn
dogmatists of Old Prussian-conservative tradition and pigtailed privy
councillors and courtier circles of the Wilhelmian epoch are still today
the leaders of the German Nationalists. " 19
In the contest between the plebeian NSDAP and the Junker-dominated DNVP for political control of East Elbian agriculture, estate
owners defended their hegemony by refusing to allow members of the
Stahlhelm to attend Nazi meetings, coercing local newspaper owners
into refusing Nazi ads, and pressuring local innkeepers to refuse to rent
meeting halls to the Nazis. 20 The conservative Junker newspaper, the
Kreuz-Zeitung, criticized at length Nazi economic and agricultural
programs as "socialist," "utopian," and dangerous to the autonomy of
the farmer. 21 In turn, the Völkischer Beobachter accused DNVP estate
owners of firing Nazi agricultural workers and hiring Communists in
their stead. 22
The Nazis quickly took away the mass following of the Junkers in the
rural Northeast in 1930-31. Junker control over the Stahlhelm and

178

Radical Perspectives

RLB was shaken. New Nazi or proto-Nazi elements ousted the previous DNVP-oriented leaders and gave greater attention to peasant and
agricultural worker interests. 23 Nazi agitators aroused small peasants
against the "moral serfdom" involved in the traditional custom of
making deep bows to estate owners. 24
The dass composition of Nazi support among farm owners in East
Elbia is shown by the occupations of the NSDAP representatives
elected to the Brandenburg Chamber of Agriculture in 1931: thirteen
peasants and one gardener on the plebeian side, and one estate renter,
two estate owners, and three owners of knights' estates on the elite
side, or fourteen to six in favor of the plebeians. Only one of the elite
representatives of the Nazis had an aristocratic name, suggesting that
big landlords who backed the Nazis were more likely to be commoners
than noblemen. 25 By contrast, DNVP-RLB slates typically had a preponderance of aristocrats.
Hostility between Junkers and Nazis was particularly acute in the
Reichstag campaign of November 1932, when Hitler said of the Herrenklub, a Berlin society of 300--400 nobles and capitalists to which
many ministers in von Papen's cabinet belonged: "You speak against
Marxism as a dass phenomenon, and you yourselves are the worst sort
of dass phenomenon. " 26 National Socialists were even worried in October 1932 that Junkers might engage in an anti-Nazi putsch with
support from Franz von Papen and Paul von Hindenburg. Nazis feared
that if they did well in the November 1932 elections, reactionaries
could make a coup d' etat, abolish the Constitution, and rule by means
of a military dictatorship that could eventually restore the
Hohenzollerns to power. 27 Nazis need not have worried because they
did poorly in this election, and the reactionaries instead became anxious about the large increase in the Communist vote and decided that
the best thing after all would be to make Hitler chancellor in a coalition
government with the DNVP, Stahlhelm, and von Papen.
In this coalition government, formed at the end of January 1933,
Alfred Hugenberg, head of the DNVP, was made minister of economics
and also minister of agriculture, the two ministries that most affected
core elites in big business and estate agriculture. 28 Hugenberg's job
was to protect core elites, who had not backed Hitler, from peripheral
elites and the petty-bourgeois masses, who had. Junkers had helped to
oust General Kurt von Schleicher as chancellor in January 1933 because Schleicher favored dividing up bankrupt Junker estates among
workers and peasants, and Junkers knew that this was also the Nazi
program. In the event, their fears came true, but not in the manner
they feared. Junker estates were divided up, not by Nazis in 1933, but
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with the arrival of the Red Army in 1945, as a logical consequence of
Junker short-sightedness in giving power to Hitler.
Junker culpability in the Nazi accession to power, however, is not the
same thing as direct Junker support for Nazism. Tue Junkers had
resisted the Hitler movement for as long as they could. Only after they
had lost their mass support to the Nazis and the only alternative
seemed to be a leftist government did they agree to support a cabinet
in which Hitler was chancellor. By contrast, outside Protestant Prussia,
National Socialists were more successful in elite recruitment. In Catholic and/or non-Prussian regions, including central and southwest Germany, Rhineland-Westphalia, and Bavaria, members of local elites
more frequently joined and voted for the Nazis.
One very common practice in these peripheral regions was for
aristocrats who were leaders of local peasant organizations to join the
NSDAP. Over and over again, one notes the presence of Nazis with
names beginning with "von" or Nazis who farmed large estates as heads
of state, provincial, or county branches of the RLB or the Cham her of
Agriculture. 29 Aristocratic farm leaders in peripheral regions who
joined the Nazis were much less inclined to quit the party over policy
disputes than were Junkers.
Of all the peripheral regions, the Southwest-the most democratic
and egalitarian area of Germany-surprisingly became the area of
strongest elite support for Nazism. In Baden, members of the upper
classes conversed casually with newspaper vendors, saleswomen, and
waiters in cafes. 30 In Württemberg, "after a good supper, a man of
office and worth will sit and drink wine with a modest artisan. " 31 These
could be regarded as matters of style, rather than substance, since
there was no accompanying willingness to give up real privileges to the
masses. Nevertheless, these expressions of democratic spirit had political consequences and served to differentiate the southwestern elite
from the Junkers and North Germans generally. Their democratic
traditions prepared them for the mass politics of National Socialism
and, unlike North German elites, they had no inbred prejudices
against associating with the masses. In many respects, the Nazi movement was a continuation of the Grossdeutsch-Greater Germandemocratic movement of 1848, with its aspirations to create a Germany
inclusive of Austria and other eastern territories, which had great
appeal in Catholic areas of the Southwest.
Another factor in the politics of southwestern elites was the many
resorts and spas in the region. Rentiers and retired people living in
these spa towns had suffered greatly in the inßation of 1923 and blamed
Weimar democracy for their plight. They often voted Nazi in con-
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sequence. These people were geographically marginalized as a function of their generational marginalization. Many of them had lived and
worked in core sectors of Protestant Prussia, but now no longer ran
companies, estates, military units, or government departments. Unlike
those actively running the institutions of society, they were under no
constraint in the expression of their political beliefs. They had nothing
to lose by radicalism. In this, they strongly resembled the young. High
school and university age children of Junkers and big businessmen also
frequently joined and supported the Nazis, even while their parents
remained loyal to the DNVP. 32 Thus, Nazi support came from the
generational-as well as geographic and power/wealth-periphery of
the elite.
Central Germany shared with the Southwest an economy based on
small factories and a political structure of autonomous states (Länder).
The Chemnitz-Zwickau electoral district of Saxony included the
Erzgebirge and the Vogtland, a region of much domestic industry and
many small lace, embroidery, silk-weaving, and toy factories, and was a
prime locale for support by the local elite for the Nazis. 33 Here
employers felt ignored by the national government, which they accused of favoring the interests of big business. 34 Tue prosperity of the
rest of Germany seemingly had permanently left behind the
Erzgebirge-Vogtland, where the poor still sometimes ate dog meat. 35
Thuringia was similar, only somewhat less impoverished, with no city
over 100,,000 population and generally small factories whose owners
heavily favored the Nazis. 36 Throughout central Germany, then, a high
elite vote for National Socialism was produced by the relatively small
size of factories and by a regional pattern of political loyalites.
In Bavaria, the homeland of National Socialism, much more elite
support for Nazism existed than in Protestant Prussia, but this Bavarian
elite support was restricted in scope by religion. Certainly the core
groups of the Bavarian upper class-the Catholic aristocracy, not very
politically influential, and the large industrialists-did not desire
Hitler in power. 37 Tue Catholic aristocracy supported the Bavarian
People's party (BVP) and hoped for a restoration of the Wittelsbachs,
the former ruling family of Bavaria, and the larger industrialists mostly
moved from the German People's party (DVP) to the DNVP. Tue BVP
attacked the Nazis as favoring a "Greater Prussia," just as the Prussian
loyalists attacked the Nazis for wanting a Bavarian or an Austrian to rule
all of Germany.38 In general, Nazis in Bavaria received support from
elite members who had formerly voted for the liberal parties, the
DNVP, or the anti-clerical peasant movement, the Bavarian Peasant
Association (BBB), rather than those who had supported the Catholic
and particularist Bavarian People's party.
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Upper-dass Bavarians gave less support to the Nazis in towns where
the Catholic church held a particularly dominating position, for instance, diocesan seats such as Eichstätt. In strongly derical towns, the
middle dass tended to dominate the local Nazi group, while the upper
dass remained aloof and loyal to the church. 39 Antidericalism distinguished Catholic elite support for the Nazis in Bavarian peasant
villages. 40 In larger towns, the Nazis were more likely to have many
supporters among the stratum of notables than in smaller towns where
the local elite was more traditionalist. In Catholic agricultural areas in
Bavaria, elite support for the Nazis came especially from individuals
who were not well-established local residents, but rather less religious
and less socially conservative newcomers. Civil servants, teachers, and
educated professionals represented the Nazielite in Catholic Bavaria,
rather than large property owners, who remained true to the BVP. 41 In
Protestant areas of Bavaria, wealthy estate owners, industrialists, and
bankers quite frequently joined the Nazis. 42
The dass structure of Rhineland-Westphalia differed markedly from
that of Bavaria. The heads of huge coal and steel corporations at the
summit in the Ruhr, men of strong national political influence and
international economic power, suspected Nazi social radicalism. Two
leading heavy industrialists, however, Fritz Thyssen and Emil Kirdorf,
were members of the Nazi party for a period, although both were
suspicious of its anti-big business rhetoric. 43 In the German regional
structure, the Ruhr counted as metropolitan, while the rest of the
Rhineland and Westphalia was merely provincial and was typified by
small and medium-size business. Thus, Nazism in the Ruhr, as in
Protestant Prussia, was plebeian, although not proletarian. 44
Elsewhere in the Rhineland and Westphalia, however, National Socialism often had strong support from the same types of small-factory
owners who backed it in central Germany. 45
Elite members in peripheral regions who became Nazis often were
former particularists and separatists, the supporters of local dynasties
that had ruled before German unification. Many had been advocates of
a local state separate from the rest of Germany in the turbulent period
from 1918 to 1923 when the French sponsored such movements in
western and southern Germany. The thwarted will to provincial sovereignty became transformed into a desire to oust the core elites from
control over the central government.
The dedine of particularism was simultaneously the death of monarchism. After the 1926 referendum to expropriate the former princely
houses-a referendum sponsored by the Social Democratic party
(SPD) and the German Communist party (KPD) that failed but, in the
process, revealed extensive antimonarchical sentiment among non-
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Marxist voters-the decline of monarchism was marked among the
plebeian supporters of the pro-Hohenzollern DNVP as well as among
particularists backing various regional dynasties . 46
In Hanover the turning point away from particularism was the referendum of May 18, 1924, on separate state status. Hanover had been
absorbed by Prussia as a result of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and
the supporters of the dispossessed Guelph dynasty of Hanover formed
their own political party, the German Hanoverian party (D HP), known
as the Guelph party. Tue May 1924 referendum was a failure for the
Guelphs. 47 This failure had been anticipated two weeks earlier by
urban elite voters for the German Hanoverian party who switched to
the Nazis in the May 4 Reichstag election. 48 Losses to the DHP
between 1920 and May 1924 seem to have been concentrated in towns
with a strong local elite population. Movement of Guelph peasants to
the Nazis was much slower, and it was only in 1932 that the Nazis
finally decimated the Guelph party among the deeply conservative and
localist peasant masses. 49 As the Guelph movement disintegrated, its
local units urged supporters to switch to the Nazis. 50
Similar particularist movements in the northwest German regions of
Schleswig-Holstein, Schaumburg-Lippe, and Oldenburg also eventually produced an important vote for the Nazis. Schleswig-Holstein
and Hanover had been absorbed by Prussia in 1866, while Oldenburg
retained its independence but remained in clear danger of being
swallowed by Prussia as part of the movement of government rationalization. Particularist elites wanted tobe controlled neither by the
Junkers of Old Prussia nor by the Socialists of New Prussia, and the
Nazis advocated continued independence for Mecklenburg-Strelitz,
Oldenburg, and Schaumburg-Lippe and respect for local autonomy
within Prussia elsewhere. For example, in Hanover, the Nazis criticized liberal peasant leaders who supported organizations devoted to
centralizing the Reich government with greater Prussian dominance. 51
In Bavaria, separatism and particularism were gradually exhausted
by a long series of rebuffs. In the immediate postwar period, numerous
consultations between BVP leaders and the French with a view toward
establishing a separate Bavarian or Catholic monarchy in the south of
Germany came to naught. Many in the BVP had separatist aims in the
events leading up to the Beerhall Putsch in November 1923. However,
the most decisive demonstration of public sentiment on the issue of
separatism and particularism was the vote in April 1924 on a proposal of
the BVP that was backed also by the DVP and DNVP. This referendum
called for a separate Bavarian state president, an upper house to the
state parliament, and a simplified form by which the Constitution
could be revised. Tue purpose of the referendum was to establish a
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state structure for Bavaria as much like the prewar structure as possible, which would make it a simple matter to restore the local monarchy. This referendum was held simultaneously with the Landtag
election in which the Nazisfirst showed substantial strength in Bavaria,
and the referendum failed. In deciding against particularism, many
Bavarian voters also decided in favor of Nazism and switched from the
parties supporting the referendum. 5 2
Bavaria also had its own internal particularism. The dominant region, Upper Bavaria, centered on M unich, gave strong support to the
Wittelsbachs. Other regions of Bavaria were less supportive of the
Wittelsbachs. The least favorable region was predominantly Protestant
Franconia, where the most intense duster of aristocratic support for
National Socialism in Germany could be found. Franconian aristocrats
felt alienated from the Catholic aristocracy of South Bavaria and the
Wittelsbachs, yet not, of course, integrated into the Prussian aristocracy. 53 These aristocrats had no hope of restoring a favorable position
for themselves merely by returning to the past, and support for the
Nazis appeared to be the best way to create an authoritarian society.
Franconia was unusual as well in the level of support the Nazis had
among sections of the elite other than the aristocracy, including police
officials, government administrators, and small factory owners. 54 Franconian localities had given the highest votes of any localities in Germany to the DNVP in 1920, but in 1924 they became the strongest
localities for the Nazis. 5 5
The key center for Nazi strength in Franconia-Coburg-had belonged to Thuringia until after the war and never quite fit into Bavaria.
As the Kreuz-Zeitung drolly put it, Bavaria was so reactionary that it
did not allow Coburgers to grill their beloved Bratwürste. 56 Dominated by a castle dating from the twelfth century, Coburg was a city in
thrall to the past. The streets were filled with signs indicating "Suppliers to the Duke," including jewelers, barbers, druggists, and bookdealers. The local dukes had deliberately retarded the development of
transportation and industry in the area so that their hunting grounds
and castles would be peaceful. The townspeople felt grateful to their
duke for supplying them with wide avenues, parks, and especially
theaters, for Coburgers were famous for their love of plays, opera, and
music. In June 1929 Coburg became the first of many "Residence
Cities"--cities of residence for a territorial ruler-across Germany's
small states to elect a Nazi government. The former duke, Karl Eduard, lived in Coburg and led the movement toward the Nazis. 57 The
Nazislogans in this election formed a revealing melange of nationalism,
particularism, and anti-Semitism: "Germany for the Germans! Coburg
for the Coburgers! And to Palestine with those who belong there!"58 At
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the end of 1929, Duke Karl Eduard appeared at the Nazirally andin
April 1932 endorsed Hitler for president. 59 Thus, the multiple levels of
particularism in Coburg-against Thuringia, Bavaria, and the national
government-made this a stronghold of Nazism.
Other areas of Bavaria also showed centrifugal tendencies. Tue Palatinate, geographically separated from the rest of Bavaria, was under
Allied occupation, and the French and Belgians encouraged a local
separatist movement designed to set up a buffer state they could
permanently dominate. Conßicts here between the occupation troops
and separatists, on the one hand, and loyal Germans, on the other,
contributed to radicalization in Pirmasens, andin the winter of 1924 a
group of separatists was lynched by the local population. 60 Pirmasens,
a center for shoe manufacture with many small factories, served both as
a locus of separatism in the 1920-23 period and one of the strongest
cities for the Nazis from 1929 on. 61 There is a likelihood that both
separatists and antiseparatists ended up in the Nazi camp.
Particularism and separatism also promoted elite support for National Socialism in other areas of the Southwest. Nazi voting totals were
often highest in university towns and former residence cities, usually
nonindustrial and nostalgic for the glories of their independent past. A
disproportionate number of the well-to-do, especially professors, civil
servants, professionals, and military officers, lived in such towns. 62
Examples of cities in the Southwest where the Nazis won a strong elite
support included Marburg, a reactionary university town in Hesse,
with a long history of conservative and anti-Semitic voting, and an
educated Nazi local leadership; 63 Kassel, a residence city in Hesse,
where the Nazi vote increased dramatically in 1924;64 and Heidelberg,
Baden, where in 1930, out of thirty-one Nazis on the city council,
fourteen were educated professionals, including judges, doctors, architects, and engineers. 65 In Hesse, the Nazis attracted the "Old
Nassauers," loyal to the dynasty displaced by the Prussians in 1866,
just as these individuals had also ßocked to separatism during the
period of French occupation. During 1923, some Naziparty members
in Frankfurt am Main simultaneously were active in the "Blücher
Association," a paramilitary organization that sought an independent
South German state under Wittelsbach rule and received funding from
the French. 66 Of course, these separatist activities were not part of
Hitler's program; they illustrate instead the confused ideological world
of National Socialism on the periphery.
Microparticularism-loyalty to a single town or a tiny region-was a
factor in support for Nazism by local elites in Thurginia. Because
merger meant losing their status as capitals, cities that had been
capitals of very small states resisted being merged into the larger state
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of Thuringia in 1920. Weimar became the capital of the united
Thuringian state, but other former ducal capitals lost their function.
This brought with it a loss of court patronage for local merchants, an
end to the ßow of tax moneys into the city's infrastructure, and a
decline in such cultural amenities as ducal theaters and libraries.
Gotha, for example, lost its Grand Duke's Court, garrison, and government ministries. 6 7
Central German particularism was agitated again in 1928 when the
governments of Saxony and Thuringia began exploratory steps toward
merger with each other, and in 1929 when the German Democratic
party (DDP) and SPD urged fusion with Prussia. 68 By an odd dialectic,
the most parochial areas of Germany became the strongest bases of
support for the movement that, once in power, would institute the most
extreme policy of centralization-Gleichschaltung, the subordination
of states to the national government.
Particularist support for National Socialism resulted from a complex
process of "deprovincialization" that had economic, social, and political
roots. Particularism was grounded in a localist economy, especially
agrarian, with support from artisans, professionals, and banks serving
local clients. As the German economy increasingly focused on national
and international markets, the strength of economic localism declined.
Another blow to provincialism was World War 1. Tue experience of
serving in military units with men from all over Germany, the growth of
national consciousness both on the battlefield and on the home front,
and the shared deprivation as a result of the peace settlement all served
to undermine localism.
Tue loss of the war, to be sure, discredited Junker, Prussian, and
Hohenzollern leadership, and during the 1919-23 period caused an
upsurge of separatism. Once separatism irrevocably failed with Gustav
Stresemann's restoration of effective central government in 1923-24,
localist elites turned their attention back to the problem of controlling
the national government in their own interest. Tue Weimar Republic,
simply by abolishing all German monarchies, helped to delegitimate
monarchism. All of these factors combined tosend many particularists
to the Nazis in the crisis elections of 1924 and 1930.
Besides particularists, Nazism received much support from liberal
members of peripheral elites who had supported the DDP and DVP
and always favored a strong central government. Liberals who became
Nazis hearkened back to the grossdeutsch tradition of the German
unification movement and welcomed any steps that would bring Austria and Germany together. These formerly liberal Nazis had several
traits in common with former particularists who became Nazis. Both
liberals and particularists were hostile to the power of Junkers and big
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business, and both were willing to join a völkisch-populist-racialistmovement and associate fraternally with the masses. These qualities
allowed them to unite with one another and with the huge Nazi
following among the lower middle dass in order to reshape Germany.
The grandsons of the Guelphs and the 48ers joined ranks to contest
Bismarck's legacy with the grandsons of the Junkers and the Krupps.
Precedents existed in other countries for the kind of regional restructuring represented by the Nazi movement. In spite of the enormous
differences in ideology, organization, and the human costs of the outcomes, structural similarities existed between the electoral coalition of
National Socialism and that of Jacksonian Democracy in America from
the 1820s to the 1840s. In both cases, the new movement represented a
significant regional broadening of the traditional base of national power
coming two generations after the founding of the new state. In both
cases, peripheral elites (westerners in the American case) united with
plebeian elements of the core regions to transform traditional political
alignments. In both cases, core elites were divided into two major
factions that had, at least temporarily, exhausted their potential for
political leadership, industrialists and Junkers in Germany and northern merchants and Tidewater planters in America. In both cases, also,
the agrarian and traditionalist half of the core elite was more willing to
give support to the new movement than was the urban and modernist
half. 69
While Nazi supporters among the provincial elites hoped to create a
truly national ruling dass for Germany in which they could play a
leading role, instead, by placing power in the hands of an irresponsible
dictatorship, they brought calamity. Their banal political aim of broadening the regional basis of power was incommensurable with the
consequences that ensued.
Methodological Appendix
County (Kreis) level analysis serves as the statistical base for this
study, with material from 1, 155 counties and towns. The percentage of
domestic servants in the population is used as a substitute indicator for
the percentage of affiuent. For purposes of regional analysis, Germany
has been broken up into seven areas. Three regions of Protestant
Prussia are considered as the core: the Northeast, the heart of Old
Prussia, and the preeminent Junker region, induding Brandenburg,
Pomerania, East Prussia, Grenzmark Posen-West Prussia, and the nonPrussian states of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz;
Silesia, with a predominance of estate agriculture, but the complicating
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factor of Catholic and industrial Upper Silesia; and the Northwest,
including the Prussian provinces of Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein
and the autonomous states of Brunswick, Oldenburg, SchaumburgLippe, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck. Four regions formed the
periphery: Central Germany, a Protestant, industrialized area consisting of Saxony, Thuringia, Anhalt, and the Prussian province of Saxony;
Rhineland-Westphalia, Catholic, industrial provinces of Prussia; the
Southwest, a region of mixed religion and light industry, including
Baden, Württemberg, Hesse, Waldeck, Hohenzollern, and the Bavarian province of the Palatinate and the Prussian province of HesseN assau; and Bavaria, the heavily Catholic and particularist homeland of
the National Socialist movement. Tue election and census data used in
this essay are from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research at the University of Michigan. 70
Domestic servants are a valid indicator of elite presence, since only
one German family in ten could afford to employ a servant. 71 Ofthe1.4
million domestic servants in Germany in 1925, three-fourths lived in
the homes of their employers. Young women under the voting age
comprised a majority of domestic servants, and those who qualified to
vote seldom actually voted or else voted as their employers indicated.
Tue rate of voting of domestic servants was the lowest of any major
occupational group. Domestic servants could form independent political opinions only with difficulty simply because they seldom spent
much time outside their employers' homes. They were expected to
work fourteen hours a day, with only a half day off on Sundays. Servants
had less free time than any other workers. 72 A good example of a Nazi
domestic servant was Frau Friederike Brzoska of Wollin, East Prussia,
who was eighty years old in 1932 and had been working for a Nazi
physician since 1922. She accompanied him to party meetings in all
weather and knit socks for the SA. 73 Her support for the Nazis was an
aspect of her servility, rather than representing an independent dass
consciousness. This argues that these statistical correlations show not
the direct impact of domestic servant voting so much as an indication of
the voting pattern of the elite that employed the servants.
Correlations used in this essay are Pearson's r, generated by the
DSTAT-2 program. Correlation shifts show the change from election to
election. Rules of interpretation are simple. In order tobe significant,
the correlation shift should be statistically significant at the . 05 level
and should be moving in the same direction as the overall vote for that
particular party. For instance, in rural localities between May and
December 1924, the Nazi correlation with domestic servants went up
.12, a statistically significant shift, but the overall Nazi vote was declining from 6. 9 percent to 3.2 percent. This means that it was not likely
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that the affiuent vote for the Nazis was increasing, but simply that the
affiuent were not deserting the Nazis in such large proportions as other
groups in the population. However, the significant shift from December 1924 to 1928 of -.28 took place as the overall Nazi vote was
declining from 3.2 percent to 2.8 percent, indicating that in this
election affiuent voters were deserting the Nazis faster than voters
generally. Thus, this correlation shift is underlined.
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69. Obviously, the differences between Jacksonian Democracy and National Socialism

are qualitatively more important than the similarities. Jackson was for states' rights
and limited government, while Hitler favored Gleichschaltung and totalitarianism.
Whereas Jackson idly wished for the death penalty for Abolitionist writers, Hitler
actually imposed concentration camps, torture, and execution on Marxists.
Both Jacksonian Democracy and National Socialism represented movement away
from Honoratiorenparteien-parties of notables, dominated by the traditional
elite-to modern, mass parties with a professional party leadership and more
organized linkages to the rank-and-file party membership and electorate, and both
brought with them a substantial increase in voting participation.
Just as National Socialism served to protect capitalism by creating a new pattern of
electoral forces, so Jacksonian Democracy served to perpetuate slavery by bringing
northern plebeians into a coalition with southern planters. Just as National Socialism
rallied the petty-bourgeois masses around a program of anti-Semitism, so Jacksonian
Democracy used antiblack measures to win the support of northern urban Irish
immigrants.
Both movements appealed to younger, rather than older, men, and, among the
elites, to the less established rather than to the better established. Both movements
were heartily opposed, at least in rhetoric, to the power of "finance capital." Neither
movement was particularly strong among urban industrial workers, and both played
on male chauvinist, militarist, and antimodern themes. Just as National Socialism
sought expansion in the East at the expense of the Slavic peoples, so too the
Jacksonians promoted Indian Removal for the sake of white settlement.
A revealing distinction between the two movements was their relationship to
Freemasonry. Jackson was a Mason and the target of agitation by the Antimasonic
party, which was strong in some areas of the United States in 1828, while the Nazis
were themselves devoted anti-Masons.
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Tue NSDAP as an Alternative Elite
f or Capitalism in Crisis
John D. Nagle
Tue rise of German fascism presents a question common to most fascist
movements that have eventually achieved state power: namely, how is
it that an extremist political elite is able to evolve from a political
position of marginality, distrust, and disinterest vis-a-vis established
social elites to a position in which political entrepreneurs from established elites are able to hand over state power to this same extremist
elite?

Three Developmental Hurdles
This is a problem of general interest for the study of fascism, since
most capitalist democracies have fascist "pretenders" as a more or less
standard feature of the political landscape. From Louis Bonaparte and
his Society of December 10 in the Second French Republic through
the Moseley and Quisling movements of the 1930s to the current
National Front in Britain, Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front in
France, and the Lyndon Larouche sect in the United States, fascist
leadership groups have presented themselves as an alternative political
elite and offered their services to established centers of power in
business, state, and military sectors. 1
Fascism as a political-elite alternative for a capitalist society faces
several developmental or evolutionary hurdles before it can achieve
state power. Of the many fascist pretenders, only a few have succeeded
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in achieving this goal. Only some have evolved beyond political marginality; fewer still have convinced established elites within society or
elites representing foreign powers that they are useful and/or necessary
for dealing with some crisis those established centers of power are
unable or insufficiently able to deal with using their own resources.
This could be called the recognition problem, the necessity for fascism
to make its services attractive or even vital to the interests of important
established centers of power.
A second problem for fascist pretender movements can be called the
assurance (or reassurance) issue: a fascist elite must be able to assure
established elites that in collaborating with this radical alternative
political elite, or in helping it to achieve state power, the main interests
of these established elites will themselves not be attacked. This is a
problem not to be taken lightly, since the fascist movement has differentiated itself in various ways from the norms and rhetoric of mainstream elites, and the fascist elite may be viewed as insufficiently
reliable or as potentially revolutionary, certainly as less calculable than
more familiar political vehicles for safeguarding the established social
order.
A third hurdle might be termed the normalization issue: established
elites must have adequate reason to believe that, after some initial
period of extraordinary service by the fascist movement, to accomplish
certain critical tasks, the fascist political elite will over time "settle
down" or transform its behavior to conform to more "normal" standards
for a political elite in capitalist society. 2 This is a longer term expectation, and may be subordinated to the more immediate needs for shortterm crisis solving and reassurance described above, but it is important
that existing elites, if they are to undertake actions that support the
gaining of state power by a fascist pretender elite, have some plausible
reasons for thinking that in the long run the fascist leadership will
"mature" into a more normal governing elite, meeting the more normal
definitions of leadership recruitment, style, and career. Although these
evolutionary hurdles may generally be sequenced as suggested here,
there may be considerable overlap in time and some of these issues
may reappear at rather separated critical points in the development of
the antidemocratic political project that brings fascism to power, as well
as within the period of fascist rule.

The Recognition Problem
Tue clearest element of the development character of the National
Socialist German Workers party (NSDAP) in Weimar rests with its
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breakthrough as a mass mobilization vehicle after 1928, and its defeat of
the Protestant bourgeois parties (Tue German Democratic partyD D P, the German People's party-DVP, the German National People's
party-DNVP, and the Wirtschaftspartei-WP or Economy party) as
political rivals. This also put the NSDAP in position to play a necessary
and indispensable role in the anti-democracy projects proposed by
established political elites.
With the decline in strength of the liberal DDP and the moderateconservative DVP even before the economic collapse of 1929, certain
bourgeois political elites were becoming more and more hostile to the
continuation of the Weimar system, which is to say parliamentary
democracy.
Tue rise in the mid-1920s of the WP party at the expense of the
German Democratic party was an early signal of growing dissatisfaction
among middle-class voters. lt offered opportunities for political elites
who represented these voters to take positions more openly hostile to
Weimar democracy (the Weimar system), and to engage in political
strategies intended to undermine the functioning of the democratically
elected Reichstag. Tue Wirtschaftspartei drew heavily from former
Democrats, and made its early gains at their expense, attacking the
Democratic party as a party of big business, big banks, Jews, and
collaborators of the Social Democrats. 3
Tue 1926 Görlitz program of the WP called for a revision of the
constitution, which would enable a strong central government to rule
independently of Reichstag majority support, a more aggressive foreign
policy toward eastern Europe, the regaining of German colonies overseas, and the resurrection of borders "matching the honor and greatness of the German Volk. " 4 Even in advance of the depression,
therefore, among the Protestant middle-class parties there was a shift
underway from those political elites most favorable to Weimar democracy to those openly hostile to the Weimar system. Yet once the
economic collapse hit, these "half-way house" parties, as Knauerhase
has termed them, were unable to provide a credible basis for either
mass antidemocratic mobilization or elite-level action to destroy the
Republic. 5 Profoundly antidemocratic and an additional burden to the
Weimar democracy, the small Wirtschaftspartei was an early symptom
of the political weakness of the liberal and moderate political elites as
supports for the Republic, and later for the pathetic attempts by classbased interest-group elites to provide mass support vehicles for smashing the Weimar system.
By 1928, the most liberal leadership groupings in the Democrat
party were losing ground and were already rethinking their political
allegiance to and identification with the Weimar democracy. After the
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1928 Reichstag elections, which again brought a Social Democrat into
the chancellor's office, the Democrats' leadership took a sharp turn to
the right, in a forlorn attempt to compete with other Protestant political elites already staking out more hostile anti-Weimar positions. 6
Within the DNVP a decisive shift in leadership from the more moderate Count Kuno von Westarp to the vehemently antidemocratic architect of the Harzburg Front, Alfred Hugenberg, also reßected a shift
over to the anti-system right. In 1928 the Catholic Center (Zentrum)
party also chose a new and more right-wing chairman, Prelate Kaas,
who would in the depression years be less supportive of the Weimar
system. 7
After 1929, among the bourgeois parties, both Protestant and Catholic, there was a further progressive shift to the right, what Hamilton has
called a "competition in toughness," to which we must add a competition for a leading position to undermine or overthrow the parliamentary democratic system. 8 In this political environment, none of the
bourgeois parties took a line of strong defense of the system, or
renewed their commitment to work with the moderate Social Democrats to keep the system functioning. They opted instead to compete
through projects that would in substance destroy the Weimar system,
and in this competition they were no match for the NSDAP as an
alternative political elite.
But why did the NSDAP win this struggle with the bourgeois
parties, and why therefore did German fascism make this critical
breakthrough as an increasingly recognized and appealing element in
the antidemocratic projects that finally came to fruition in January
1933? First and foremost, the NSDAP was in many ways a "modern"
party organization, able to rely on its own manpower and financial
resources in order to function. lt was also, in Hamilton's phrase, a
"virtuous organization" in its fighting and work capabilities, resting on
the bonding and war-fighting skills of the front generation that populated its units. 9 In many respects, the NSDAP was an extremist forerunner of the modern Volkspartei or "catch-all" party, able and willing
to project political slogans and policy outlines toward the most diverse
segments of the population, with differential effect, of course, but
without much concern for the contradictory nature of its total package
of appeals. 10
Second, recent studies have emphasized the role of the newspapers
and election-campaign speeches and posters in spreading the message
of the NSDAP, andin making the party a known factor in the political
landscape for voters. In this regard, special attention should be paid to
Hamilton's findings about the role of leading bourgeois newspapers in
their favorable and highly biased reporting of the activities of the
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NSDAP, especially in respect to the street-fighting dashes with the
Marxist parties. Hamilton points out that this reportage in newspapers
widely read in the best upper- and upper-middle-dass neighborhoods
portrayed the Brownshirt fighters as defenders of these neighborhoods
against the asserted growing threat ofleftist violence and revolutionary
upsurge. 11 This research has shown more specifically how the NSDAP
built its huge and contradictory voter following, from upper-dass
neighborhoods to "Tory" working-dass voters to rural farming communities. Of special interest here is the evidence that the highest level of
voter support for the NSDAP on the scale of social dass was tobe found
in the upper-dass neighborhoods of the largest Protestant cities. 12 In
the "best" neighborhoods of Berlin and Hamburg, for example, 60 to
70 percent of the upper- and upper-middle-dass Protestant voters cast
their votes for the NSDAP in the July 1932 elections. This indicates the
overwhelming effectiveness of the NSDAP appeals, mediated by certain elements of the press, precisely among the families of established
social elites, which could not have failed to have an effect on these
elites' own perceptions of the Nazis as useful-even necessary-allies
in any anti-Weimar political project. In fact, although Hamilton does
not want to explore this line of reasoning, one might assert that there
was something approaching a consensus among upper-dass Protestants
that the NSDAP represented their salvation as a social dass.
Hamilton makes good points about the deavage between Catholic
and Protestant voting patterns, but his research actually supports the
argument that in the Protestant big cities, where modern dass relations
and modern dass struggle in the midst of the economic crisis would be
expected to be most dear-cut and most bitterly fought, the socially
advantaged dasses were the greatest electoral supporters of the
NSDAP, in proportions approaching what could reasonably be called a
dass consensus. Whether the bourgeois press played a planned or an
unintended role in this process is an interesting question. The newspapers owned by Alfred H ugenberg certainly played a rather conscious
role in legitimating the NSDAP to social elites, but the main point is
that these social "betters" were not in any way bastions of resistance to
Nazi appeals. Rather these social elites and their families were in fact
voting for the NSDAP in higher percentages than was the lower middle
dass, on whom earlier theories of disproportionately high electoral
support for the NSDAP had focused. One of Hamilton's additions to
our understanding of this period is precisely that it was not the lower
middle dass that was most "panicked," or most susceptible to Nazi
appeals, but rather the social milieu of the dominant Protestant urban
establishment.
The NSDAP leadership was able to portray itself more credibly as an
alternative political elite, an alternative to those bourgeois political
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Table 1
Generational Composition of Reichstag Deputies
Birth
decade
pre-1870
1870s
1880s
1890s
1900s

DVP
DDP
Zentrum
DNVP
NSDAP
1928 1932 1928 1932 1928 1932 1928 1932 1928 1932
%

15
15
23
46

%

2
8
21
42
27

%

20
49
30
7

%

8
42
37
14

%

19
47
35

%

46
46
9

%

14
68
14
5

%

50
50

%

19
39
37
5

%

9
30
42
16
3

elites that had participated in the Weimar system, even though they
were increasingly more hostile to that system since they no longer
seemed able to make it work in their interests. Tue NSDAP had
developed a leadership profile that set it apart from its bourgeois rivals,
both generationally and occupationally. 13 Tue bourgeois political elites
that in the last years had denounced the Republic were overwhelmingly the same leaders who had sat in the Reichstag and participated in government coalitions before 1928; their verbal distancing
from their own past behavior was not as convincing as was the Nazi
leadership assertion of itself as a young, more diversely representative
and physically aggressive, violent opponent of parliamentary democracy. From Reichstag parliamentary almanacs of the Weimar period,
containing photos and short autobiographical sketches of each deputy,
one can see the differences between the NSDAP Reichstag faction,
with its emphasis on uniforms, fierce poses, war records, and fighting
ability, and its bourgeois political opposition, older men of conventional upper-class credentials, even for the most notorious antidemocratic conspirators such as Hugenberg and Franz von Papen. (See
Table 1).
Between 1928 and 1932 the old leadership groupings of the bourgeois parties did not give way to a younger, more vigorous cohort, nor
did younger leaders in those parties succeed in ousting or overthrowing
the old guard. lnstead, there was a shift to the right within the oldguard leadership generation, and the plotting and playing out of a
series of political projects by these bourgeois political elites, each
designed in its way to undermine the Reichstag and to destroy the
electoral process. After 1929, however, these antidemocratic political
scenarios had to deal with the recognition that the NSDAP was a
necessary and useful element in any plan to destroy Weimar.
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The Reassurance Issue

There were many reasons for established elites in politics, business,
the military, and elsewhere to be distrustful of the Nazi leadership as a
possible alternative political leadership. The NSDAP since its revamping in the early 1920s had attempted to market its putschist skills to the
antidemocratic right-wing establishment elites. Indeed, one of Hitler's
steady goals had been to secure elite backing for his party and its
activities. 14 For the most part, however, these early attempts to build
bridges to established elites received little interest and only occasional
financial support. Turner is probably correct in his assessment that
business elites who regularly funded political organizations continued
until 1933 "to bestow the bulk of their funds on opponents or rivals of
the Nazis. " 15 What Turner does not mention, however, is that these
big-business political funds in the early 1930s were funneled to more
respectable bourgeois political elites, such as von Papen and Hugenberg, who were engaged in their own schemes to destroy the Republic,
utilizing Nazi strength but trying to maintain political control for
themselves. Naturally big business was more comfortable with this
type of prospect, but it does not make the big-business elites into
supporters of democracy or excuse them from their support of von
Papen and Hugenberg, who played such key roles in handing state
power over to Hitler.
Several issues raised the anxiety level of elites about the NSDAP
leadership. Most important perhaps was the Nazi economic program,
which under the rubric of "national socialism" raised the suspicion that
the Nazis might be, after all, "national Bolsheviks." The Nazi attacks on
banking and finance circles, the glorification of village and peasant life
exemplified by Walter Darre's Blut und Boden (Blood and Soul)
völkisch philosophy, the call for the breaking up of department store
chains, and the strength of the Strasser (Otto and Gregor) "left" wing of
the party presented considerable difficulties for established elites.
Precisely the contradictory appeals of the NSDAP, necessary to win
support from farmers, rural and small-town residents, owners of small
businesses, and "Tory" or anti-Marxist workers, also stirred some
doubts about the NSDAP as the ultimate weapon for the salvation of
German capitalism.
Hitler tried to resolve this problem by following a conscious twopronged strategy. 16 In a series of private talks, he attempted to reassure
business and banking elites that he had no intention of attacking
private property or the private banking system (except for Jewish
businesses and banks), andin June 1930 he threw Otto Strasser and his
more serious left followers out of the party. 17 Yet the influence of
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Gregor Strasser remained strong until the end of 1932, when Strasser
lost influence after his discussions with General Kurt von Schleicher on
the possible formation of some sort of militarist-populist dictatorship.
Through the series of 1932 elections, including the November Reichstag elections, the Nazis continued to deploy their füll array of anticapitalist slogans to their intended audiences to keep their massive but
very diverse voter following together.
A second source of distrust of the Nazi leadership stemmed from the
fact that it was different, socially and behaviorally, from conventional
elite standards, and was proud of that difference. This social distance
was more bothersome to business elites than to Reichswehr elites, who
generally had a more positive attitude toward Hitler and his party's
militarist organization, cultural values, and foreign policy goals. Turner
takes this relative difference to mean that it was the military elite that
bears an institutional guilt for the rise of Hitler, whereas the business
elite was largely innocent. 18 Turner does not consider the overlapping
economic interests and inter-elite social ties between big business and
the Reichswehr leadership as important factors in the antidemocratic
projects to destroy the Weimar system.
Many young NSDAP militants had indeed destroyed whatever business and professional careers they might have developed in the
mid-1920s through their combative, often violent, behavior. By committing "economic suicide" in advance of the Depression they broke
with normal bourgeois society and cemented a commitment to the
militarized and continuous political activism of the NSDAP. 19 Tue
NSDAP had also proven its capacity to build up a tough and competent
party organization and street-fighting army that was largely self-supporting and beyond the control of established elites. This organization
was on the one hand attractive for its antiunion and antileft coercive
potential, but was also more independent of manipulation by financing,
or by socializing, than elites of the bourgeois parties. 20 Yet at the same
time these social elites were drawn to Hitler's appeals for national
renewal, for overturning Versailles, and for smashing the unions, the
Marxist parties, and the Weimar democracy. These appeals, combined
with the apparent power and aggressive nature of the NSDAP, had a
wide resonance and produced great enthusiasm among individuals of
the established elite. Many observers have noted the simultaneous
mixture of expressions of dizzying adulation, suspicion, and distrust
with which leading businesspeople, military, and bourgeois party leaders described Hitler. 21 This sense of often messianic support mixed
with anxieties of social distance was in part mirrored in the discrepancy
between very high levels of upper-class voting support for the Nazis,
and relative reluctance-before January 1933-to join the party.
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Still another element of distrust revolved around the role of the
street-fighting army (Sturmabteilung, or SA) which in the early 1930s
under Ernst Röhrn was claiming to be not only the military arm of the
NSDAP but its political arm as well. While the bourgeois elites applauded the SA attacks on the Social Democratic party (SPD) and the
German Communist party (KPD), and increasingly viewed SA violence
as a useful asset that the Nazis would bring into any coalition of forces
to undermine the democracy, it was also true that the Nazis had
employed their thug tactics against bourgeois political parties as well. 22
These attacks started with Jewish candidates of the liberal Democrats
as the targets, but grew to include non-Jewish candidates of the DDP
and the moderate conservative DVP as well. With the "revolutionary"
rhetoric and antibourgeois polemics of the SA, this use of coercion and
violence against bourgeois party candidates and meetings might well
have given pause to many established elites as to the reliability of the
Nazi leadership as an ally, and about its true intentions if brought to
state power with the help of established elites. Taken together, these
doubts about Hitler and the NSDAP leadership constituted a second
evolutionary hurdle for the party, and for those among the established
bourgeois political and military elites who most wanted to utilize the
Nazis as a weapon to bring down the Weimar Republic.
The empirical analysis of the process by which these anxieties were
quieted has been enhanced by recent research. Kater has detailed the
role of the Protestant church, through its clergy and church elders,
between 1929 and 1932, in legitimizing the Nazi elite as a political
alternative for executives, business people, professionals, and intellectuals. 23 Hamilton has stressed the biased, even hysterical, reporting of
leading bourgeois newspapers, in heightening the fear of Red revolution, in defending and glorifying Nazi street-fighting actions, and in
picturing NSDAP leaders as well-intentioned and honorable, if somewhat brash and overly idealistic. Other reassuring messages transmitted through leading bourgeois newspapers included statements from
high-status individuals such as that of Prince August Wilhelm that
Hitler was "sent by God to the German people," and reports from Italy
on the merits of Italian fascism. The presentation of Italian fascism as a
political model acceptable to the upper classes represents another
avenue of reassurance "learning."24 This process of selective communication networking and elite "vouching" for the legitimacy and reliability of the NSDAP as an alternative political elite, as well as the
massive voting percentages for the Nazis among the families of Protestant urban elites, it can be argued, served to reduce elite anxieties, to
facilitate the work of the leading bourgeois political anti-democratic
schemers in negotiating an alliance with the NSDAP, and to head off
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the possibility of specifically anti-Nazi political projects led by more
moderate elites.
What took place, therefore, from early 1930 to January 1933 was a
series of political projects, undertaken by "political entrepreneur"
groups from within the ranks of the antidemocratic bourgeois political
elites, Reichswehr officers, business representatives, and Hindenburg
advisers, to fashion a coalition of forces that could undermine the
Weimar system as a functioning parliamentary democracy, and put in
place a strong right-wing government not responsible to a freely
elected Reichstag and not responsive to left or liberal parties or tradeunion interests.
This process had begun in 1930, with the removal of the SPD from
government and the elevation of Heinrich Brüning from the right wing
of the Catholic Center party to reich Chancellor, permitted to govern
under emergency powers of President Hindenburg under Article 48 of
the Weimar Constitution, without heeding Reichstag majority support. 25 During the entire year of 1932, the development of projects to
bring the NSDAP into some political project to destroy Weimar democracy and to smash organized labor and the political left intensified
as the NSDAP reached the heights of its electoral support (37 percent
in the July Reichstag elections) and even more after the Nazis showed
signs of weakening in the November elections, losing over 2 million
votes and dropping to 33 percent of the total vote. Hörster-Philipps has
described the series of measures undertaken by the government of
Franz von Papen in the course of 1932 aimed at putting in place the
elements of a rightist coalition, which would be able to utilize the
power of the NSDAP as a part of government. 26 Von Papen's government initiated actions that first tested the level of resistance that might
be expected from the workers' movement and the Social Democrats in
case a fascist government should come to power in Germany, and then
engaged the NSDAP leadership in protracted negotiations over the
role Hitler would be willing to accept in a new governing alliance of von
Papen, Hugenberg's DNVP, and the NSDAP.
The von Papen government, from its first day in office on J une 4,
1932, undertook measures that decreed major cuts in spending for
pensions, jobless benefits, and war veterans. Ten days later it readmitted the Nazi street-fighting and paramilitary SA and SS organizations,
while turning police and judicial forces against liberal and socialist selfdefense organizations. The major test provocation of democratic forces,
however, came with the deposing by Reich authorities of the elected
SPD-Catholic Center government of Prussia, which in 1932 was the
last great stronghold of democratic political strength in the Reich.
The next stage, according to Hörster-Philipps, was to bring the
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NSDAP into negotiations that would include the Nazi leadership in a
new Reich government. 27 These discussions came up against Hitler's
demand that he be named chancellor, and despite advice from Fritz
Thyssen and Hjalmar Schacht that he accept von Papen's offer, Hitler
refused to join a reconstituted von Papen government as a junior
partner.
After this setback, von Papen attempted to put through a new
economic program favoring big business, and to engineer a constitutional reform project designed to legitimate a presidial-presidential
central government; the latter in practice would have ended parliamentary democracy, while keeping the facade of an elected but ineffectual
Reichstag. Von Papen's government was heavily supported in this
attempt by members of leading big-business and military circles, and
big business in particular put its political funding weight behind von
Papen's allies in the November Reichstag elections. Tue result was a
disaster for von Papen; his political allies garnered only 10.7 percent of
the vote, and it was clear that without the NSDAP, there was no mass
base of support behind his efforts to destroy the Republic.
Tue November elections, however, also demonstrated the possibly
weak staying power of the NSDAP. In fear that the Naziparty might
decline as rapidly as it had grown, the pressure to bring Hitler into the
government actually increased. The signs of Communist electoral
strength (nearly 18 percent of the vote) and increased strike activity
added to fears that the political momentum might be swinging to the
left, and that by waiting the right might miss its historic moment.
Recent research by David Abraham on the Deutsche Führerbriefe, the
internal political correspondence of German industry, shows the turnaround in the political thinking by the leading export sectors of German industry from support ofWeimar in the mid-1920s to both support
for Nazi participation in government and enthusiastic backing, by
November and December of 1932, for Hitler tobe named chancellor. 28
An analysis of the election results by the NSDAP's Reich Propaganda
Leadership also concluded that the Nazi coalition was beginning to
come unstuck, and that further free elections could be disastrous for
the party; Childers concludes that had the NSDAP not come to power
very quickly, it might well have declined rapidly in electoral strength,
and Goebbels' RPL analysis made clear that there must be no more
elections. 29 Tue Cologne banker Kurt von Schröder, who hosted a
decisive round of negotiations in early January, stated to Allied authorities in 1945: "When the NSDAP suffered its first defeat on November 6, and had thus passed its peak, the support by the German
business community became especially urgent. "30
One last alternative project was undertaken by von Papen's former
defense minister, General Schleicher. Schleicher attempted in De-
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cember, during his brief interregnum, to put together an alliance of
military (Reichswehr) and paramilitary (SA, Stahlhelm) forces , along
with the left wing of the NSDAP (led by Gregor Strasser), and hopefully some worker support from both nonsocialist and socialist unions.
Schleicher's scheming was viewed by many business elites as representing some sort of reparliamentarization process with further elections; this fear, voiced openly in the Führerbriefe, added all the greater
critical importance to the immediate success of von Papen's project. 31
Schleicher's attempt to split the NSDAP as well as the working-class
followings of several parties and give a mass basis to a military-led
dictatorship not only failed but forced Strasser to resign his party
offices, giving another "reassurance" message to established elites that
a Hitler government would not be dominated by the Strasser wing of
the party.
By January, the political environment again favored the antidemocratic political entrepreneur grouping of von Papen, Hugenberg,
and Hindenburg's adviser circle. Turner details the remaining opposition to a Hitler-led government among big-business leaders, but his
studies show that their line of preference fell mainly between a rightist
coalition including Hitler but led by von Papen, and a coalition including von Papen but led by Hitler. Naturally, most big-business elites felt
more comfortable with the Herrenklub-personage of Franz von Papen,
but this hardly makes the case for their innocence in the whole process
of destroying Weimar and shaping the rise of German fascism. 32 Despite understandable remaining anxieties and jitters, which were expressed in these fateful moments, business elites, like military and
bureaucratic elites, were disposed to work with the new regime from
its first days in office, to continue to seek reassurances, and to inßuence
the unfolding of government policies in their favor. Big-business leaders who really feel threatened by a regime know how to express their
opposition: investment boycott, decapitalization, capital ßight, and
emigration of families abroad. With the obvious exception of Jewish
capitalists, these classic signs were remarkably absent in the first
months and years of the Nazi regime. Turner, following Schumpeter,
calls this "adapative" behavior on the part of big business, but at the
same time notes all the overlapping areas of policy agreement with the
NSDAP. 33 In these areas, no adaptation was necessary; the political
understandings were broadly mutualistic, and the end effect synergistic, for the evolution of German fascism as a political elite alternative for capitalist interests.
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The N ormalization l ssue

What expectations did established elites have about the longer term
evolution of a governing fascist political elite? Beyond the immediate
jubilation over the SA terror directed against the KPD, SPD, and
trade-union organizations in the first months of the Naziregime, how
did social elites imagine that this new governing elite would develop?
In particular, would the Nazi elite gradually conform to standards
expected by social elites, becoming a more "normal" political leadership? Most scholars of German fascism have emphasized the belief
among many bourgeois leaders that the Nazi elite could be tamed, or
that it would mature with proper tutelage from bourgeois circles.
Some, like von Papen and Hugenberg, believed that the Nazis could
be used for their own reactionary, antidemocratic, and antileft purposes and later dismissed. 34 More moderate elites, who had opposed
the Nazi rise to power, hoped that the Nazi movement would quickly
burn itself out in office, and that by cooperating with the NSDAP (for
example, in supporting the granting of emergency powers to Hitler in
March of 1933) they might pave the way for a moderation in its behavior
and a return to a more civil politics. Generally, these hopes and
expectations of bourgeois leaders have been treated as evidence of
political myopia, self-delusion, and incompetence, which on the personal level may be quite accurate. Certainly the Nazi leadership immediately used its newly acquired state power to suppress its left
opponents and to scatter the organizations of its bourgeois party rivals.
On the other hand, despite the absence of bourgeois political liberty
and bourgeois parties, the NSDAP elite did evolve in ways that represented a kind of normalization to established elite standards. Most
often cited here are the defeat and bloody purge of both the Strasser
left wing of the party and the Röhrn SA leadership on June 30, 1934.
Bracher also reports that by the end of 1934, nearly 80 percent of the
political leadership consisted of newcomers who had joined the party
since the beginning of 1933, and that only the Gauleiter ranks were
predominantly still from the "old fighter" cohort. 35
Likewise, the Nazi regime, while still paying lip service to Walter
Darre's villagization plans and the protection of small business and
small farms, pursued an economic policy, starting in June 1934, that
was most favorable to big business and detrimental to small business. 36
Certainly the share of national income going to capital rose each year
from 1932 to 1939, as did retained earnings of corporations. 37 By
comparison with the pre-Depression year 1928, property-entrepreneurial income rose from 29.2 percent of national income to 33.8
percent in 1939 and retained corporate earnings from 1.8 percent to
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5. 4 percent, while wages and salaries dropped from 65. l percent to
58.8 percent. Nazi rhetoric about strengthening small enterprise and
artisans was an empty promise in actual practice. 38 Private investment
had risen by 267 percent in the 1932-38 period in steady progression,
and armaments investment had risen by 2400 percent; government
nonarmaments investment had risen too, but by only 180 percent, and
was in 1938 still 12 percent below the 1928 figure. 39
The actual beneficiaries of Nazi economic policy, therefore, were
those elite sectors in big business and the military whose interests, far
from being threatened by the NSDAP regime, were in fact stregthened
by the changes within the NSDAP elite, resulting in closer working
collaboration and wide-ranging mutualism of interests. Looking at the
evolving social composition of the NSDAP leadership, established
elites had reason to believe that that leadership was not a revolutionary
elite, but rather one which might reasonbly be expected to gradually
adjust to standards of established power centers. Careful scholarship
has for some time now largely disproven Lerner's earlier notion of the
Nazileaders as a collection of "marginal men" or social outsiders, and
recent research indicates that at the top levels of the NSDAP hierarchy,
leaders were themselves predominantly from elite backgrounds. 40 This
elite dass in Weimar society, which represented only 2. 8 percent of the
population, accounts for 14of17 NSDAP Reichsleiters, 46.3 percent of
Gauleiters (1925--28), and 36 percent of 1933 NSDAP Reichstag deputies. By contrast, in 1933, when social elites were joining the party in
relatively higher proportions, still only 12.2 percent of new Naziparty
members were from elite social backgrounds. 41
Kater shows that during the Third Reich, the NSDAP elite also aged
in office, becoming far less a generation of "angry young men" distinct
from the expected age of a political elite in noncrisis times. The Nazi
leadership had been notable for its youth during Weimar; once in
power, this elite generation became quickly entrenched in office (see
Table 2).
The NSDAP Reichstag deputy contingent, already quite young in
1928 in comparison with other parties (except the KPD), and even
more radically rejuvenated by 1932, underwent a gradual aging
through 1938. Nearly 60 percent of Nazi Reichstag deputies in 1938
were over forty years of age, compared with only 43 percent in 1932
(November). In the five years from 1933 to 1938, despite the tremendous inßux of first-time deputies to the all-Nazi Reichstags of 1933(11),
1936, and 1938, the average age rose by more than three years. The
average age of Reichleiters rose from forty-three in 1933 to fifty-four by
1944, and of Gauleiters from forty to forty-eight over the same
period. 42 At lower levels of the NSDAP organization, the Nazi lead-
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Table 2
NSDAP Reichstag Deputies, 1932-38

Birth
decade
pre-1870
1870s
1880s
1890s
1900s
1910s

NSDAP
only

NSDAP
only

193211

19331

193311

1936

1938

2
8
21
42
27

1
6
23

1
5
19
46
29

1
5
17

1
5
16
42
34
2

%

%

44

25

all-NSDAP
Reichstags
%

%

44

32
1

%

Note: Roman numerals following 1932 and 1933 reßect the fact that there were two
Reichstag elections in those years.

ership was also stagnant, entering middle age in office. Tue NSDAP
did not represent a fundamentally different, innovative, or revolutionary type of political elite in this respect. While affirming in part the
lower-middle-class values of the majority of the party leadership, Kater
concludes:
This judgment, however, requires three reservations, all of which emphasize the importance of elite elements in the leadership. First, the relative
proportion of elite elements was higher among the leaders than in the
party or in the Reich population. Second, the elite portion tended to
increase with rank. And third, the elite element was particularly inßuential when extraordinary leadership was called for, as in the period between 1932 and 1934. These three points show that even the monopolistic
party of the Naziregime, whose corporate behavior has been described as
impulsive, disorderly, and confused, was affected by the elite's rules of
rationality, performance, and efficiency. 43

Tue Nazi leadership, as an alternative political elite, was torn between the old fighter (lower-middle-class) mentality and the establishment "upper-class consciousness." Once in power, the NSDAP elite
did not revolutionize the social order, nor did it undermine established
elite social values, despite its pre-1933 antibourgeois rhetoric.
Can it be deduced that the NSDAP leadership constituted a new elite in
German society, as has been argued by a score of writers? No, that was
not the case .... To classify as a counter-elite, the leaders would have had
to bring about the completion of the National Socialist revolution, but this
they were not able to do. And, coming after and aping in various respects
their austere Prussian pre-cursors, they retained far too many epigonal
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characteristics to be considered a new species .... There were too many
elements of accommodation, of fusion, of absorption. In social composition alone, the pattern of mutual interactions and interlockings between
the two groups was nearer to collusion than to collision. 44

Tue mutual penetration of party elite and social elite (already considerable before 1933), the purging of SA and Strasser leadership factions,
and the aging in office throughout the entire Third Reich era all
indicate that the German fascist leadership was undergoing a normalization process; established elites were not foolish or myopic in
their belief that the NSDAP would be critically useful, as an alternative
political elite: safe, and ultimately unable to revolutionize the social
order. 45

The Debate on the NSDAP as an Alternative Elite
In recent years, various scholars have attempted to exonerate established elites, and in particular big business, from responsibility for the
rise of German fascism. Tue line of defense has been that big business
and other elements of the established elite did not favor handing over
state power to the Nazis, and were surprised and outßanked by a small
group of conspirators around von Papen, Hugenberg, and Hindenburg. The later collaboration with the NSDAP is either not dealt with,
or is seen as an accidental by-product of Nazi policies, not as a preexisting mutuality of interests or as the fruits of a mutually sought political
coalition.
lt is ironic that the research findings of these scholars in fact provide
additional evidence for the thesis of a bourgeois-fascist coalition-building process, a process with several hurdles, to be sure, but one of
conscious political projects designed to bring down the Weimar democracy, to utilize the NSDAP mass support and street-fighting army, and
to bring about a decisive shift in economic and military policy in favor
of elites in big business and the military. Several entrepreneurial efforts
were undertaken to accomplish these goals, and the offers to the
NSDAP started at a lower level than Hitler would accept. In the end,
the bidding included the acceptance of Hitler as chancellor, and the
effective handing over of state power to the fascist elite. This was not
the first choice of established elites for solving their problems with the
Weimar system, but it was a conscious choice, an opportunity they did
not let slip through their fingers.
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Part II

Confronting the Past:
Lessons from History

Tue Destruction of the Workers' Mass
Movements in Nazi Germany
Gunter W. Remmling
Since its appearance on the political scene of Weimar Germany the
National Socialist German Workers party (NSDAP), had been bitterly
opposed by the workers' mass movements. Berlin, a stronghold of
workers' organizations, was the Rote Festung, the Red Fortress, in
Nazi jargon. And there were many other red fortresses in Weimar
Germany. The Nazis thus viewed the destruction of the workers' mass
movements as a prerequisite for the establishment of absolute power.
Adolf Hitler was obsessed by the idea of annihilating the workers'
movements-an obsession that was equaled only by his pathological
preoccupation with the destruction of the Jews. Flagrant misuse of the
law and secret-police terror constituted Hitler's chief weapons in his
attack on the Jews and workers. Hitler, the cunning demagogue, also
knew that many Germans either shared his hatreds or believed them to
operate to their advantage.
When Hitler ordered the destruction of the workers' mass movements, he certainly fulfilled the wishes of the German ruling dass. As
far as the large landowners, industrialists, generals, and top administrators were concerned, workers existed to be exploited, and rebellious workers belonged at the end of a rope or in front of a firing
squad. Most middle-dass Germans aped the attitude of the ruling dass
and admired the Freikorps mercenaries who were murdering thousands of German workers when Hitler was still an obscure fanatic. As
long as the workers were impoverished and powerless the solid burghers had nothing but loathing and contempt for them. When the
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workers rebelled against their oppressors the middle-class citizens
applauded the most brutal methods of ruling-class repression.
Class-conscious workers were fully aware of their situation in the
"fatherland." Their experience had made quite clear the truth of Marx's
observation that the capitalists view the person who, without capital or
ground rent lives entirely by his labor, in other words the proletarian,
as a mere worker, but not as a human being. 1 They also recognized
fully that the modern working class consists of laborers who live only so
long as they have work, and who have work only "so long as their work
increases capital. " 2 The consequences cut deeply into the workers'
lives: capitalist laws of the market rendered the price of labor equal to
its cost of production, limited to "the cost of the means of subsistence
he needs for his upkeep and for the propagation of his race. "3 The
workers knew one thing for sure: the capitalist laws of the market
forced them to live in slums and eat garbage. In the Kaiser's Germany
the workers sang the imperial anthem with their own lyrics describing
their customary dinner of Pellkartoffeln und Heringschwanz (boiled
potatoes and herring tail).
But the German workers did more than ridicule the emperor's
fatherland. They fought back against their oppressors and created
powerful proletarian mass movements, whose growing strength was
reßected in working-class participation in government. In the first of
the nine national legislative elections in the Weimar Republic, which
took place on January 19, 1919, the combined left vote amounted to
45.5 percent of the total. The Social Democratic party (SPD), took 37.9
percent of the vote; 7.6 percent of the voters supported the radical
Independent Social Democratic party (USPD). On January 19, 1919,
voting participation was 82. 7 percent. 4 During the last free Reichstag
elections of November 6, 1932, the SPD polled 7,248,000 votes with
121 seats in the German parliament; the German Communist party
(KPD) polled close to 6 million votes with 100 seats in the Reichstag. 5
In other words, the SPD took 20.4 percent of the total vote; 16.9
percent of the voters supported the KPD. Together the two disunited
Marxist parties had 37.3 percent of the total vote. On the other side of
the trenches lurked the NSDAP; the Nazis received 33. l percent of all
the votes. On November 6, 1932, voting participation was 80.6 percent. These elections brought gains for the Communists and losses for
the Socialists and Nazis. In the preceding election of July 31, 1932, the
NSDAP had received 37.3 percent of the total, the highest percentage
the party ever won before its assumption of power on January 30, 1933.
On July 31, 1932, the German people gave 21.6 percent of the vote to
the SPD and 14.3 percent to the KDP-a combined left vote of 35. 9
percent. The voting participation was 84 percent. 6
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Tue KPD, the most powerful Communist party in Europe, was
founded in December 1918, growing out of the revolutionary Spartakusbund. The KPD originated within the left wing of the pre-world
War 1 Social Democratic party. The KPD achieved a mass basis in 1920,
when the party reported some 380,000 members, and Communist
party membership held steady until March 1922. During the period of
relative stabilization in Weimar Germany, Communist party membership declined. In September 1930, in the first year of the Depression, the KPD had some 120,000 members. 7 The Communists also led
the 100,000 workers who in 1924 hadjoined together in an organization
called Roter Frontkämpferbund, or League of Red War Veterans. Half
of the membership consisted of workers who were not members of the
KPD or any other political party. 8 Many of the men gave their lives in
the street battles which they fought against the Nazi's Sturmabteilung
(SA), or Storm Detachment. The stormtroopers killed or tortured many
red fighters in the basements of their Nazi party strongholds (Braune
Haus).
Tue KPD represented the workers' mass movement as a revolutionary party. 9 Tue majority of the workers supported the SPD--a party
strongly committed to social reform. Tue Social Democratic party,
founded in 1891, has its roots in the political activities of German
workers which date back to 1790, gaining momentum in the 1830s and
1840s. In 1869, August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht-the father of
Karl Liebknecht, leader of the Spartakusbund-founded the Social
Democratic Workers' party, which was the immediate Marxist predecessor of the SPD. 10 In 1912, the SPD had 110 seats in the Reichstag
and was the strongest parliamentary group in Germany. During the
nationalistic fever dance of World War 1, the SPD lost almost threefourths of its members, dropping from 1 million to 250,000. By 1921,
the SPD had regained its character as a mass movement, numbering
1.2 million members. During the period of relative stabilization the
SPD suffered numerical losses, but by 1930 it again had over 1 million
members. 11 On February 22, 1924, the Reichsbanner Schwarz-RotGold was founded in Magdeburg. The Reichsbanner, a paramilitary
organization of war veterans dedicated to the protection of the Weimar
Republic, eventually numbered over 1 million members-most of
them recruited from the ranks of the SPD and the free trade unions. 12
In the second half of the nineteenth century German workers
formed trade unions to protect their social and economic interests.
After World War 1, the union movement achieved great strength, and
the free trade unions with their social democratic orientation came
together to establish the powerful German Trade Union Federation
(ADGB), which grew during the years 1920-22 into an organization of
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7.9 million members. During the period of relative stabilization the
ADGB lost members, dropping to 4.1 million in 1925. The German
population in 1925 numbered 63, 178,619. By 1929, membership had
increased to 4. 9 million. Membership began to decline again in 1930 as
the world economic crisis made its impact on Germany. 13
During the last years of the Weimar Republic the deadliest enemy of
the workers, the Nazi Party, grew in strength. As the depression year of
1929 drew to a close the NSDAP had about 178,000 members. A total
of 129,563 Germans belonged to the Nazi party on September 14,
1930. At the beginning of 1932 the NSDAP probably had 450,000
members. The party's membership stood at 719,446 at the end of
January 1933. By the end of 1933, 4 million Germans had jumped on
the bandwagon, and 750,000 of them were workers. 14 In 1930, there
were approximately 100,000 SA stormtroopers who clashed in street
battles with Red Front fighters and the Reichsbanner. In these confrontations the SA could usually count on the support of the German
police who shot down many Communist and Socialist workers. 15
Despite their partial self-definition as a socialist workers' party the
Nazis were not successful in mobilizing the working class and their
"radical rhetoric about socialism remained nothing but rhetoric. " 16
The Nazis' rise to power was made possible by the support of large
numbers of middle-class voters who saw their economic position and
social status threatened by the social and economic changes in Weimar
Germany. The Nazis were especially successful in rural and small-town
areas, where they "gave the most blatant expression to the fears and
prejudices of the middle and particularly the lower middle classes. " 17
During the 1930s the Nazis also operated with the consent and backing
of the ruling dass. Many generals, big businessmen, bankers, top civil
servants, and landowning aristocrats supported the NSDAP. Hitler's
destruction of the workers' mass movements was in keeping with
ruling-class wishes and expectations. His suppression of the workers
also laid the fears of many middle-class Germans to rest.
As the NSDAP rose to political prominence in Weimar Germany, the
party began to receive political nad financial support from inßuential
representatives of banking and big business. Hitler repeatedly made
speeches to leading capitalists, including "industrial magnates such as
Vögler of the United Steelworks and Springorum of Hoesch," persuading them to become Nazi supporters. 18 On January 27, 1932, Hitler
spoke to the Dusseldorf Industry Club, an organization of the industrial leaders of the city and surrounding area. Fritz Thyssen, the steel
baron, championed Hitler's political career and had made the arrangements for the Nazi leader's speech which took place in the exclusive
Park Hotel. This meeting brought the NSDAP "increased support from
industrialists in the Ruhr district," who by the summ er of 1932 wanted
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to include the NSDAP in the government. 19 Fritz Thyssen and
Hjalmar Schacht, who had been president of the Reichsbank until
April 1930, went a step further-they wanted to have Hitler as the next
German chancellor. 20
In the spring of 1932, Nazis and industrialists worked together in a
circle organized by the chemical engineer and corporate executive
Wilhelm Keppler. The group mapped out the details of a promise made
by leading Nazis that they would fulfill and safeguard "the wishes and
interests of big industrialists," and in November 1932, thirty-eight
German industrialists recommended the Nazi cause in a letter to
President Hindenburg. Signatories included Cuno, Schacht, Vögler,
Thyssen, Krupp, Siemens, Springorum, and Bosch. 21 Industrial and
business leaders who opposed the Nazis favored traditional conservative causes; their opposition was guided by pragmatic reasoning
rather than political principles. 22
Shortly after the accession of the Nazis on January 30, 1933, the
Schutzstaffel (SS) found new recruits among German aristocrats. A
number of industrialists accepted membership in the circle of Friends
of the Reichsführer-SS; Heinrich Himmler's new pals who paid money
into the coffers of the SS included Dr. Heinrich Buetefisch of 1. G.
Farben, Hans Waltz, a director of Robert Bosch, Friedrich Flick and
representatives of the Deutsche Bank, Norddeutscher Lloyd and Hamburg-Amerika shipping lines, the Dresdner Bank, the Dr. Oetker food
company, Siemens-Schuckert, and Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke. 23
If the destruction of all workers' organizations constituted the immediate payoff which the Nazis made to the rural aristocracy and the
leaders of German industry and commerce, the Nazis made another
payoff in the form of slave labor. Tue National Socialist government
forced the inmates of concentration camps, foreign workers, and prisoners of war to perform slave labor, allowing large landowners and
industrialists-as well as the Nazis themselves-to reap enormous
profits. Some industrial moguls, such as Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und
Haibach, operated their own slave labor camps near their factories.
Krupp's profit-making inferno included Buschmannshof, the German
capitalist's concentration camp for children. In 1944 Krupp exploited
about 100,000 slave workers in Germany, other Nazi-dominated countries, and in concentration camps. 24 Other industrialists opened factories inside the concentration camps. Tue giant chemical combine 1. G.
Farben used camp labor after 1941 in its Buna synthetic rubber plant at
Auschwitz concentration camp and operated its own concentration
camp in nearby Monowitz. 25 And other companies in Germany that
exploited concentration camp prisoners included AEG, Telefunken,
Siemens, BMW, and Rheinmetall. 26
Tue business relationship between the SS and German capitalists
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was not one-sided, however. Tue SS also realized profits from the
forced labor system, both in its own enterprises and from monetary
contributions which German corporations and banks made to the organization. 27
Tue millions of political prisoners, Jews, and other victims of race
hatred which the SS had collected worked under hellish conditions and
were fed a starvation diet. Camp workers usually died after four
months or became unfit for work. Those who could no longer work
were put to death in the gas chambers. At Auschwitz prisoners were
tortured in "medical experiments conducted by the Bayer division of I.
G. Farben." 28
Hitler's destruction of the workers' mass movements satisfied the
expectations of the ruling dass; but the dictator had another, more
important reason for his campaign of swift annihilation. Hitler and his
gang realized that Marxist working-class organizations were a potential
threat to the consideration of Nazi dictatorship, making their destruction inevitable. Tue seeds of dictatorship were cast upon the land
during the final phase of the Weimar Republic, when German politics
drifted into extraconstitutionality. Tue Reich President's Emergency
Decree for the Protection of the People and the State of February 28,
1933, obviously revoking the basic constitutional rights of the citizens,
hastened these developments. 29 Then the enabling law of March 24,
1933, gave the Hitler government unquestioned authority to issue any
kind of dicfatorial edict. 30
Tue chief weapons the Nazis used to destroy the workers' movements were secret-police terror and a perverted legal system called
National Socialist battle law, or Kampfrecht. The wide ranging attack
included the arrest, torture, and murder of proletarian leaders and
activist workers, the theft of all properties and funds belonging to trade
unions, workers' organizations, the KPD and the SPD, and the prohibition of all working-class activities. 31
Tue first blow against the KPD fell on February 2, 1933-the fourth
day of Nazi rule-when the Communists were denied the right to hold
demonstrations. 32 Two days later the Nazis initiated what soon became
recurrent practice: invoking article 48 of the Weimar Constitution to
issue a Decree for the Protection of the German People, they spread a
threadbare mantle of legality over their dictatorial rule. This measure
made it impossible for opponents of the Nazi regime to hold meetings,
engage in demonstrations, or publish their views. 33 On February 17,
1933, Hermann Göring, in his capacity as Reichskommissar for the
Prussian Ministry of the lnterior, ordered all police officers to use their
firearms against Communists without mercy. 34 Göring's decree, euphemistically entitled Furtherance of the National Movement, repre-
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sented another aspect of what became standard practice in Nazi
Germany: the combination of repressive legislation with police terror.
On February 24, 1933, Berlin's Political Police closed KarlLiebknecht-Haus, the Communist party's headquarters. On the evening of February 27, Göring sneaked an SA squad into the Reichstag,
the seat of Germany's national parliament. Tue stormtroopers set the
building on fire, but the Nazis blamed the Communists for the destruction. Tue National Socialists made the Reichstag fire a pretext to step
up the brutal violence which they employed to suppress the KPD. On
February 28, the day after the blaze, the Nazis prompted the senile
Hindenburg to sign the Emergency Decree for the Protection of the
People and the State, which again invoked article 48 of the Weimar
Constitution and threatened "to repulse Communist acts of violence
endangering the State. "35 With one stroke of his pen Hindenburg had
suspended all constitutional provisions for individual and civil liberties;
he had also put his legal seal of approval on Hitler's establishment of
the German dictatorship. On the same day came the sweeping mass
arrests of Communist Reichstag deputies, party officials, workers, and
Communist and pacifist writers, journalists, lawyers, and physicians.
Tue SA occupied the Karl-Liebknecht-Haus in Berlin and changed its
name to Horst-Wessel-Haus.
On March 1, Reichsminister Göring delivered an interminable radio
address and told his listeners: "We do not only want to repulse the
Communist danger ... rather ... it will be my noblest task ... to
exterminate Communism in our people"36 One day later Hitler endorsed his fat henchman's attack on the KPD in an election speech
which he gave in Berlin's Sportpalast. But the newly anointed chancellor widened Göring's offensive, reviling Marxism in general and the
"destructive" idea of democracy. The Nazi leader also revealed his
Social Darwinist frame of mind as he went on to assail the ideal of
human equality and to glorify the superior personality and the productive strength of capitalism. 37 While Hitler raved in the Sport Palace the
German police kept on arresting thousands of Communists. On March
3, Ernst Thälmann, chairman of the KPD's Central Committee, was
arrested in Berlin-Charlottenburg in the apartment of a lathe
operator. 38 On March 8, the Political Police moved its department for
the "fight against bolshevism" into the KPD's former Karl-LiebknechtHaus. 39
On March 9, Wilhelm Frick, minister of the interior, declared in a
speech that Communists and their "red allies" from the SPD must be
taught "productive work" in the concentration camps. 40 On March 15,
the Reich Cabinet echoed the minister when its members recom-
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mended that Communists should be punished with special brutality"mit ganz brutalen Strafen." 41
Tue official announcement of the SS state came on March 20, 1933,
when Heinrich Himmler, acting police president of M unich and leader
of the SS, told journalists at a press conference that the concentration
camp at Dachau was about to open. 42
On March 23, the Nazi government carried out the second major
legal maneuver in support of Hitler's establishment of the German
dictatorship. By a vote of 441 the Nazi-dominated Reichstag adopted
the Law for the Removal of Distress of People and Reich, transferring
the legislative powers of the Reichstag to the Cabinet and thereby
giving Hitler the power to enact laws deviating from the Constitution.
Tue incarceration of all Communist deputies had forced the KPD out of
the Reichstag, and this left only the Socialist deputies, who cast their
ninety-four votes courageously against the enabling law. 43
Under their newly tailored legal mantle the Nazis intensified their
terror campaign; with increasing regularity the never-ending reports of
arrests of Communist and Socialist functionaries included the news that
the victim had been shot while "trying to escape. "44
At the beginning of their third month in power the Nazi leaders
knew that most Communist political activists were either dead, in
prison, on their way to a concentration camp, or in exile. Therefore the
Nazis widened the attack which came to include people suspected of
harboring left-wing or other anti-Nazifeelings. Consequently the Law
for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service was promulgated on
April 7, 1933. Paragraph four of the law was sufficiently vague to fit the
dictator's purposes, stating that all civil servants who were suspect
because of their "former political activity" could be dismissed. Paragraph three decreed the immediate dismissal of civil servants who were
not of 'Äryan descent." Tue National Socialists used this infamous
'Äryan paragraph" as their big "legal" canon in their relentless attack
on "the economic underpinnings of the Jewish community: a tidal wave
of discriminatory legislation followed the attack on J ewish civil servants. "45
Tue First Decree to the Law for the Restoration of the Professional
Civil Service of April 11, 1933, ordered in section one the immediate
dismissal of all civil servants with Communist affiliations. In section
two the decree extended the firing to civil servants who had only one
Jewish grandparent. 46 Tue Third Decree of May 6 extended the expulsion to former members of the Communist party and its affiliated
organizations, including the national-communist movement Schwarze
Front. Tue Third Decree furthermore extended the definition of civil
servants to judges, notaries, school and university teachers, and mem-
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bers of the Schutzpolizei, or police. 47 Professional proscription continued until Communists, Socialists, Jews, and other politically
"undesirable" people had been economically ruined. With the growth
of the concentration camp population and the unfolding of the Holocaust the economic destruction of these people was followed by their
physical annihilation. When the smoke swirled around the ruins which
were the only legacy of Hitler's Third Reich over 10 million concentration camp prisoners had been murdered-among them were 6
million European Jews.
On April 7, 1933, the Nazi government decreed that Communists
and Jews could no longer practice law. A decree of April 22 forced
Communists and Jews out of the medical profession. On April 30
professional proscription victimized Jewish and Marxist journalists. On
May 6 the Nazi government promulgated a law prohibiting Communists and Jews from working as tax consultants. A decree of July 27
expelled Communists and Jews from the ranks of dentists and dental
technicians, while other laws and decrees reached into other types of
professional activity. 48
On May 1, 1933, Joseph Goebbels published an article carried by all
German newspapers; the Minister for Popular Enlightenment and
Propaganda boasted that Marxism had been smashed. With typical
insolence he declared: "Marxism had to die so that a road to freedom
could be opened up for German work. "49
Tue Social Democratic party and the trade unions suffered the same
fate as the Communists. The SPD and the KPD had failed to establish
a united front against the National Socialists. Tue Nazis, however,
made no distinctions in their attack on the German workers: Communists and Socialists who had not fought side by side eventually perished
together.
During the first month of their rule the Nazis had concentrated their
attack on the German Communists, and within a few weeks they had
destroyed the most powerful Communist party in Europe. In the
second month of their dictatorship the Nazis directed the füll force of
their onslaught against the Social Democratic party and the trade
unions.
On March 8, 1933, SA and SS units occupied SPD and trade union
offices and the buildings housing Socialist newspapers. These artibrary
and unlawful acts occurred all over Germany. On the same day the
Nazis arrested thousands of Social Democratic functionaries. 50
Tue attacks continued. On May 10, the Nazis began their campaign
against Social Democratic leaders, leading to the removal and arrest of
all Socialist deputies, politicians, administrators, and mayors. To forestall the resistance of paramilitary units the Nazis moved against the
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Reichsbanner occupying their headquarters in Magdeburg on
March 11. 51
On March 31, the Reich government promulgated a law that brought
back the death penalty by hanging, targeting "crimes against public
security" for this barbaric punishment. In this way the Nazis fused
their perverted "battle law" with their political terrorism. This law was
followed by the Anti-Terror Law of April 4, which introduced the death
penalty for "political crimes. "52 Always quick to add insult to injury
Göring announced to a Berlin audience on April 9, that he was "especially happy that also German socialism has been victorious. "53 On
May 2, at 10 A. M. the Nazis occupied by surprise all buildings and
firms belonging to the Free Trade Unions, including the Arbeiterbank,
or Workers' Bank. Robert Ley, president of the Prussian Privy Council,
who ordered this gigantic robbery of the German working dass, used
the occasion to declare: "The devil's doctrine of Marxism must croak
miserably on the battlefield of the National Socialist revolution. "54 The
payoff came on the next day, when Hitler ordered his mouthpiece
Rudolf Hess to elevate Ley to the rank of Reichsleiter of the Deutsche
Arbeitsfront, or German Labor Front. 55 This totalitarian apparatus run
by Nazis for the benefit of Nazis replaced all German labor unions. The
relationship between the Nazi Labor Front and the Free Trade
Unions exhibited the same nightmarish unreality shrouding the
ghastly performances of concentration camp orchestras that played
under the SS whip in front of the gas chambers. The Nazi attack on the
German labor unions triggered mass arrests of union leaders. And the
population living behind barbed wire kept on growing-by April 1939,
Nazi concentration camps were crowded with more than 300,000
Germans. 56
Hitler opened the first congress of the Arbeitsfront on May 10, 1933,
with a speech declaring that the fight against Marxism would never
end. He vowed to destroy Marxism, "to exterminate [it] down to the
last root, ruthlessly and mercilessly. "57 On the same day the Nazis
literally kicked the Social Democratic deputies out of the M unich town
council, and in Berlin and many other German cities Nazi students
burned so-called un-German books. 58 The book burning happened
shortly after the publication of a "first list" of forbidden authors which
had appeared on April 23, outlawing all significant writers from Bertolt
Brecht to Stefan Zweig. Nazi proscription of creative activity silenced
about eight hundred authors and banned all major artists and
thinkers. 59 In the concentration camps the Nazis murdered many
artists, writers, and intellectuals along with activist workers and other
political foes of the German dictatorship.
On May 19 the working people became subject to the Law About
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Trustees of Labor which empowered the chancellor to appoint such
trustees. By filling the posts with high-ranking Nazis, including lawyers, administrators, and managers, Hitler greatly expanded their
power to maintain the Arbeitsfrieden, or labor peace, including the
determination of wage scales, working conditions, vacations, and dismissals. 60 From then on, these lackeys ruled the workers' lives, always
to the benefit of employers. Tue stormtrooper and Minister of Labor
Franz Seldte addressed the entire gang of trustees on June 20. Seldte,
who would soon be promoted to the rank of SA-Obergruppenführer,
parroted the authoritarian nature of the law ordained by his master and
declared that collective bargaining and arbitration based on the "Marxist principle of the dass struggle" had ceased to exist. 61 Tue minister's
speech announced to the workers that the entire organizational structure erected by the trade unions since the dawn of the labor movement
had been buried in the graveyard of the Labor Front. One J une 22,
Ley, the führer of the Labor Front, ordered the Nazi thugs in the
National Socialist Organization of Industrial Cells (NSBO) to "clean
out" the Arbeitsfront "down to the last cell." Ley told his minions to
"brutally remove" all former Marxists, followers of the Catholic Center
party, and members of middle-class organizations from the Labor
Front. With this pronouncement the Nazis declared war on the Christian labor unions: On June 24, members of the NSBO occupied all
offices of the Christian labor unions and terminated their existence. 62
Tue destruction of the SPD was officially announced on June 22,
1933, with the declaration by the minister of the interior that the Social
Democratic party was an enemy of the state and the people, deserving
the same treatment that had been used against the Communist party.
Tue Nazi government prohibited all functions performed by the SPD
including parliamentary representation, meetings, and publications.
Tue Nazis confiscated all assets belonging to the SPD and its affiliated
organizations and arrested the remaining Socialist leaders including
Paul Löbe. 63 Löbe, who had been president of the Reichstag from 1925
to 1932, later joined the German resistance group Goerdeler-Leuschner to carry on the fight against the Nazis. During the Naziregime the
120 seats of the SPD in the Reichstag remained vacant. 64
After the final destruction of the workers' mass movements on June
22, 1933, the Nazis began their attack on the other political parties. On
June 25, Goebbels gave a speech in the Rhineland town of Rheydt,
where he was born, and declared that the German people must be
"unified" in one political party, the NSDAP, and denied that any other
political party had the right to exist. 65 On the same day the Nazis
arrested the deputies and functionaries of the Bavarian People's party.
On the evening of June 27, representatives of the conservative German
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Nationalist Front, got together with Chancellor Hitler and signed a
pact of friendship; then the German Nationalist Front "decided" to
dissolve itself. 66 On J une 28, Goebbels spoke in Stuttgart and demanded self-dissolution from the leading Catholic political party, the
Catholic Center party, and on July 1, the Staatspolizei closed the
offices of the entire complex of organizations affiliated with the Center
party. The Gestapo also confiscated all the assets owned by the organizations of the party. 67
On July 4, the Bavarian People's party and the German People's
party ceased to exist. The leaders used the occasion of their parties'
"voluntary" dissolution to make subservient noises in the direction of
the Nazis. On July 5, the leaders of the Catholic Center party addressed their subservient utterances to Herrn Reichskanzler Hitler
and declared the Center party's "self-dissolution. "68 This day marked
the end of political parties in Germany. On July 5 the Nazi-dominated
press celebrated the National Socialist Totalitätsanspruch, or "totality
claim." As Kriegk, the editor of a popular Berlin newspaper, put it in
the incredible neo-German of the Third Reich: "Now the work of
destruction of the party state has been completed. " 69
On July 11, Hitler's mouthpiece Reich Minister Frick officially declared the completion of the "German revolution" and proclaimed:
"The National Socialist German Workers' party has herewith become
the sole carrier of the state." 70 On July 14, a law was passed which
declared that the NSDAP was the only political party in Germany,
making all attempts to maintain or form other political parties a crime
subject to severe punishment. The law concerning the Unity of Party
and State of December 1, 1933, completely and irrevocably handed the
state over to Hitler's National Socialist party. 71
For the Nazis the destruction of the workers' mass movements and
democratic politics was not only a political maneuver on the road to
genocide and total war; it was also a gigantic heist foreshadowing the
colossal plunder of the Jews and many European peoples. On May 9,
1933, the Nazis set the Prussian criminal justice system in motion to
engineer the confiscation of all assets belonging to the SPD, the
Socialist press, and the Reichsbanner. On May 12, all assets belonging
to the Free Trade Unions were confiscated and handed over to the
leader of the Nazi Labor Front, while the confiscation of SPD assets
was carried out in all parts of Germany. 72 On May 15, the Labor Front
took over the consumers' cooperative societies thereby giving the Nazis
a fortune in hard-earned savings which millions of workers had entrusted to the cooperatives. On May 26, the Reich government passed
a law based on paragraph 40 of the penal code concerning high treason
which led to the confiscation of all Communist assets. On June 22, the
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Nazis confiscated all remaining SPD assets and those of organizations
affiliated with the Socialists. 1 3
On July 11, 1933, the Nazi government officially declared that the
"German revolution" had been completed. The official circular, signed
by Frick as minister of the interior, also celebrated the establishment of
the one-party system. 7 4
Meanwhile the National Socialist leaders reviled the other political
parties as collections of miserable cowards who had deserted their
colors without a fight. On June 16, 1933, Goebbels spoke at a Nazi
party rally in Hamburg and expressed his astonishment over the swift
disappearance of the Nazis' enemies. 75
Long after the destruction of Nazism by the Allied armies of World
War II, many problematic questions continue to haunt us. Did the antiNazi forces underestimate Hitler's will and ability to rule? Did they
assume Nazism was doomed to quick failure and disintegration? Did
German leftists believe that the Nazis were a necessary evil needed to
hasten the collapse of capitalism, thereby opening the road to socialism? Did the hostile feelings separating the KPD from the SPD run
deep enough to forestall the formation of a proletarian United Front?
Did the workers' leaders fear that high unemployment would turn the
call for a general strike into an empty gesture? Were the workers'
leaders out of touch with the rank and file? Did the leftists fear the
Reichswehr, believing that the army would come out shooting to prop
up the Nazis? Were the proletarian leaders rooted too deeply in the
parliamentary-legal process to force the fast-moving Nazis out of the
political arena? Did the Nazis' gangster methods stun their opponents
to such an extent that they could not defend themselves? Had the
world economic crisis paralyzed the workers' will to resist?
These questions and others have remained part of the debate surrounding the destruction of the workers' mass movements. Writing in
late May 1933, Leon Trotsky called "the unparalleled defeat of the
German proletariat the most important event in modern history since
the assumption of power by the Russian proletariat. " 76
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Terror and Demagoguery in the
Consolidation of the Fascist Dictatorship
in Germany, 1933-34
Kurt Pätzold
The question of how the fascist politicians succeeded in winning power
over millions upon millions of Germans and mobilizing them against
their own basic interests is still one of the most exciting historical
themes that engages historians in both German states as well as in the
West generally. There are obvious reasons for this attraction: there has
not been another state system in recent German history that could
temporarily rely on such a broad popular basis and there has not been
another system that plunged its followers into such a disastrous situation .
For decades, this question has been attractive in its many aspects:
economic, ideological, cultural, historical, philosophical, anthropological, even religious. A generalizing question raised in this connection is
the issue of what people are capable of, what can be clone to them or
what they would tolerate to be clone to them . The fact that such a
savage regime as Nazism was able to recruit so many followers is
considered by many tobe a source of skepticism and pessimism concerning the human condition. This is all the more reason why historians should feel challenged to develop their theories.
Furthermore, this seems to be advisable in view of the many simplistic conceptions of history that are extant concerning this extremely
Translated by Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann
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complex problem. In fact, in terms of the fascist dictatorship in Germany, there may be no other historical issue where there is a deeper
gulfbetween the specialists' understanding of history and the interpretations held by many lay people. This gap is due not so much to the
work of historians as to the misconceptions spread by magazines and
illustrated history books, motion pictures, and, above all, television.
Time and again the images of propagandizing Nazi leaders and their
followers are presented in magazines, on film, and on television
screens and they take on the character of a commercialized commodity.
We see the demagogues who talk and gesticulate in a way that hardly
impresses anyone today and may even make people laugh. In contrast,
we view the masses deeply stirred and enthusiastic for reasons that are
obscure, trustfully looking up to these leaders or applauding them
hysterically. A world is re-created that is completely alien to our times,
and is not understood by the average person, even if informed. Frequently one has the sense that the fascist leaders of the past were
somehow very clever and manipulative, whereas their followers were
foolish and unthinking. Presented in this fashion, the history of how
German fascism won over millions of people is a matter that dazzles
and amazes many, inducing them to be astonished or even making
them shake their heads in disbelief. The information embodied in
experience is lost, and the notion that this could happen again also
ceases to be taken seriously, whereas in reality similar processes in
character happen every day, wherever popular masses are aligned
against their own interests.

The Rise of the Fascist Dictatorship
The leaders of German fascism did not come to power through the
votes of the majority of the people. Under the conditions of the
bourgeois-parliamentary system of the Weimar Republic they received
somewhat more than one-third of the electoral vote. Late in 1932 the
National Socialist German Workers party (NSDAP) was faced with a
dramatic loss of voters. All efforts taken to make good the loss on the
occasion of a state parliament election in a miniature landslide early in
1933 were not fully successful. The Nazis did not win the same number
of votes as they had in the summ er of 1932. In terms of mobilizing the
voters, they had arrived at a hiatus they were unable to breach so long
as their rivals and opponents were allowed to act unrestrictedly. If the
NSDAP had intensified national demagoguery, they probably would
have won over more voters from the right wing but would have lost
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"leftist" followers. The process would have taken a reverse course if the
Nazis had stressed social demagoguery. This tension meant that the
fascist politicians had little chance of coming into state power through
observing the parliamentary rules of forming a government, but they
could entertain hope because the Constitution was being increasingly
invalidated under the Heinrich Brüning and Franz von Papen administrations.
Once the situation had fundamentally changed through Hitler's
being appointed chancellor of the Reich, which made it possible to
combine the power of the Nazi organizations with the power of the
state, the fascist politicians thought it possible to win over the majority
of the people during a Reichstag election. They did not fully succeed in
subsequently legitimizing the undemocratic formation of a government
on January 30, 1933, that was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the
law. No doubt, the NSDAP won votes on the wave of their successtwo out of five voters gave their support to the Nazi party-but the
government could surpass the 50 percent mark only due to the fact that
the union of the German nationalist allies of Nazi fascism provided-the
margin and that narrowly. The elections of March 5, 1933, reßect a
fatally tragic decision by half of the electorate in the German Reich.
Organization of the majority of the people under the swastika still lay
ahead. When did it in fact occur? There are no election returns or
opinion polls available to answer this question. lt is not appropriate to
consider those votes given in November 1933, on the occasion of the
German Reich's provocative withdrawal from the League of Nations, to
be a general declaration for the fascist regime. lt is also difficult for
contemporary observers to understand the actual attitude of the masses
toward the regime. There are many possibilities to speculate about, at
that time and later. lt was the antifascist forces who especially hoped
that the followers of the regime would soon be brought down to earth,
thus initiating its isolation from the masses.
What then can the historian focus on? An obvious area of examination is the changing environment under which the Nazi leaders could
manipulate the people. Another is the drift in methods and tactics used
in canvassing for more followers. lt is obvious-but not frequently
enough noted-that the Nazis' success in canvassing for more followers
was by no means due only to their own efforts and activities. The new
economic and other living conditions created by the regime for sections
of the population can be referred td but their effect is difficult to assess.
To summarize: the historian can only analyze the factors that fostered
the consolidation process and helped the rulers to achieve more inßuence in the domestic sphere. With this focus, it is possible for the trend
of development and its causes to become recognizable.
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Long before January 30, 1933, the fascist politicians had, time and
again, declared their intention to "reunite" the German people, to
overcome the-allegedly artifically developed-polarity of the classes
and strata, and to create a "national socialist popular community." This
is also what Hitler and other leaders of the Nazi party offered the
industrial and land-owning aristocracy, the Junkers, when they met
with them. The community and system they proposed was not tobe an
end in itself. On the one hand, it sought to directly improve the
situation of capital's rule and its conditions of realilzation; on the other
hand, it aimed at facilitating the preparation and waging of a war for
world domination in the course of which there would "never again be
November 9th" (1918). This meant, simply, that the people under
fascist rule would have to be willing to sacrifice until the victorious end
of the coming war. The fascists held (and so did all other deadly
enemies of the working-class movement) that it was, above all but not
alone, the political parties of the working dass and the trade unions
that stood in the way of the popular community. German fascism also
came out as an avowed and unqualified opponent of democracy and
liberalism and undertook to turn back history not only to before 1917
but even before 1789. These unpopular goals could be reached only
through force escalated up to terror because the working-class movement would not disappear voluntarily and there were also unswerving
people among democrats and liberals who would use any opportunity
to act against Nazism as long as they were not deprived of this option.
The fascist politicians made no apologies for their determination to
resort to terror. Even before they came to power they had already
mentioned concentration camps as a final destination for their political
opponents.
The first stage in the consolidation phase of the fascist dictatorship,
which lasted from late January to approximately mid-July 1933, was
marked above all by the attempt of the Nazi leadership to manipulate
public opinion through terrorism and brutality. Consequently, they
severely punished any basic opposition toward the regime. The political scene in Germany changed in those months, in a fashion and at a
rate that surely had been unimaginable for contemporaries at the
beginning of the year. All parties other than the Nazi party were made
illegal. The trade unions were smashed. Many other more-or-less
political organizations, federations, and associations disappeared. Some
were eliminated through the intimidation and violence of the paramilitary formations of the Nazisand the state; others quit of their own free
will and declared themselves dissolved. In each case it was the use of
force, the threat of violence, or, at the very least, the fear of force and
violence that created the desired situation for the fascist rulers, namely,
the end of an effective legal opposition. This meant that the opposition
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was pushed underground, thereby severely reducing its impact from
the outset.
The methods of terrorist deterrence were used openly and pointedly
in the course of this first stage of the consolidation process. Political
opponents were murdered in public places. The Communists, Social
Democrats, and other opponents of Hitler, bearing the marks of the
tortures to which they had been exposed in the "brown houses" and
other meeting places of the fascist storm troops, were sent back to their
homes, to the employment offices, and to the factories to be a living
warning. In most cases, the first concentration camps were located in
or near towns and industrial districts so that what occurred within these
camps would become more well known than would be the case in the
concentration camps built later whose names have become notorious.
The first Communists executed, for example, were sentenced to death
by a court even before the Reichstag fire trial.
Brießy, force and its most extreme manifestation, terror, was from
the very beginning the basic factor that made the manipulation of the
masses in the fascist state possible. lt was the precondition and basis of
everything else. A graphic representation of the three factors that most
inßuenced the population could be made in the form of a triangle, the
foundation of which is the terror, from which emanates the demagoguery; a third factor could be called corruption through success.
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The respective inßuence of these factors in the overall thrust of fascist
alignment and mobilization of the popular masses did not remain
unchanged during the years of Nazi rule. The proportions varied. lt is
evident that for the consolidation phase the corruption through success
in domestic and foreign policies (real or imagined) still had a very
limited effect. Terror remained the fundamental element even when
the regime dazzled large sections of the population through its successes in implementing its foreign policy without war. The major fascist
leaders understood that fact and offered resistance against all proposals-which were also made from their own ranks-to restrict its
arbitrary application and to grant some of the prisoners in the concentration camps the legal instrument to force reconsideration of the
reasons for their detention. The direct effect of the terror, which
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induded murder, put the opponents of fascism to the most severe test
as early as the first months of 1933, and it inßuenced the decisions of
Hitler's opponents in terms of how they would face the regime. The
German Communist party (KPD), in particular, but other opponents of
fascism as well, resolved to wage the illegal fight although they knew
they could be cast into concentration camps or guillotined, whereas
others remained antifascists by conviction but refrained from action.
The terror did not only act as a deterrent. lt also had a propagandizing effect. Some people, often those from the socially weak middle
dass, were opposed to the use of extreme force whereas others assessed
it as a sign of the regime's durability and hence to be expected and
began adapting themselves to its demands. Thus the demonstration of
violence in itself had a demagogical effect. Certain preconditions for
this tendency had already been set. Many Germans had learned to
overrate the role of force, even to admire it. They interpreted the use of
terror in the establishment of the fascist state as proof of the fact that
now Germany had strong-willed leaders who would be able to maintain
"order." lt is in this tendency that we see a dose connection between
terror and demagoguery.
In order to judge the effects of demagoguery in the initial phase of
fascist rule, it is necessary to examine carefully the situation of the
masses to whom the Nazi politicians addressed their promises, for it
was not intrinsically the programs promised and the slogans issued that
brought the rulers new followers and sympathizers. During the years of
the international economic crisis, the NSDAP fomenters and particularly Hitler himself had developed a particular appreciation for the
methods that would be most useful in the exploitation of the miserable
conditions of the masses for their own fascist purposes. They had long
since become aware of the fact that, due to increasing levels of despair,
it was possible to win over not only the middle dass but also fringe
groups of the proletariat, provided these people received promises that
the situations they found unbearable would change drastically and
rapidly. Furthermore, the low educational standard of these strata
made it possible to promote simplistic solutions revolving around the
notion that Hitler was the savior who would rescue Germany from the
depths of economic and political despair.
After January 30, 1933, the NSDAP was faced with the problem,
which they had created themselves, of meeting the high expectations of
their followers. Since they were unable to meet these expectations,
they had to mollify the masses by the daim that the first signs of change
were harbingers of more fundamental transformations coming later.
After seizing power, when docks began running differently, the fascist
policy had a twofold agenda. lt had to keep the existing followers finetuned and, at the same time, recruit new followers. lt is a well-known

Terror and Demagoguery

237

fact that the Nazis lost a few followers in the early months of power, but
won many more who became supporters of the NSDAP again or joined
the party for the first time. Before the elections in March, Hitler had
demanded that he be given four years' time so that he could realize his
plan "for the rescue of workers" and a parallel plan "for the rescue of
farmers." This modulated approach indicated that his tactic now was to
restrain the high expectations of the German people. As to the more
extremist demands of his own followers regarding the need for prompt
social measures, the fascist leadership at once declared that the first
order of business was to correct policy before they could deal with "the
economy." This approach was very different from the promises made in
1932. The divergence inevitably produced disappointment, which
sometimes intensified because the ordinary Nazis saw how rapidly
their leaders managed to feather their own nests. Social demagoguery
was not abandoned but the timetable was extended. Moreover, this was
justified by the fascist politicians with the claim that they had to
reverse the dreadful Marxist legacy of the "System Period," as they
disparagingly called the Weimar Republic. This legacy was unfairly
described as being the result of Marxist policy, although Brüning and
von Papen during the crisis had clearly supported the interests of
capitalist rule and exploitation. The new rulers were also aware of the
fact that using terror and making demagogic excuses was not enough to
consolidate the fascist regime but that it was necessary for them to be
able to show results, and the sooner the better. The reduction of mass
unemployment was considered the decisive policy that would keep
millions of people loyal to the party. This would improve the living
conditions of proletarians and indirectly alleviate the situation of the
middle classes.
In fact, the campaign aimed at creating jobs was the Nazis' propaganda coup as early as 1933. The leaders produced the impression that
all their efforts were concentrated on doing away with unemployment
and they tried to make people believe that this program was for them.
In truth, the economic status of the masses was of less importance to
Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, and Robert Ley, who only pretended solidarity with the people, than to any other group of politicians in recent
German history. In their search for shortcuts to war, they considered
job-providing measures that stepped up the process of armament and
that were likely to promote Germany's war preparations to be preferable. Of course, it was impossible to immediately adopt and implement
this course because jobs in the war industry were expensive and there
were only limited state funds that could be used to subsidize them. Yet,
each step toward the reduction of the unemployment figures had to be
highly appreciated by the regime for its political benefits.
As early as the summer of 1933, the Nazi newspapers started to
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report triumphantly about rural districts where unemployment was
said to have been clone away with completely. These were remote
agrarian regions where there had been a low unemployment rate to
begin with and a high rate of rural exodus because of the monotony and
dullness oflife without any prospect of change. A greater advantage for
the regime was the fact that it established itself at a time when there
was a gradual and slow upswing in economic activity. Work-providing
measures, particularly in the building trades-already planned by the
last cabinets of the Weimar Republic and now realized and passed off as
an indication of the new policy-additionally reduced the unemployment rate. In this regard, the spectacularly staged start of the construction of the autobahn in the autumn of 1933, which was the
implementation of another technological idea the fascists had adopted,
showed Hitler himself as a worker, as a very new type of German
politician.
In view of the fact that the unemployment rate rapidly increased
again by the end of 1933 and soon exceeded the 4 million mark,
references to full employment alone would have placed the fascists'
demagoguery on too weak a foundation. The notion that the "New
Germany" was a community in which everybody extended active solidarity toward the poorest in their midst was also exploited. In that state
the "national socialist people's community" would not leave anybody to
his fate. Tue attention Goebbels aroused in the winter aid campaign
(Winterhiltswerk) in 1933-34 even exceeded that called forth in the
struggle against unemployment. Tue campaigns in which charity donations in the form of money and goods were collected from the people in
order to be distributed again among the very needy, preferably the old
and the sick and among large families, proved to be very effective in
terms of propaganda.
Other campaigns were less effective than these two drives. This, for
example, is true of the organization "Vigor Through Joy" (Kraft durch
Freude), launched in the autumn of 1933, and it is true of its initial
activity aimed at demonstrating a new attitude toward work and performance by providing recreation and holidays for working people. lt
was Nazi followers in the first stages of the program who were provided
with inexpensive or gratuitous holiday trips and who received them as a
reward for their "work," which they had carried out within the ranks of
the Sturmabteilung (SA) or Schutzstaffel (SS) in the early years of the
struggle. Tue fascist politicians pointedly showed their solicitude for
the war-disabled of World War 1 and claimed that they were defamed
through the work of such painters as Otto Dix or George Grosz, who
had in fact accused not victims but profiteers of war in their paintings
and drawings.
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The essence of Nazi demagoguery was the description of economic
and social measures as policies that would make Germany a ßourishing
country once again, inhabited by contented people. This is a critical
point that helps explain the rush of followers fascism could register.
War was not discussed; none of the ruling politicians trißed with the
idea of unleashing a war. The Nazi propaganda itself used Goethe's
picture of a people resembling Faust making deserts accessible for
mankind. This was another ruse to deßect any suspicions that might be
raised concerning the intensifying preparations for a war aimed at
achieving revenge for Versailles and realizing the conquest plans that
German imperialism had striven for in 1914 plus additional territorial
ambitions. In fact, these activities were carried out energetically despite Nazi denials.
The peace demagoguery played a central role in creating the mass
foundation of the regime as early as the consolidation phase. In 193334 it was easier than in the following years to deceive the people
through false pretensions for peace, because the measures taken for
armament and the extension of the Reichswehr (German armed forces)
could hardly be noticed by the public. Those who would have been
able to draw the people's attention to this fact and warn against these
attempts had already been largely deprived of their inßuence. Thus it
was even possible for the Nazis to describe the withdrawal from the
League of Nations largely without let or hindrance as a sign of national
self-esteem, although in reality it was a step toward unhindered and
unchecked armament.
The pretense of the pursuit of peace would not have been accepted
by so many credulous people if the fascist rulers had not been able to
supplement the demagoguery of their words with the demagoguery of
their deeds. The diplomatic isolation of the regime was at no time
complete, even though the capitalist governments were rather inhibited in their dealings with the Nazis, particularly at times when the
proletarian and middle-class opponents of the Nazis in their own
countries took concerted action to jointly accuse the fascists-as for
example on the occasion of the first persecutions of the Jews. The
negotiations concerning the Four-Power Pact, which was never effective; the conclusion of the concordate between the Vatican and the
German Reich; and above all the signing of the German-Polish nonaggression pact in January 1934 could be used by the fascist leaders and
declared voluntary corroboration on the part of foreign powers of their
readiness to cooperate with the "new" Germany. Furthermore, the
agreement made with Warsaw provided the Nazis with an opportunity
to exhibit their readiness to pursue a policy of rapprochement toward
the neighboring countries in the East, a policy that-the fascists as-
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serted-had broken with the anti-Polish policy of the Weimar Republic.
Fascist demagoguery found its greatest success in the willingness of
the masses to accept deceit and to exploit anational myth. Here it was
possible for the Nazi politicians not only to act on the basis of the fruits
of their own policies but to take advantage of the unintentional concessions provided by the activities of all other bourgeois parties, and
that was more effective than the social hypocrisy connecting Nazism
with a national "socialism." All politicians from the center to the right
had inveighed against the "infamy," the "shame," the "chains" of
Versailles for nearly one and a half decades. There had been endless
discussions of Germany's "utmost humiliation" and "enslavement."
This mythology averted consideration of the fact that German imperialism was responsible for the unleashing and the aftermath of World
War 1 and the exporting of internal causes of social misery and it kept
alive the idea of the total revision of the 1919 treaty and the determination to avenge it, both very popular ideas with the German people.
When the Nazis came into power, they knew how to arouse national
enthusiasm among old and new followers. Still, they did not escalate it
into a chauvinist frenzy in 1933-34 because they were forced to use
certain moderating tactics in their foreign policy for some years. The
refrain "Germany awaken" issued time and again showed clearly
enough, however, which trend was envisaged for the mobilization of
the masses. In fact, there was nobody in Germany who had not
encountered at school those pictures of sleeping giants and warriors
who had been awakened and had risen to perform new great deeds.
Who did not know the legend of the Emperor Frederick 1 Barbarossa,
who had vanished in a mountain and was said to return one day in
order to make the empire great again? Of course, Hitler was not naively
considered the resurrected member of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, but
broad elements of the middle classes and the petty bourgeoisie were
seized by the rescuer/savior sentiment, the desire to win new glamor
and glory.
The fascist demagogues endlessly reiterated that they were only
interested in acting for "Germany" and their "fellow Germans." Concord and harmony were described in a simple but effective way as the
original nature of the Germans, which had been destroyed by their
enemies, the Jews, striving for world domination, and those Germans
depraved by them. The awareness of the existence of social classes and
dass struggle seemed to be arbitrarily created by the enemies of the
people. lt was alleged that the subjugation, elimination, or, at best,
reeducation of those enemies would reunite the Germans and put an
end to discord among them once and for all. The internal purpose of
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this national demagoguery was quite obvious. lt served to justify the
persecution of all opponents and, particularly, the terrorizing of the
working-class movement. That is, the policy aimed at "wiping Marxism
off the map." What seemed to be the necessary precondition for the
emergence of a new community of all Germans, the "national socialist"
community of the people, was the belief that the opponents of fascism,
which was propagated as the actual embodiment of the national idea,
be subjugated or exiled, that they be made to vanish in penitentiaries
and prisons. This national socialist community of the people, in turn,
was considered to be the guarantor of the rise of the new Germany.
From the first months of 1933, high national and world-historic importance was attributed to the victory of the fascist counterrevolution by
the use of such terms as "national uprising," "Third Reich," and
"millennium." The prophetic term was not used later on.
This national demagoguery, the core of which was to serve the
mobilization of national ideas and feelings for reactionary and, finally,
aggressive-warmongering purposes, formed a unity with a demagoguery of action, and the same is true of the social demagoguery. lt found
its expression in the policy of persecuting the Jews. To put it bluntly,
this shameless policy was not only aimed at aligning the ''Aryan"
Germans along fascist principles and for adventurous-imperialist purposes. Particularly in the early phase of practical anti-Semitism, it
aimed at the internal consolidaiton of the system. What were the
benefits of that tide of Nazi slogans such as "Germans, only buy from
Germans"; "Germans, only allow Germans to judge you"; "Germans,
do not let anybody but Germans teach you"; "Germans, only allow
Germans to medically treat you"; "Germans, only read German literature, only enjoy German art"; and so forth? All these slogans obviously showed anti-Semitism in its classical diverting function.
Attempts were made to use them-now as before-to muddle the
causes of all social grievances, to brand guilty those who were not. Tue
Jew-baiting not only had the function of reducing the focus of the
"national socialist revolution" to the persecution, expropriation, and
expulsion of German Jews, thus being conducive to feigning a revolution where only vulgar and purposive nationalism and racism spent
themselves. Anti-Semitism and persecution of Jews in 1933, which
mainly used the arbitrary contrast of "German" and "Jewish" and ßatly
denied that Jews could assimilate, had an integrating function: uniting
the approximately 99 percent of the Germans declared to be Aryans,
isolating them from the "aliens" and "enemies," and committing them
to the allegedly national government, and thus, in the last analysis, to
fascist rule.
Tue German J ews were the obvious victims of practical anti-Semi-
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tism, but those who were intended to be disciplined were the nonJ ewish Germans. This policy was successful, and not only within the
strata of the social petty bourgeoisie. lt was very easy, for example, to
commence the implementation of anti-Semitic laws and regulations in
the field of higher education even as early as a few weeks after the
establishment of a fascist dictatorship. lt was not even fascist special
superintendents who did so but, initially, rectors and deans already
elected before January 30, 1933, who were assisted in implementing
the mendacious principle according to which "Jewish" tenets were no
longer allowed to be disseminated at "German" universities and colleges. Indeed, it was the holders of the traditional elected posts who
saw to it that the questionnaires searching for "Jews" were distributed
and filled in and then handed over to the fascist authorities. These
professors, often erudite but committed to anti-Semitism-as a rule,
not fascist anti-Semitism-started to collaborate with the fascist racists
in March/April 1933. German-Jewish scholars were suspended from
office, pensioned off, or divested of their lectureships.
These early events at the universities and colleges are only one
example of a multitide of events that took place, only slightly modified-in supervisory boards of corporations, banks, industry, the executive boards of world-famous companies, and management boards of
hospitals, theaters, and orchestras. They all demonstrated that the
consolidation process of the fascist dictatorship was stimulated and
directed by members of the administration but that it was by no means
their work alone. Tue speed by which the regime was established was
possible only because a rapidly increasing number of persons volunteered for Nazi leadership although they were not fascists themselves,
but mistook the new government for a force of national awakening, and
accepted and supported it. The aspects of the regime they did not like
were rationalized away by the excuse that you cannot make an omelette
without breaking eggs. Tue German-Jewish colleague who was formerly treated as an integral part of German society was now sacrificed
for a greater cause. How can a dismissed Jew plunged into misfortune
and misery be compared with the imaginary importance of national
events?
Tue national demogoguery became the ideological cement of collaboration: it mobilized collaborators, and served to justify their doing the
fascists' dirty work although they had not been forced to do so and
although fascism had not yet established itself 1 am not denying the
fact that some followers of fascism were very uneasy about this nor am 1
minimizing the psychic pressures to which they were exposed. No
doubt, much personal energy and courage was necessary toset oneself
against this wave of "national awakening" that was running so high and
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not allow oneself to be swept away with it. This was a type of strength
that mostly characterized those who were able to oppose fascism on the
basis of fundamental alternative ideological and political creeds and
conceptions. Even those sections of the German middle classes and
petty bourgeoisie who as yet had resisted Nazi propaganda were still
inßuenced by many of the ideas and views regarding Germany's present and future that were kindred or very similar to fascism and, in the
changed circumstances of 1933, were no more resilient than cracks in a
dam bound to break once the pressure increased.
What added to this pressure was the collapse of the non-Nazi bourgeois parties and organizations 'and the concomitant circumstances
around their retreat. They did not simply quit without comment. The
last papers issued by those parties announcing their self-disbandment
used the national phrase and even included strict orders to their own
cadres and members to volunteer for the "national government." What
else could the fascist rulers actually desire? They had already been able
to take advantage of other decisions prior to these statements. The
bourgeois parties, rivals so far but in part already partners of the
NSDAP (e.g., in some state governments before 1933), had repeatedly
stooped to provide surety for cabinets headed by Hitler. Their behavior
on the occasion of the vote regarding the Enabling Act in March and
the government's foreign-affairs declaration in May 1933 had to be
considered votes of confidence and provided excellent opportunities to
overcome the reservations that had been entertained against the
NSDAP and its leaders by members of the Catholic parties, the Center
party, and the Bavarian People's party, as well as the German People's
party and the State party. The very last actions of all these parties called
on their followers to give their allegiance to the rulers. What must also
be mentioned in this connection is the vote of the remaining fraction of
the Social Democratic party of Germany on the occasion of the ballot in
May 1933.
There is a long list of organizations and institutions that called on the
people to rally around the Hitler administration or at least demanded
subordination to the government. They were not all equally important
or inßuential. The Christian churches figured prominently. Their call
to the faithful to apply to the fascist power the appeal quoted from the
Bible, to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, was most
significant. As early as March 28, 1933, the leadership of the Catholic
church of Germany removed most of the obstacles they had set up and
maintained to prevent priests and laypeople from going over to the
NSDAP. The penalties for siding and affiliating with Nazi fascism that
had been pronounced and executed before that date were no longer
effective.
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There was a wide range of motives for this support of the fascist
government. Some were of an intellectual or material nature; others
were marked by economic, political, and personal interests. For many,
it was pure opportunism. From time to time the structure of the
motives varied because in most cases there was not only one operative
motive. In capitalist circles, for example, a mixture of political and
economic interests was decisive for those large and small employers'
associations that "backed the government" and called on the people to
follow their example because it made good business sense. Similarly,
the most powerful economic forces used their relations and contacts
with foreign ccountries to assure their business partners that the Hitler
administration would not resort to anticapitalist measures and would
not obstruct the turnover of capital and foreign trade. In the episcopate, it was a mixture of intellectual-political motives inßuenced primarily by committed anitcommunism that led to sympathy for a fascism
that had come to power.
No doubt, it is one of the tasks of historiography to shed light on the
motives of the historical actors but it is also very obvious that the course
of historic events is not determined by motives, but by political behavior. Creeds as such are of little historic relevance. They become
significant in terms of history only if they give rise to action. Tue
consolidation phase of fascism in Germany also demonstrates that
action resulted from very different inducements, all of which, irrespective of their causes, contributed to consolidating the dictatorship
through their creation of a broader mass basis for fascism. For this
support did not only contribute to the rapidly deteriorating balance
between fascism and antifascism to the disadvantage of the latter. The
ability of the fascist administration to consolidate itself so rapidly led to
subsequent developments. Tue fact that the fascist dictatorship in
Germany fulfilled domestic objectives within months rather than the
years it had taken the M ussolini regime, and the conclusion of an
agreement between the state and the Catholic church, just to mention
two examples, accelerated the speed of the fascist system. There is also
a causal connection between the depth and speed of the consolidation
process in 1933-34 and the fact that it took the German Reich no longer
than six and a half years to be prepared for the total war that was to
begin in 1939, a war they had striven for and unleashed. Developments
would have been quite different if fascism, after having come to power,
had been forced to maintain it in an open battle or had been faced with
stronger resistance in its initial phase. Taking this into account, one can
state that the subsequent evil was not only determined by the victory of
fascism but by the way in which it was reached.
At the end of its consolidation phase, which is felt to coincide with
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the murder of Ernst Röhrn, the SA chief of staff, in 1934, the regime
obviously had a relatively stable group of followers that included more
than half of the population. There had not been any essential change in
its social composition compared with the crowd of partisans of the
NSDAP before January 30, 1933. The bulk of the followers was recruited from the middle dass, although the first year of the fascist
dictatorship had not met their expectations. Even the demagogues
themselves confessed that they had not decisively succeeded in winning over sections of blue-collar workers. This was achieved in the two
or three years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war. The
composition of the group of followers did not remain fully stable in the
subsequent period. There were more or less significant movements at
the fringes of the mass basis of the fascist dictatorship, mostly depending on the attractiveness or unattractiveness of particular steps and
measures taken by the rulers as they impacted on individual social
groups.
Thus the partisans did not follow in an unquestioning way. As the
subsequent years showed, they responded very sensitively to two
factors: the drastic deterioration of the working and living conditions
they were faced with in the second half of 1935, in connection with
shortages of mass consumption goods, and foreign-policy decisions of
the government that could lead to war, such as the so-called Sudeten
crises in May and September 1938. The frequently used picture of the
people blindly following fascism is not completely true, although there
were masses who were fanatic champions of the regime. For the course
of history it was of decisive significance that the temporary dips in
support of the policy of the fascist leadership never reached such an
extent that it would have forced them to change their policy or to
essentially decrease the pace of their efforts to accomplish imperialist
objects.
This also shows that the opponents of fascism, in spite of all their
activities and spirit of sacrifice, could not favorably alter the relationship of forces between themselves and the rulers as it had developed during the consolidation phase. lt was impossible to set off
sweeping antifascist actions, even during times when the regime lost
popularity with sections of the population. The political police, gradually united throughout the Reich in 1933-34 to form the Secret State
Police (Gestapo), functioned effectively and hardly made it possible for
broader stable contacts to be established between the organized opponents of the regime and the dissatisfied people. The method ofbrutally
persecuting certain persons and thus disciplining, frightening off, and
discouraging others so they would give up was successfully practiced.
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Between January 30 and J une 30, 1933, when fascism established
itself as state power and gained in stability, preliminary decisions were
made that turned out to be of grave consequence to German and
European history. There is no deterministic relationship between these
preliminary decisions and September 1-3, 1939. Alternatives were still
possible in 1933, but they can only be thought of as an interplay of
internal and external factors. Since none were realized, it was possible
for German imperialism to largely dominate developments in Europe
for a short but disastrous period. Looking on history in the early phase
of fascist rule strikingly corroborates the truth of Goethe's warning to
learn to be wiser early enough. The battles between humanism and
barbarism once lost by those championing the cause of humanity, the
chance to determine the course of history to the favor of human
interests once given away, may result in the initiative being taken by
destructive forces for a relatively long period. Now that the turn of the
century is drawing near, historians in many countries surely will more
and more reßect that, on the one hand, those twelve years of fascist
rule were a very short period-less than one-eighth of this centurybut that, on the other hand, they played a significant role in this
century. There is an international urge to continue reßecting on the
questions raised in this connection and to decline any offers to turn
away from them and direct one's attention to "more welcome" events
and processes.

Defense of Democracy or Advance to
Socialism? Arguments Within German
Social Democracy in the mid-1920s
BenFowkes
lt might well be thought that the antithesis stated in the title of this
essay is somewhat unreal, given the closeness of the connection between democracy and socialism. lt gains meaning, however, when one
counterposes the defense of existing democracy, "bourgeois democracy," "political democracy," "formal democracy," to the advance to a
deeper, more consistent, more all-embracing democracy, the extension
of democracy from the narrowly political and technically electoral field
to society, the economy, and the various institutions of the state (bureaucracy, army, judiciary), all of which is one part of the "advance to
socialism." The other part is of course the conversion of the means of
production into social or national property: "socialization" or "nationalization."
The conflict over the defense of bourgeois democracy and its
extension was thus central to the debates within the noncommunist
left parties in the mid-1920s. In addition, there were secondary
disagreements over whether bourgeois democracy was itself in such
imminent <langer that the advance to socialism would have to be
postponed to a more distant future; or whether the material interests of
the workers (sometimes wrongly identified with socialism) were more
important than either aspect of the advance to socialism; or whether
local and partial achievements (as exemplified by the measures of the
Social Democratic party [SPD] in the Prussian government) were
possible while the commanding heights of the state were in capitalist
hands. 1
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Eventually, a less ambitious dispute centered around whether
a more specialized and technical version of the advance to socialism
could be achieved (" economic democracy," as in the German Trade
Union Federation [ADGB] plan of 1928) on the basis not of political action but of the inherent suitability of such plans to the
given stage of capitalist development, as well as the employers'
assumed need to maintain a partnership with the other side of
industry. 2
While these debates went on both before 1924 and after 1930, the
period between 1924 and 1930 has been chosen because it possesses a
conjunctural unity in terms of political economy: this is true for the
German, the European, and perhaps even the world economy. Before
1924 one sees economic instability, difficulties of postwar adjustment,and in Germany, an inßationary crisis; after 1929 there is the
onset of the Great Depression. The intervening period is marked by
relative stabilization, based on the integration of Germany into the
world economy through the Dawes Plan, and its social and political
concomitants, namely, the defeat of the working-class struggles of the
early 1920s, the restoration of middle-class domination over German
politics, and the reestablishment of industrial peace on a new basis, the
main features of which were industrial rationalization, an export-led
boom, and a readiness by some sections of industrial capital to compromise with the more "reasonable" demands of the workers and accept
the democratic foundations of the Weimar Republic. The repercussions
of this readiness to compromise extended to the sphere of bourgeois
politics and therefore opened the way to broad and potentially stable
coalitions. My purpose here is to examine the reaction of the noncommunist left to this situation.
Not surprisingly, most of the basic issues had already been raised
before 1924, but in connection with urgent developments in critical
political situations that did not allow a leisurely examination of possible
strategies. 3 After 1924, on the other hand, the issues could be argued
through. The official position of the SPD had been clear since 1918: it
was possible to achieve long-term socialist advance through the parliamentary system. In the shorter term, the aim was a democratic reconstruction of state and society by evolutionary means. These
conceptions implied a fundamental optimism, but already by 1920
(after the fiasco of the Workers' Gdvernment proposal in the aftermath
of the Kapp putsch*) most Social Democrats had considerably lowered
*A rightist conspiracy headed by Wolfgang Kapp that assumed
power in Berlin for a few days.
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their sights. lt appeared that there was a permanent antisocialist majority under the Weimar Constitution, and that the only (parliamentary)
way forward was through coalition with parties to the right of Social
Democracy.
Moreover, the defense, rather than the extension, of the achievements of the November revolution, the movement that toppled the
Prussian military monarchy and replaced it with a parliamentary-democratic state, was by 1920 the explicit aim. When Hermann Müller, the
outgoing German chancellor and a leading figure in the Majority Social
Democratic party (MSPD), approached the Independent Social Democratic party (USPD) in June 1920 it was for a defensive not an offensive
coalition: "Only through a coalition strengthened by the inclusion of
the left'' (i.e., the USPD) "would it be possible to defend republican
institutions against all attacks from the right and to maintain social
gains, especially the eight hour day. " 4
Tue USPD rejected these overtures, and the SPD withdrew from
government; the moment for a coalition of working-class parties
passed, not to return. From then on the problem was the kind of
conditions the noncommunist left parties should lay down for collaborating with the nonsocialist parties. The SPD Congress of October 1920
in Kassel-greatly inßuenced by SPD disillusionment with the previous coalition, and its demise-set some conditions that sounded very
stringent: "Re-entry to the government would only be possible if
urgently demanded by the interests of the proletariat, which require
above all the democratisation of the administration, the republicanisation of the Reichswehr, the socialisation of those branches of the economy ripe for this, and a peaceful foreign policy. " 5 A further
requirement was added subsequently: "Cooperation with a party
which does not in principle and in practice stand on the ground of the
Republican form of state cannot come into consideration. "6
These conditions would have made coalition with the nonsocialist
parties impossible, and in fact only a peaceful foreign policy and a
practical commitment to the Republic were insisted on. Nevertheless,
the conditions were reaffirmed by the Görlitz program of 1921,
which proclaimed the democratic republic to be "the form of state
irrevocably brought about by historical development," a form of state in
which Social Democracy could not realistically expect to take sole
power. Tue SPD must therefore "throw its political power into the
scales on behalf of the republican, democratic form of state" while
making certain conditions. 7
One condition not explicitly made was the defense of workers' material interests, but in fact this exerted a powerful pull. Coalition with the
inßuential German People's party (DVP) was rejected not so much on
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the grounds of its essential monarchism as because it represented
capitalist interests against the workers. This was why the SPD refused
to join the DVP in the Wirth Cabinet on November 14, 1922, and why
it left Gustav Stresemann's first Grand Coalition cabinet on October 3,
1923, the issue in this case being the preservation of the eight-hour
working day. 8 The SPD's withdrawal from the second Stresemann
coalition (November 2, 1923), on the other hand, was a reaction to the
use of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution to remove the Social
Democratic government in the state of Saxony. This undemocratic act
made SPD participation in a coalition meaningless. 9
The SPD remained outside the government between 1923 and 1928.
Although Erich Matthias has criticized the party leaders for having "no
political plan, either in power or for opposition," the fact is that there
was no shortage of strategic conceptions, merely an inability to agree
on applying them. 10 The division between the "activists," such as Otto
Braun, Carl Severing, and the revisionists around Sozialistische Monatshefte, and the "passivists," such as Hermann Müller, Rudolf Hilferding, and everyone to their left, already apparent in October 1923,
continued to bedevil Social Democratic policymaking.
The activists (or, to use David Abraham's typology, the "social-liberal
integrationists") were prepared to accept the Weimar system as it
stood. 11 Philipp Scheidemann put this view energetically at the party
congress held in Berlin in 1924: "We are committed to this republican
state which with all its shortcomings is our creation. . . . Our most
important duty, on which all our forces should be concentrated, is to
save the republic, cost what it may. " 12
Carl Severing, himself continuously involved in the Grand Coalition
in Prussia, often used the columns of Sozialistische Monatshefte to
argue in favor of this position. 13 His main points were (1) given the
need to pursue a consistent foreign policy on the lines of Locarno,
which would be jeopardized by the entry of the German National
People's party (DNVP) into a coalition because they did not accept the
German renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine; the SPD should keep out the
DNVP by joining the coalition themselves; (2) the experience of the
Prussian coalition had shown that it was possible to cooperate with the
DVP despite disagreements with it; (3) the struggle between capital
and labor needed to be robbed of its hateful and poisonous character
(an authentic revisionist note); and (4) the presence of the SDP in the
government helped to prevent the reemergence of the Black Reichswehr (i.e., the secret military formations that had sprung up in
defiance of the Versailles Treaty in 1923). Further advice of a similar
character came from Karl Hildenbrand, Heinrich Peus, and Wally
Zepler, who condemned "a large group of comrades" for "fearing to go
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over from the comfortable defensive of political opposition to the
offensive [of coalition]. " 14
The majority of the party held very different views, as was shown in
early 1926. On January 11, President Hindenburg asked Fehrenbach
(Center) and Koch-Weser (German Democratic party-DDP) to try to
form a new edition of the Grand Coalition. There was a sharp conßict
within the SPD parliamentary party over the question. The activists,
who might almost be called "the Prussians" in view of the predominance among them of people with Prussian ministerial experience,
favored entering negotiations with the Center, the DDP, and the DVP.
Otto Braun called on the party to find "the courage to take responsibility," adding that "if they were to continue to let their actions be
determined by the fear of responsibility, it would deliver a devastating
blow to the parliamentary system and smooth the path for the reaction. " 15 The passivists argued that "the interests of the working masses
should alone be decisive here," and they won the day (by 85 votes to
33). The three reasons the party put forward eventually for its refusal to
enter negotiations reßected the "passivist'" position: (1) the importance of returning to the eight-hour day, which the DVP had rejected;
(2) the urgent need for unemployment insurance, SPD proposals which
the DVP had rejected; and (3) the persistent efforts of the DVP to
get compensation for the former German princes. 16 As Hermann
Müller (who must at this stage be counted a passivist) wrote in April
1926: "The views of the DVP on the restoration of the German economy at the expense of the German workers and the practical abolition
of the eight hour day are incompatible with the views of Social
Democracy. " 17
There was, however, a middle way between coalition and opposition:
toleration. For much of this period the issue was whether to tolerate
the government of the day or to help overturn it. The December 1924
elections confirmed the situation brought about in May of that year: a
government opposed by both the extreme left (German Communist
party-KPD) and the Monarchist and fascist right (i.e., the DNVP
and the National Socialist German Workers party-NSDAP) could
retain its majority only with SPD toleration. The activists and the
passivists could agree on the necessity of tolerating the cabinets of this
period for foreign policy reasons. Hence the government formed in
January 1926 owed its survival to Social Democratic abstention in a
vote of confidence. Shortly afterward Müller wrote an article in Die
Gesellschaft defending the principle of tolerating a government the
opposition party, which
oppo
party was not prepared actually to join:
does not itself want to enter the government, may in some circumstances have the duty to give a government over which it has no
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inßuence the chance to begin its legislative work, if that government
itself stands on the ground of the parliamentary system. " 18
The policy of toleration bore considerable fruit in the years 1926 and
1927. lt could be argued that the SPD achieved more for the workers
when out of office than when in it. The list of gains is impressive:
establishment of compulsory arbitration by the ministry of labor; the
1927 law on working hours, restoring the eight-hour day in large firms;
the Labour Courts Law of 1926; and the Employment Facilitation and
Unemployment Insurance Law of July 1927 (AVAVG), which established insurance paid for by contributions from employers, employees,
and the state. 19
Despite these achievements, opinion within the SPD moved away
from mere toleration toward active participation in bourgeois governments in this period. There were several reasons for this. First, the
Prussian experience seemed to show that coalitions could be fruitful;
second, the increasing division within the conservative camp between
the DVP, which was moving away from its anti-working-dass position,
and the DNVP seemed to indicate the possibility of a coalition with the
former (though this was hardly a new development); third, and perhaps
most important, Paul Silverberg's speech of September 1926 to the
League of German Industry (RDI) seemed tobe an olive branch from
the industrialists to labor. lt provided coalition with the necessary
social basis, in the sense of the readiness of an important section of
German industry (Abraham's "dynamic-export fraction") to take the
SPD into partnership. The gains of the years 1926 and 1927 were in
part a reßection of this situation. Rudolf Hilferding in particular, as the
major theorist of the SPD leadership, provided a Marxist justification
for entering a coalition government, based on his perception of a
contradiction between the "finished goods industries and the raw
materials industries." He saw the form er attaining leadership in German capitalism, a fact that should benefit the German working dass
since they did not "stand in such a direct contradiction to the working
dass as heavy industry. "20 Hilferding's artide of October 1926 in Die
Gesellschaft is the first presentation of ideas he was to put forward with
success at the Kiel Party Congress of 1927. They were adopted by the
party, and Hermann Müller tried to put them into practice in his
coalition government of 1928 to 1930.

Political Power and Economic Democracy
The Kiel Party Congress of 1927 was dominated by Rudolf Hilferding's defense of coalitions. His basic theoretical justification for coali-
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tions between the SPD and bourgeois parties was that the state was not
inevitably an instrument of the ruling dass. The ruling dass under the
Weimar Republic was the capitalist dass, but the parliamentary democracy set up in 1919 was not its instrument. lt was rather a special
form of state that the workers should support. The way forward was to
reassert the supremacy of the state-now under threat from the monarchist reaction-by intervening politically. This could be clone by participating in governments alongside nonsocialist parties. Coalition was
therefore justified in principle. 21
Participation in government, in Hilferding's view, could serve one of
two purposes: it was "either a means of warding off the <langer of
reaction or of achieving advances in the interests of the workers'
movement." His keynote speech at the congress dwelt much more on
the first goal, the protection of democracy against the <langer of monarchist reaction. 22 "Viewed historically, democracy has always been the
cause of the proletariat . ... The preservation of democracy and the
republic is the most important interest of the party. "23 The left-wing
opposition, on the other hand, argued that the interests of the workers
were not served by coalition. The resolution moved by the left in 1927
made this very plain:
The task of Social Democracy in the German republic is to represent
proletarian dass interests in opposition to the dass rule of capitalism, and
to fight for social demands and socialism. In comparison with this task the
fight for the preservation of the republic which the bourgeoisie has
decided to put up with is of lesser significance .... The tactics of the
SPD must be: opposition instead of coalition. This opposition must be
conducted in the spirit of proletarian dass struggle with all appropriate
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary means.24

In her eloquent speech in support of this resolution, Toni Sender
concentrated her fire on the question of power. Mere entry into a
coalition, she said, did not bring power. Power could be achieved only
if "strong, active social forces stand behind the government, if we have
conquered a position of power in society as well." She was all in favor of
a united will to power on the part of Social Democracy, but "not a will
to the semblance of power." The second point was one that has been
made repeatedly by left-oppositions since the late nineteenth century:
cooperation with the bourgeoisie would mislead the workers. "How
can we educate the workers to dass-consciousness? Not by co-operating with the bourgeoisie in a coalition government. "25
The second major speaker for the left was Siegfried Aufhäuser. He
brought out another constant theme of the left's arguments: the impossibility of separating out the issues, or, to put this another way, the
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presence behind the Monarchist agitation against the republic of a
hidden capitalist agenda. To stress the <langer from the developing
capitalist offensive was not to deny the importance of republican institutions, but to penetrate to a deeper level of analysis. "This government" (i.e., the Bürgerblock government headed by Wilhelm Marx) "is
a sign that the capitalists rule the state more than ever." (This point was
intended as a rebuttal of Hilferding's argument about the role of the
state.) "The content of our resolution is that this government represents less a move against the republic than an anti-social move against
the working dass .... The present bourgeois government does not
want the form of state to be the decisive factor, but the desires of the
economic interests that stand behind the state. "26
The left's resolution received 83 votes at the congress, as against 255
for the executive: a minority, therefore, but a substantial one. The
party went forward to the 1928 elections, and to eventual coalition,
with Hilferding's resolution to guide it:
The participation of Social Democracy in the government of the Reich
depends solely on its judgement as to whether its strength among the
people and the Reichstag gives the guarantee that it can achieve certain
specific goals in the interests of the workers' movement, or ward off
reactionary dangers by participating in the government in a given situation. The decision is a tactical question and cannot be answered by
applying definite formulas laid down once and for all.27

The absence from this resolution of any mention of structural change or
the achievement of economic democracy is striking. The revisionist
wing of the party saw the decision of the Kiel Congress as a complete
vindication of their attitude over the previous thirty years. Paul
Kampffmeyer described their pre-war slogan, "More Power," as identical with Hilferding's call at Kiel for "the conquest of state power." In
each case the aim was the "gradual democratic conquest of power and
the advance of constitutionalism. "28 Carl Severing was equally satisfied
by the Kiel Congress. The Kiel debates, he said, had removed the
impression of hesitancy that had grown since 1923. "We want political
power, we want to conquer the state," he added, encouraging the party
with the words "Push forward step by step! ... The fight for power in
the republic is ultimately a fight for the republic itself " 29
While the party went forward from the Kiel Congress with an agenda
of the conquest of (shared) political power, the question of economic
democracy was left tobe raised by the trade unions. This corresponded
to the formal division of tasks that was upheld by both sides, but it was
nonetheless unrealistic. The proposals for economic democracy,
worked out by Hilferding and others and presented by Fritz N aphtali

German Social Democracy

255

in 1928 at the Hamburg Congress of the ADGB, could not fail to have
an effect on the attitude of the SPD's potential coalition partners: the
latter regarded these proposals as dangerous nonsense, even though
they were explicitly meant to be inserted into the given capitalist
system and to correspond to the stage of "monopoly capitalism"
reached in the interwar years. 30
Naphtali distinguished economic democracy specifically from socialization: economic democracy was not meant to affect power over
industry, but was rather aimed at restricting "the autocratic management of industry. "31 This could be achieved through "trade union
participation in the communal-economic institutions of self-government"-a reference to the National Economic Council, an advisory
body that was the sole relic of the hopes of 1919 for codetermination in
industry through factory councils. 32 Despite Naphtali's statement that
"the Free Trade Unions and the SPD are in complete agreement about
the present tasks of economic policy," the SPD took no steps to
implement the trade unions' plans politically. 33 Economic democracy
did not, for instance, figure in the SPD 1928 election program despite
the stress laid on it by Hilferding at the Kiel Congress. 34
Things might have been different if the developing left-opposition
within the party had had trade-union connections (apart from Siegfried
Aufhäuser, leader of the clerical unions). lt did not, and when it began
to take shape it defined itself above all negatively: against the behavior
of the Saxon Land fraction, against coalition, against the theory of the
neutral state, against pocket battleships. Tue raison d'etre of the left's
journal, Der Klassenkampf, was to attack the practical steps taken by
the SPD in coalition, to call for its withdrawal from government, and to
undermine the theoretical defense of coalition provided by the party
majority. This entailed a running battle between the Austro-Marxist
theorist Max Adler and Rudolf Hilferding over the correct Marxist
analysis of the state, with Adler reaffirming the idea that the state could
not be neutral as between the classes and that therefore the Weimar
state must be the state of the capitalist class. Given these overwhelmingly political preoccupations it was not surprising that steps
toward economic democracy did not form a part of either the opposition's election program or the (already impossibly stringent) conditions
for coalition with the bourgeois parties advocated by Der Klassenkampf
in 1928. 35
The favorable showing of the SPD in the 1928 elections (29.8 percent
of the votes, and 153 out of 491 seats in the Reichstag) was followed by
Hermann M üller's attempt to form a grand coalition, in line with the
green light for such an endeavor given by the 1927 congress. lt was not
an easy task. In view of the refusal of the DVP to agree on a common
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program with the other parties, Müller had to form a "cabinet of
heads," selecting leaders from each of the five parties to serve in a
personal capacity. This curious arrangement continued until April
1929, when the parties finally agreed to support the Müller government in an organized manner. This did not improve matters. In both
cases the only issues where agreement could be reached within the
cabinet were in the realm of foreign affairs, where support for
Stresemann's policy of fulfillment was noncontentious. Otherwise there
was constant conffict, and constant retreat by the SPD in order to save
the cabinet. There was the failure to get the ninth of November
accepted as an official celebration of the anniversary of the November
1918 workers' revolution; there was the surrender of the SPD ministers
to blackmail over the decision to build Pocket Battleship A, opposed in
favor of expanding social programs; there was the defeat of Labour
Minister Rudolf Wissell over the 1928 Ruhr Iron Company lockouts,
when management refused to abide by the decision of his appointed
arbitrator; there were disappointments over fiscal policy, with the
abandonment of Hilferding's budget proposal of March 1929 to raise
the tax on beer due to the opposition of the Bavarian People's party
(BVP); finally, and most significantly for the future, there was the
running battle over financing unemployment benefits.
The resources provided under the Unemployment Insurance Law of
1927 were already inadequate to meet the lowest Weimar unemployment level of 1 million (they were meant to cover 800,000); and the
number of registered unemployed (annual average) went up from 1.4
million in 1928 to 1.9 million in 1929, leaping to 3.3 million in 1930.
The conffict over this eventually broke up the Grand Coalition, but the
issue was already smoldering in 1928. The view of the trade unions,
which they impressed strongly on the SPD, was that contributions
should be raised from 3 percent to 3.5 percent; the DVP was entirely
opposed to this, calling instead for a reduction in unemployment
benefits and a means test, plus a campaign to weed out scroungers
(March 1929). In saying this they were accurately reßecting the views
of their supporters in big business. 36
lt was in this situation, with a crumbling coalition government in
which the SPD ministers seemed captives to anti-working-class policies, that the next national congress of the SPD met, the Magdeburg
Congress of May 1929. The "passivist" or "left" arguments against
coalition had now gained added weight. Even Rudolf Breitseheid,
reporting on behalf of the parliamentary party, had to admit that after a
year of government "there is still a tremendous amount left to be
desired." "We have neither fulfilled nor brought close to fulfillment
what we demanded in the years of opposition," he added. 37
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The complaints of the left were manifold. In the first place, the party
had entered the coalition in 1928 without a program. The Party Committee had simply met une 6, 1928) after the successful elections and
resolved to empower the parliamentary party to undertake negotiations
with a view to forming a government under SPD chancellorship. 38 No
prior conditions were set. As Hans Vogel put it, on behalf of the
executive, "With coalition governments every party has to come down
a peg or two with its demands ofbasic principle," otherwise no government could ever come into existence. 39 There were no guarantees
therefore that the SPD would achieve anything; but there were certain
expectations raised in the course of the election campaign in the minds
of the voters: the major positive slogan had been "Food for the children
not pocket battleships," implying a simultaneous rejection of naval
expansion and commitment to social politics. These hopes were disappointed. Naval expansion went ahead; social politics were put in question, first, by the Ruhr lockouts and the succcessful defiance of arbitration, then by threats to the financing of the unemployment insurance
fund. Hence two points dominated the proceedings of the Magdeburg
Congress: the way to prevent the building of Pocket Battleship A and
the way to defend the social achievements of the late 1920s. 40
The SPD had fought the elections of 1928 in part against the building
of pocket battleships; the SPD ministers promptly voted in favor of
Pocket Battleship A once they had entered the cabinet (August 10,
1928). Müller justified this by saying: "lf the SPD were to take a
negative attitude on questions of defence it could never participate in
the national government at all. " 41 A storm of indignation arose in the
party at large, and the parliamentary party disavowed the decision of its
own ministers, subsequently introducing into the Reichstag the resolution that "the building of Pocket Battleship A should cease. "42 The
SPD ministers were compelled under party discipline to vote in favor
of the resolution and against their own cabinet (November 16, 1928).
The naval building program went ahead anyway, since there was a
center-right majority in support of it.
There was nothing the SPD could do at Magdeburg to reverse this
decision; what they could do was work out an overall defense program.
A party commission was set up for this purpose, and it produced a
program that accepted the need for national defense but made ten
proposals directed at increasing parliamentary control over the
Reichswehr and restraining it from violating the armaments limitations
laid down by the Treai:y of Versailles. 43 The necessity of giving ground
to the SPD's coalition partners was not mentioned in this context; the
party's leaders favored national defense for its own sake. The resolution
was pushed through by 242 to 147 votes. 44 The left-opposition, which
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had been going from strength to strength in its campaign against the
compromises forced on the SPD by its participation in a coalition
government, was in the most favorable possible situation to make its
mark. Tue left objected in principle to providing the Weimar state with
the means for conducting wars, and called for the removal of the army
and navy altogether, as instruments of the ruling dass, and their
replacement by "the instruments of proletarian power needed by the
coming socialist society for its defense." That was the long-term program; in the short term the left suggested the abolition of the navy,
parliamentary control of the army, and a large number of measures of
democratization. 45 Tue revisionist right of the party, in contrast, maintained that the German navy should be expanded. Max Cohen argued
in Sozialistische Monatshefte that the building of Pocket Battleship A
was justified in itself, and that the SPD had been "unforgiveably"
wrong to base its agitation in the 1928 elections on opposition to this.
Tue ßeet was needed against Britain, he implied: "What was wrong
with the pre-war naval policy of the Reich was that it lacked a guiding
idea, which is to be found in securing our ßanks by alliance with
France and Russia. "46
Tue party executive did not take this extreme view, of course, but
argued that the pocket battleship affair should not be taken as a reason
for leaving the coalition, since positive advances could still be made in
social politics. lt conceded, conversely, that a failure in that sphere
would be much more serious. As Stampfer said: "If once the fateful
situation came up that we had to decide, in a question of social politics
like unemployment insurance, between the government on the one
hand and the trade unions on the other, there could be no doubt about
our decision. In such a case we should have to act according to the
principle: party and goverment are two, but party and trade unions are
one. " 47 Rudolf Breitseheid underlined this: "We do not want a crisis [in
the cabinet] but if it comes to serious disagreements, the unemployment insurance is a much more favourable battlefield than the battleship." No attack on the principle of unemployment insurance or any
attempt to reduce the numbers qualifying would be permitted, he
added. 48
Tue matter of unemployment insurance was thus given a rather onesided weighting by the party's leaders, and this was to provide the
psychological background for their controversial decision to dig their
heels in precisely on this issue. 49 Nevertheless, the general approach
that emerged from the Magdeburg Congress was rather one of staying
in the government at any cost. Breitseheid issued this remarkably
accurate prophecy to the restless left: "Consider this! If this government falls what comes next? Dissolution. Fine. But do you think that
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democracy can survive in the long run if there is a dissolution every two
years? Otherwise what? We might receive a kind of cabinet of officials
which would in itself already be a concealed dictatorship. "50

The End of the Coalition
The decision of March 27, 1930, to end the Grand Coalition, which
is often regarded as the fatal turning point in the history of Weimar and
of German Social Democracy between the wars, cannot be understood
without reference to the increasing intransigence of the bourgeois
coalition parties over at least the previous six months, in the context of
the onset of the world economic depression, and reßecting industry's
abandonment of the policy of concessions to the industrial working
dass, or, as Abraham puts it, the shift in the leadership of industry from
the "dynamic-export fraction" (Silverberg, Duisberg) to the "heavydomestic fraction" (Hugenberg), 51 followed by a joint onslaught on the
social gains of the previous few years in the shape of the League of
German Industry (RDI) manifesto of December 1929, entitled "Recovery or Collapse. "52
Two major surrenders by the SPD ministers in face of this pressure
on the cabinet-the October 2, 1929, compromise with the DVP over
unemployment insurance, and the removal of Hilferding as finance
minister after an ultimatum from both Schacht (at the Reichsbank) and
the DVP-strengthened the left-opposition's case against coalition and
led even some defenders of coalition to express doubts. By January
1930 George Decker, writing in Die Gesellschaft, had been driven to
advocate posing an ultimatum to the other coalition parties: "The
standpoint of Social Democracy must be this: we are not prepared to go
along with a coalition as a party merely there on sufferance .... The
task of Social Democracy is to force upon the bourgeois parties the
stabilization of the government's position they themselves preach but
don't practice. "53
The last straw was the insistence of the DVP on meeting the growing
economic crisis by reducing unemployment pay rather than increasing
contributions, and the support of the Center party for that position.
The decision of March 27, 1930, to break up the Grand Coalition was
made by a majority of the SPD parliamentary party, who followed
Wissell and the trade-union leaders in rejecting the advice of the other
SPD ministers in the cabinet (Müller, Severing, and Robert Schmidt).
This has been seen in retrospect as the great turning point for German
democracy, and the fatal error of the interwar SPD. Julius Leber, in his
inßuential memoir, concluded as follows: "27 March 1930 was a black
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day for Social Democracy and for German democracy altogether: for on
that day German democracy refuted itself, and Social Democracy
showed it was still incapable of directing the government of the
state. " 54 Stampfer's point of view is similar; he condemns the tradeunion leaders in particular. 55 There is a considerable degree of
hindsight in these judgments. The memoirs of the only person directly
involved at the time (Severing) take a different line. Severing regrets
only that Müller resigned precipitately, depriving himself of the opportunity of explaining to the Reichstag the impossibility of holding the
coalition together any longer. 56 The decision is defended strongly in
Wilhelm Keil's memoirs. He points out that "the party went to the
uttermost limits to save the Müller government but social antagonisms
were stronger than this endeavour. "57 Similarly Rudolf Breitseheid:
"Perhaps a compromise tolerable to the working dass might still have
been arrived at that stage, but later developments have taught us that it
would not have lasted long. The forces on the bourgeois side pressing
towards a break were too strong. "58
Seen in this light the decision of March 27, 1930, has an air of
inevitability. . lt was not so much a "victory of Marxist ideological
principles over a realism capable of compromise" as the reductio ad
absurdum of the policy of defending the day-to-day interests of the
working dass conceived in a narrow material sense. 59 Once the SPD
began to regard itself as an interest group and an extension of the tradeunion movement, it was bound tobe defeated by the much stronger
interest group of the employers. The "Prussian strategy" of coalition
was bound to fail once the SPD's coalition partners decided that the
social conßicts were too strong for them to avoid the pull of their
middle-dass paymasters. The in itself rather minor dispute over a onequarter percent reduction in the employers' unemployment contribution was only the culmination of a capitalist offensive that had been in
progress since the Ruhr lockout of 1928. 60 In this context the departure
of the SPD from the coalition seems like a foregone condusion. The
party did have a choice; but it was a choice between leaving the
coalition and staying in it "to preside over the dismantling of the social
programmes" of the late 1920s. 61
In the course of 1930, under the impact of twin crises in the economy and the political system, the terms of the argument changed
radically. The economic crisis meant that any genuine parliamentary
coalition containing the SPD was deprived of its social basis through
the unwillingness of any section of the capitalist dass to accept measures favorable to the workers; this had after all been the lesson of
March 1930 and it was underlined by Brüning's reliance on Artide 48
of the Constitution to force through his deßationary fiscal policies. The
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political crisis took some time to ripen: in the summer of 1930 the SPD
leadership continued to believe that the Brüning government was a
temporary phenomenon and would be replaced by a new coalition after
defeat at elections. The decision of the voters on September 14, 1930,
made it plain that the situation had been transformed. From then on
the choice was no longer "coalition or opposition" but "toleration or
opposition." The new kind of toleration, of a government the SPD
would normally have combatted fiercely, was something not envisaged
in Hermann M üller's analysis of 1926 of the conditions for tolerating a
government Social Democracy was not prepared to join. The alternative with which this essay began, "defense of democracy or advance
to socialism," ceased to have any meaning, since the latter could now
occur only within the context of the kind of radical overthrow of
capitalism ruled out by the principles of Social Democracy.
Let us, finally, draw together some of the themes that have emerged
in this discussion. First, it should be clear that the defense of existing
democracy was always a very clear priority in the minds of the leading
group in the SPD. Any steps liable to compromise this, even if they
furthered or appeared to further the material interests of the workers,
were always opposed. This applied even to the decision of March 1930,
which was opposed by all the political leaders except one-Rudolf
Wissell, with his strong bias toward giving priority to social politics.
The left-opposition (which in March 1930 fortuitously had its way for
the first and only time) was less concerned with the defense of existing
democracy than with giving it some real content: this could not be
done through parliamentary maneuvers. Even within the context of the
mere maintenance of existing democracy, the left argued that once the
economy was in crisis the only option was a far-reaching transformation
of the economy during the crisis itself: for the political crisis could not
be solved without solving the economic crisis. The second theme,
raised repeatedly by the left-opposition, was the need to mobilize the
working dass, and, conversely, the danger of demobilization arising
from participation in government or responsibility for it.
There were several subsidiary themes as well: the effectiveness of
coalition at the local level, with the Prussian example to the forefront
(the confused situation in Saxony, in contrast, was more a deterrent
than an encouragement); and the possibility of somehow bypassing
capitalism, first advanced by Hilferding in 1924 and taken up by the
trade unions (the ADGB plan of 1928). 62 Hilferding represented a form
of Marxist Fabianism. His proposals for economic democracy would be
introduced, he thought, inevitably, since this necessarily followed from
the concentration of capital, and the growth of organized capitalism, as
outlined in his article of 1924 in Die Gesellschaft and his speech of 1927
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to the Kiel Congress. 63 Tue ADGB, similarly, based their own 1928
proposals for economic democracy on an optimistic overestimate of the
weight of trade-union advice. Fritz Tarnow, in introducing them, described capitalism as "malleable" and capable of being changed "without power being 100 per cent in our hands. " 64 The capitalists
themselves, on the other hand, regarded economic democracy as a
serious threat. 65 There was an immense gulf in both cases between the
radical nature of the proposals and the moderate means envisaged for
their implementation. 66
What was needed was a combination of the program for achieving
economic democracy with political action designed to implement the
program: it was necessary to explore the limits of bourgeois political
democracy before the bourgeoisie itself began to close in those limits
under the impact of the world economic crisis. Tue two halves of the
equation were never fitted together: the defense of existing democracy
became the obsession and sole raison d'etre of the SPD leadership; the
steps toward socialism proposed by the ADGB in 1928 and by some
SPD theorists were developed in isolation as campaigns over single
issues. Without the vitalizing effect of a militant mass movement there
was no prospect that political and economic democracy could be combined.
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Part III

Forgetting the Past:
Redoing History

From Denazification to the "HistorikerDebatte": Reckoning with the Past in the
Federal Republic of Germany
Reinhard Kühnl
In the immediate wake of the destruction of the fascist regime in 1945 a
relatively broad consensus existed among all Germans, from the Christian Democrats to the Communists, with regard at least to the basic
issues involved in fascism and its consequences. This antifascist consensus was evident in the early party platforms, in the state constitutions established in the years 1946--47, and in the denazification and
punishment of war criminals undertaken together with the Allied
Forces. In these early postwar years, the demands for a thorough
process of democratization of government and all aspects of public life,
for effective guarantees of broad political and social civil rights-including the right of civil disobedience in the face of unconstitutional use of
government powers-and for socialist measures allowing democratic
control of economic forces, had considerable political significance. 1 lt
can be readily seen that these demands were based on definite views of
the causes and beneficiaries of fascism. These demands were even
incorporated into the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of 1949, although by
then in a weakened form, in Article 139 (Ban on Fascism), Article 26
(Peace Imperative), and Article 15 (Sanctioning Socialization), among
others. 2
The antifascist consensus was gradually destroyed, however, as
Translated by Martha Baker
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the United States began to (1) move toward a policy of confrontation
with the Soviet Union, (2) view the dass of former leaders under the
fascist regime as allies, and (3) reestablish those leaders in positions of
power in government, the economy, and society on a large scale. At the
same time, all those who were suspected of sympathy for communism
were pushed into sideline positions. Already by 1950 members of the
German Communist party (KPD), the Association of Persons Persecuted during the Nazi Regime (VVN), and many other organizations
were barred from the civil service through a resolution by the German
federal government. These were exactly the same groups of people who
had been sorted out and persecuted under the fascist system and who
had made the greatest sacrifices during the fight against fascism.
On the other hand, the process of denazification was completely
halted. Approximately 150,000 civil servants and employees who at
first had been fired from their positions because of their activities
during the fascist regime were rehabilitated in their jobs through the
so-called 131 Law of 1951, associations for persons expelled or evacuated from former German territories were organized largely under the
leadership of former functionaries of the Nazi party; and neofascist
organizations and publications were again tolerated. Since the policies
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the "Policy of
Strength," which according to Konrad Adenauer were aimed at the
liberation of "all of the enslaved East European countries," considered
the enemy, in terms of foreign policy, to be the same as in the war
against the Soviet Union up to 1945, there was a strongly felt need to
rehabilitate that war and those who had been its leaders-namely, the
military and the Waffen-SS (armed special forces), even though the
Waffen-SS had been condemned by the Military Tribunal in Nuremberg as a criminal organization. 3
Thus the armed forces of the Federal Republic were built up under
the leadership of Hitler's former generals. Tue Waffen-SS and the
Gestapo were publicly rehabilitated through inclusion in the 131 Law.
Tue SS veterans associations were thus not only accepted, but often
even welcomed and lauded by representatives of the local authorities,
the armed forces, and the Christian Democratic party when they held
their meetings. Franz-Joseph Strauss praised the Battle of Stalingrad as
a "meaningful sacrifice" and a "legitimate calculation" and emphatically
rejected the thesis that Germany must shoulder the major portion of
blame for World War II. 4 As early as the 1960s Strauss interspersed his
remarks on this topic with the claim that in view of the reparations
made by the Federal Republic, it had earned the right to hear nothing
more about Auschwitz.
In view of the international constellation of powers, the ruling right
could go no further. Those who adamantly claimed-quite correctly
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from their own point of view-that May 8, 1945, represented defeat
and not liberation did not have an easy time of restoring their position
of power at the outset, in spite of the prevailing hysteria of the cold war.
Tue mistrust of the neighboring countries, even those in Western
Europe that had suffered fascist occupation, was much too great. In
order to achieve state sovereignty, freedom of economic development,
and a new military power, certain concessions had to be made. Tue
ruling classes had already experienced this after the defeat of 1918 and
had successfully mastered the situation. 5 Now, after World War II, it
was held that a disassociation from fascism and its crimes as well as an
acknowledgment of a certain degree ofblame (which was expressed, for
example, in the financial reparations made to the state of Israel) were
necessary prerequisities for a new rise to political power. These steps
were the price of admission to the circle of "free nations" and the
"Western cultural community."
These were things the "recalcitrants" on the extreme right did not
comprehend. Tue ruling right was forced by its own sense of political
realism to keep a certain distance between itself and right extremists.
At the same time, they saw to it that neofascism was able to formulate
new, far-reaching position statements and thus generate and preserve a
certain consciousness, which was on the whole beneficial to the consolidation of right-wing ideology. Since the beginning of the 1950s, neofascists have spread the idea that all accusations against the Third Reich
that claim that it planned and conducted a war of aggression and
perpetrated war crimes and mass murder are unfounded and based on
lies that have been invented only in order to keep Germans in a state of
intellectual and political subservience. Whoever accepts such tales has
become a stooge of the enemy and a betrayer of his own nation's
interests. Measured against this position, the ruling right could in fact
portray itself as being "moderate" and part of the political "middle,"
while in cases such as the Deutschland-Stiftung (German Foundation),
the associations for displaced persons, and the right wing of the Christian Union parties, the borderline is indeed quite thin. 6
Thus the conception ofhistory that came to dominate political public
opinion shows definite traces of revisionism. Tue methods used by this
rightist form of revisionism have always been (and are still today)
characterized by a com bination of three factors. First, the crimes of
fascism are made to appear innocuous and edged into the range of
normality. Second, some of these crimes are portrayed as legitimate
because they were committed for a good cause in a harsh but unavoidable set of circumstances. Finally, the causal structure of crimes that
cannot be otherwise excused is shrouded to such an extent that, in the
end, they can best be attributed to socialism and communism.
Tue ideas necessary for this kind of treatment of fascist crimes had to
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a large extent already been developed during the fascist era itself. Ways
of rendering acts harmless or innocuous had already been incorporated
into the offical vocabulary-with such terms as Sonderbehandlung
(special treatment) and Endlösung (final solution). Ideological and rhetorical legitimation was characteristic of the overall policies of fascism.
For instance, the machinery of terrorism was established in 1933 "to
save the people and the state," war was conducted "to save Germany"
and, in 1943, to "save Europe" from Bolshevism. 7 lt goes without
saying that others were responsible for terror, war, and mass murders.
The Reichstag building was supposedly set ablaze by the Communists,
and the Jewish people pushed Germany into war after actually declaring war on it in 1939. On January 30, 1939, Hitler made the following
statement to this effect before the Reichstag: "Today I have another
prophecy to make. If the international Jewish financiers in and beyond
Europe should again succeed in plunging the nations into a world war,
the result will not be the bolshevism of Europe and thereby a victory
for Judaism, but rather the annihilation of the Jewish race throughout
Europe." 8 The attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 was naturally
declared a war of prevention which only in the last minute prevented
the Soviet aggression that had been imminent, just as the attack on
Poland in 1939 had been declared a war of self-defense, during which,
to quote Hitler's words before the Reichstag, Germany only "shot
back."
This method of argumentation was taken up and developed further
in 1945-46by the politicians, military leaders, and economic leaders
who were accused of war crimes. Since the beginning of the 1950s the
country has been inundated by a ßood of memoirs, neofascist brochures, pamphlets, and newspapers using such arguments. This defense has also been taken up, to some extent, by the right wing of such
groups as the Christian Union parties, the associations of displaced
persons, the Springer publishing conglomerate, the German armed
forces, the German Foundation, and so forth.
This position is in marked contrast to the official image the Federal
Republic has defined for itself. In order to be accepted into the
Western European community, where the memory of fascist crimes
was deeply ingrained, and to be able to acquire national sovereignty
and new military power, it was essential to portray the Federal Republic as a country that had completely turned away from fascism: the
Federal Republic stood in the tradition of resistance (civil and military)
and opened itself unreservedly to "Western values" in its Basic Law
(Grundgesetz).
Beyond this, the lessons to be learned from fascism encompassed
nothing more than political institutions and ideology-the parliamen-
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tary and democratic form of government, the constitutional state, the
disavowal of a racial ideology, and, above all, the reconciliation with the
Jews and their state, Israel. The political segregation of Communists
and Socialists corresponded to the methodological exclusion of social
and economic causes from the analysis of fascism. The restoration of the
former leading elite dass was also methodologically consistent with
foregoing the inquiry into the role of capitai, the upper levels of civil
service, and the military establishment in fascist systems. The main
thrust of this "diminished" antifascist consensus was, of course, no
longer still aimed at fascism, but was governed instead by the totalitarianism thesis, that is, against communism and socialism. As Rainer
Barzel of the Christian Democratic party aptly put it in 1965 in a
speech before the Bundestag: "Hitler is dead, but not Ulbricht" (Walter Ulbricht was at that time chairman of the Staatsrat of the German
Democratic Republic).
The scholarly debate over fascism is naturally embedded in the
general political and intellectual climate of its time, but it is not simply
identical with the prevailing political course. lt so happened, however,
that the spirit of the cold war quite thoroughly coincided with the
traditions and the view of life held by historians themselves. Ever since
the time of the first German empire, history as the leading social
science has played a decisive role in forming the views held by the
educated elite. Historians legitimized the efforts to sidetrack the working-class movement, the socially privileged status of the bourgeois and
titled classes, and the militarism and wars of conquest by the German
empire. After 1918-since the revolution was not strong enough to
democratize the higher schools of learning-historians made significant contributions to the conservative, reactionary, and militaristic
climate of opinion that ßourished and even became especially strong in
the universities, and that in turn enabled fascism to prevail. Thus,
under the fascist regime the historical sciences did not need to be
subjected to purging measures; they were already clean of democratic
and socialist ideas. In the following years historians for the most part
were faithful, even enthusiastic adherents of fascism. Many even became members of the National Socialist German Workers Party
(NSDAP).
The basic theoretical ideas on which the German historians founded
their apologetic for a powerful nation-state were developed by Leopold
von Ranke, and since the end of the nineteenth century, by proponents
of what is often called "historicism. "9 Among the tenets of this theory is
that the state is the determinant subject of the historical process, and
its activities are therefore the focus of historical study. The essential
nature of the state is power and the expansion of power, expressed
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above all in foreign policy and in war. Since striving for power is its
instrinsic task, the state cannot be considered to be wronging anyone
by following its existential purpose. The state is not only an instrument
of power, however; it is at the same time the representative of morality,
and thereby superior to individuals and their interests, which is to say
it is an end in itself
lt is perfectly obvious that these ideas originate in an authoritarian
state; that they are directed against the principles of enlightenment,
sovereignty of the people, and democracy; and, furthermore, that they
help to justify any form of a government's political power over its
society and toward all others. Moreover, since another tenet is that all
historical events and personalities are solitary and singular occurrences, adherents of this theory can claim that Hitler and fascism were
such unique events in German history that one does not need to look
for moments of continuity with preceding stages of history. Second, it
could be deduced that with the defeat of the fascist regime and the
death of Hitler the problem has been taken care of once and for all.
Third, it follows that there is no coherent historical process, but rather
a wealth of individual cases whose meaning is not discernible. As Karl
Dietrich Erdmann, chairman of the Association of German Historians
(1962-67) and chairman of the German Education Council (1966--70),
wrote: "There is no scientific basis for statements which explain where
history is coming from or where it is going. " 10
Naturally it was clear to these historians after 1945-just as it was in
other branches of research-that one had to distance oneself from
fascism in order to solidify one's own position and come out of isolation
on the international level. Thus the portrayals of fascism within the
history profession at that time coincided to a large extent with the
official image of the Federal Republic itself. 11 The issue of totalitarianism dominated historical research. Racism, anti-Semitism, and
concentration camps were condemned, as was the war of aggression the
German Reich began in 1939. The interests of society that gave rise to
these policies and the forces that supported and carried them out
remained outside the range of investigation. That the working classes
were deprived of their rights and that millions of foreign workers were
made into slaves to be exploited by the German industrial economy
was not even mentioned. One spoke of Machtergreifung (seizure of
power) and by use of this concept from the arsenal of fascistic propaganda, the question of who had turned the power over to the NSDAP
remained shrouded. In much the same way, one spoke of "Hitler's
tyranny" as being the product of a single individual. Whenever the
leading echelons of the corporate industry, the military, the higher civil
service, and the church were mentioned, they were portrayed either as
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being all equally subjugated by the regime or as supporters of the
resistance and representatives of the "better part of Germany." In this
way they also acquired the moral qualities that were requisite for taking
on leadership roles in the new German state. Responsibility for the
victory of fascism and the success of its policies was shifted instead as
much as possible to the new (and old) public enemy, the communists.
The allegations ranged from the Weimar Republic's being throttled
jointly by the National Socialists and the communists to the fascist
movement's having a socialist or even proletarian character, from the
suppression of a workers' resistance movement to a joint plotting of
World War II by both "totalitarian dictators" via the Hitler-Stalin Pact.
Undoubtedly, this version of history contained some elements of
historical fact. lt admitted, above all, to those facts that corresponded
to the images held by the Western Allies-namely concentration
camps, war of aggression against Poland, racial discrimination, antiSemitism, and dictatorship--and therefore acted, so to speak, as the
admission ticket to the Western community of nations. These elements
of fascist domination were described, but not given serious analysis. In
other words, the causal interrelationships were not exposed. Thus the
overall image that resulted did not allow fascism to be portrayed in
terms of the conditions of its success, the underlying interest groups,
and the forces that sustained it. 12 The Führer, Adolf Hitler, was presented as the only relevant subject-as the lone culprit.
The legend of German history as an otherwise unscathed tradition
was not shaken until the beginning of the 1960s, when Fritz Fischer
and his followers proved that the German Reich had carefully planned
and intentionally precipitated World War 1 with the goal of subjugating
half of Europe. In the following years they even demonstrated that it
was at that time the same ruling echelons who ruined the Weimar
democracy and joined ranks with the NSDAP in order to stage a new
war. 13 Thus at the same time that the ruling forces were officially
distancing themselves from fascism and attempting to legitimize their
image of having been part of the bourgeois resistance, especially in
connection with the failed attempt to assassinate Hitler on July 20,
1944, and the established academic circles were admitting and portraying selected aspects of Nazi crimes, the belittling portrayal of fascist
crimes and the partial rehabilitation of fascism were already in full
swing in wide sectors of day-to-day journalism and politics.
Nevertheless, the collapse of cold war politics led to significant
changes in the political climate of the Federal Republic. The politics of
detente and the social-liberal hopes for reform gave the left such a
strong stimulus that it was not only able to hold back the spread of
organized neofascism, but also to weaken the entire right altogether
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and keep it out of power for twelve years. Certain democratic improvements in the structures of the colleges and universities, an increase of
entry paths to schools of higher education to the benefit of students
from the lower classes, and a general liberalization of public discussions
of political and intellectual topics served then to fortify antifascist
modes of thought, particularly among the younger generation.
Tue historical sciences, still locked into conservatism, lost a considerable amount of prestige to the "new" political science, which had
advanced considerably in the United States since 1945 and was being
portrayed as the "science of democracy," and to sociology, which
viewed itself as the science of emancipation par excellence. 14 Under
these circumstances a social-liberal tendency was able to develop
within the left wing of the historical sciences. As a result, some
attention was given to social and structural dimensions of the historical
process. This new political context enabled research to take a critical
view of topics that had previously been treated apologetically or
avoided entirely. In particular, this included the role of capital in the
destruction of the Weimar Republic, the erection of a fascist dictatorship, and the role of the military establishment in conceiving and
achieving fascist policies-including mass murder. Tue resistance
efforts of the workers' movement-even the Communist componentwere no longer barred from consideration. 15
In the 1970s, however, the right again moved into the offensive. With
considerable financial and propagandistic support, a campaign was
started that has become known as the Hitlerwelle (Wave of Interest in
Hitler). Tue entire country was ßooded with brochures, newspaper
articles, magazine articles, films, and television documentaries whose
common message boiled down to the idea that Hitler and his regime
also had their positive side---in particular in terms of achieving full
employment and generating enthusiasm for collective causes-which
indeed deserved reconsideration when looking for solutions for contemporary problems.1 6
Many of the central topics brought up then have since been consolidated into a new view of history by right-wing conservative historians.
Joachim Fest developed the thesis that Hitler's error lay in his not
mobilizing all his European forces in the war against the Soviet Union,
instead of conducting war against the West too. Fest cast his vote for a
new assessment of the war and for using anti-Bolshevism as the decisive criterion in judging Hitler's policies. 17 Sebastian Haffner described Hitler as eine Leistungskanone größten Kalibers (powerful
mastermind of the highest caliber), who was able to abolish unemployment through his Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracles). As far as the
war was concerned, this should be considered a perfectly natural event
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as long as there are so many sovereign nations and should in no case be
considered a criminal act. War criminals ought tobe treated as "phenomena which inevitably accompany those extraordinary circumstances, under which citizens and family men have accustomed
themselves to killing. "18
Tue positive reviews the Fest and Haffner books received from their
colleagues andin various publications of right-wing conservative historians (such as Klaus Hildebrand and Andreas Hillgruber) reßected a
trend toward the right within established historical scholarship that, in
spite of sharp criticism from the left, was hardly noticed by liberal
sectors of the general public. Ernst Nolte was even able to publish his
thesis regarding the connection between political developments in
Russia and Auschwitz in the face of the Bolshevik menace in the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (July 24, 1980), without a stir of protest. Disappointment over the abandonment of reform policies by the
Social Democratic government, the economic crisis resulting in mass
unemployment and the destruction of hopes and dreams for many
young people, and the obvious inability of the governing politicians to
deal with this crisis led to the dissipation of the potential for further
reforms and prepared the way for the new and once again attractive
version of a right-wing ideology as well as the formation of a conservative government.

New Qualities in the Government of the Wende (Turnabout)
Thus in many diverse ways the path had already been paved when
conservative historians appeared on the scene in the summer of 1986.
Nonetheless, since their opponents, as described above, had been able
to garner a considerable measure of inßuence since the end of the
1960s, one could count on a stronger resistance.
Since the beginning of the 1980s there have been ever louder proclamations regarding the need for a new feeling of nationalism, of selfconfidence, in order to stimulate the higher levels of performance
required to participate in international competitive markets and to
exercise a leadership role within Europe--including a new level of
military preparedness. National self-confidence and stamina are also
needed to keep open the unresolved question of the reunification of
Germany. Since 1982 this version of national identity has been an
essential characteristic of the "intellectual and moral turning-point,"
the slogan under which the Kohl government came into power. 19
From the beginning the complaint was that the complete development of the economic and military capacity of the Federal Republic is
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heavily handicapped by the memory of fascism and its enormous
crimes, which so deeply affected the peoples of this world and had such
a great inßuence on the mentality of the citizens of the Federal Republic themselves. lt was thus time for the Federal Republic to finally
free itself from the "curse of the years 1933--1945," in the words of
historian Michael Stürmer, and "step out from the shadow of Hitler," in
those of Franz Joseph Strauss. These views were proclaimed by conservative historians and political scientists as well as the leading politicians of the right. 20
Michael Stürmer, historian at the University of Erlangen, advisor to
the chancellor, and editorial contributor to the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, has expressed the basic ideas of this new view of history in the
following words: "lf we do not succeed in agreeing on an elementary
lesson plan for our culture, in setting forth our work with continuity
and consensus throughout the land, and in rediscovering the moderate
middle-path of patriotism, then it could just be that the best years of
the Federal Republic of Germany have already gone by." The political
effect of statements such as these is more important than the historical
truth: "The future belongs to whoever supplies memory, shapes ideas,
and interprets the past. "21 The Federal Republic needs "that highminded insight, which next to religion, has only been achieved through
national identity and patriotism. "22 To substitute history for religion as
the means of achieving national political consensus-this is the platform on which the ideological offensive of the ruling forces was based.
The historian takes on a primarily political, even quasi-military task: to
occupy the battlefield and fill it with meaning-politically generated
meaning.
A distinctively new step in the direction of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past) was taken during a widely
publicized conference held in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of Hitler's appointment as imperial chancellor in the Reichstag
building in West Berlin. One of the main addresses, which received
considerable coverage in the German newspapers read by the upper
classes, was given by Hermann Lübbe, now a professor of philosophy
in Zurich, who had previously resigned his post as minister for cultural
affairs in the state of North Rhein-Westphalia after a law allowing
greater democracy in the affairs of the state's colleges and universities
had been passed. Here he stated reasons for "communicative silence
about the Nazi past as a citizen's duty." Keeping silent about fascism is
a prerequisite for political consolidation and necessary for internal
reconciliation within the Federal Republic; "a certain degree of stillness was the social-psychological and politically necessary means of
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transforming our post-war population into citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany. "23
Lübbe also made it clear that a certain ideological opponent was
threatening the domestic peace, was preventing the lifting of the curse
of the years 1933--45, which would enable Germany to achieve a more
active political basis, and was getting in the way of a new national
ascendency. Tue opponent is antifascism, whose precise task it is to
keep awake the awareness of fascism and its crimes. At the same time,
Lübbe set himself the task of really revising the current view of history
and, in particular, of repainting the picture of fascism, which is still
bound up with images of blood and terror, of war and mass murder, in
lighter tones.
This is the point of departure for the "Historiker-Debatte." Such was
the state of affairs when the fortieth anniversary of the liberation from
fascism-May 8, 1985-drew closer and groups from every position in
the political spectrum felt compelled to issue a statement concerning
this event. The ritual ceremony performed by Chancellor Kohl and
President Reagan in the German town of Bitburg was a public rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht forces and the Waffen-SS by the German
government as well as by a leading member of NATO. They thus
committed themselves to a position that was already being called for by
Alfred Dregger and that fraction of the Christian Democrats known as
the Stahlheimflügel (Steel Helmeters). A direct connection was made
between the battle of the fascist German army against the Soviet army
at the end of World War II and the necessity of establishing defenses
against the same enemy today. In other words, these fronts were
considered identical.
This view of the significance of May 8, which although always held by
the extreme right-wingers, had been supported in the past by only a
small number of voices in the mainstream right, was now taken up by a
strong fraction of the ruling right-wingers and aggressively advanced.
May 8, 1945, was by no means the day of "liberation," but much more a
"devastating defeat, almost a catastrophe" for Germany-if not indeed
for Europe. 24 Thus, with this event all of the key views had been put
forward, which were then taken up and consecrated as scientific findings a year later by conservative historians. In other words, all of the
essential ideological statements had already been expounded. They
only needed-and found-support from the scholarly world.
At first this path proved to be untenable. Even among the ruling
forces there was apparently no consensus on these issues. Tue opposition was most clearly and impressively articulated by the president of
the Federal Republic, Richard Weizsäcker, in his speech on May 8 in
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the Bundestag. Even the simple sentence "the 8th of May was a day of
liberation" can be seen as a clear rejection of the right-wing views. Tue
following statement was directed against the ideology of compensation:
"The end of the war should not be viewed as the cause of evacuation,
expulsion, and bondage. lt is tobe found at the beginning. We should
not separate the 8th of May, 1945, from the 30th of January, 1933."
Then, as the president counted up the victims of that regime and those
who took part in the resistance, he also recalled the "innumerable
citizens of the Soviet Union and Poland" and the "hostages who were
executed"; among the resisters he specifically named "the resistance
among the working classes andin the labor unions," the "resistance of
the communists," and the "resistance in all of the countries which we
occupied."

The Debate
This was the starting position for the next stage of the offensive
venture which the conservative right began in the summer of 1986. 25
Once again the upper-middle-class newspapers served as a platform,
and the leading politicians of the ruling right provided the general
ideological backing in the form of ever more acrimonious statements.
Tue demands for a revision of the current view of history were now
indeed presented as the outcome of scientific research and endowed
with the prestige of recognized historians.
Tue offensive concentrated on three main themes. Andreas Hillgruber, a Cologne historian who is often a guest at panels and interviews and supplies political catchwords for Strauss and Kohl, declared
that a historian must identify with the battles of the German armies on
the Eastern front in the years 1944--45. 26 Decisive for him was the fact
that this was a "defensive" struggle against the Soviet Union and the
chance to maintain Germany's position as a major power. In view of
these dominating concerns, Hillgruber held that the oppressed peoples of Europe and the tortured and murdered victims of concentration
camps should take a subsidiary position. Every form of antifascist
resistance, even that of the upper-class military circles involved in the
assassination attempt on July 20, 1944, was considered by Hillgruber as
being actually in the interest of the Bolshevik enemy. Tue lesson to be
learned for the present day from this interpretation ofhistory was quite
obviously that when it comes to erecting defenses against Bolshevik
threats, certain things must be put up with-if need be, even fascist
terror.
Gillessen, of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Hoffmann, at
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the Research Office for Military History in Freiburg, attempted to
make credible the idea that even by 1941 the war against the Soviet
Union was at least understandable, because it was a war of prevention
against Soviet aggression. 27 Just before this, the Christian Social Union
(CSU) had given considerable publicity to a book by Ernst Topitsch, a
social philosopher, in which Hitler and World War II were described as
being tools of Stalin from the very beginning. The lesson to be learned
from this thesis of a war of prevention was quite obviously that a war of
aggression against the Soviet Union is then justified when signs of
preparation for attack can be detected. What this thesis can lead to is
not hard to imagine.
Finally, Ernst Nolte, a historian in West Berlin, defined Auschwitz
as an Asian act," as a reaction to the Asian" Bolshevism that had made
Hitler so afraid that he had to commit mass murder as a preventive
measure, so to speak. 28 The Bonn historian Klaus Hildebrand, a member of the advisory board for Kohl's Bonn Museum, and Joachim Fest,
co-editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, gave the Hillgruber
and Nolte theses flank protection in his paper and swept the critical
objections that began to crop up resolutely under the carpet. 29
With the adoption of these three theses the image of the Federal
Republic that had been officially presented up to that time was in effect
cast onto the rubbish heap. The new image no longer consisted of an
aversion to fascism, of the tradition of a civil resistance and the unconditional allegiance to liberalism and democracy in the Western sense,
but rather of a far-reaching justification of fascism and its policies. "The
consensus was revoked from the right. "30 The new view of history is
politically characterized by the assertion that the German Reich, on
the whole, was already at that time oriented toward the correct foe,
fighting the right war, and even defending the interests of all of Europe--in contrast to the Western Allies, who were at that time on the
wrong side. In view of the danger coming from the East, the crimes of
fascism appear to some extent reasonable and to some extent less
serious. For these reasons, the Federal Republic has no reason to have
scruples today about developing its füll potential as a major power.
The themes developed by these historians did not go entirely unheralded. First of all, when German fascism and all of its political
activities are viewed as deriving mainly from Hitler's ideas and intentions, and Hitler is made into the sole person responsible for all that
happened, then it would seem obvious that all other parties involved
must be found guiltless. This goes as well for the Wehrmacht, the
fascist party and its branch organizations, and the Waffen-SS. In point
of fact, this very Führertheorie has been one of the dominant approaches to explaining that period of history right up to today. Hill-
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gruber and Hildebrand, in particular, have never tired of speaking of
"Hitler's war" and "Hitler's regime." The only new development has
been that Hillgruber now draws certain explicit conclusions that serious historians had not yet drawn, but that fit in well with current
political trends. Hillgruber assures us, indeed, that he wants to identify himself not with Hitler, but with government and Nazi party officials and with the military establishment that organized the "defensive struggle."
Second, when it as been stated for decades that National Socialism
and communism are essentially equivalent phenomena, and the totalitarianism thesis has been elevated to an official state ideology as well as
to a major scientific tenet, then it is natural that all questions concerning the specific interests and power constellations that brought
fascism into power and determined its policies will become negligible.
Class struggle and racial struggle can be declared equivalent. When
leading politicians are forever bringing up the idea that one form of
totalitarianism is now part of the past, while the other is quite alive and
extremely dangerous,/ historians have no reason not to consider the
relationship between the two forms of totalitarianism and, wherever
possible, to make the Soviet version, which is at present still a threat,
responsible for Nazism, which belongs to the past but is still so burdensome. In this way the political enemy of German society can also be
charged with the crimes that totalitarianism committed in Germany
and in Europe forty years ago. Nolte has in fact emphasized that he
intends to help bring the theory of totalitarianism again into the
forefront and to determine more exactly just what kind of qualitative
difference exists between the two forms of totalitarianism. 31
Finally, when one views as given that all states attempt to expand
their power beyond their own boundaries, then it is quite clear that the
struggle of the fascist empire and the defense of its position as a great
world power in 1944-45 be considered legitimate and the interests of
those peoples who were oppressed or locked up in concentration
camps be considered subordinate to the former. By following these
tenets, one can also justify the new power politics in the Federal
Republic. These conclusions, which the conservative-right historians
have drawn on the basis of long-standing, academically inßuential
theoretical approaches, are not imperative. Other historians whose
research is based on the same types of approaches certainly have not
made the same claims. lt is possible to draw these conclusions, however, and it has happened now that the ideological climate has changed
as a result of the political Wende.
Since these three historians are not concerned to exclude fascism
from the continuity of German history, but rather to integrate fascist
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crimes into the normal course of historical process, they have gone to
some trouble to obscure distinctions in political and historical phenomena. Not only has fascism taken its place within a series of tyrannical regimes from Stalin to Pol Pot, but modern history generally
speaking can be seen-as in an article by Hildebrand of this title-as
the ''Age of Tyrants." In keeping with this new view of history, questions about the particulars of fascist crimes, not to mention questions
about their perpetrators and beneficiaries, are merely bothersome.
Critics based their criticisms on political and moral considerations,
although the debate often appeared tobe a purely methodological one.
Thus, it was asked whether or not it is meaningful to even talk of
historical events as singular and whether or not historical comparisons
are viable and meaningful in the case of fascist crimes. Significantly,
the methods of argumentation used by the conservatives, when measured against all standards of the historian's craft, were exposed as
unsound and absolutely untenable. Of course, it was primarily historians specializing in social and structural history, namely the leftist
minority in the guild of historians, who voiced their views in this
matter. Among such methodological critics, Jäckell-a Stuttgart historian-was most articulate. From his point of view, Hitler's ideas and
aspirations were the most important factor in the political activities of
German fascism.
All critics agreed, however, that this conservative revision of history
was quite sufficient to reawaken the dangerous rightist traditions of
Germany's past, thereby endangering the democratic tendencies
within the Federal Republic itself and the development of peaceful
relationships with other nations. United in this view were not only
historians and social scientists connected with the Social Democrats,
but also liberal editors (such as Rudolf Augstein of the weekly newsmagazine Der Spiegel), Marxist scholars in the Federal Republic and in
the German Democratic Republic (such as Ulrike Hörster-Philipps,
Georg Fülberth, and Kurt Pätzold), and Jewish intellectuals (such as
Walter Grab, Michael Brumlik, and Dan Diner). 32 This broad spectrum shows clearly what it was and is all about: a controversy being
debated with the tools of the historian's craft, but substantially political
in nature. At stake is the political path to be taken by the Federal
Republic, its internal political structure, and the direction of its foreign
policy.
The Standards of Criticism
Critics in general object to the attempt by rightist historians (and
politicians) to place fascist crimes among the events considered normal
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in the 'Äge of Tyrants," arguing that they can be shown to be of a
singular nature. In reply these writers argue it is by all means valid to
draw comparisons between evils and test the viability of these comparisons. Here is a remarkable reversal of fronts. lt was precisely the
thesis of singularity in the historicist school that for decades served to
justify removal of the fascist period from the continuity of German
history and to prevent the building of any social science concepts at all.
Even today it is still an absolute requirement for any historian who
wants to gain recognition among his peers to speak of "National Socialism," or better yet "Hitlerism," but not of "fascism." (Nolte developed the other variation of the apologetic in favor of using the term
"fascism" by viewing it purely in intellectual terms as the idealistic
product of the Führer, and then declaring the "Era of Fascism" as
having ended with his death, but this view has not prevailed.)
Yet the concept of fascism does cover all of those essential features
shared by the various movements and systems in different countries. lt
does not deny the existence of special national characteristics or the
fact that these peculiarities can take on enormous proportions. lt does
open the way for viewing social-economic structures and interests, the
connection between property and forms of political power--questions
that historicism's thesis of singularity does not take into view. 33 lt is
therefore important to consider the insistence on the methods and the
singular extent of the crimes committed during German fascism as
absolutely justified. Additionally, only a social-scientific concept of
fascism can clarify the conditions under which fascist developments can
still exist or develop following the fall of the fascist regime in 1945. A
second point of concern relates to the new direction taken by the
Federal Republic after 1945. Liberal and social liberal critics Gürgen
Habermas, Jürgen Kocka, Kurt Sontheimer, Heinrich August Winkler,
and others) have reproached conservative historians in particular for
endangering that most singular historical achievement by the Federal
Republic which has in fact given it a special role: the unrestricted
opening toward the West.
The so-called Öffnung zum Westen after 1945 was, however, also
connected with the restoration of capitalism, with rearmament, and
with integration into the military alliance headed by the United States.
The Kohl government reasons exactly along these lines whenever it
makes reference to the commonality of values between the Federal
Republic and the United States or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Habermas, on the other hand, wishes to make a distinction between the opening of the Federal Republic to "the political
culture of the West," which he considers a major achievement, and to
the "philosophy of NATO," from which he disassociates himself. In
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reply, Andreas Hillgruber asks whether one can separate culture and
politics in this manner and whether the "aversion to NATO which the
left loudly asserts does not usher in and accelerate exactly that political
and cultural process which Habermas supposedly wants to prevent. "34
Liberal historians and political scientists project, in fact, a certain
idealism when speaking of the origins of the Federal Republic and its
"opening to the West." This is evident when references are made to the
structure and politics of Western powers, as weil as to the conditions
under which the Federal Republic was founded and the goals related to
that process. By comparison, Hillgruber can really portray himself as a
"realist" when he points to Britain's (imperialist) war plans or to the fact
that the Federal Republic is militarily integrated with the West.
Tue fact that the objections of the liberal historians are much more
pointedly aimed at Nolte, while Hillgruber's theses have been treated
fairly benignly, may also be related to this idealistic Westorietierung.
More specifically, Nolte broke the very taboo that has oflicially symbolized the Federal Republic's renunciation of fascism. He has portrayed Auschwitz as an insignificant matter and dispensed with any
admission of guilt in connection with the genocide of the Jews. By
doing so, he robbed the Federal Republic of a certain amount of the
credibility it had gained in the West. Hillgruber, however, has turned
his attention primarily toward the Soviet Union and declared the war
conducted by the German Empire in 1944-45 to be legitimate and
necessary. In this way, his thoughts, at least, are in principle in line
with those of the postwar Western Allies. While Marxist historians have
been quick to challenge Hillgruber's theses, sharp criticism among
liberal historians has come only from Habermas; liberal historians for
the most have been very guarded in their remarks.
So it is necessary to differentiate between various versions of the
notion of an unreserved opening to the West. lt is undoubtedly correct
that this notion is implicitly distinct from all ideologies concerning the
deutsche Sonderweg (Germany's unique course) or the conception that
the Prussian-German tradition-with its code of virtue based on the
belief in the authority of the state, military power, obedience to superiors, and willingness to work hard for the benefit of the whole-represents something especially valuable, relevant for the future, and
even exemplary for other nations (Modell Deutschland). In point of
fact, the idea is again in vogue among conservative historians and
politicians that the Federal Republic of Germany may acquire certain
leadership functions (for instance, because of its location in middle
Europe) that could be carried out only if "well-tried" German traditions are revived.
Another problem in the arguments of liberal critics relates to the
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question of who was responsible for the crimes of fascism. The idea that
"we Germans" are responsible and therefore, even today, have every
reason to be ashamed is the leitmotiv in their criticism. Morally this is
an absolutely respectable position and, insofar as it refers to the overall
responsibility of the German nation and its state as an object of international laws, it is no doubt correct. Nonetheless, I have my doubts
whether this is in keeping with historical reality and whether it is
sufficiently effective to counteract the ideological offensive from the
right.
First of all, it must be made clear that the phrase "we Germans" is
logically equivalent to phrases such as "the Germans" or "the French,"
and so forth. lt supposes the existence of shared interests and a
uniformity in thinking and doing that, in reality, does not exist, not
even under fascism. This phrase ends up, explicitly or not, quite near
the conservative ideology of Volksgemeinschaft (the distinctive identity
of a people) and, more specifically, the thesis of collective guilt.
But who would contend that those who fought fascism from the
underground or the antifascists who were condemned to prison and
concentration camps share in this guilt? Who would expect them tobe
ashamed of their actions? Of course, they made political mistakes by
not having found the right way to put a stop to fascism. In this sense
one could also speak of a joint guilt (as did the appeal of the German
Communist party on July 11, 1945). The joint guilt of the victims,
however, is obviously on a different level from that of those who were
actively involved in initiating and carrying out the policies of fascism.
Thus it is necessary to name more precisely the forces and interest
groups responsible for fascism. Even the thesis of collective guilt,
which at first (for instance, in the American press) was an expression of
the inability to grasp realistically the social characteristics of fascism,
eventually became one of many ways in which the real power structure
behind fascism became shrouded. With this thesis the entire period of
fascism is viewed so nebulously that it is no longer possible to tell the
difference among the fascists, the antifascists, the leading decision
makers, those who followed their orders, and those who were hoodwinked by them.
From such a vantage point the thesis of collective guilt is hardly
different from the Führer theory (although it is usually based on
entirely different moral reasoning). Whether one claims that everyone
has to carry the same amount of blame or that everyone is equally free
of guilt (since only the Führer is guilty), there is no significant difference in these views. I would even dare to claim that the appeal to
finally close the books on the past will prevail all the more easily if the
right succeeds in convincing the general public that the question of
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guilt applies to "the Germans." Thus, to champion the thesis of collective guilt is likely to help further the right-even though the advocates
of this thesis are acting with honorable intentions.
Second, one must take into account those who grew up after 1945 or
were not even born until the 1950s or 1960s. These groups now
comprise the majority of the population. They are encountering traces
of the fascist past everywhere. There is hardly a town in the Federal
Republic that did not have a field station of a concentration camp or a
camp for forced labor, hardly a village where some inhabitants whom
everyone knew were not murdered or deported. Local histories-often
researched by volunteers or school dasses-have uncovered many
things the adult generation of that time had already pushed out of mind
and believed forgotten. lt was and is their own grandfathers and
grandmothers who lived through those years and whom the students
can consult as Zeitzeugen (contemporary witnesses).
We are dealing here not with crimes that are as distant to us as the
crimes of Nebuchadnezzar or Genghis Khan, in spite of what the
conservative ideologists would have us believe. Tue extent and the
methods of these crimes are, by all means, so singular in character that
they force us to make penetrating inquiries about how they could have
happened. Yet the fact is that the effort of conservative historians to
integrate fascism into the "normal" course of modern history is already
part of the lesson plans in the schools of most of the federal states (by no
means only in those governed by the Christian Union parties ).
There has been a struggle over the correct view of history ever since
the rise of dass society and the consequent need to maintain the
privileges of power by means of, among other things, ideology. This
struggle has reached a new level since the ruling dass has been
confronted with organized forces in the form of a workers' movement,
which represents not only a social-economic alternative, but also an
intellectual and moral alternative that has developed its own world
view, giving the struggle a goal and a sense of direction. Tue fact that it
was possible for the ruling dasses to defend their ideological hegemony
over the correct interpretation ofhistory until 1918, and then after 1919
gradually to win it back, contributed to fascism's ability to establish
itself and achieve its political goals.
This struggle over historical questions did not, of course, come to an
end in 1945. lt has also represented for the history of the Federal
Republic a significant impulse for the wide-ranging altercation over the
interpretation of the world and humanity and over the path the Federal
Republic should take. Conßict over history is thus a political conßict. lt
is taking place whether we are conscious of it or not. lt is better to be
conscious of it, because only they can we effectively intervene in it.
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For anyone who is at all interested in historical questions-and there
are many, not only in academic circles-the question as to which side of
this Historikerstreit is correct is highly relevant. Here the conservative
historians have obviously been unsuccessful. Their critics have been
able to show conclusively that, for one thing, they have disregarded the
most basic ground rules of historical craftsmanship in order to arrive at
their results. Second, it is not the case that new scientific results are
under examination; these are simply new assessments, which have
been reached, in part, by means of abstruse speculation. Finally, these
new assessments are in reality quite old, namely, the ones propagated
by neofascism for decades.
While the untenability of its scientific claims has never been a reason
for Germany's guild of historians to revise its position, the defeat of the
conservative historians is nevertheless significant. Not only the established left, but also the liberal and perhaps even some of the conservative sectors of the general public will be much more skeptical
from now on when "recognized historians" present their "scholarly"
judgments about German fascism. Democratic and liberal historians
must nevertheless confront the revisionists with ever more careful
research and analysis of the past to enable a new generation to shape
the present and the future to their own liking.
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After Nazism: Antifascism and
Democracy in Dachau, 1945
Tony Barta
On May 8, 1945, World War II ended with Nationalist Socialist Germany's unconditional surrender to the Allies. That has not, until
recently, been an occasion for commemoration in West Germany. But
each year, in the last days of April or in early May, at a special site, a
group of men with a special bond have met to commemorate a day of
special significance for them. From Poland, from France, from Italy,
from East Germany, from Czechoslovakia, from all the countries occupied by Hitler's armies, old men, in dwindling numbers, have come
to Dachau, to the Appellplatz of the former concentration camp, to
remember the day of liberation. Some of the men spent twelve years
imprisoned in this camp or elsewhere in the system that spread out
from Dachau. They, of course, and others arrested as the original
opponents of the Nazis, did not come from Poland, or the Soviet
Union, or from Austria: every person sent to a concentration camp
before 1938 was a German citizen. Whether Communists (the largest
group) or Social Democrats, they sustained themselves with the belief
that the defeat of the Nazis would bring a new beginning in which the
solidarity of the left would be the basis of a progressive democracy. The
story 1 want to tell here concerns the hopes of these men on liberation
day 1945 and what happened to them in the first year of the Allied
victory over fascism. 1
Most of those who spoke of the Hitler dictatorship in terms of
"fascism" were Communists. Their belief that they had recognized
more clearly than anyone else what fascism was, and against whom it
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was directed, was supported by the number of their comrades the
regime had imprisoned. Anti-Nazis might oppose the dictatorship;
"antifascists" were engaged in a more historic struggle. With the defeat
of Hitler's Reich the dark night of reaction was over; everywhere in
Europe the men of the left who had played leading roles in the
resistance to the Nazis stood at the head of the liberators. Everywhere
Communists expected, and for a time made, political gains. The situation in Germany after the war was different, however. The Germans
were not liberated, they were conquered. In the eastern part of their
truncated country that would mean the establishment of a Communist
regime in a new state under Soviet protection. In the western zones of
occupation there was also to be a new state, founded on liberal and
democractic (as well as anti-Soviet) principles, and under American
protection. Dachau, being in the zone originally occupied and governed by the U. S. Army, was a microcosm of this evolution. There we
can see the principles of the conquerors of N azism being converted
into the practices of the successor West German state. lt was talking
about what happened there with those disappointed men who still call
themselves antifascists that led me to reßect more closely on a transition they have long perceived as critical.
lt is not a transition to which historians have paid a great deal of
attention: we will probably always be more fascinated by what took
place when the Nazis came into power than by what happened when
they lost it. The aftermath as been discussed mainly in terms of Allied
policy and the division of Germany into two states when the Allies fell
out. In both East and West Germany the emphasis is on the opening of
a new chapter rather than the closing of an old one. Or else it is
assumed that the old one simply did close with the defeat of N azism in
1945-as in very important respects it did. However, just as it is more
illuminating to look at the Nazi "seizure of power" over a period of
months, and perhaps best in one place (as W. S. Allen does), it is
instructive to follow the Nazi fall from power over several months, and
again in one place. 2 The place, Dachau, has become a symbol for what
happened when the Nazis took over; that gives it a special interest after
their fall, too. Just as we can see the seizure of power as "a coup d' etat
by installments" directed at eliminating the socialist threat from German life, it becomes evident that the liberation from Nazism entailed
(at least in Dachau) a remarkably parallel elimination of the threat from
the left, though this time by very different means.
The difference in means can hardly be overemphasised-democracy
rather than violent dictatorship. But we should not lose sight of the
ends. If the most important thing about National Socialism was its
guarantee to remove the left threat to majority conceptions of social
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and individual interest-and it undoubtedly was-it makes sense not
to close the campaign with Hitler's bullet in the bunker but to pursue it
at least into the denouement of 1945-46. That places the question of
the historical failure or success of National Socialism in a rather different perspective. 3
No one in Germany was thinking of the historical success of National
Socialism in April 1945. There had been more than five years of war,
which ordinary people had continued only because they had no power
to stop it and because they were constantly reminded of the terrible
retribution advancing toward them from the East. The propaganda
pictures of Soviet atrocities were stark. When so many men had diedfathers, husbands, brothers, sons-should it have been so that their
families would end like this? There was no alternative but to continue,
simply continue.
Rosel Kirchhoff had grown up in Dachau. In 1944 and 1945, as a
student in Stuttgart, she helped serve meals to the survivors of the
terrible Allied raids. She noticed that the people no longer cried as
they took their food amid the rubble and watched the bodies of their
sisters or their parents being dug out. They were no longer capable of
responding with grief, and they did not care about defeat. When the
Wehrmacht finally began to disintegrate at the end of April, Rosel
hitched a ride home to Dachau. lt looked, she remembers, just the
same as it always did. Though M unich, only seventeen kilometers to
the south, was almost as badly bombed as Stuttgart, in the old market
town on the Amper river it could have been peace time. 4 The local
newspaper no longer appeared but in the last issues life can be seen
going on as usual, in the small print of personal notices under the large
print rhetoric of the war:
Business notices: Johann Fischer and son, farm equipment. Closed from
27.12.44 to 2.1.45 for stocktaking.
Employment: Housemaid required for hotel-restaurant in Dachau. Opportunity to learn cooking. Factory seeks cook for foreigners' canteen.
Exchange: Pram, ivory, good condition, for accordion, 3 or 4 chord.5

On April 29 the end was obviously near. American guns could be
heard not very far away. The Schutzstaffel (SS), so prominent in Dachau
for twelve years, had ßed, leaving behind huge storehouses of almost
every conceivable commodity-spirits, cosmetics, cigarette papers,
leather, fabric, canned foods-things ordinary people had not seen in
years. Many were still out on the streets with armloads of Italian cloth

292

Radical Perspectives

or oxcarts of French champagne when the first American soldiers
appeared.
They came like cats, silently, on their rubber soles. 6 Strange creatures in their greenish overalls and curious helmets, they fanned out
among the houses and started to requisition billets. Their armored
vehicles rumbled through the town, down the hill, and across the river,
in the direction of the concentration camp. From inside the camp the
prisoners heard shooting. Their wait was tense. Many had already
gone, forced into a "death march" to the south, and it was known by
those remaining that Hitler wanted no concentration camp prisoner to
fall into Allied hands alive. When the helmet of the first American
soldier appeared over the gate there was cheering and immense relief.
Before long the ßags of all the imprisoned nationalities were ßying over
the camp.
lt is significant that the euphoria of liberation was celebrated not in
the town itselfbut largely by foreigners in that other Dachau which the
local community had always felt was fastened on to it as an alien
growth. lt was assumed in the town that these foreigners, the liberators
and the liberated, would now have the say in what was to happen. Only
a few people, in the first days, had the presence of mind to sense that
key moves in determining the political future of Bavaria-and these
people were still as much Bavarian as German-would be made early
in the rule of the outsiders. Whether the hitherto dominant community values of the conservative majority were reasserted or whether
radical departures were allowed to get under way would depend (or so
it was then thought) on this first struggle for inßuence. In Dachau the
contending forces were tobe represented by the American commandant, Captain Malcolm Vendig, his chief German administrative official, Landrat Heinrich Kneuer, and the leader of the antifascist resistance, Georg Scherer.
Everyone in Dachau said 1 must try to talk to Georg Scherer, though
some thought he would not talk very willingly: "He doesn't have
anything to do with politics these days." To members of his generation
on the left he was clearly something of a folk hero and even conservative townspeople spoke of him with affection and respect. People
who could never get themselves to utter the word "antifascist," and did
not particularly admire him for spending six years in the concentration
camp or for leading Dachau's only armed resistance against the SS,
recalled his decency, energy, and fairness in the difficult days after the
war. Nobody had a bad word to say about "der Scherer Schorsch." So
when, on a weekday evening, 1 succeeded in seeing him-even in his
seventies he was very busy running his clothing factory-he was very
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much as I expected to find him: shortish, vigorous, straight to the
point, more comfortable in shirt sleeves than in his business suit. He
thought he would complete the interview more efficiently in his office
than in his home, so he led me through the back garden to the rear
entrance of the big building, whose front facing the Münchener Strasse
bears the name "Bardtke und Scherer, Kleiderfabrik." Under the harsh
factory office lights, surrounded by fabric samples and racks of winter
coats, he told me in a few sentences about his arrest, his release, the
rising at the end of the war. He did not expect to be asked about his
earlier life: that was not part of the history of which he was the
recognized custodian. He was uncomfortable, outside his field, because at that time in his life there was nothing remarkable in his
experience. He had gone hungry, he had worked hard just like everybody else. A childhood in Dachau meant severe and crowded schooling, a kind of poverty that was normal and therefore not unhappy in
retrospect. You remembered things like being sent to buy beer-by
the jugful, not by the bottle. You had a ten-minute run up to the pub to
get what was called "three-quarters"--just short of a litre. On the way
home you always drank a bit off the top and then ran water into it so
your father did not notice. His early life, he insisted, was typical for
working-class people of his generation.
Georg Scherer was eight when World War I broke out. lt was the
summer holidays and he had been sent to work for a farmer at Pippinsried, twenty-five kilometers away. On August 1, 1914, coming
home from the fields at midday, the workers were met by people telling
them to unhitch the horses and park their wagons across the road to
hold up the French advance. The roadbock stayed there all through
dinnertime, but at one o' clock the French still had not come so the
horses were hitched up again and everyone went back to the fields.
That was his last memory of summer. The four long years of war were
years of grim struggle for most families. In his view, Dachauers who
knew only World War II, when Germany could draw supplies from all
of conquered Europe, had no idea of deprivation. Even the years of
hardship afterward were luxury in comparison.
The euphoria of going off to fight for the Fatherland did not last long.
When Georg's father went, immediately on the outbreak of the war, his
mother was left alone with four small children. Georg was the eldest
and became joint breadwinner with his mother. While she worked at
the gunpowder factory down on the ßat to the east of the town, Georg
spent half of every day working for a farmer, half going to school. The
farmer kept an ox in his barn where the family lived in Dachau, just off
the Mittermayer Strasse, and had a field down on the Moos. Georg had
to cart feed from the field to the ox every day and was paid with a loaf of
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bread. On Wednesdays, because that was the day the peasants ate
noodles, he would put on a knapsack and go from farmhouse to farmhouse, begging for bread. The pieces he brought home were cut up and
dried out so that there would be something for soup in the winter. The
other staple was potatoes found by picking over the fields after the crop
had been harvested. Wheat fields also yielded a few gleanings, small
ears of wheat that he would sometimes eat where he found them. In the
evenings the children would climb over the walls of the convent to steal
apples, which would also be stored for winter. Georg as a provider had
to do what was necessary: ''After all, 1 had four mouths to feed." What
his mother earned in the powder factory and what she received as a war
pension did not go far. Each morning she sent him off to school with a
single slice of bread, leaving the loaf marked with a notch. When he
came home he carefully cut himself another slice and marked the loaf
off again with a ruler. After he finished his day's work for the farmer he
cooked the evening meal-almost always bread, soup, and potatoes.
There was never any question of meat: the family went right through
the war without eating meat.
At the end of the war Georg had his first taste of the political violence
that was to consume Germany in the aftermath and to fasten itself, as a
very synonym, on Dachau. When the White Army arrived in 1919 to
give the coup de gräce to the Bavarian Räterepublik (Soviet Republic),
the twelve-year-old Georg was rather thoughtlessly wearing a red
cockade. A White soldier hit him so hard in the face that he was
knocked into the dirt. Georg's father came back from the war and found
a job emptying powder from surplus shells in the explosives factory.
One day there was an accident and he was blown to bits. The workers'
factory committee decided the least they could do was to help the boy
learn a trade so he too went into the factory-now called "Deutsche
Werke"-apprenticed as a fitter and turner. When the Deutsche
Werke closed down in 1923 (Himmler was to find another use for all
those empty barracks ten years later) Scherer was forced to clear
ditches, pick hops-anything to support the family through the inßation. Then in April 1925, when money was again worth something, he
was taken on at the Bavarian Motor Works in Munich. He held his job,
on good pay, through the depression. He bought a motorbike, got
married, became a father. There was no need for him to rock the boat.
He was, however, a socialist. Even if his main interest was sport it
was always, since 1922, workers' sport. The affairs of the Dachau
Workers' Sports Association were his major intere·st: he was a committee man andin 1928 he attended the Workers' Olympics in Frankfurt.
In 1931, when the Socialist Workers' party (SAP) was founded, to the
left of the Social Democractic party (SPD), he was attracted by its call
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for a united working-class front against the Nazi challenge. He was not
the kind to give up either his sport or his politics just because the Nazis
had taken over government, dissolved the unions, and closed down the
Workers' Sports Association. Despite pressure at work he refused to
join any party organization; in 1935 he even distributed some anti-Nazi
pamphlets given to him by one of the foremen. He should, he said,
have known better. He was taking some children for a gymnastics
lesson, practicing for a Christmas show, when they came to arrest him.
He was interrogated, beaten, and finally thrown into the concentration camp--a world removedJrom the Dachau he had lived in up
to now. For six years he knew only the society of imprisoned comrades
and SS brutality. In 1940 he was appointed Lagerältester, responsible
for all prisoners. In this time he not only learned what solidarity
between comrades was; his name became virtually synonymous with
it. Released in 1941 in order to be sent to the eastern front he found a
job in a small munitions plant. He evaded an almost certain death by
being able to stay in Dachau, but there was almost no one who would
talk to him. He was now not a Dachauer, but a "KZler"-one of those
from down there. By 1945, however, it was precisely this unique dual
identity that was to give him his extraordinary role. Fearing that the SS
might commit fort.her atrocities before the Americans arrived, and
determined also to show that not all Germans had to be liberated from
fascism by foreign arms, he led an armed insurrection in Dachau on
April 28. The rising, coordinated with resistance action in M unich, was
at first successful-the Rathaus was taken, the Volkssturm sent home.
lt was then bloodily suppressed by the SS. Three Dachau workers and
three concentration camp prisoners lost their lives. 7 Their bodies were
left lying in the town square as a warning.
Scherer and others fled to the woods in the west. He watched,
appalled, as the Americans rounded up the few Germans who attempted to make a fight of it and shot them down against the wall of a
church. The next day someone came to fetch him. He was called before
the American commandant and appointed deputy Bürgermeister. "I
didn't especially want to do it," he told me, "but there was no-one
else.
There were huge practical tasks to be accomplished. There were
6,000 dead from the camp tobe buried; 27,000 survivors tobe fed. A
typhoid outbreak had to be contained by strict quarantine. Transport
and labor had to be organized, food requisitioned, prisoners awaiting
repatriation accommodated. For all these tasks the Americans relied on
local organization. In the camp there was the discipline of the prisoners' national and international committees. They knew that to survive the liberation continued solidarity and patience were necessary.
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Outside the camp there was chaos, and something like a "great fear."
Forced laborers of many nationalities, but mainly Russians and Poles,
were in the streets, along with concentration camp prisoners from
outside work brigades. Not all the prisoners, as some people in Dachau
still remind you rather too quickly, were political prisoners. There were
common criminals. People in Dachau feared vengeance; in fact the
worst crimes were thefts of radios and bicycles. The main hardship they
suffered was the wholesale requisitioning ofhousing by the Americans.
Max Gorbach was one of the prisoners outside the camp. His experiences in the hotel trade in Switzerland and Canada had helped make
him a Communist; he had smuggled anti-Nazi material across the
border into Germany and he had fought fascism in the Spanish Civil
War. After he was handed over by the Vichy French to the Gestapo in
1941, and sent to Dachau, he had been put to work in the Wülfert
meat-canning factory in the town. Now, at the liberation, he immediately became one of the organizers of provisions and of labor.
Several times in the account Gorbach gave me (he supplied rather
more detail than Scherer) the same phrase crops up: "Es war notwendig Ordnung zu schaffen." The first necessity was to create order. To
stop plundering, restore essential services, create the basic conditions
for the continuance of organized life. There is some irony in this: the
Communists had often enough mocked the Majority Social Democratic
party (MSPD) for keeping things going at the end of World War 1.
Ebert had said, "We were in the truest sense trustees in bankruptcy of
the old regime." Were not men like Gorbach, disciplined Communists,
becoming trustees in bankruptcy for the society that had produced
National Socialism? Certainly at the time it was not the most pressing
consideration: these men felt they simply had no choice but to step into
the breach. They had to act. First of all they had to act out of solidarity
for their comrades. The supplies, transport, and housing they organized were in the first instance for their fellow prisoners in the camp.
Second, in the special case of Scherer, he had to act out of solidarity
with his own community. He was a Dachauer, and even if many people
in Dachau had not wanted to know him after he was released from the
camp, there was now a job to be done and he was the only one who
could do it. Someone had to organize fuel for the bakeries and hospitals
in the coming winter, to find workers and provisions for turf-cutting
brigades. Someone had to organize labor and transport for the burial
parties if disease was going to be contained.
This emergency organization, of course, was never nonpolitical.
Quite the contrary. These men had not spent twelve years in unflinching ideological opposition to National Socialism for nothing. They saw
themselves as Widerstandskämpfer, resistance fighters. In fact they
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believed, not without some reason, that they were the only Germans
who offered determined resistance to Hitler. Further, some among
them were theoretically as well as experientally educated to understand the historical phenomenon of fascism and they had fairly dearcut ideas about the political tactics to be adopted at the moment of
fascism's defeat. These tactics they now put into effect. 8 They divided
Dachau, then containing some 22, 000 inhabitants, into seventeen districts. In open meetings on the streets they called on people to take
part and everywhere committees of seven members were elected. This
meant that all the things that had tobe clone could be organized on the
broadest possible base. There was an attempt to establish the broadest
political base as well. To coordinate the seventeen districts a committee
of eight was chosen: two Communists, two Socialists, two from the
former Bavarian Peoples' party-the populist Catholic conservative
party of the majority-and two without party affiliation. To this committee they gave the name Anti-Fascist Action Committee (AFA).
Such committees-generally known as ''Antifa"-sprang up almost
everywhere in Germany when the Third Reich collapsed. They were
purely local and uncoordinated creations that, as a U. S. intelligence
report put it, set out "to mobilize all the politically healthy forces in the
population so as to create the conditions for a new, democratic Germany." In the best early assessment of the antifascist initiatives, the
report pointed out that under the circumstances it was naturally "the
old working dass, the group in German society most active in opposing
the Nazis, which makes up the overwhelming majority and also most of
the leaders." Whether the leaders were from the German Communist
party (KPD) or the SPD depended mainly on the qualifications of
available personnel. "The Communists have nevertheless taken over
the leadership in the majority of groups because on the one hand their
commitment is especially strong and on the other hand the idea of the
united front accords exactly with their current programme." Many
older Social Democratic leaders were suspicious of the Communists
and more interested in their own party organization. They may also
have doubted that antifascism could build on the social base the Communists thought had been created by the war, with sections of the
middle dass moving to the left. Whether the basically working-dass
antifascist organizations could win over the middle dass remained tobe
seen. "At the moment," commented the report, "the mass of the
middle dass regards these groups constituted mainly of workers with
traditional mistrust. " 9
In Dachau, of course, there was an additional reason for suspicion.
The concentration camp gave extra strength to the antifascists-they
were able, for instance, to issue a duplicated broadsheet almost daily-
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but with regard to the local population it was not an advantage to
belong to such a notorious concentration of Communists, or to be
associated with the threatening horde of foreigners. The broadsheet,
called "The Anti-Fascist," was subtitled "Voice of the Germans from
Dachau," partly to identify it among the publications of all the other
nationalities. 10 However, in Dachau town it was not enough to be
German; even more than elsewhere people wanted reassurance that
the voices listened to would be from their own community.
The AFA in Dachau was not a coterie of outsiders. The initiative and
organizing energy came from men of the left, some of whom had been
in the camp, and the presence of the camp undoubtedly strengthened
their hand. The AFA itself was not made up of former prisoners; as in
other towns it was set up as a citizens' organization across party and to
some extent across dass lines. Because "antifascist" was a term used
mainly by Communists it was difficult for middle-class people, whether
compromised with Nazism or not, to take the word into their mouths.
Some Catholics believed their anti-Nazi credentials were as good as
any Communist's; they believed cooperation was both necessary and
politic. Such men as master glazier Syrius Eberle served both to
reassure the conservative majority and to give them a voice.
The AFA was prominent and energetic. lt could claim to be representative. However, it had no authority of its own. lt started the postNazi reconstruction working, street-by-street, home-by-home: making
lists of all Naziparty members, evicting them from houses, enrolling
them for compulsory labor-"you put in the next three days with your
oxcart shifting bodies; here's a gas mask"-but the AFA could issue
orders only so long as it was permitted to do so by the U. S. Army.
The American army had fought its way across Europe in a crusade
against Hitlerite evil. lt took over responsibility for governing the
largest part of occupied Germany with a basic prejudice that all Germans had more or less supported Hitler and that they should therefore
be treated as a conquered rather than as a liberated people. Apart from
the consequent "nonfraternization" order-a directive crying out for
subversion by battle-weary soldiers-policy was still in the process of
being formulated when the military government detachments took
over the towns and districts assigned to them. They had the Handbook
of Military Government, whose status was rather uncertain, and two
general aims: to remove Nazisand to "get things going." 11 These aims,
as they hardened into the twin pillars of American occupation policy,
did not necessarily contradict each other but they did involve deciding
which Germans really were Nazis, which groups should have inßuence
on local policy, and who should have executive authority in administra-
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tion. Tue obvious groups to turn to, in the first instance, were the
antifascist committees.
In the first days there was agreement on priorities and effective
cooperation. With regard to the first American objective, "denazification," the antifascists had already led the way. Even before the occupation authorities issued their 132-question Fragebogen to all people
over eighteen, the AFA in Dachau had started compiling lists and
distributing handwritten questionnaires. Their concern-and in this
almost all Germans, as distinct from almost all Americans, agreed-was
that the real Nazis, those who had promoted and profited from the
regime, be identified. Nominal membership in a Nazi organization
they saw as unimportant. Their realism about this, and the neighborhood structure that let people decide who was a real Nazi and who
was not, did not impress the Americans; they persisted in an inflexible
policy of excluding all party members from even minor official positions. When denazification, again on American insistence, was given
over mainly to ad hoc German courts, the Spruchkammern, in which
those with the right connections could produce exonerating testimonials (Persilscheine) while "little Nazis" were fined or deprived of
their livelihood, most antifascists quit in disgust. Because it affected so
many people personally, denazification was to remain one of the most
resented consequences of Germany's defeat and few people distinguished the commonsense practice of the local antifascists from the
rigid directives of the occupying power. 12
Even as they attempted to purge every branch of administration of
Nazis, the Americans knew they had no option but to rely on Germans
as administrative personnel. Yet they never seriously considered basing
the continuing operations of military government on the antifascist
committees. Rather more curiously, in view of what had happened in
the transition to the supposedly democratic and republican administration after 1918, the American practice of installing experienced civil
servants was never seriously questioned by the antifascists. They seem
to have recognized it (in perhaps a too-German way) as inevitable even
though they knew that trained administrators were unlikely to be men
of the left. Tue result, at least in Dachau, was an element of "dual
power" that indeed had striking parallels with the situation in 191819. 13 There developed almost immediately a competition for inßuence
between those who believed they were nurturing a new democracy in
the cooperative effort of antifascism and those who regarded the experiment with deep suspicion.
Tue competition was not, in the first instance, for the allegiance of
the German people, but for the ear of the sole authority, the occupying
power. Captain Malcolm Vendig, its representative in Dachau, was
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described by one of the men who served under him, later a minister in
the Bavarian government, as being "filled with what could only be
called missionary zeal for the democratisation of Germany. " 14 Working
together with Georg Scherer and the Anti-Fascist Action Committee
seems to have posed few problems for him in the beginning. But local
administration was not to remain a matter for local decision. The
military government, while not yet formally recognizing any Bavarian
entity, decided to restore the pre-Nazi administrative system and on
May 7, the day before Germany's unconditional capitulation, Vendig
was given (or himself selected-the exact process is obscure) a German
chief executive who immediately managed to make that surrender
seem more conditional than it appeared. This man was Heinrich
Kneuer, described by everyone who knew him as "a professional administrator of the old school." He had served in a lesser position in
Dachau from 1921 to 1930; during the war he held an important post in
the State Food Supply Office in M unich. As district administrator, or
Landrat, he was now answerable for the entire Dachau district administration. His deputy, Josef Schwalber, the future minister, later called
him "ein Mann des Rechtes"-a man of justice and right (not of "the
right," though he was that, too), a man "for whom the principles of the
rule oflaw had become second nature-a quality which, in a time when
no one knew what rights and laws were still valid, could not be valued
too highly. " 15
The Landrat was directly responsible to the commandant and was
required to report every day. A full transcript of these meetings is
preserved in the state archives in M unich. 16 lt is a fascinating record
not only for the information it contains about the turmoil of the immediate postwar situation but because it shows how in that situation two
men with completely different ideas about politics and German history
see themselves as deciding the direction of Germany's political development. In theory and in practice they thrash out whose conception
of democracy should prevail; in the end, of course, it is the practice and
not the theory that counts.
From the outset Landrat Kneuer took it as his duty to educate the
American as to German realities. So from the first day he complained
about the antifascist committee, which he considered not only a challenge to orthodox administration but a threat to the social order-and
the political order he believed necessary to maintain it.
On May 14 Kneuer claimed he could not get on with registering the
foreigners-the main object of local anxiety-and the farmers out in
the villages were forming vigilante groups for their own security. 17
LANDRAT:

They have not been listed by their nationalities. Besides I
am being held up too much by these antifascist people.
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COMMANDANT: In what way?
They simply undermine all authority, decide against everyLANDRAT:
thing that they think might be bourgeois.
COMMANDANT: Who are they?
They are Communists. They want a Communist BürgerLANDRAT:
meister.
COMMANDANT: But who would they put forward?
Scherer. I had a talk with Dr. Linnmeier [the BürgerLANDRAT:
meister] on Saturday and he told me he would make way for
Scherer ... I asked him not to rush matters, but to let me
talk things over with you today, as I did not wish to be
pushed into any decision. Since yesterday I have been
informed that it is Scherer who is bringing confusion into
the population, he being head of the antifascist movement,
by making them work hard labor, worse than the Nazis ever
did.

Kneuer is outraged because his own wife, his children, his servant,
and his father (aged 70) have been asked to appear at 7:00 each morning
to work as laborers. Tue commandant does not seem to think it would
hurt them to put in some hours with a shovel but in the end he gives
the Landrat authority over labor matters. "lt is your affair to get the
house in order-1 want to see the results."
Some days later Kneuer tried to have the antifascists dissolved, as in
Munich, on the grounds that they were a political party.
COMMANDANT: I have not looked at this antifascist movement we have here
as a political party ... they may be helpful in ferretting out
people, that's why I have not taken action so far. I can't see
any definite political direction there.
LANDRAT:
But the name!

All through June, Kneuer was relentless in his attempts to have the
antifascists suppressed. Though he did not say so in so many words, he
seems to have seen the AFA structure as something not far removed
from soviets and he was determined to end the situation of dual power.
By the end of the month he was largely victorious. Though the commandant refused to veto the publication of antifascist propaganda in the
Amtsblatt, the weekly official bulletin, he called in Herr Eberle,
chairman of the AFA, and told him that he wanted the Landrat to have
authority in all matters.
Still the Landrat's anxieties about political developments were not
resolved. Some days later he managed to engage the commandant in
discussion of fundamental political principles, on which he considered
himself an authority. He perhaps got more of a debate than he expected.
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LANDRAT:
COMMANDANT:
LANDRAT:
COMMANDANT:

LANDRAT:
COMMANDANT:
LANDRAT:

COMMANDANT:

LANDRAT:

COMMANDANT:

LANDRAT:
COMMANDANT:

LANDRAT:

COMMANDANT:

lt won't do to listen too much to the people.
Well, we do in the United States.
Tue voice of the street never determined any political
con victions.
That is one of the reasons why Germany never had a good
democracy. I maintain that the Naziparty came into power
because the majority of the people wanted that govemment. lt was a perfectly legal government.
I believe that a certain dass of intellectual men should run
the government of the state.
Well, here you have it, you do not want democracy but
what we would call autocracy.
Tue mass is stupid and if it is permitted to run the government, nothing good would come from it. Tue government
should educate the masses.
We don't look upon the people or the public as a mass, we
look at him as an individual. We think that every individual
has his rights and we think that the rights of the individual
are as strong as the rights of the state.
Oh no, this is not what I meant. I have written books on
politics. I mean to indicate that there must be one body
which represents the government.
That's Hegel's thesis on political philosophy. Hegel considers the supreme body the state, we don't. When did you
ever have liberalism in Germany?
In the Weimar Republic.
Look here: when does Germany's history start? Say from
the year 500 to 1919. All right, you had a steady growth.
That means 1,500 years against the 15 years of the Weimar
Republic and most of that freedom was only on paper. I
think that Dr. Kneuer is a perfect example for a German
democracy. He has the theory, but in practice he does not
even know what democracy really is. He wants democracy
but as soon as people are to have something to say in
politics he will maintain that they are incapable of governing themselves. We don't think that any group of people are
that smart that they should tell other people what to do.
My idea of democracy is different. I have studied democracy and I still believe that a certain dass of clever men
should run the government for the other masses. I am
against all sorts of dictatorship.
Well, to me it seems your democracy will be a dictatorship
of a certain group of persons. That's enough on democracy
today.

The Landrat's most pressing concern was not with principles. His
real worry was that under the cover of democratic principles the
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Communists lurking within antifascism would take up positions from
which it would be hard to shift them. A case in point was whether
Communists would be eligible for appointment for the new gendarmerie.
COMMANDANT: If you keep Communists out of everything they are going to
go against you. I think a man should not be barred from a
position because he is a Communist. I do believe that we
should not engage an undue proportion of Communists in
the Gendarmerie, but they should not be excluded. The
Communist party in the United States is perfectly legal,
but they never can get too many votes.
LANDRAT:
Communism in America or England is an altogether different thing than in Germany. Germany is a poor nation
and open to Communism.
COMMANDANT: Well it wouldn't be so poor if it did not start a war every
twenty years.
LANDRAT:
Communism among the Gendarmerie won't do. We have
had o.u r reports coming in from the whole Landkreis. Now
if we have men who are working against us [Communists]
we can't rely on these reports.
COMMANDANT: I don't want communism to establish a dictatorship as you
say in Germany. But understand me: if you put a cup of
water on the stove and take away the lid it will never boil
over. As soon as you put the lid on it will boil over. As far as
appointing the new gendarmes goes, they should be picked
as to whether they are good gendarmes and not as to
whether they are Communists.
LANDRAT:
Now we are clearing this country of National Socialism and
bringing Communism in. Dictatorship again. National Socialism is no <langer to us any more, it is dead. Communism
is the future <langer.
COMMANDANT: We won't have another dictatorship. Because you forget that
we have a military government, you can afford these experiments in your government now, because you have the
ultimate control of the military government.
LANDRAT:
I am afraid that America will get tired of getting order into
European affairs. They are liable to up and leave it to
someone else who may be more interested.
COMMANDANT: Military government will stay here for a few more years to
come. For a couple of years you do not have to worry.

In fact, Kneuer did not have to wait two years to have his mind put at
rest. His speculation about America was shrewd, yet he turned out to
be wrong. He turned out tobe wrong about democracy too. On July 21
the Commandant read him a list of names. They were to constitute a
new town council, which according to Vendig would be the first town
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council in postwar Bavaria. There were eight men of the right-mainly
affiliated to the old Bavarian People's party (BVP)-and eight men of
the left, five Social Democrats and three Communists.18
This signaled the end of the political moratorium the Americans had
continued for twelve weeks after the collapse of twelve years of Nazi
repression. The beginning of democratic politics, which Kneuer
dreaded and Vendig was determined to establish, could not be far off.
Already in July the Western powers had begun to authorize political
parties-the German Communist party (KPD) was the first-and in
September they began to organize in Dachau. In November the first
party political statements-under the authority of the Landrat and the
military government-appeared in the Amtsblatt. There were three
equal columns: for the Social Democratic party, the Bavarian Volksbund or People's League, soon to merge with the new Christian Social
Union (CSU), and the KPD.
Tue statements, as is the way with political platforms, offer few
surprises. Tue SPD appealed to history, its credentials as the longeststanding democratic party in Germany; the KPD soldiered on with its
strategy: "the firm unity of all antifascist, democratic, and progressive
popular forces." Most interesting, though, is the pitch made by the
Bavarian Volksbund:
1. The Bavarian Volksbund is the organization recognized by the Dachau
military government which has made it its aim to embrace all those
opponents of National Socialism who don't subscribe to the SocialistCommunist common action program.
2. lt is a solely local organization of the town and district for, on the one
hand, making preparations for the coming Bavarian Landespartei [the
party that would express the particularist interest and special character
of Bavaria] which will fulfil the basic principles below; on the other
hand for representing these principles in public life in the locality until
such time as that party is founded.
3. The fundamental principles of the Bavarian Volksbund are:
(a) The building up of a state and social order out of the powers of
Christianity which has been the foundation of Western civilization for
two thousand years and which gave a large proportion of the active
fighters against National Socialism the strength to reject its horrible
and corrupting teachings and methods.
(b) Attainment of a true democracy by rejecting all militarist and
dictatorial efforts no matter of what kind or color.
(c) Creation of a powerful Bavarian state as guarantor of the common
good and cultural particularity of the Bavarian people.
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(d) Setting up a social community life recognizing the worth of the
human personality. The equal rights of all before the law, without
difference as to status or property. Help for the economically weak. 19

Everybody recognized the Bavarian Volksbund for what it was: the
successor to the old Bavarian Volkspartei, which could not be directly
reßoated because in the end it, and its voters, had not resisted Nazism
as firmly as its rhetoric implied. Catholicism was initially an effective
inoculation. lt wore off when economic interests were threatened and
the very order of society appeared to be imperiled by the increase in
Communist strength during the depression. Even though the Volksbund's political demands now included "cleansing Bavaria from National Socialism in every form," ordinary Naziparty members might be
excused for thinking that "exclusion of all real National Socialists from
political, economic and cultural life; punishment of the criminally
guilty" did not apply to them. They might also have noted that though
workers' interests as represented in unions would be recognized, the
state would exercise economic leadership "according to the sole criterion of the interests of the Volksgemeinschaft"-a collectivity impossible to purge of its Nazi connotations. Not every former Nazi would vote
for the party farthest to the right. Some turned to the SPD, a few even
to the Communists, who consistently defended the "little Nazis" while
demanding that the powerful and the profiteers be called to account.
However, it could be expected that those whose strongest political
instinct was for conservative stability would declare themselves as soon
as they had the opportunity.
The American reports repeatedly referred to the apathy of the Germans, and without doubt many were now past caring what happened
politically: their immediate preoccupations were food and shelter and
the fate of missing husbands and sons. They were not, however, devoid
of political opinions and when, at American insistence, they were asked
to express them, they made completely clear where they stood. In the
first turnout of the new democracy, a poll for an elected town council
held on January 27, 1946, the people of Dachau voted 59 percent for
the Bavarian Volksbund, the only party, as it proclaimed, for those who
did not want to vote Socialist or Communist. The SPD got 29.4
percent, the KPD 11.6 percent. The Volksbund's vote was six percentage points higher than the combined BVP and National Socialist vote in
March 1933 (29.2 and 24 percent respectively); the SPD's was almost
exactly the same; the Communists' was down by a fifth from what they
got under Hitler (14. 7 percent). 20
What had happened to antifascism? The short answer, one vigorously
disputed by antifascists, is that it had been superseded by democracy.
In a free expression of opinion the people had declared themselves
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firmly against taking any risks. They preferred known party loyalties.
Because this result could have been foreseen, the Communists in
particular had appealed against holding early elections. They needed
time to negotiate their common-front program with the other parties,
and to convince the electorate that their policy of cooperation and
nonrevolutionary democratic consensus was genuine. Goldhammer,
secretary of the Bavarian Communist party, was energetic in his efforts
to set up a bloc of democratic parties after the model of the Russian
zone and indeed would have preferred to participate in a Bavarian
government under CSU founder Josef Müller, rather than under the
socialist Wilhelm Hoegner. 21 The Communists, their ranks terribly
thinned from the struggle with fascism, knew that their only chance of
continuing political inßuence was inclusion in an alliance-a governing
alliance-of all progressive parties. Elections were bound to drive the
parties into contests that the Communists could not hope to win: they
therefore had tobe put off as long as possible. "Several of our people
were ministers, and they made a good job of it, too," Max Gorbach told
me. "But the Americans did the same here as in Greece; they scheduled elections too early, before the process of democratization had
taken hold."
The military government definitely intended to thwart the left by
insisting on early elections at a local level. From the beginning, as it
reported in August 1945, it saw the antifascist committees as posing
"something of a problem." On the one hand there was "their evident
desire to play a part in denazification activities and local community
self-help": they contained "democratic elements only too anxious to
cooperate with MG" whose services in tracking down Nazis and getting
things going locally were thoroughly useful. On the other hand the
committees were "almost wholly ofleftist orientation. " 22 The responses
of American authorities at the local level varied from the cooperative
caution of Vendig in Dachau to the outright banning of the largest and
most active committees on the grounds that they were contravening
the prohibition on party political activity. Obviously, though, prohibition of party politics could only be an interim policy for the most
ideologically democratic of the victors, especially when parties were
permitted, under license, in the Soviet zone. Once parties were authorized (on a local level in August, on a statewide basis in November) it
would be better to hold elections quickly before the left could organize
the "alliance of progressive forces" that was the key to Communist
hopes. Writing in 1950, at the height of the cold war, and with the West
German government successfully established under Konrad Adenauer,
General Ludus Clay was straightforward about why, as head of the
American military government, he had pushed for early elections.
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"The overthrow of the Nazi regime which had ruled Germany for
twelve years left a political vacuum. This had tobe filled promptly with
democratic leadership while we were still there to prevent the growth
of new totalitarian systems under different names. 1 was convinced that
we could neither hesitate nor delay. "23
Early elections, then, had a threefold purpose. First, they would
encourage the silent majority, known to be conservative, to come out,
as it were, after the debacle of conservatism Hitler had lured them
into. Second, they would force the progressive parties to compete with
each other before they had time to consolidate a bloc. Third, since such
a grouping might give the Communists access to government office for
an extended period it was important to isolate them from the outset.
The results of local council elections in Dachau showed that this
never-quite-explicit purpose of the poll was a complete success. The
Communists had worked successfully with Social Democrats and even
conservative Catholics in the Anti-Fascist Action Committee. They
were included in the Bavarian government headed by the Socialist
Hoegner, and even though they knew of Schumacher's determination
to keep the SPD in the western zones out of a merger with the KPD
they had hopes for a united front at least in Bavaria. Now the parties
had gone into the election not only separately but as rivals and the
consequences of this were drawn dramatically at the first meeting of
the newly elected town council. The Bavarian Volksbund had won
twelve seats, the SPD five, and the Communists two. The new burgermeister was of course from the majority-Josef Schwalber, about to
make his career in the CSU. Scherer, when he had been the center of
antifascist inspiration and organization as deputy burgermeister, had
not been thought of as a party man. For the election, though, he had to
choose whether he would stand as a Socialist or a Communist. lt was
not a choice: he would stick with his comrades from the concentration
camp resistance. The Communists tried to capitalize on his popularity-and no doubt to an extent succeeded-by running the slogan
"Wählt die Liste Scherer": vote for the list headed by Scherer. Now,
when his position of deputy burgermeister again had to be filled, the
SPD decided not to support Scherer. They put up their own man and
secured the numbers to have him elected. Subsequently they explained it was the democratic thing to do. If the people had wanted a
Communist as deputy burgermeister they could have voted for his
party in the first place. 24
Failure to win the Socialists to an electoral alliance was the death
blow to antifascism. In explaining why they did not vote for Comrade
Scherer, the SPD made much of the fact that the parties were still
separate at the national level; they could not move ahead of the national
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leadership. For another two months it was still possible to hope that the
considerable rank-and-file sentiment in favor of closer cooperation
between the working-class parties would have concrete results. In
April 1946, a merger was achieved in the Soviet zone. The SPD in the
West, however, chose as its leader Kurt Schumacher, a most vehement
opponent of amalgamation. In the Soviet zone the Communists never
contested an election on their own; at local and state elections held
later in the year it was the new Socialist Unity party (SED) that
represented the combined left. 25 The KPD, like the SPD, henceforth
existed only in the western zones. lt was not allowed by the occupation
powers to use the name Socialist Unity party because, as the SPD
pointed out, in the west the parties were not unified. An application by
the Communists to change their name to "Sozialistische Volkspartei
Deutschlands" was also disallowed. They had to face the electorate
isolated as the same old KPD.
This outcome was everything the Communists had sought to avoid.
The hope of both local antifaseists and the party leadership had been
that common programs and in effect consensus politics would secure
them much more broadly based support. The line Walter Ulbricht
brought back from Moscow in 1945 appealed for nothing more radical
than "the completion of the bourgeois democratic revolution which was
begun in 1848." Part of the aim was to give the working-class parties
time to recover and organize in a more united way; there was also a
genuine belief that "people from all sections of the population who
jointly suffered in the prisons and concentration camps have become
friends and will now, too, continue to stick together and work together." Ulbricht believed the Communists could form a progressive
alliance even with people from the middle classes because "profound
social changes have taken place as a result of Hitler's war. Men and
women from bourgeois circles have been thrown out of their customary
ways of life. "26
This view-until elections reminded people that their customary
ways of life went together with customary political allegiancesseemed to have some foundation in Dachau. Though basically a working-class initiative and the key organization of the radical left, the AntiFascist Action Committee clearly had strong middle-class representation at its meetings and as the Communists reminded voters at the time
of the 1946 elections, they themselves had taken the lead in bringing in
people like Eberle, in order to secure the cooperation of "positive
antifascist elements" from among the middle classes. "Georg Scherer
didn't ask, 'Are you a Communist, a Social Democrat, or from the
Volkspartei?' He asked, "Are you an antifascist and willing to help clear
up the Scherbenhaufen (heap of rubble) that the Nazis have left us?"'
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That the middle classes-Qverwhelmingly Catholic, commercial, and
conservative--might gain more from the cleanup and the return to
normality than the left seems not to have been considered. As Scherer
told the very first meeting of the AFA on May 8, 1945, what he
proposed was simply a necessity: the bringing together of all positive
antifascist forces in Dachau as the indispensable basis for forming
policies that were both healthy and possible for Dachau; rooting out the
remnants of fascism; and reestablishing a normal civilian life--"ein
normales bürgerliches Leben. "27

Bürgerlich does not only mean "civilian": in fact, only in the extraordinary circumstances of 1945 could it have that meaning. "Bourgeois," "civic," and "respectable" are all more important connotations
of bürgerlich, though no one word translates this key term of German
politics adequately. lt denotes, in ways Scherer certainly did not have
in mind, that large class sector of German society whose economic and
social standing can be more or less affiuent and status conscious, whose
attitudes can vary between righteous philistinism and relatively relaxed
liberalism, but whose politics have the reliable common ground of
being conservative in an antisocialist sense. In Dachau, where even
under the monarchy there had only been a couple of aristocrats, and
where the ideology of the center and the right was cemented into
Catholicism, bürgerlich denoted a political culture that embraced not
only the genuine Bürger, the old-established craft and trading families
clustered round the church, the Rathaus, and the marketplace on the
top of the hill; it also linked naturally with the rural conservatism of the
surrounding farmers. Since the beginning of the century this majority
had been in passionate ideological combat with the incursions of socialism, spreading out from M unich through the unionized workers
living down on the ßat, and the insistent campaigning of the Social
Democratic party.
Socialist electoral strength increased steadily in Dachau (though
never in the outlying villages) and for a time after World War 1 the
Socialists had a majority on the town council. They may have thought
that this phase--their leader, Burgermeister Böck, could claim to come
from one of the oldest settled Dachau families-integrated them into
the dominant political culture. To an extent it did, but such a historic
shift toward democratic norms could not be consolidated under the
unfavorable conditions of the Weimar Republic. When the crisis came,
the local Socialist majorities-whether in whole states such as Prussia
or small towns such as Dachau-were overwhelmed by a radical reaction that exploited the values, norms, and rules of the old political
culture to give Germany a revolution in political institutions. The old
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political system (in both monarchical and republican variants) had not
been without its successes in representing social interests ideologically
and in reconciling them pragmatically. Under the impact of successive
disasters even its forms could not survive the long ideologized but now
desperately polarized consciousness of interests.
With the ruinous inßation a fresh memory, and as the lines of
unemployed and gains in Communist strength threatened further social upheaval in the depression, the political culture of conservativism
found a place for Nazi radicalism. 28 More and more of those who saw
themselves, and the society in which they wanted to continue living, as
bürgerlich saw their political choice as being ever more starkly between socialism-not necessarily any longer Social Democracy-and
National Socialism. Hitler persuaded an increasing number of Germans, many more than voted for his party, that the Communist threat
demanded the most resolute action. "Fourteen years of Marxism have
undermined Germany. One year of Bolshevism would destroy Germany." For Germany to experience political and economic revival, "a
decisive act is required: we must overcome Germany's demoralization
by the Communists." 29 What Hitler's decisive action meant became
clear after the Reichstag fire and his subsequent election victory. On
March 20, 1933, Himmler announced the setting up of the first concentration camp, outside Dachau.
The anti-Communist majority in Dachau, and in similar towns
throughout Germany, still felt beleaguered in 1945. The war was over,
Hitler's twelve-year rule was ended, but they had not been delivered
from their enemies. They were occupied by foreigners they had not
been trained to regard as liberators: those who did regard the Americans as liberators were a highly suspect and threatening assortment.
Some of them-Poles, Russians, and other "displaced persons"
(DPs)-were an immediate <langer. Others, notably the antifascists
who had emerged from the camps together with the Poles and Russians, were bent on reordering their world in ways ordinary peaceable
people had gone to extraordinary lengths to resist. For anti-Communists, as well as antifascists, should the awful sacrifices of the Hitler
years have been in vain? Most people remembered vividly what had
happened after the last war: the revolution born out of defeat seemed to
be the start of all their troubles. Then too there had been workers'
committees and eventually-if briefly-a "Council Republic"
(Räterepublik) antithetical to their conceptions of social and political
order. They had had to mobilize then, with much less equivocation
than in 1933-the Nazis after all had not been the most savory alliesand now that the Nazis were out of the way they had no doubts at all
about the kind of society they wanted to protect and the political
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institutions appropriate to it. They did not want antifascist committees;
they wanted regular town councils. They wanted parties with which
they could clearly identify their interests, not "alliances of all democratic and progressive forces" that would most likely be against their
interests. They wanted things very much as they had been.
The Americans did not want things as they had been. They set out to
effect a revolution in German history. Malcolm Vendig in Dachau was a
very articulate spokesman of their cause. lt may be true, as an Americn
historian (Gimbel) who studied the experiment in another place (Marburg) has remarked, that they "proceeded without a conscious theory
of artificial revolution:: they did not know how to turn a fascist society
into a democratic one. 30 But then nobody else did, either. The two
obvious policies were to remove fascists and to bring in democracy.
Unfortunately, the first of these policies, denazification, was not altogether a satisfactory basis for the second. Niethammer has called
denazification "the American surrogate for anti-fascist reform," and he
shows why this purging of people rather than institutions was only a
partial and contradictory success. lt was radical enough to take the
wind out of the sails of genuine antifascists; it was not radical enough to
prevent the return of rehabilitated Nazis or those who had gone along
with the Nazis (Mitläufer) into positions of authority in structures that
continued to function as before. lts main effect was probably, as
Niethammer says, to provide many West Germans with the idea that
any possible responsibility they might have had for fascism and its
consequences was more than compensated for-and disposed of-by
what they were subjected to in the discriminatory and corrupt procedures of denazification. 31
In the first years of the occupation many more people were concerned with clearing themselves through these proceedings than with
political reconstructon. When those most actively interested in political reconstruction-the antifascists-were squeezed out, their disillusionment, as Gimbel says, "permitted the assumption of leadership, at
the local level, by others whose political, social and economic views
bear a striking similarity to those of the leaders of the same community
who proved so ineffective in the face of the Nazi challenge. "32
That is carefully worded-and dead right. lt reminds us again that it
was the occupying power alone that had authority in the situation and
must therefore bear a large part of the responsibility for encouraging or
thwarting political tendencies. lt also reminds us that the tendencies
themselves were not made in America; they were home grown, the
product of communities with much more political experience than has
generally been recognized. Though we can blame the Americans for
cutting short the experiment in antifascist democracy, for reverting too
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speedily to the institutional forms of the established political culturetown councils locally, aligned with political parties nationally-it is
difficult to imagine that any genuinely democratic reconstruction of
post-Nazi Germany could have had a different result. Political cultures,
especially those with a highly ideologized history in which the connection between social interests, societal conceptions, and political allegiance has been tested and reconfirmed, are not so easily dislodged.
Tue terrible trials of violent political conßict and total war are as likely
to strengthen them as subvert them. For most people the disaster of
National Socialism would have become total only if it had ended in the
Communist takeover that they had put their faith in Hitler to save
them from in the first place.
Tue antifascists, who had experienced the worst that desperate majorities can do, never fully understood this. Toward the end of September 1945, when Communists and Socialists had · been working for
almost five months in close cooperation with their more conservative
fellow townspeople both on the AFA and the appointed town council,
they held their first political meeting. In the Schlosssaal, Dachau's
largest and most prestigious location, 700 people applauded the speakers from both parties who spoke of the sacrifices their members had
made in the fight against fascism, and the need for all to cooperate in
removing the remnants of Nazism and in political renewal. Even those
who shared responsibility for what had happened could atone by
joining in the work of democratic reconstruction. Tue report in the
Amtsblatt ended with an appeal: "Looking beyond the differences of
opinion of differing world views we offer you our hand, for the building
up of a new, antifascist, truly democratic Germany. "33
For the antifascists, that was the only possible appeal; for those to
whom it was addressed it said everything wrong. No one in the conservative majority believed that either Social Democrats or Communists had changed their own world views; even among Social
Democrats there was suspicion of what, in a Communist world view,
the "building up of a new, antifascist, truly democratic Germany"
might mean. 34 Cooperation in practical matters, in what antifascists
hoped was a radical political departure, had been possible precisely
because politics had been suppressed. Once democracy allowed the
expression of different world views, the world view of the majority, for
whom all the connotations of antifascism would only invoke mistrust,
would be bound to prevail. What the idealism, energy, and fairness of
men like Gorbach and Scherer had achieved was the reconstitution of
that political world that would unequivocally reject them.
lt has often been said that Marxists have little conception of culture,
that their phrases about consciousness and "false" consciousness
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obscure for them the real ways social values and individual expectancies form each other. I think however, that ordinary Communists in
West Germany had and still have a strong sense, from their experience
rather than from their theory, of how powerful a political culture can
be. A majority is a majority because its values, expectations, conceptions of legitimate political order, are publically recognizable and
privately shared. The antifascists, by the more heroic, historic qualities
of their biographies, had demonstrated their distance from the majority; what makes them so impressive also made them politically ineffective. If the majority won again, and not more heroically than in 1933, it
was because of a socially and culturally grounded political solidarity
that antifascists had every reason to regard as formidable.
lt was this previously mobilized, historically tested solidarity and not
just ideology that Kneuer represented at every opportunity to Vendig.
Vendig, with not much more enthusiasm than Scherer, had to recognize its power within the first few weeks. Scherer, representing an
alternative solidarity, would also have to be the representative of its
defeat. The victory of the Landrat in his dealings with the commandant, of the Bavarian Volksbund and then the CSU in one election after
another, were all democratic victories. Those who had suffered and
struggled for twelve years to bring democracy to Germany had to
accept what they had won.
In 1949, with the Federal Republic established, the cold war mounting to its pitch, a few weeks before the explosion of the Soviet atomic
bomb, the first elections for the new Bundestag were held in West
Germany. In Dachau the Communist party, perhaps wanting to recall
the hopeful days of 1945, again hired the Schlosssaal for an election
meeting, but just before the meeting began a "troop" of 150 DPs,
mostly from Hungary, arrived in a body. As soon as the chairman rose
to speak he was shouted down, the stage was stormed, and the candidate, Egon Hermann, ßed to the Rathaus, from where he was rescued
only by the intervention of local police, state police,and American
military police. Hermann declared that he would not speak in Dachau
again and "freely," as the report says, accepted the offer to place
himself in "protective custody"-"sich in Schutzhaft zu begeben. "35
The word must have had resonance for Hermann and others in Dachau:
"Schutzhaft" was what the Gestapo placed you under when, without
going through the courts, you were to be put away in a concentration
camp. There were of course to be no more concentraton camps; that
solution had been tried. Hermann was simply escorted into Munich,
and in the election the KPD received only 5. 7 percent of the vote
anyway. Just to be sure, on November 22, 1951, the democratic gov-
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ernment of West Germany began proceedings to have the Communist
party banned. 36
Former Landrat Kneuer, 1 do not doubt, was pleased. (His tenure of
office had been cut short by the discovery that he had given misleading
answers in his denazification questionnaire.) What Malcolm Vendig
might have thought 1 can only guess. lt has not been possible to trace
him through the U. S. Army. Max Gorbach would have been angry but
philosophical. At the end of 1945 he married the woman who had been
his fiancee twenty years before. Burgermeister Scherer officiated.
Scherer was also a realist. When he could not persuade the town of
Dachauto use the sewing machines from the SS tailoring shop to start a
municipal undertaking, he took them over himself. Down on the ßat,
beside the road to Munich, exactly, as he told me, where the last 1919
revolutionaries were shot down by the Whites, he built a factory.
There, late at night, surrounded by the bolts of material and racks of
winter coats, he recalled how long ago, on the eve of his departure, the
American Commandant had said: 'Tve only known one genuine democrat in Dachau, Herr Scherer. And that is you."
If "Dachau" means anything in terms of Germany's political development it means the failure of the left to secure democracy between 1918
and 1930 and the determination of the right to have clone with challenges to entrenched interests once and for all. Hitler pledged to be
the destroyer of Marxism and Dachau was set up to put this final
solution, not the more famous one, into effect. lt was assumed in 1945
that he had failed. Later, people could point to the German Democratic Republic and say: so much for destroying Marxism. From where
Georg Scherer looked back, half a lifetime after Hitler's defeat-well,
he must have wondered.

Notes
A German version of this essay appeared in Dachauer Hefte 1. Jahrgang, Heft 1, Die
Befreiung (Dachau: Verlag Dachauer Hefte, 1985).
The essay owes much to many people. 1 am particularly grateful to those who
contributed generously in interviews and to friends who suggested improvements in the
writing. My greatest debt is to my mother, Hedy Barta, for her many hours of work in
turning often indistinct recordings into readily consultable transcripts.

1. According to Bruno Bettelheim's review of the various estimates, at least 11 million
people and possibly twice that number died in the concentration camps; at best
530,000 survived at the time of Allied liberation. If, at the beginning of 1938, there
were fewer than 30,000 prisoners, mainly in Dachau (6,000) and Sachsenhausen
(8,000), the old political prisoners must have been a small proportion of the survivors. However their solidarity and the positions they established in the camp
administrations enabled them to increase not only their own survival chances but
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with the huge increase in the Nazi vote during the depression (the Communist peak
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